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Abstract 
Recent research has questioned the commonly accepted notion that transformational 
changes are instigated when compelling evidence establishes a clear sense of urgency 
for action. Following these intriguing results, this thesis set out to investigate why some 
leaders avoid taking action even when a crisis is threatening their systems. For that 
reason, a sophisticated interdisciplinary approach was designed, which allowed insights 
from the discipline of psychology and the study field of management to be reviewed 
and meta-synthesized into a conceptual framework that expands the myopic paradigm 
of urgency and thereby elaborates the process of change instigation.  
The findings suggest that once a crisis is faced, leaders engage in an emotional change 
process during which the compelling evidence is appraised in reference to business 
goals and ego-commitments. These appraisals give rise to negative emotions as they 
inform the individual of the encountered threat. As a result, a self-protective regulatory 
mechanism is triggered, the operations of which determine the future of subsequent 
appraisals and thus the response to be adopted. That is, action might be taken to secure 
business continuation (adaptive), or the leader could trigger defence mechanisms 
(maladaptive) and thus respond in ways which might go against organizational 
interests, but protect the threatened ego. 
Although the theorization has not yet been empirically validated, the thesis bears 
significant contributions to knowledge. It demonstrates that urgency a) is a necessary 
yet insufficient element of the emotional change process; b) provides a superficial 
explanation of how transformations are instigated. Its logic is grounded in the outdated 
assumption that human beings are purely cognitive, cold and rational processors of 
information. Instead, the suggested framework emphasizes the important role that the 
unconscious hot cognitions and the emotional experiences play. Ultimately, through 
the analysis of more than 1200 multi domain sources, this theorization provides a viable 
alternative to the current urgency paradigm. It facilitates the diagnosis of defensive 
appraisals and paves the way for the development of tools to assist the agents of change. 
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1 What does it take to instigate change? 
1.1 The diachronic appeal for organizational change 
Change always has been one of the most alluring topics for thinkers. Its philosophical 
emergence dates back between 535 BC and 475 BC, when the ancient Greek 
philosopher Heraclitus stated that “Everything flows, nothing stands still”. Through his 
observations in nature, he inferred that the world’s elements naturally change and that 
nothing should be considered constant (Osborne, 2003:99). Since Heraclitus, various 
thinkers have stressed the importance of perceiving change as part of nature (Muessig, 
1969), a view that became commonly accepted after the beginning of the 19th century, 
when “naturalists” changed mankind’s mind-set of a static existence (Bakerjian, Wick, 
Benedict and Veilleux, 1993:1-3). Indisputable proof of the business world not being 
an exception to this rule is shown by the last decades' increase of change initiatives in 
business as well as academic research on change (Mills, Dey & Mills, 2008:11).  
Specifically, the phenomenon took the magnitude of an “epidemic” and authors have 
written that change has become a fashion in which organizations blindly follow pre-
packaged change programmes (Mills, 2003:88). Despite the criticism on the discipline 
and the fallacy of believing in magical best practices for change (Hallencreutz & 
Turner, 2011), companies, as the new change-theory trend advocates, have to consider 
change as nature’s causality and manage within it (Bruke, 2006:15). It is clear that in 
order to survive and prosper within the contemporary unprecedented pace of change 
(By, 2005) organizations have to infuse a change mentality in their systems, which 
develops a new role for the academic community. That is, to engage more with 
organizations in developing new knowledge that will facilitate change and accelerate 
performance within a turbulent and highly evolving environment (Mohrman and 
Lawler, 2012).  
1.2 Research focus: Instigating transformational changes 
1.2.1 A dichotomous typology & the planned approach to change 
There are many types of organizational change and various ways to categorize them. A 
widely used typology has been offered by Burnes (1996), who proposed that there are 
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two general approaches for managing change: planned and emergent (see also Botten, 
2009:501; Erasmus, Van Wyk & Schenk, 2004:731; Farrell, 2000)1. As it was depicted 
above, organizations operate in a continually changing environment, in which stability 
could be considered as an unforgivable mistake. In that sense flexibility and 
adaptability to environmental changes, enabled by a continuous improvement 
philosophy (Kaye and Anderson, 1998), is necessary. However, at the same time, issues 
like, dramatic environmental events, potential opportunities or problems and adverse 
business results, or even the inadequacy of continuous incremental changes (Weitzel & 
Jonsson, 1989), could make an emergent approach insufficient, and impose the need 
for radical business changes (Kelly, 2008:124). The complementary nature of these 
approaches is evident (Burnes, 2004a) and leaders have to choose how they will 
manage a potential combination (Livne-Tarandach & Bartunek, 2009).  
This work neglects the emergent and focuses on the planned approach. There are some 
special qualities that distinguish this approach to change. Osborne and Brown 
(2005:91) claim that planned changes (PC) are deliberate and linear, and aim to 
premeditatedly change organizational aspects (Stickland, 1998:81). Generally, the 
main assertion of the PC approach is that an organization’s stability is interrupted, most 
of the times dramatically and externally (Weick & Quinn, 1999), by change which is 
disruptive in nature (Sharma, 2006:9). In that sense, and given the fact that PCs are 
“top-down” driven approaches (Mehta, 2009:66), top management’s role becomes of 
major importance. It is their responsibility to anticipate environmental changes and take 
planned and managed steps, which usually reflect a process (Levy & Merry, 1986:3), 
to face the adversities and prosper when those changes take place (Banerjee, 1995:294). 
However, despite PCs’ proactive nature, it should be stated that organizations could 
react to unanticipated events in a planned manner, which still refers to PC approach 
(Lewis, 2011:37). 
1.2.2 Categorize planned change based on their magnitude 
There are plenty types of PCs. One key dimension to categorize them is the magnitude 
of change, which mainly refers to the impact of change in organizations (Cummings & 
                                                 
1 Operational definitions for delimiting the work's basic research-terms and establishing 
a common understanding (Any, Jacobs, Sorensen & Razavieh, 2009:35) concerning 
change, organizational change and change management can be found in appendix 1. 
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Worley, 2008:31). According to this dimension, the analysis of various typologies of 
change depicted that there are three general types of PC, including minor, major and 
transformational (table 1). 
Source Minor Impact Major Impact Transformational 
Golembiewski, Billingsley, & 
Yeager, (1976) 
Alfa Beta Gamma 
Keen (1997:127) Step-Shift Radical Fundamental 
Anderson & Ackerman 
(2010:51) 
Developmental Transitional Transformational 
Lorenzi & Riley (2002:182) Operational Strategic Cultural 
Huy (2001) 
Work 
Processes 
Beliefs 
Social 
Relationships 
Harigopal (2006:43) Directional Total   
Nadler & Tushman (1989) Adaptation  Re-creation    
Cummings & Worley 
(2008:63) 
Incremental Quantum   
Table 1. Types of planned change (Magnitude Characteristic) 
Transformational changes are essential shifts in organizational philosophy (Lorenzi & 
Riley, 2002:182), which aim to fundamentally change an organization, its culture and 
practices, as well as the way it sees the world (Anderson & Ackerman, 2010:51). Major 
changes are large-scale changes as well. They require aggressive actions at a strategic 
level (Nadler & Tushman, 1989), but, in contrast to transformational ones, they leave 
an organization’s basic principles intact (Keen, 1997:127). Minor changes, on the other 
hand, are changes at a lower level like in the work processes and operations (Lorenzi 
& Riley, 2002:182), which aim for improvements in productivity and quality (Huy, 
2001). 
1.2.3 The need for transformations as a spark for this research  
This work focuses mainly on transformational changes, which have been an area of 
concern for various management thinkers. A notable example is Deming (1985) who 
opposed the current way of management and preached an urgent appeal for its 
transformation. His vision was to see a world where malevolent competition would 
have been replaced by cooperation, so that everybody could win (Deming, 1992).  
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While the specious good results of western world’s economy during his era made the 
realization of the need for transformation difficult (BBS, 1992), today's crisis vindicates 
his argument that Western management needs to change. Similarly, Juran, another 
quality thinker, could also be considered as a pioneer of management. Unlike Deming, 
who was a philosopher proposing transformational changes, Juran was a practitioner 
who tried to teach managers better ways of management in a system familiar to them 
(Evans and Lindsay, 2008:107). His thinking was mainly captured in Juran's trilogy, 
which, despite the differences in the conceptual steps, is similar to the approach 
followed for managing finance (Juran, 1999:2.5). Despite the less transformational 
character of his theories, very few companies have embraced them as Japanese did 
(Juran as cited in Leitner, 1999). Apparently improvement as well as refusal to adopt 
new practices could lie in major changes as well.  
Despite the fact that the approach of Japanese management could provide solutions to 
problems of the previous (Drucker, 1971) as well as the current century (Landesberg, 
1999), the examples, cited above, do not aim to presage a work focusing on its adoption. 
Yet, these problems demonstrate, what becomes more apparent in our days, that both 
practices and theories used to manage business need to be rethought (Ghoshal, 2005). 
This need is apparent even to management gurus, who have both “nourished” and 
“been nourished” by the current management approaches. For instance, the economic 
crisis of our system made Porter, a leading western management guru (Gordon & 
Turner, 2000:310), propose that business and academic communities should rethink 
the way businesses operate (Porter, 2011). His main proposition is that companies 
instead of focusing on profits should create a shared value both for and in cooperation 
with society. While Porter’s (2011) recommendations are not as revolutionary as those 
previously described, they take into consideration the dramatic consequences which 
resulted in the financial crisis and are expected to lead to changes not only in the private 
but also the public sector as well (Diamond & Liddle, 2012).  
Senge, another distinguished Western scholar, proposed a new industrial revolution 
towards sustainable and innovative business models (Senge, Carstedt & Porter, 2001). 
He developed the five disciplines of a learning organization and conceptualized them 
in a model for transforming a traditional organization into a learning one (Senge, Ross, 
Bryan, Roberts & Kleiner, 1994:45). According to Senge (1993), management thinking 
should be transformed with the aim of developing and managing such organizations, 
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which are believed to be the only ones that can survive within the contemporary 
turbulent environmental conditions (Limerick, Passifield & Cunnington, 1994). Despite 
the phenomenally different approach, his ideas have been widely influenced by Deming 
(Senge, 2006:xi), and arguably could constitute a breakthrough for current management 
practices, which unfortounatly has not yet occurred. Ultimately, theoretical 
advancements like the previous, along with many more that exist in the literature or 
developed in practice, can improve business performance and lead organizations and 
systems towards a sustainable path. The big question then, which also developed the 
inaugural idea for this work, is “why are there not more companies like that?” (Moreno 
& Gitlow, 1999).  
1.3 Instigating change: The current Paradigm 
1.3.1 A review of process based change models 
The call from various thinkers for change that has been discussed above gives a 
perspective to problems with PCs other than the investigation of potential causes of 
failure during the change process (i.e. Eaton, 2010; Lucey, 2008). That is, it orientates 
the research’s focus a step "before" the very beginning of the PC effort and triggers the 
interest in identifying how transformational and major changes can be instigated in first 
place. In this respect, Ranjekar (2007) argued that it is not clear what induces large 
scale change in nations. Similarly, in organizational settings there are many ways in 
which the existing equilibrium can be disrupted and, consequently, a period of 
transformational change be initiated (Gersick, 1991). Nevertheless, no matter what the 
exact trigger might be (see. Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986) the core question 
within the scope of this research concerns how this trigger is realized as well as 
cognitively (see below) treated in regard to the initiation of a PC process. Ultimately, 
an appropriate basis from which, to commence this research is a holistic review of the 
existing PC models’ initial steps in order to identify what is recommended for 
instigating change. 
As it can be seen in the following table, twenty-three models were identified, many of 
which have been developed under the umbrella of Organizational Development (OD). 
It should be noted that OD is, also, described as a form of PC (Burke and Bradford 
2005:10), the primary aim of which is to understand and facilitate the process of PC in 
organizations (Marshak, 2005:21; Macredie & Anketell, 1998:7). Since it is widely 
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accepted that OD is synonymous to PC (Amado & Amato, 2001:38; Kondalkar, 
2009:3; Margulies & Raia, 1978:51; Ramanathan, 2009:30), it was decided that 
theories referring to it are indeed related to the needs of this work and, therefore, they 
were included in the literature review.  
Model Year “Urgency” step in each model Reference 
Lewin's 3 step model 1947 Step 1: Unfreeze "Felt Need" Lewin (1947:210) 
The Phases of planned 
change 
1958 
Phase 1: The development of a 
need for change 
Lippit, Watson & 
Westley (1958:131) 
The organizational-
change process 
1969 
Stage 1: Diagnosis (Realize 
potential Need/Problem) 
Lawrence & Lorch 
(1969:85) 
Dynamic Seven-stage 
model 
1970 Step 1: Scouting 
Kold & Frotiman 
(1970) 
A model for 
organizational 
Development 
1976 
Stage 1: Anticipate a need for 
change 
Donald (2006:14) 
Beckhard & Harris 
Change model 
1977 
Step 1: Defining the need for 
change 
Beckhard & Harris 
(1977:17) 
The CAP – General 
Electric (GE) 
80s 
Step 2: Creating a Shared 
Need (after appointing the 
change leader) 
Developed by  
Crontoville Company       
Garvin (2003:127) 
Enhanced Planning 
Model 
1985 
Change Process 1: Need 
Awareness 
Bullock & Batten 
(1985) 
 
The critical path to 
change 
 
1990 
Step 1: Mobilize Commitment 
to change through Joint 
Identification of Business 
Problems 
Beer,  Eisenstat, & 
Spector (1990) 
10 Commandments for 
change 
1991 
Step 1: Analyse the 
organization and its need for 
change               
Step 4: Create a sense of 
Urgency 
Jick (1991, in Jick & 
Peiperl 2011:216) 
General Model of OD 1993 
Step 1: Entering and 
Contracting 
Cummings & Worley 
(1993, in 2008:58) 
Kotter 8 Step 1996 
Step 1: Create a sense of 
Urgency 
Kotter (1996:35) 
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The change 
management process 
model 
1996 
Step 1:Establish the need to 
change 
Galpin (1996) 
A Process model for 
change 
1998 
Step 1: Recognition (of the 
need)                                                    
Step 2: Translate the need for 
change into a desire for change 
Hayes (2007:82) 
A framework for 
change 
2002 
Step 1: The idea and its 
context 
Mento, Jones & 
Dirndorfer, (2002) 
7-steps to Change 2003 
Step 1: Mobilize Energy and 
Commitment through Joint 
Identification of Business 
Problems & Their Solutions 
Luecke (2003:33) 
Leading Change 
model 
2006 
Phase 1: Create a Felt need for 
change 
Russell & Russell 
(2006:48) 
C-H-A-N-G-E 2007 
Phase 1 Challenge the current 
status 
Biech (2007:31) 
The ICBERG 
approach 
2007 Phase 1: Identify the need Mishra (2007) 
Carter’s model 2008 
Phase 1: Set Up for Success                                      
Phase 2: Create Urgency 
Carter (2008) 
A framework for 
change management 
2010 
Step 2: Establish a sense of 
urgency (after assessing 
readiness) 
Varkey & Antonio 
(2010) 
The action research 
model 
2011 
Step 1: Scouting                                                              
Sub Step 1: Awareness of a 
Need for Change 
Swaim (2011:198) 
Steps in Leading & 
Managing Change 
2011 
Step 1: Understand the need 
for change                                           
Step 4: Create a sense of 
urgency 
Ensaola & Atchley 
(2011:54) 
Recipe for Strategic 
Change 
2012 
Step 1: Establish Urgency for 
True Current Position 
Metzer & Vogel 
(2012) 
Table 2. Analysis of Change Models in their initial steps 
Logically, this number of models would entail variation regarding the necessary initial 
steps. Thus, it was essential to proceed to a deeper analysis in order to identify 
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similarities and differences between the models, as well as trends that have been 
developed throughout the years. For that reason, the coding process, which enabled 
isolation of the most important phrases within these steps was utilized (Burnard, 1991). 
More precisely, patterns were identified and therefore the affinity process (Cowley & 
Domb, 1997:170) was utilized to compile the phrases back into groups (app.2). 
Afterwards, the groups were linked with the change models themselves in order to 
facilitate further analysis. The results of this process are demonstrated in table 3 and 
will be discussed in the following section. 
1.3.2 Analysis of the change models’ steps 
In general, PC models support, some more explicitly than others, that awareness of a 
need or a problem is the first and essential step for a change program’s initiation. 
Everything starts when someone, at or near the organization’s top, identifies and then 
demonstrates to top management the need for change with the aim of persuading them 
to initiate it (Biech, 2007:31). The main premise is that the development of this “felt 
need” is the only moving force necessary to convince individuals to initiate change 
(Donald, 2006:14). Some authors propose that the essential awareness of the need 
should be followed by both a good diagnosis of the conditions ringing the bell for 
change and the formalization of an articulate visionary state (Beckhard & Harris, 
1977:17). In that sense change leader(s) should translate the symptoms into a coherent 
picture of problems, prioritize them and, given the constraints and potentials of the 
current state (Mishra, 2007), start building their solution plan (Lawrence & Lorch, 
1969:85). Then the vision is developed and the leading team both creates a sense of 
urgency among business’s population and proposes solutions, so that employees will 
accept change (Ensaola & Atchley, 2011:54).  
Different approaches contradict the previous order. The GE change model suggests that 
before the vision is created, the need for change should be both disseminated and 
understood by everyone within the organization (Garvin, 2003:125). The aim of this 
shared “felt need” should be to reduce resistance to change (Fulmer and Goldsmith, 
2000:71) and capture people’s attention by creating a sense of urgency (Russell & 
Russell, 2006:48). Authors have also proposed that the first step should be to enable a 
common diagnosis of the problem in order to foster the initial necessary commitment 
throughout the organization (Beer, et al. 1990). It has been argued that by letting people 
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wonder “why” and identify the reason for change a sense of urgency among the 
population will be developed (Luecke, 2003:33). 
   
Id
en
ti
fy
in
g
 t
h
e 
C
o
m
p
el
li
n
g
 
N
ee
d
  
D
ia
g
n
o
si
n
g
 &
 A
n
al
y
si
n
g
 t
h
e 
C
o
m
p
el
li
n
g
 N
ee
d
 
 "
U
n
fr
ee
ze
" 
- 
E
li
m
in
at
e 
In
er
ti
a 
D
is
se
m
in
at
e 
th
e 
C
o
m
p
el
li
n
g
 
N
ee
d
 &
 I
n
cr
ea
se
 A
w
ar
en
es
s 
In
fu
se
 &
 E
st
ab
li
sh
 U
rg
en
cy
 
E
n
fo
rc
in
g
 t
h
e 
C
o
m
p
el
li
n
g
 N
ee
d
 
S
u
b
je
ct
iv
e 
se
n
se
 o
f 
N
ee
d
 
R
eq
u
ir
es
 D
es
ir
e 
fo
r 
ch
an
g
e 
Lewin's 3 step model X   X           
The Phases of planned change -   X X      X 
The organizational change process - X             
Dynamic Seven-stage model X               
A model for OD X               
Beckhard & Harris Change model - X             
The CAP – General Electric (GE) -     X         
Enhanced Planning Model X               
The critical Path to change - X       
10 Commandments for change -   X   X X     
United Model for OD - X   X     X   
Kotter 8 Step -   X  X  X X     
The change management process model -   X     
A process model to change X             X 
A framework for change -  X            
7-steps to Change - X     X X     
Leading Change model -   X X X      
C.H.A.N.G.E. X        
The ICEBERG approach - X             
Carter’s model - X   X    
A framework for change management -       X X     
The action research model X              
Steps for Leading & Managing Change -       X X     
Recipe for Strategic Change -       X       
Times (Out of 24) 7 8 5 6 8 5 1 2 
Table 3. Matrix Analysis of Planned Change Models2 
                                                 
2 The symbol “X” indicates that the models mentions element. On the other hand, the symbol 
“-” indicates that the element is implied.   
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In every approach, identified in the literature, urgency seems to play a dominant role 
as an initial step. Jick (1991, as cited in Jick, 2011:216) seems to be the first one who 
introduced the concept of urgency as a step after the development of the vision and 
mainly focuses on the lower levels within the organization. However, Kotter (1995) 
highlighted the idea and constituted urgency as the major step in the change process. 
After his model (Kotter, 1996:21), which is probably the most reputable and influential 
step-oriented model in organizational change (OC) literature (Dunford & Palmer, 
2010:366; Lambert, 2008:431; Periyakoil, 2009), urgency was established as a major 
and inextricable initial step in the vast majority of change models. Indeed, according to 
Kotter (2008:13) it has to take place at the very beginning of every change program, 
even before a vision’s creation (Kotter & Cohen, 2002:27), and places its poor 
development as the number one reason for the existence of unsuccessful change efforts.   
Essentially, the aim of urgency is to overcome the problems of inertia and 
complacency. According to Kotter (1996:35), business as usual is not easy when there 
is fire in the place, since resistance might be reduced when people face a crisis (Daft & 
Marcic, 2009:306), like a bankruptcy (Jick, 2011:216). However, waiting for the fire 
is not the best practice and therefore change leaders should create crisis in order to push 
the urgency levels up (Kotter, 2008:142). The main concept is to disseminate 
throughout the organization a compelling reason for change by demonstrating dramatic 
and tangible evidence that both point to a new business direction and convince people 
that change is necessary to overcome the problems with the current paradigm (Varkey 
& Antonio, 2010). Even though the idea of creating an artificial crisis has been 
critically, morally and ethically challenged as well as characterized as a dishonest 
action (By, Hughes & Ford, 2016), the concept of urgency inspired authors to develop 
identical approaches (i.e. Metzger & Vogel, 2012) and state that change will not happen 
without urgency (Luecke’s, 2003:33). 
1.3.3 A combined approach of change’s initiation steps 
The review indicates that authors agree on what has been proposed by the so called 
father of PC Lewin (Pathak, 2011:327), that a “felt need” is an essential requirement 
for a change to take place (Burnes, 2004b). This felt need, in later models, is translated 
as a compelling need or reason, and its existence is mainly understood when the 
organization and its people experience a sense of urgency (Kotter, 1996:35). Despite 
the agreement, though, before any attempt to provide a common approach based on the 
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models, differences concerning when and where urgency should take place require 
clarification. More precisely, some models support that urgency should start from the 
higher levels of an organization (i.e. Ensaola & Atchley, 2011:54). In their view leaders 
analyse the environment and realize the compelling need, create a guiding coalition and 
a vision, and then develop urgency among employees and change recipients. Slightly 
different seems to be GE’s model (Garvin, 2003:127), which places the dissemination 
of the need first. However, this dissemination is only for capturing people’s attention 
in the first place and clearly doesn’t signify any difference in the underpinning logic 
that wants leaders to initiate the process.  
 
/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Change’s Initiation Steps 
Despite their slight differentiations, these approaches hide a widely accepted, and 
probably dangerous assumption for profound changes (Senge, 1999:10), that leaders 
are aware of everything that needs to be done and that such awareness is missing from 
lower levels (Bartunek, Balogun & Do, 2011). It might be true that the necessary power 
and holistic view for a change to occur lie most of the times at the top (Kotter & Heskett, 
1992:89). Yet, this doesn’t mean that either the spark for change or the solutions to a 
problem are always possessed by top leaders and key actors (By, Burnes, & Oswick, 
2011; refer to sec. 8.3 for further elaboration on this point). By extension, the current 
work accepts recent theorizations according to which the realization of a need to change 
may occur at any level of the organization (Moon, 2008; Piderit, 2000). Based on this 
Steps 
1. A change agent(s) realizes & then “diagnoses” 
the compelling need (insider or outsider). 
o Identifying the Compelling Need 
o Diagnosing & Analyzing the Compelling 
Need 
2. The compelling need is deployed among top 
executives (Urgency at the top). 
o Unfreeze – Eliminate Inertia 
o Disseminate the Compelling Need and 
Increase Awareness 
o Infuse &Establish Urgency 
o Enforcing the compelling Need 
3. The compelling need is deployed throughout 
the organization and the rest of the steps take 
place (Urgency is disseminated). 
Outsider 
3 
Insider 
1 
2 
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argument, figure 1 demonstrates the necessary steps for a PC to occur, as well as their 
sub-steps which constitute elements identified in the change models (table 2). 
While, philosophically speaking and mainly given an inside perspective, “a system 
cannot understand itself” (Deming, 1994:92), stability is not inevitable. There are and 
always have been individuals, belonging to the world’s minority, who profoundly 
question everything and chase to develop improved conditions. These individuals 
transform themselves from insiders to outsiders who due to their quality of being 
detached from the current status quo (Johnson, 1992) can realize the need for change 
(step 1). In the context of this work they will be called, change advocators (following 
Conner, 1993 terminology), and they could be external, for example a consultant or a 
university’s memeber who analyses a company’s specific problem, or an 
unconventional internal one (Kotter & Heskett, 1992:91) coming from any level within 
the organization. The change advocate, or the team of advocates, could either have a 
specific recommendation, which may be revised later on, or could have only a sense of 
what should be done, which will require a deeper diagnosis of the need in subsequent 
steps. Nevertheless, in both cases and given the top driven nature of PCs (Mehta, 
2009:66), the change advocate has to deploy the compelling need to the executive level 
to persuade them to authorize change (step 2). Then, the compelling need has to be 
spread throughout the organization (step 3), and the rest of the steps should follow 
(Kotter, 1996:21). 
1.4 Contextualizing the problem: The individual perspective  
George Bernard Shaw argued that the first step to change anything is to change your 
mind (Malhotra, 2005:42). In PCs this phrase acquires vast credibility, since in order 
for a change to occur, leaders have to change their beliefs regarding the status quo 
(Unfreeze in Lewin, 1947:210) and authorize it in first place. In that view this research, 
whereas it is about OC, should unfold on an individual-based perspective, and, for that 
reason, the Transtheoretical Model (TTM), which is considered to be the most important 
(Samuelson, 1997) and popular (Sharma & Romas, 2011:98) individual change model, 
was utilized. While its primary focus is on changing behavioural problems and 
promoting healthier habits (DiClemente & Hughes, 1990; DiClemente & Prochaska, 
1982; Prochaska, et al. 1994; Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcross, 1992), it has been 
argued that its individual stage-matched perspective could provide a better insight in 
OC efforts (Prochaska, Prochaska & Levespue, 2001). Indeed, Whelan-Berry, Gordon, 
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& Hinnings (2003) argued, after their research of an actual case, that the model 
facilitated understanding of the PC process. 
The model consists of five stages, but the focus of this research is on the first four 
(fig.2). That is to say from pre-contemplation, where the leader is unaware or ignores 
the need for change, till the very first point of action stage (red line in fig.2), where the 
leader modifies his thinking and is ready to initiate change (Prochaska, DiClemente & 
Norcross, 1992). The reason why this work doesn’t include the entire action step is 
because there could be factors, like increased costs or insufficient resources (Lehman, 
Greener & Simpson, 2002), which, despite leaders' desire to change, could cause issues 
with the change process. Those kinds of factors lie beyond this work’s scope since the 
main focus is on the barriers that prevent leaders from accepting and committing to 
change which come before the assessment of a company’s readiness for change at 
employee level and, the dynamically linked with this readiness, reshaping capabilities 
(refer to Jones, Jimmieson & Griffiths, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. TTM for Leaderships’ mental shift 
The steps recommended by TTM have been adapted in order to reflect the needs of this 
work. West (2005) argues that model’s stages are not clearly separated and suggests 
that someone has to drop dividing lines among them in order to categorize individuals 
into the stages. For eliminating this problem, which actually was faced during the 
construction of the adapted model, specific time attributes, according to which the 
model categorizes individuals to stages, have not been taken into consideration. Instead, 
the general idea behind the steps has been used and the logic of the model’s specific 
application to PCs has been adopted (Matheny, 2005; Whelan-Berry, Gordon, & 
Hinnings, 2003), in order to present and analyse the fallacies that are suggested within 
the scope of this work. 
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At this stage, it is essential to clarify that the scope of this research is restricted to the 
investigation of the individual’s mental processes associated with the decision to take 
action in the face of compelling evidence. Therefore, the organizational, political, 
social, cultural and economic contexts within which a leader makes a decision (Norton 
and Hunges, 2009:71) will not be considered. In addition, the group dynamics, such as 
influence from the board of directors or the employees, which also affect a leader’s 
decision to change (i.e. McNeese, Reddy & Friedenberg, 2014), have been explicitely 
excluded. It is acknowledged that these issues may play an important role on the 
instigation of a change process and suggestions on how future research could 
incorporate them in the analysis is offered at section 11.7.1.  
1.5 Developing the research questions: Fallacies in the current paradigm 
1.5.1 The essential yet insufficient compelling needs 
According to Kotter (2008:10) urgency is a state where individuals not only are aware 
of opportunities and hazards but also desire to produce change by behaving in a fast 
and focused way. Yet, Clark (2010:94) argues that it is common to see organizations 
reacting with complacency even if they face extinction. In fact, Donahue & O'Leary 
(2012) investigated NASA’s accidents and identified reasons that could cause 
organizational passivity, even after dramatic shocks are faced. Their work identified 
reasons that led to “compromised” responses by looking the change process as a whole 
and focusing mainly on cultural and structural characteristics of the company (see also 
Eaton, 2010; Lucey, 2008). One of the aspects that they mention and discuss is 
managers’ unwillingness to listen to the various concerns that engineers were raising. 
From a broader perspective, given the top-down approach of planned changes (Mehta, 
2009:66) this reluctance becomes a crucial issue that calls for further investigation. 
This is because, even when a compelling need is obvious for company’s employees or 
for external advocates, dismissive leaders can still see no reason to change and, 
therefore, adhere to the existing paradigm (Hoag, Ritschard & Cooper, 2002).  
In that context, Dunn (2009) wonders how could cognitive barriers that hinder senior 
managers’ adoption of innovative solutions be overcome? His model for implementing 
lean in manufacturing has been rejected by the European Board of an international 
company, despite the deployment of need, urgency and a successful trial that 
demonstrated dramatic long term potential impact. Hodgkinson & Wright (2002) used 
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the method of scenario planning in a specific case with the aim of overcoming cognitive 
inertia, yet they were unable to persuade the CEO of the company and her team to 
change the current inadequate strategy and, thus, face the challenges of the future. 
Kitsos (2011), experienced similar problems, when the board of a Greek SME refused 
to apply his knowledge management based model for enhancing competitiveness, 
despite the executives’ acceptance of it as an excellent solution to their problems. What 
was interesting in his case is that the company was facing the country’s severe 
economic crisis, which according to the urgency concept should have enabled change. 
Similar cases in which senior managers led their company into loosing its competitive 
advantage by neglecting the warnings of a crisis from employees in lower levels, have 
been discussed in the literature (i.e. McGrath, 2013). 
Urgency is indeed a diachronic and essential requirement for a change to occur 
(Appelbaum, Habashy, Malo & Shafiq, 2012; Guzman, et al. 2011; Quinn, et al. 2012). 
However, it seems that the PC models’ main assertion that initially a need is identified 
and then a sense of urgency is created suffers from bias which probably is attributed to 
their anecdotal support (Whelan-Berry, Gordon & Hinings, 2003). Kotter’s (2012a) 
claim that urgency starts at the top indicates that these models have focused on how to 
apply change by taking for granted the existence of an all knowing and committed 
leadership. But they fail to take into consideration cases where companies are operating 
at the edge of catastrophe and no one initiates change, until sometimes the inevitable 
happens. Similarly, most of Kotter’s (2008:61) tactics are not always available when 
urgency starts from outside or in a lower level. For instance, a change advocate can 
neither distract in other activities nor “get-rid of” an executive member of the board. 
In other words, they can be essential tools for facilitating leaders to galvanize 
significant change in organizations (but see Kelman, 2005), but they do not address 
how to get the senior management team to recognize the need for change and commit 
to action (i.e. Hodgkinson & Wright, 2002).  
Take for example the case of Heineken. Its CEO Freddy Heineken managed to 
transform company’s distribution system despite any resistance that he faced from 
other top and middle managers. Yet, some years later when change was again necessary 
the very same CEO did not instigate the necessary changes, despite the fact that the 
compelling evidence was clear (Beugelsdijk, Slangen & van Herpen, 2002). Ultimately, 
the current thesis argues that something additional to the essential but insufficient 
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compelling needs is necessary for overcoming this top-level denial to change 
(Buchanan & Denyer, 2013), which according to this work lies behind two fallacies of 
the current approach and is conceptualized in the following fundamental question: 
Research Question: What barriers inhibit senior management to accept the need for 
change and commit to action when urgency has been established?  
1.5.2 Fallacy 1: Ability to see the need for change 
According to the model the first step for an individual is to move from the 
precontemplation stage, where he/she is unaware or ignores the problem, to the 
contemplation stage, where he/she becomes aware and thinks of tackling it. The major 
issue at this first stage is that people cannot see the problem (Prochaska, DiClemente 
& Norcross, 1992). Respectively, in PCs the question could be why executives seem to 
suffer from “need-blindness”?. Harper (2011:198) and Ben-Eli (2008) attribute this 
phenomenon to individuals’ mental models, which are established representations, 
frameworks and patterns about how the world operates and how the individual should 
act within it (see Mohammadi, Saberi & Banirostam, 2015 for a review on definitions). 
In addition, Harper (2011:198) supports his argument with examples of executives’ 
irrational argumentations and decisions in the face of clear evidence. Senge (2006:8) 
shares this view and claims that mental models are a major reason why insights into 
innovative management practices are not applied. These studies clearly suggest that 
mental models play an important role when it comes to realize or reject the need for 
change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Fallacy 1: Ability to see & understand the need for change 
Recent research indicates the fundamental importance of mental models to leaders’ 
effectiveness (Johnson, 2008). Given that leaders’ mental models control their 
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responses to change events (Daft, 2008:133, Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron & Byrne 
2007) as well as play a determinant role in an organization’s strategic renewal (Barr, 
Stimpert & Huff, 1992), reflections on and challenge of current assumptions should be 
an inherent skill when operating in a continually changing environment. Yet, this 
necessary quality is not generally possessed by traditional leaders (Senge, 1998), a fact 
which leads to the first fallacy (fig.3). In particular, leadership research assumes that 
every manager is a leader and that leaders are heroes (Hunter, Bedell-Avers & 
Mumford, 2007). Similarly, PC models assume that CEOs will act as leaders by 
initiating change in the light of a compelling need.  However, the impact of compelling 
needs at this stage is not a determinant change factor, since mental models seem to be 
prone to stability even when dramatic down-turns in the market occur (Hodgkinson, 
1997). As, Weinstein, Sandman & Blalock (2008:126), stated, awareness of a hazard 
will not have the same effects on individuals’ behaviour, since people who have 
established opinions about a hazard are more reluctant to change than the ones who 
haven't. In that sense, for every case the individual lies on a point in a spectrum, where 
on the one end compelling needs could “penetrate” their mental models while on the 
other it is like “hitting on a steely wall”.  
In essence, people with the same information, indicating the compelling need, will 
respond differently. This is the reason why Cummings & Worley (2008:29) claimed, in 
their PC model, that change initiatives do not proceed after the initial analysis of the 
problem due to disagreements about the need for change. While this detail seems to be 
ignored, or not explicitly expressed, by the rest of the models, it is generally accepted 
that breakdowns in PCs could be caused when change participants miss the need for 
change (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011). Definitely, awareness and acceptance of a need is 
an essential factor for developing commitment to change (Jaros, 2010), but Pasmore’s 
(2011) work ascribes an additional perspective to the issue. He suggests that leaders 
could fail to realize a crisis or a problem, even if a burning platform is there. Therefore, 
it is not about lacking commitment to change due to lack of awareness but that the need 
for change is not understood and consequently the necessary awareness is not possessed 
in first place. On this basis, the following research question needs to be addressed: 
 “Sub-question 1: Why, even in the light of clear evidence, may it be so difficult for 
senior management to accept the need for change?” 
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1.5.3 Fallacy 2: Desire to go for change 
If the first fallacy is overcome, the individual will be in the contemplation stage which 
means he will both understand the need and think about changing.  However, awareness 
of the need doesn’t mean deciding to change, since the individual at this stage is not 
yet committed to action (Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcross, 1992). Indeed, 
awareness of a compelling need, even if it is developed by a crisis or dramatic data, 
doesn’t automatically lead to desire for change. For instance, aware individuals 
continue smoking, even if lung cancer has the highest rate of deaths (Jemal, et al. 2011) 
or they refuse to change their diet after a bypass surgery (Edward Miller, as cited in 
Clark, 2010:94). In addition, the vast majority of organizations with powerful financial 
ability and governments able to establish different policies remain passive and 
indifferent in the face of major issues like environmental pollution, inequality, injustice 
and wars (Green & Allen, 2008). Although there could be factors preventing change in 
the previous examples, which may or may not apply when it comes to business 
transformation, Clark (2010:94) argues that similarly it is common to see organizations 
reacting with complacency even if they face extinction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Fallacy 2: Desire to initiate-authorize 
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leaders have to translate the need to desire for change. The main premise is that because 
employees will resist change, acceptance and agreement in first place is essential 
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of resistance has been widely critiqued in the literature (By, et al. 2016; Hughes, 2016). 
For example, Dent & Goldberg (1999) suggested that researchers and managers, under 
the social fights between labour and management in the 50s, have mistakenly 
established the notion of resistance from employees as a received truth. Similarly, 
Krantz (1999) argued that resistance has been utilized as an excuse for management 
and helped to transfer accountability for failures to lower levels.  
It can be argued, therefore, that resistance is not something that lies merely at lower 
hierarchical levels. Instead, it can be considered as a fight between continuality and 
interruption embedded in the human-social reality (Adair, 2007:112) that can cause 
commitment problems even at the most senior level of the organization too (Kegan & 
Lahey, 2001). From this perspective, OC theory assumes that leaders jump from 
contemplation to preparation stage, which implies that commitment to change on their 
behalf is granted (fig.2). Similarly, it seems that PC models (refer above) implicitily 
assert that the compelling reasons are enough to set leadership in favour of change. 
However, as Lippit, Watson & Westley’s (1958:131) stated “problem awareness is not 
automatically translated into a desire for change”, a detail which has not been taken 
into consideration by the rest of the PC models. On the contrary, OC literature has been 
based on the assumption, or as Griffith (2001) characterizes it, dangerous myth, that 
change starts automatically after the realization of the need. This assumption is logical, 
given that leaders have been treated as “resistance-proof”, but in reality it seems that 
it is difficult for leaders to develop strategic beliefs inconsistent with the current 
business practices, even when the need for change has been identified (i.e. Polaroid 
case see Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Wack, 1985). On this basis, the following research 
question needs to be addressed: 
“Sub-question 2: Why is it so difficult for senior management to commit to change 
when the compelling need has been established and accepted?” 
1.6 Setting the research objectives: A cognitive-emotional approach  
1.6.1 An interdisciplinary research approach 
Following the research question and the fallacies that have been identified above, this work 
sets out to develop a new theoretical understanding that will explain why some business 
leaders avoid taking action when evidence indicates an urgent need for change. The 
complexity of this research problem makes clear that any potential solution is going to lie 
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beyond the borders of the change management field. In such cases, the interdisciplinary 
research becomes a useful methodology, since it brings closer ideas that lie in distinct and 
isolated disciplines and fields of study (Rhoten & Parker, 2004). As a result, the first step 
of the current work is to design the methodological approach according to which the 
researcher can conduct the interdisciplinary research and, thereby, construct a genuinely 
new theoretical framework. This leads to the first objective of this work, which is to: 
“Objective 1: Design a strategic research approach for developing a new 
interdisciplinary theoretical understanding of a problem.” 
1.6.2 The call for a schema change process 
The world is full of information which individuals analyse and, according to their 
understanding, decide how they should respond (Lehto, 2006:66). Similarly, 
compelling needs are realized through information, which leaders analyse and decide 
whether or not they will authorize action (Liu & Perrewé, 2005). In particular, when a 
change advocate introduces the need for a new initiative, leaders in the company are 
expected to have their existing schemas, and, consequently, their mental models, 
challenged which will lead to a sense-making process (Weber & Manning, 2001). The 
result of such a challenge, therefore, needs to be a revised mental model and, thus, a 
new understanding of the case at hand which will, ultimately, lead to the initiation of 
different actions and responses on leader’s behalf (Cameron & Green 2004:21). 
Cognitive psychologists suggest that the construction of mental models is guided by 
minds’ abstract cognitive structures, called schemas (Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997:293; refer 
also to sec. 3.1), based on which individuals interpret information (Ikiuga, 2007:63) 
and "store" their knowledge about the world (Michon, 1986:55). Apparently, then, the 
preliminary aim of this work is to research within the general scope of schematic 
information processing, the process according to which leaders analyse information and 
revise their mental models in order to reflect the needs indicated by the received 
evidence. Thereby, an understanding of the cognitive approach to the schema change 
process, which can then be used to develop a sophisticated model to address the 
problem under investigation, will be formulated. This leads to the second objective of 
this work, which is to: 
“Objective 2: Research within the general scope of schematic information processing 
how schemas change and construct a revised mental model.” 
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1.6.3 The need for a cognitive-emotional approach to change 
It is true that schema change has not been ignored by organizational researchers. 
Nevertheless, despite schema theory’s initial focus on the individual, organizational 
researchers have allocated their interest and efforts towards the analysis of shared 
schemas (Labianca, Gray & Brass, 2000). Consequently, the analysis from this higher 
collective level led to a disregard of the cognitive and emotional demands, which are 
necessary at an individual level for a schema change to occur (Thompson & Ryan, 
2011).  This is a significant omission, given that the challenge that leaders experience 
because of the compelling evidence, places them in an emotionally unstable state, in 
which they try to make sense of the new by modifying and adapting their pre-existing 
schemas and mental models (Bartunek, et al. 2011).  
A significant exception is the work of George & Jones (2001), who driven by this gap 
in the literature developed a model that not only focuses on individual schemas but also 
considers cognitive and affective factors during the change process. However, while 
their model, accompanied by the more abstract TTM (sec. 1.5.2), constitute the basis 
of this work, the mediating and static role that they ascribed to emotion (Tobey & 
Manning, 2009), makes their approach inadequate for the needs of the current research 
and calls for radical improvements. For that reason, it is essential to understand the 
principles that underpin the schema change process as well as the logic of resistance, 
exclusively at individual level and on a dynamic cognitive-emotional basis. This leads 
to the third objective of this work, which is to: 
“Objective 3: Establish the basic cognitive – emotional principles that underpin the 
schema change process at individual level.” 
1.6.4 Schemas & resistance to change 
Schemas do not accept passively the need for change when they face evidence 
discrepant to their existing beliefs (sec. 3.2), but, due to their inherent resistance 
qualities (Arzenšek, 2011; Larson, 1994), could halt the change process. 
Characteristically, Pasmore (2011) gives examples where evidence, both qualitative 
and quantitative in nature, could be misunderstood due to alternative explanations-
excuses that both cause need-blindness and constitute compelling evidence insufficient. 
According to Boin & Hart (2003), there are psychological factors responsible for 
leaders’ refusal to face their personal as well as organizational deficiencies, which, 
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however, have been largely ignored by the superficial analyses that the scientific 
concept of “resistance to change” adopts (Tannenbaum & Hanna, 1985:99; Thompson 
& Ryan, 2011; but see George & Jones, 2001). It is necessary, therefore, to design the 
mental process according to which compelling evidence is perceived and accepted, as 
well as to determine the respective barriers that could prevent leaders from identifying 
the need for change. This leads to the forth objective of this work, which is to: 
“Objective 4: Determine the barriers that prevent leaders from perceiving and 
accepting the need for change.” 
Someone could argue that when the compelling evidence for change is identified and 
accepted it is obvious that change is the only way. Definitely, awareness and acceptance 
of a need is an essential factor for developing commitment to change (Jaros, 2010), 
yet, schema-change may not occur even if the need is identified (George and Jones, 
2001). As Weinstein, Snadman & Blalock (2008:130) claimed, in the face of a potential 
mind-set change, individuals could get stuck and quit trying, before they even start 
changing. Within the business context, in particular, this could happen because in order 
to change their mental model, leaders will need to accept that something is wrong with 
the current status. Admitting difficulties with the current organizational condition could 
require an “ego-challenge”, which might be hard especially when it is admitted to an 
outsider (Hayes & Prakasam, 1991) or to employees that come from lower levels of 
the hierarchy (Crosby, 1993). In this sense, a proposed organizational change is equated 
with a small “internal death” of leaders’ “ego” (Zell, 2003), which could make them 
act egoistically to protect their image and the current status quo by opposing change 
(Levay, 2010). It is essential, therefore, to design the mental process according to which 
commitment to change is developed as well as to determine the respective barriers that 
could prevent leaders from undertaking the necessary action. This leads to the fifth 
objective of this work. That is, to: 
“Objective 5: Determine the barriers that prevent leaders from committing to 
action.” 
1.6.5 Testing the theoretical model 
Given that it is the application of a theory that may cause its revision (Deming, 1994:103), 
the theoretical recommendations will have to be verified. For that reason, a research 
design based on the methodological paradigm of formative evaluation will be adopted 
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(q.v. ch.9). The main aim will be to assess the functionality and logic of the proposed 
model (Patton, 1988), as well as identify areas for improvement during the initial stages 
of its design and development (Beyer, 1995). Therefore, the last objective is to: 
“Objective 6: Verify the theoretical recommendations and revise them based on the 
analysis of the feedback” 
1.7 Introduction to the rest of this work 
In order to address the research problem, the work will commence with a research 
methodology chapter, in which the logic that guided the development of the theoretical 
model will be explained (objective 1). The chapter will initially present the 
philosophical assumptions of the researcher and will discuss the nature of the current 
investigation. Then, a strategic methodological approach for conducting 
interdisciplinary research that aims to construct a new theoretical framework will be 
developed.   
Afterwards, an introductory chapter in which the link between schemas, mental models 
and subjectivity will be presented as well as the subsequent assumptions regarding the 
schema change process will be discussed. On this basis, a suitable model of schematic 
interpretation of information at the individual level will be identified and the necessary 
modifications so that it can reflect a change process will be analysed (objective 2). The 
core of these modifications is the re-conceptualization of the model based on the fact 
that the nature of the incoming message is discrepant, instead of neutral, an alteration 
which raises important implications regarding the concept of resistance to change.  
In chapter 4, the appeal for a cognitive-emotional approach for studying the schema 
change process and the logic of resistance will be addressed (objective 3). More 
precisely, a suitable theory of emotions for accompanying the cognitive approach to 
schema change will be introduced. Then, the motivational implications from the impact 
of the emotions on the process and the respective action tendencies will be discussed. 
Finally, the defensive scenario, which refers to the development of action tendencies 
that drive the leader to undertake insufficient action to change, will be further 
elaborated.  
The following four chapters will conceptualize the schema change process by 
modifying accordingly the already selected model. This will be accompanied by the 
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identification and analysis of the barriers that inhibit leaders from understanding the 
need for change (objective 4) as well as committing to action (objective 5). In particular, 
chapter 5 will discuss the process that leaders follow in order to perceive the 
information that indicates the need for change. While, realization starts at an automatic 
and unconscious level, acceptance of the need and commitment to action take place at 
a higher level of consciousness. The process in the higher level will be discussed in 
chapter 6 and it will be mapped in chapters 7 & 8. By mapping the process, a basic 
guiding framework will be provided, which is expected to enable the change advocate 
to adopt specific actions for overcoming leaders’ denial.  
The work will, then, proceed to the development (chapter 9) and application (chapter 
10) of the formative evaluation research and the presentation as well analysis of its 
results. The next step of this work is to discuss the research implications that have 
emerged as a result of the development of the interdisciplinary theoretical 
understanding. In addition, limitations of the approach that has been followed as well 
as recommendations for future research will be provided (chapter 11). Finally, a 
concluding chapter will summarize and present the most important points of the work 
(chapter 12). 
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2 A methodological design for constructing a new theory 
The aim of this chapter is to elaborate the research approach that was followed within 
the scope of this work. That is, to explicitly demonstrate both logic and specific 
methods that were used in order to develop the proposed theoretical model. To start 
with, the chapter will present the philosophical assumptions of the researcher and will 
discuss the nature of the current investigation.  Existing methodologies and approaches, 
found in the literature will be synthesized with the aim of building an integrated 
research design that could meet the requirements of the current work as well as 
guarantee robust scientific results. Specifically, this design puts forward a strategic 
approach, with a specific step-based process to follow, for conducting solo 
interdisciplinary research.  
2.1 Developing a new interdisciplinary theory 
2.1.1 The philosophy & fundamentals of the methodological design 
Any research can be perceived as a process that starts from the conceptualization of a 
problem and gradually builds understanding with the aim of providing an answer-
solution to it (Morse, 2003:189). It stands to reason that there is no such thing as a 
single best way to conduct research, since the suitability of the methodological 
approach to be followed depends on various factors (i.e. Sogunro, 2002; Tuli, 2011). 
With this absence of an “one size fits all” solution in mind, the researcher has to take 
plenty of decisions throughout the process, which, needs to be made under a set of 
unique rules that ensure consistency of scientific logic (Remenyi & Williams, 1995) so 
that sound research with robust results can be produced (Jonker & Pennink, 2009:22). 
On this basis, figure 5 illustrates, in a pyramidal form, the questions, and their answers, 
that drove the methodological design of this work.  
To start with, it is essential to discuss the philosophical paradigm by which the 
researcher abides, so that the reader can have an understanding of its influence on the 
research process (Morgan, 1979). The researcher shares the phenomenological 
assumptions of constructivism, which, generally speaking, advocates that (social) 
reality is inter-subjectively constructed though a dynamic process of continuous 
interactive deliberation (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Morgan & Smircich, 1980; see also 
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interpretivism in Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011:10; and Jayanti’s, 2011 analysis 
on constructivism & postpositivism). As a result, it is assumed that universals and 
absolute truths do not exist (ontological paradigm), as reality is a particular that is 
defined, and thus perceived as such, by how individuals think and act in a specific point 
in time and space (nominalism: Gonzalo, 2015).  On this basis, constructivism and the 
concept of subjectivity influenced not only the logic according to which theoretical and 
practical data were analysed and interpreted, but also the entire philosophical 
underpinnings of the work. Characteristically, as it will be made clear throughout the 
work, the whole argument on why leaders do not perceive as well as commit to change 
was based on the idea of an ego-driven reality that is subjectively constructed based on 
the emotional experience of the individual.  
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At the same time, it is important to take into consideration that, while the paradigm is 
essential for every aspect of the research (i.e. Guba & Lincoln, 1994), flexibility 
regarding the design and application of a research (methodological question-
assumptions) should be sought (Brannen, 2005). More precisely, when it comes to 
develop a methodological design it is also essential to consider the research question 
and the general requirements imposed by the work itself (i.e. Sogunro, 2002; Tuli, 
2011; Jarvinen, 2000; O'Leary, 2004:24). This enables researchers to capture the 
potential of mixed method approaches, like the one followed in this work. 
Within the scope of this research, therefore, a highly qualitative dominant mixed 
method approach was followed. This allowed, under general qualitatively oriented 
thinking, which is advocated by constructivism (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004), 
quantitative characteristics (e.g. the use of propositions for verification/falsification: 
Guba & Lincoln, 1994) to influence the underpinning logic (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & 
Turner, 2007). The mixed method facilitated the development of a flexible research 
design, which on the one hand was, to the extent that this is possible, free of restrictions 
imposed by the researcher’s predetermined philosophical assumptions (Hammersley, 
1996), and on the other hand ensured robust solutions to the research questions 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The following section provides a general 
introduction to the methodological design. 
2.1.2 Introducing the process & the appropriate methodologies 
During the very first steps of this research, the need for a mixed method approach that 
would enable the development and testing of a new theory was apparent (Creswell, 
2009:49). A review of the methodologies for building theories (cf. Torraco, 2004) 
indicated that none of them could entirely capture the special conditions that 
characterize this research. Consequently, the need for a new customized approach 
emerged. For that reason, Lynham’s (2002) generic method for applied theory-building 
research (black boxes fig.6) was linked (black discontinuous arrows fig.6) with 
Bourner’s (2002) four basic steps of any research journey, in order to create a general 
guiding process (claret boxes fig.6) according to which specific methods can be 
logically deployed (claret discontinuous arrows fig.6). It should be noted that any 
choice for developing the methodological design was taken under the general logic that 
there are no right or wrong research methodologies but only more or less useful ones 
(Silverman, 2011:53). 
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Figure 6. A process for building & testing interdisciplinary theories 
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internally consistent (Wacker, 1998).  
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The operationalization phase is the stage of the theorization process that links theory 
and practice (Lynham, 2002). On the one hand, it refers to the conceptualization of the 
accumulated theoretical understanding in a model-framework that is accompanied by 
specific and testable propositions (Lynham, 2002). Of course, the produced model is 
not a static outcome of a separate stage of theorization, but it reflects the dynamic and 
continuous modelling of the researched phenomenon (feedback loops in fig.6), which, 
essentially, is an inextricable aspect of the entire process of the interdisciplinary theory 
formulation (Schwaninger & Groesser, 2008). Through a set of questions (see fig.8) 
the researcher could reflect on the theory’s internal consistency and, thus, validity and 
logic (Wacker, 1998). In addition, internal validity of a theoretical systematic review 
of existing knowledge is established based on the rigour and robustness of the approach 
that is followed (i.e. Bigby & Williams, 2008). The interdisciplinary research will be 
graphically illustrated and explicitly analysed, along with guidelines for reassuring 
validity, in the following sections. 
At the same time, the operationalization phase includes the step of theory testing 
(Bourner, 2002), during which the final version of the model and the captured within 
it theoretical understanding are evaluated so that external validity can be established 
(Holton & Lowe, 2007). For the needs of testing the theory, a research design based on 
the methodological paradigm of “formative evaluation" that aimed to assess the logic 
of the proposed model (Patton, 1988), as well as identify areas for improvement before 
it is put into practice (Beyer, 1995), was adopted (q.v. ch.9). As a result, a formative 
evaluation research was designed and integrated with the interdisciplinary research so 
that a mixed dynamic design of a developmental type could be built (Development 
design: Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989). That is, the results of the interdisciplinary 
research guided the design of the formative evaluation one which in its turn revised the 
interdisciplinary framework and so on. This process will complete the confirmation and 
disconfirmation phase (Lynham, 2002), and is expected to deliver a robust theoretical 
model-framework that is ready for practical application and potential revision in future 
research (q.v. ch.11). 
2.2 The logic behind the conceptual interdisciplinary research 
Within the qualitative dominant paradigm (French, 2009) the inductive reasoning of 
philosophical research (from specific experiences to established theories) and the 
deductive one of literature review (from established theories to specific experiences) 
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were continually interacting in order to build a new theory (Parkhe, 1993). In addition 
to the complementary elements of empiricism and cerebral logic (Schwaninger & 
Groesser, 2008), theorizing, especially when it is based on knowledge that comes from 
distinct domains (Holmström, Ketokivi & Hameri, 2009), requires intuition (Bourgeois, 
1979), which is part of an abductive approach that is distinct to the previous reasoning 
(Anderson, 1986). Abduction is the process of developing the best possible hypothesis 
that someone can think of, or imagine, for explaining a set of data at hand (Josephson, 
1996). Therefore, the method of disciplined imagination was used, since it is suitable 
for involving the necessary intuition and creativity of abductive reasoning in the 
theorizing process (i.e. Lee, Pries-Heje & Baskerville, 2011). Overall, the described 
methodological approach underpinned the interdisciplinary process that is presented in 
the following table.  
Table 4. The steps of the interdisciplinary research 
Theory building 
phases 
(Lynham, 2002) 
General steps of 
research journeys 
(Bourner, 2002) 
Steps of the Interdisciplinary Research  
(Repko, 2006) 
Conceptual 
Development 
Reviewing the 
field(s) 
Define the problem or formulate the 
focus question 
Justify using an interdisciplinary 
approach 
Identify relevant disciplines and fields 
of study 
Reviewing the 
fields 
& 
Theory Building 
Conduct a literature search 
Develop adequacy in each relevant 
discipline 
Analyse the problem and evaluate each 
insight into it 
Theory Building 
Identify conflicts between insights and 
their sources 
Create or discover common ground 
Conceptual 
development & 
Operationalization 
Integrate insights 
Produce an interdisciplinary 
understanding 
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To start with, the literature review led the entire process; that is from the establishment 
of the research question (Forrester, 2012) to the analysis and discussion of the scientific 
results (Randolph, 2009). As far as the theoretical part of this work is concerned, the 
review aimed at the creation of a preliminary framework that could be used as the basis 
for advancing knowledge regarding the problem (Webster & Watson, 2002). In order 
to achieve this aim, the need for an interdisciplinary understanding advanced an 
integrative type of literature review (Khoo, Na & Jaidka, 2011) that aimed to generate 
a new theoretical advancement. In particular, knowledge from various domains was 
extracted and critically analysed for its potential contribution to the problem, and then 
synthesized anew, in order to produce an integrative theoretical framework (Torraco 
2005) that could hypothetically address the research problem under investigation 
(critical reviews in Grant & Booth, 2009). Consistent, therefore, with the paradigm of 
qualitative meta-synthesis (Walsh & Downe, 2005) the researcher reinterpreted the 
findings of the reviewed studies, through the lens of the current work’s needs and 
questions, in order to develop a new theory (Schreiber, Crooks & Stern 1997) that will 
explain the phenomenon under investigation (Zimmer, 2006).  
Philosophical (or analytic) research, which refers to a purely mental pursuit based on 
the researcher’s internal logic (Buckley, Buckley & Chiang, 1976:26), was the second 
method used within the scope of this work. While as a method it is neglected, or not 
explicitly discussed in doctoral studies (Schwartz & Walden, 2006), its contribution to 
a research project can be essential under specific conditions (i.e. Furuholt & Sein, 
2012). As far as this work is concerned, philosophical research was chosen due to three 
main reasons. Firstly, the huge amount of data from various disciplines and the need 
for reasoning causal interdisciplinary relationships required pure mental reflection on 
the literature review for establishing research hypotheses (Jenkins, 1985). Secondly, 
consistent with Furuholt & Sein’s (2012) work, it was necessary to capture knowledge 
from previous experiences regarding the problem, since both the researcher (Kitsos, 
2011) and supervisor have faced irrational resistance from CEOs in their careers. 
Therefore, philosophical research, accompanied by regular and profound discussions 
between the researcher and his supervisor, was considered to be an appropriate method, 
since it enabled reflection on already available data (Buckley, Buckley & Chiang, 
1976:41). Lastly, philosophical conceptualization is a type of theory building that 
introduces the qualities of in-depth and logical constructive thinking (Meredith, 1993). 
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Such qualities are essential elements of any research that follows a theoretical approach 
to new theory development (Remenyi, Williams & Money, 1998:47). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Mix methods for the interdisciplinary research 
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the field(s) 
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Figure 8. The process of interdisciplinary research
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2.3 The dynamic process of the interdisciplinary research 
The steps of the interdisciplinary research (table 4), which constitute the phases of 
conceptual development and the first stage of operationalization (fig.6), are illustrated 
in fig.8. The whole approach was driven by the methods described above (fig.8: pink 
box left-top corner) and ended in the development of an interdisciplinary understanding 
that was ready to be conceptualized in a testable framework (operationalization phase). 
As it can be seen from figure 8, the process of conducting interdisciplinary research 
can be divided into three main stages, which will be analysed in the following sections.  
2.3.1 Stage 1: Identify relevant (Sub)disciplines and fields of study 
The first two steps, that is the formulation of the research problem (q.v. ch.1) as well 
as the reason for choosing an interdisciplinary approach (sec. 2.2), have already been 
discussed. As far as the identification of the relevant disciplines and study fields is 
concerned the challenge was to identify those that could potentially contribute to the 
solution of the problem (Repko, 2009:160). Table 5 presents them, as well as their 
specific branches or subdisciplines, which have been used within the scope of this 
work. It should be noted that the focus of analysis will be on the sub-disciplines, since 
these days they can constitute independent fields of knowledge (Repko, 2009:5).  
Disciplines & fields Sub-Disciplines & brances 
Business & 
Management 
Leadership/ Management 
Change Management (Organizational & individual) 
Theoretical approaches on crisis resolution 
Psychology 
Cognitive Psychology 
Psychology of emotion  
(Appraisal theory, Core affect & emotion regulation) 
Dual-Processing 
Depth psychology (Psychodynamics) 
Motivation 
Philosophy 
Various Philosophical Schools (i.e. Platonism, Sophism) 
Epistemological & Ontological theories 
Consciousness & mind 
Table 5. List of relevant disciplines & fields (Academic Disciplines 2013; Repko, 2009) 
While the initial sub-disciplines & fields of study (red-coloured) were determined 
based on the research question and experience with the problem itself (Tress, Tress & 
Fry, 2006:246), the need for additional disciplinary perspectives emerged in later 
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phases of the work (Q.1 in fig.8). They complemented the previous ones and facilitated 
the development of a coherent interdisciplinary understanding. The logic according to 
which the sub-disciplines and fields were chosen as well as their contribution to the 
development of this work’s theoretical model, are presented in detail at appendix 5.1. 
2.3.2 Stage 2: Working on single-disciplinary level 
Once the disciplines and fields were chosen, the researcher had to work with the 
literature of each single discipline and field in order to retrieve relevant information, 
understand it, and, ultimately, discuss its contribution to the problem at hand. The 
following sections aim to explicitly present the steps that the researcher followed in the 
single-disciplinary level.  
Conduct a literature search 
The first step was to reach and retrieve literature relevant to the work (Gabbott, 2004). 
For that reason, with the research question in mind, initial keywords have been listed. 
This list was afterwards expanded, due to the dynamic nature of the work (Continuous 
circles fig.8) and the consequent need for additional searches in the literature (Averard, 
2010:77). A list with the main key words that were used within the scope of this work 
is provided at appendix 5.2. The key words did produce a considerable amount of 
sources. Therefore, the main challenge at this stage was to develop a method that would 
enable an initial filtering of the literature to take place. In the current study a filtering 
strategy was designed and deployed in reference to two factors; quality and relevance. 
The following table illustrates the process. 
Type of sources 
- Prioritized 
(Creswell, 
2009:33) 
Specific criteria for judging 
source’s quality 
(Rowley & Slack, 2004) 
Skimming approaches for 
ensuring relevance 
(Brereton, et al., 2007) 
WEB sources and 
general online 
overviews 
In which audience does the 
page refer to? 
To whom the page belongs? 
 
* Knowledge from these 
sources wasn’t used a lot in 
this work. The only reason for 
reviewing that type of sources 
was to get the basic “feeling” 
 
1. Scanning the web page. 
2. Use of search options. 
 
* If the page was big enough 
it was exported into pdf form 
and keywords were utilized. 
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Journal articles 
Is the paper academic-
oriented? 
Is there a list of references to 
support the evidence? 
Is the Journal reputable? 
1. Initial reading of the 
abstract.  
2. Scanning of introduction 
& reading of 
discussion/conclusion. 
3. Skimming of the main 
part.  
4. Read headings & study 
diagrams & illustrations 
Books 
Edited Same rules with Journal articles were applied. 
Classic 
 
Is there a list of references to 
support the evidence? 
Is it well presented and clearly 
structured? 
Is it written by authoritative 
author? 
1. Read table of contents 
2. Use of the index or search 
options (E-book). 
3. Focus on interesting 
sections - Read first and last 
paragraph. 
4. Read heading & study 
diagrams & illustrations. 
Conference 
papers & Thesis 
Is the conference paper part of 
a book? 
Are there any other published 
papers from the author(s) on 
the subject? 
 
*Conference papers and thesis 
have slightly been used in this 
work. 
Similar to Journals 
Table 6. Ensuring source’s level of quality & relevance 
It should be clarified that a study didn’t have to meet all of these criteria. For instance, 
if a book had a small amount of references, but is written by an authoritative author or 
has a clear structure, it was possible to be considered as a good study to read. This is 
because, the aim at this stage was to evaluate the quality of the source, not the source’s 
context, a process which was taking place in the following step. 
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Develop understanding in each relevant discipline & field 
Once the studies were chosen the researcher had to go through the process of critical 
analysis, in which he critically evaluated previous research in order to develop 
understanding (Chandler, 2013). For interdisciplinarians, analysis should end in a 
general “feeling” for the overall disciplinary perspective and a deep understanding of 
the specific theories in use (Newell, 2001; Szostak, 2002). The challenge, therefore, 
was to develop a set of rules-criteria according to which the researcher could judge 
which studies and theories to include or exclude (Kennedy, 2007), so that a sound 
understanding could be developed. To start with, the acceptance of a study was based 
on the criteria listed on the following table. 
Criterion Questions 
Provenance 
What is the author’s credibility?  
Are the arguments of the study based on evidence (i.e. reference 
list or empirical evidence) or are they the outcome of author’s 
own experience? 
Objectivity 
Is there an equal consideration of opposing evidence or does the 
paper present a one-sided view?  
Did the researcher(s) follow a robust research approach? 
Persuasiveness 
Are the author's arguments and conclusions convincing?  
Which of them are most/least convincing?  
How did the author come to such conclusions? 
Value 
Does the work contribute to the understanding of the problem 
or issue under investigation? 
Does the work contribute to the advancement of knowledge in 
the field in general?  
Table 7. Criteria for evaluating a study (Based on University of California, 2013) 
While the previous criteria were used to evaluate any type of study that has been 
retrieved from the literature, in this work specific theories have been utilized as the core 
basis for developing the theoretical interdisciplinary understanding of the problem 
under investigation (i.e. Axelrod’s, 1973 theory of cognition; Scherer’s, 2001 & 
Lazarus’s, 1991 appraisal theories of emotion, etc.). As a result, it was necessary to 
use specific criteria in order to evaluate such theories in more depth and, thereby, decide 
whether they should be included in or excluded from the work. The following table 
presents the criteria that have been used for that reason. 
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Criterion Questions 
Reliability 
Is the theory reliable? Can it be trusted? 
Has the theory been tested empirically?  
Has the theory been recommended by other authors?  
Convenience 
Is there available knowledge regarding the theory? 
 Does the theory contribute to the understanding of the problem?  
What are the implications? 
Established 
Status 
Has the theory been used in the field? If yes, to what extent?  
How many times has it been cited?* 
*For that reason the citation index in Google scholar was used. 
Table 8. Criteria for assessing theories (Based on Stahl & colleagues 2008) 
The use of the criteria presented above ensured the high quality of the studies that have 
been included in this work and, thus, established a strong basis upon which a robust 
interdisciplinary understanding could be built. You may wish to refer to appendix 5.3 
as well. 
Analyse the problem and evaluate disciplinary insight into it 
The studies, after their analysis, were synthesized in order to construct the disciplinary 
insights to the problem (Repko, 2006; 2009:217). Mind maps were utilized for noting 
down and structuring into categories important arguments and ideas (Eppler, 2006; see 
also Cañas, Reiska, Åhlberg & Novak, 2008 for similar use of concept maps). The result 
of this step was a clear demonstration of the disciplinary concepts that constituted the 
essential element of “what” will be included in the overall theory (Whetten, 1989). An 
example can be found in appendix 5.4. 
Criterion Explanation 
Competence 
The literature review should describe, in great depth, the issue under 
investigation by critically discussing arguments and counter-
arguments regarding a specific phenomenon.    
Congruence 
The literature should include sources that after discussion and 
synthesis can reach to a common conclusion and, thus, collectively 
construct a theoretical understanding.  
Consistency 
In the literature, conflicts between the sources that have been used 
need to be addressed to the extent that this is possible.   
Stability 
The fundamental structure of a comprehensive literature review 
should not be affected when new sources are discovered. 
Table 9. Criteria for evaluating the literature review (Leseure, Shaw & Atif, 2006) 
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Finally, the contribution of the literature review up to this stage of the model had to be 
evaluated in reference to its sufficiency and comprehensiveness (Leseure, Shaw & Atif, 
2006). The aim of such an evaluation was to answer whether the problem or the issue 
under investigation was researchable or not given the level of single-disciplinary 
understanding that has been achieved (fig.8: Q.2). The criteria that have been used for 
that reason are listed in table 9. Disciplinary insights that satisfied the previous criteria 
were considered as ready to be utilized to construct the interdisciplinary understanding. 
The following stages aim to describe this process.  
2.3.3 Stage 3: Working on the interdisciplinary level 
Once the disciplinary insights were captured, the researcher had to work at the various 
disciplinary crossroads. That is, the insights that had been captured at the single-
disciplinary level, needed to be synthesized and integrated with the aim of creating an 
interdisciplinary understanding of the research problem. The following sections aim to 
explicitly present the steps that the researcher followed in the interdisciplinary level.  
Identify conflicts & discover or create common ground 
The first step in the interdisciplinary stage was to trace conflicts and then create 
common ground among the various disciplinary insigts that have been captured during 
the previous phase (Repko, 2009:247,271). Common ground is developed based on five 
integrative techniques including expansion, redefinition, extension, organization and 
transformation (not all of them used in every single case. refer to Repko, 2009:281). Its 
result was to conceptualize the “how” element of a theory, which describes the causal 
relationships between the already identified “whats” of the developed understanding 
(Whetten, 1989). Appendix 5.5 demonstrates an example of this process.  
Integrate insights & produce an interdisciplinary understanding of the problem 
The “what” and “how” elements accompanied by various charts and diagrams are the 
essential, yet insufficient, parts of the theorizing process the ultimate aim of which is 
to produce a robust theory (Weick, 1995). This is because a complete theory must 
explain the logic that underlies the various causal relationships between the concepts 
(Sutton & Staw, 1995; Whetten, 1989). As a result, the next step was to creatively 
combine disciplinary insights (Repko, 2009:296) and make explicit “why” the specific 
concepts of “whats” and their integrations of “hows” were chosen. For that reason, the 
researcher utilized conceptual diagrams which facilitated the structuring of complex 
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interdisciplinary concepts by linking predefined disciplinary categories (Eppler, 2006). 
Appendix 5.6 demonstrates an example of this process. The aim of the integration was 
to produce a systemic interdisciplinary understanding, which consists of the chosen 
disciplinary sub-systems and their links, and explains the overall phenomenon that has 
been studied (Newell, 2001; Repko, 2009:310).  
Evaluate the interdisciplinary theoretical construct 
After the development of the interdisciplinary understanding, it was also essential to 
verify whether the proposed theorization was able to meet the requirements of a well-
constructed theory (idea inspired by Holton & Lowe, 2007). Therefore, the researcher 
reviewed relevant literature on how to evaluate a theory, and, after making the 
necessary adaptations according to the unique needs of the current work, developed ten 
criteria (table 10) that were considered appropriate for assessing the consistency of the 
proposed framework (i.e. Brookfield, 1992; Dubin 1978; Jayanti, 2011; Lincoln & 
Lynham, 2011; Patterson, 1986). In addition, apart from evaluative dimensions, these 
criteria played the role of research aims, in the sense that the researcher used them as 
drivers for building the interdisciplinary construct of this work. Finally, the reader 
should keep in mind that while the researcher’s aim was to develop genuine evaluative 
dimensions that would meet the specific needs of this work, in many cases exact 
phrases have been extracted from the existing criteria that have met this requirement.  
Criterion Description 
1
. 
Im
p
o
rt
an
ce
 &
 
M
ea
n
in
g
fu
ln
es
s A theory is important, or else significant, when it is related to 
(Patterson, 1986), as well as provides scientific explanation 
(Mansilla, 2005) and deep understanding of (Lincoln & Lynham, 
2011), "actual" events, behaviours and general phenomena that 
concern social life. 
2
. 
 L
o
g
ic
al
ly
 c
o
n
si
st
en
t 
in
si
g
h
tf
u
ln
es
s 
The “traditional” inductive and deductive reasoning to theory 
development were complemented by abductive logic, which allowed 
imaginary creativity to emerge and formulate new theoretical 
interdisciplinary constructs (pragmatism: Jayanti, 2011) of higher 
and leveraged understanding (Mansilla, 2005). These constructs 
need to be insightful and can accommodate "some" ambiguity 
(Lincoln & Lynham, 2011), without, though, losing internal 
consistency (Patterson, 1986) or their logical basis to other-external 
literature (Dubin, 1978) & practice (Brookfield, 1992). 
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3
. 
N
ar
ra
ti
v
e 
&
 
il
lu
st
ra
ti
v
e 
el
eg
an
ce
 
The complex theorization needs to be narratively elegant, and 
conceptually rich, provocative and evocative (Lincoln & Lynham, 
2011), with adequate use of illustrative techniques (i.e. 
figures/images, tables, examples when necessary) to facilitate the 
establishment of a clear understanding (Jayanti, 2011) as well as 
make any assumptions clear (Brookfield, 1992). 
4
. 
 M
u
tu
al
it
y
 o
f 
co
n
ce
p
ts
 &
 
d
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
lo
g
ic
 The complex theorization and its formalized outputs (Jayanti, 2011) 
should be conceptualized in propositions (Brookfield, 1992) that are 
clear and explicit enough (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011), so that they 
can: 
1) Be Put into action by practitioners 
2) Be Used and tested by other researchers. 
5
. 
 F
ru
it
fu
ln
es
s 
&
 
p
ro
v
o
ca
ti
v
en
es
s 
Theoretical elaborations must be fruitful and provocative, in the 
sense that they not only illuminate some aspect of social life but also 
allow room for critique (Mansilla, 2005) and, thus, suggest new 
avenues of research and/or action (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011). 
6
. 
T
ra
n
sf
er
ab
il
it
y
 &
 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
ab
il
it
y
 
The theoretical framework should illustrate, clearly enough, its 
usefulness for other users (in their own situation/context) and, thus, 
invite them (Brookfield, 1992) to conduct additional research 
according to the following dimensions (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011):                                                                                                                    
1) Transferability: the ability in individuals, through interaction 
between the knower and the known, to carry propositional and/or 
tacit knowledge from one context to inform another, 
2) Transportability: the applicability to different populations, of 
utility in varying contexts, with varying populations. 
7
. 
In
te
rd
is
ci
p
li
n
ar
y
 t
ra
n
sf
er
ab
il
it
y
 
During an interdisciplinary study distinct disciplines & fields of 
study collaborate and, without abolishing their autonomous 
operation, generate a collective understanding of a research issue 
(Aboelela, et al. 2007; Repko, 2006). From this perspective, and by 
following the 6th criterion of transferability & transportability 
(Brookfield, 1992; Lincoln & Lynham, 2011), it can be argued that 
interdisciplinary transferability concerns the extent to which 
theorists from the involved disciplines can realize:  
1) Contributions of their own discipline/field to the problem under 
investigation, 
2) Advances in their discipline/ field due to the generated 
interdisciplinary understanding and, thus, become able to conduct 
further research on the basis of carrying knowledge from the 
interdisciplinary to the single-disciplinary level and vice versa. 
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8
. 
E
m
p
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ic
al
 
v
er
if
ia
b
il
it
y
 The theory should generate new knowledge (Patterson, 1986) that 
match some element of socially constructed life, as this is judged 
based on the ‘lived experience" (i.e. personal experience, meaning-
making, or general observations) of the respondents (Lincoln & 
Lynham, 2011). 
9
. 
 U
se
fu
ln
es
s 
&
 
ap
p
li
ca
b
il
it
y
 
The theoretical advances must be useful and applicable for ordinary 
persons, suggesting ways of being in the world, or ways of altering 
one’s circumstances in some context (Mansilla, 2005). Specifically, 
it should provide (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011): 
1)  new ways of seeing things, such that meaningful change can 
occur, 
2) models for human flourishing, as living knowledge, and for 
practical application and high organizational performance. 
1
0
. 
C
o
m
p
el
li
n
g
n
es
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&
 
P
ro
m
p
t 
to
 a
ct
io
n
 
The theoretical framework should provide a good conceptual 
understanding of practice and create a prompt to action on the part of 
a wider set of audiences/stakeholders who have a legitimate stake in 
the findings. Essentially, it should connect theory with action and 
learning for continuous refinement and improvement, illustrate 
practicality of the theory (Lincoln & Lynham, 2011) by assisting in 
the realization of certain social and political values (for a better 
world) and in improving social and political condition (Brookfield 
1992). 
Table 10. Criteria for evaluating the interdisciplinary understanding 
Specifically, Patterson’s (1986) criteria, which are the most popular ones in the 
literature, were considered to be inappropriate for direct adoption, since they focus on 
reviewing theories that have been developed under the positivistic paradigm (in Lincoln 
& Lynham, 2011). For example, his criteria of “Parsimony & simplicity” and 
“Comprehensiveness” could not be used in order to evaluate a theory that, by its very 
nature, is underlined by the need for long-scale narration and refers to the creative 
processes of human imagination. Therefore, Lincoln & Lynham’s (2011) criteria for 
assessing a theory that has been conceptualized under the interpretivistic paradigm, and 
Mansilla’s (2005) criteria for evaluating interdisciplinary theories, were utilized as a 
basis. In addition, influences from the abductive reasoning which was followed in order 
to formulate the current work’s interdisciplinary (Repko, 2006) understanding (criteria 
for pragmatic reasoning in Jayanti, 2011), the intention to develop mainly a formal 
theory (Brookfield, 1992), as well as the criterion of “Logical consistency” which is 
suitable for assessing the conceptualization phase of theory development (Dubin, 1978) 
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were taken into consideration. Further analysis of the process that has been followed 
can be found at appendix 5.7. 
Ultimately, the interdisciplinary understanding that satisfied the criteria listed above 
was considered as ready to be conceptualized into a theoretical framework/model 
(phase of operationalization; Lynham, 2002). It should be clarified though, that this 
integration was taking place gradually, as the process of constructing the model of this 
work was extremely dynamic. In other words, the researcher had to use the feedback 
loop (fig8: Q.3) many times to revisit the literature and retrieve additional useful 
sources that could further enhance the incomplete theoretical advancements. The 
feedback loops that have been followed are reflected in the three question that the 
researcher has added to Repko’s (2006) model for conducting interdisciplinary 
research.  
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3 The fundamentals of the schema change process 
The current chapter aims to introduce the reader to the general underpinning philosophy 
of this research. The analysis of the research problem made clear that in order for action 
to be decided, and, thereby, an OC to be instigated, a mental shift regarding how leaders 
perceive and act in respect to a specific change issue is necessary. At this stage, the 
researcher will explain how the need for such a mental shift, and, thereby, for an 
organizational transformation is legitimized. Then, the cognitive and more precisely 
schematic approach to change will be approached and a suitable model that can work 
as the basis for developing the theoretical construct of this work will be identified. The 
chapter will conclude by introducing the notion of cognitive discrepancy, which, will 
establish the basis for developing and discussing the principles and the logic of 
resistance to change.  
3.1 Core theories, principles & philosophical assumptions 
3.1.1 Objective reality & the legitimization of the need for change 
Before any further analysis, it is essential to clarify the philosophical basis behind the 
existence of a need for change. Taber & Lodge (2006) question the boundary line 
between tenable scepticism and reasonless bias when it comes to changing pre-existing 
political beliefs and attitudes. The current work faces a similar challenge, since its 
fundamental assumption, according to which a change advocate(s) “rightly” 
understands the need for change and an executive “wrongly” resists it, seems to lack 
coherence. Indeed, if someone considers the various, and most of the times 
contradictory, philosophical considerations regarding the essence of good-right and 
evil-wrong (cf. Ogorek, 2006:78), it is worth wondering what gives the “right” to the 
change advocate to be “right”. In this sense, the work faces a fundamental question that 
shakes its “keystones”; that is “what legitimizes the need for change?”. 
A specific determination of the end state is not necessary, yet, in principle, it can be 
argued that a need for change suggests that the current reality is in a sense problematic 
and requires change (Cowan, 1986; Kilmann & Mitroff, 1979; Smith, 1989). The issue 
of legitimisation emanates from the determination of the current reality and, therefore, 
it is highly dependent on the ontological and the concomitant epistemological 
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assumptions of the individual-reader (Krauss, 2005). For that reason, the researcher 
will demonstrate how the need is legitimized from the perspectives of an extreme 
objectivist as well as subjectivist, so that the reader can adapt his/her understanding and 
proceed to the rest of the work according to his/her position on the spectrum 
encompassed by these two extremes (for the basic assumptions refer to Morgan & 
Smircich, 1980).  
Table 11. Philosophical paradigms & the legitimization of the need for change 
From an objectivistic point of view, reality is something external to the human beings 
and given its concrete and structured essence it can be modelled and determined on an 
absolute basis (McMurray, Pearson, Scott & Pace, 2004:10; Morgan & Smircich, 
1980).  The inception of this paradigm can be traced back in Plato’s theory of Forms 
(Bowie, 2004:13), which support that absolute truths (Charney, Newman & Palmquist, 
1995) exist independently of what individuals perceive and believe the reality to be 
(Krauss, 2005). Thence it arises that the need for change is indicated and legitimized 
solely by the facts, or else the in-“Form”-ation, that the change advocate presents to the 
board of directors (i.e. financial crisis Pasmore, 2011; consistent with Kotter’s view). 
Respectively, the process of rejecting change concerns the intellectual ability of the 
organizational elites to perceive these absolute truths (the Platonic view in Alexander, 
1989) and, thereby, justify the power that is unquestionably given to top executives, by 
the current heretical and “totalitarian" in nature business paradigm (Chomsky, 1996), 
to initiate change (i.e. Falkowski, Pedigo, Smith & Swanson, 1998). 
General Approach 
(Morgan & Smircich, 1980) 
Objectivist Subjectivist 
Paradigm 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994) 
Positivism Constructivism 
Philosophical basis 
(Bowie, 2004; Jowett, 2014)  
Plato Protagoras 
Ontological assumptions 
(Charney, et al. 1995) 
Absolutism/ Realism Relativism 
Epistemological assumptions 
(Krauss, 2005) 
Truth exists out there 
& is to be discovered 
Meaning is to be 
constructed by subjects 
The need is legitimized by 
Facts realized by an 
Elite 
Democratic deliberation 
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For a subjectivist, what exists in the natural world lacks inherent meaning (McMurray, 
Pearson, Scott & Pace, 2004:10), and it is the individuals who construct (Krauss, 
2005), through imagination and social interactions (refer also to Castoriadis, 1987), 
the reality within which they exist (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). The notion that any 
perception is valid for the observer-individual is traced back in Protagorian relativism 
(Bowie, 2004:13), which, if it is considered at the level of organized societies (Versenyi, 
1962), can explain how reality is “determined” under the subjectivistic paradigm. In 
particular, individuals do not live in the void but continuously interact, and, given the 
absence of an absolute reality, collectively construct an intersubjective world (Zilioii, 
2002). This interaction occurs on a footing of equality, since Protagoras through his 
famous doctrine “the man is the measure of all things” (in Versenyi, 1962), suggests 
that everyone is equally entitled to be right, and, thereby, gives the power to the 
majority (Alexander 1989). In this sense, Protagorian relativism justifies the democratic 
imperative (Roochnik, 2014), according to which the people collectively conceptualize 
a reality that has the ability for a very specific point within the infinite space-time to 
phenomenally get out of the “Heraclitian flux of becoming” (Osborne, 2003:99) and 
name itself a momentary “absolute being” (refer also to Yoon Cheol, 2012). On this 
basis, it accrues that reality is determined and consequently the need for change is 
legitimized by the majority in the institution (consistent with De Burgundy, 1996), 
which, then, makes the question of resistance an issue of consonance between the 
power that executives possess (Chomsky, 1996) and the will of the members.  
The two paradigms described above should be considered as the two ends of a 
spectrum. By criticizing the Platonic absolutism for being completely detached from 
humanity (i.e. Schiller, 1908) or suggesting that the Protagorian relativism requires a 
unchangeable and pre-determined absolute to validate the rightness of the subjective 
opinions (i.e. Watson, 1907), the individual moves away from the extremes to more 
modest world views. An example is the doctrine of evaluativism (Charney, et al. 1995) 
which reconciles the two extremes, by suggesting that individuals who hold different 
views approach the objective reality through sound and scientific reasoning (Bett, 1989; 
Hales, 1997; Megill, 1995). Apparently, there are plenty of paradigms, yet, it goes 
beyond this research’s scope to discuss how objective reality is determined according 
to each of them. Nevertheless, after the previous analysis and the specific example 
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provided in the appendix (app. 3), the reader should be able to understand how the need 
is legitimized according to his/her position on the spectrum. 
3.1.2 The role of mental models & schemas 
The purpose of cognitive psychology is to shed light on how people acquire, process, 
and utilize information by studying human mental processes (Esgate, Grrome & Baker, 
2005:2; Groome & Dewart, 1999:2; Kellogg, 2002:4; Sternberg & Mio, 2009:2). One 
of the main and general conclusions in cognitive psychology is that human cognition 
is a mixture between what the objective reality is and what the individual expects the 
reality to be (Eysenck & Keane, 2005:1). This inherent notion of subjectivity (Sampson, 
1981), which also seems to be the reason why leaders avoid taking action (q.v. sec. 1.5), 
has its roots in individuals’ schemas and mental models; constucts that lie at the core 
of cognitive science (Held, Knauff & Vosgerau, 2006:5). In particular, when a situation 
is interpreted, its objective characteristics (sec. 23.2.1 for the philosophical 
assumptions regarding objective reality) are denatured by receivers’ internal 
representations of reality, as a mental model’s structure tends to maintain the perceived 
and not the objective structure of the faced situation (Doyle & Ford, 1998; Palermo, 
1986). That is to say, stimuli could be misinterpreted, or even be replaced (Al-Diban, 
2012:2200), as individuals’ mental models impose meaning to the stimuli.  
The process of mental shift can, then, be described by considering the role of schemas 
in information processing and their link to mental models. It is true that the two terms 
have been used interchangeably in the literature (Gaglio & Winter, 2009:309), but 
differences do exist and it is crucial to clarify them in order to establish an 
understanding concerning the rest of the work. When individuals receive information, 
schemas are invoked for analysing the stimuli and understanding the environment 
(Ikiuga, 2007:63). They do so through the two major functions with which they have 
been attributed within the concept of perception and information processing. That is, 
on the one hand they are responsible for the formalization of expectations which 
navigate individuals’ information “sensors”; on the other hand, they are the basis upon 
which the selected data is interpreted (Braune & Foshay, 1983). Once the processing 
of information is completed, the invoked schemas will construct a mental model (Al-
Diban, 2012:2200), which is a cognitive representation of the specific situation 
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(Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997:293; Michon, 1986:55). In its turn, the mental model will 
determine individuals’ perception of and response to the stimuli (Senge, 2006:8).  
It is logical, then, to suggest that for a mental shift to occur and, thereby, change to be 
instigated, existing schemas have to “integrate” the new evidence (Bartunek, et al. 
2011) and “construct” a different, yet consistent with the needs that are indicated by 
the received evidence, mental model. In this sense, despite the fact that it is mental 
models which provide the distorted perception of reality, the mechanism for it lies in 
schemas. Indeed, mental models, unlike fixed schemas, are dynamic in nature 
(Callahan, 2005:270) and could undergo transformation. More precisely, mental 
models are not part of people’s long term memory and are continually reconstructed 
based on schemas. The reason why mental models seem to be constant is because 
individuals tend to invoke the same set of schemas which lead them to develop a mental 
model similar to the one used in the past (Schnotz & Preub, 1999:150). Focusing, 
therefore, on schemas seems essential for understanding why leaders may ignore as 
well as neglect evidence that demonstrate the need for change. 
3.1.3 A model of schematic information processing 
Schema change has not been ignored by organizational researchers, yet, there is a 
fundamental key issue that makes existing approaches insufficient for the needs of the 
current work, and, hence, calls for the development of a new theory. That is, the focus 
of researchers on the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy (Labianca, Gray & 
Brass, 2000). More precisely, within the scope of change management, schema theory 
(Lau & Woodman, 1995) has mainly focused on identifying antecedents for enabling 
change in employees’ schemas. The yearning outcomes are expected to be employees’ 
positive attitude towards the already initiated change as well as increased participation 
and commitment on their behalf (i.e. Arzenšek, 2011; Balogun, Johnson, 2004; Chiang, 
2010; Kayser, Walker & Demaio, 2000; Lau, Tse, & Zhou, 2002; Liu, Lui & Man, 
2009; Thompson, & Ryan, 2012). This area of research is indeed useful for the change 
literature, yet irrelevant to the nature of this work, since its results ignore the necessary 
schematic changes at an individual-leadership level (Thompson & Ryan, 2011), where 
the call for transformation will be made in first place. In addition, the necessary 
demands for a schema change to occur at an individual level have also been 
disregarded, since the analysis has been restricted mainly in shared schemas and belief 
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systems (Labianca, Gray & Brass, 2000) which are considered from an overall 
organizational perspective (i.e. Björkman, 1989).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Schematic interpretation of information (Based on Axelrod, 1973) 
Driven by the described fundamental difference in focus, the researcher sought a model 
that combines two major “ingredients” of this work, individual schemas and 
information processing, so that it can be used as the basis for further analysis. Among 
the schema based models that were identified in the literature (i.e. Beck, & Clark, 1997; 
Braune & Foshay, 1983; Labianca, Gray & Brass, 2000; Noble, Boehm-Davis & 
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Grosz, 1986; Norman, & Bobrow, 1976:118; Reger &, Palmer 1996), Axelrod’s (1973) 
has been discerned, mainly because it demonstrates, through a simple logic of yes or 
no step-questions, the channels that information should pass through when it is 
processed by schemas. Hastie (1981:45) has also developed an identical, yet simplified 
version of Axelrod’s (1973) model, which, however, was discarded due to its lack 
regarding the depth of analysis. In addition to its detailed perspective, Axelrod’s (1973) 
model is widely known as the incipience of the schematic approach in political science 
(Bolland, 1985), and its logic has been utilized in studies of decision making, in which 
it provided deeper understanding and insight (Lee, Chung & Kim, 2004). The previous 
evidence led the researcher to appraise Axelrod’s (1973) model as the best available 
choice for the basis of this work’s arguments. 
Figure 9 illustrates Axelrod’s (1973) model with slight changes in the expression of the 
steps, for better clarification and compatibility with the current work’s terminology. 
The logic of the model is quite simple and linear. More precisely, the individual goes 
through a set of Yes or No questions (i.e. Hastie, 1981) with the aim of identifying a 
schema that will enable understanding of the incoming message3. Based on the chosen 
schema the individuals have three alternatives, exit with the old interpretation, exit with 
a new interpretation or exit without an interpretation (Peterson, 1985). However, 
despite the fact that the model seems suitable to be utilized as the theoretical basis of 
the current research, it is necessary to modify some of its elements in order to reflect 
the special conditions regarding change, which prevail in this work. The areas in which 
changes should be applied are coded with different colours and mainly concern the 
input and outputs of the model. The following section will present the changes in the 
input and the respective implications, which are essentially what drives the changes in 
the outputs that will be discussed throughout the work.  
                                                 
3 It should be clarified at this stage, that when the incoming information are sophisticated 
enough the individual utilizes a lot of schemas, and probably their subschemas, in order to 
interpret the case (i.e. Norman, & Bobrow, 1976:118; Rumelhart, 1980:42). However, for 
reasons of simplicity the word schema(s), within the scope of the current work, will refer to a 
holistic schema(s) which lies in the top of the schematic hierarchy and includes all those 
schemas that were utilized to interpret the discrepant message (sec. 5.4). 
The fundamentals of the schema change process             Page 52 
3.2 Facing a discrepancy: An essential but undesirable reality 
3.2.1 The notion of a discrepancy 
Entman (1989) claims that Axelord’s (1973) model assumes that people will resist 
knowledge that contradicts their fundamental values and beliefs. Following this 
standpoint it could be argued that the most important difference between Axelrod’s 
(1973) model and the requirements of a change process lies in the nature of the 
incoming information (fig.10). In particular, instead of neutral the initial message is 
discrepant to leaders’ mental representation and expectations of the case at hand, while 
its aim is to manifest a compelling need for change (Armenakis & Harris, 2002; 
Armenakis, Harris & Feild, 2000). That is, a discrepancy indicates, in personal 
(Higgins, 1987) or business (Kilmann & Mitroff, 1979) level, a gap between “what 
actually is” and “what ought (problem) or potentially could (opportunity) be”. To all 
intents and purposes, a change advocate conceptualizes the discrepant message either 
as a problem and predicament or as a need/opportunity for higher performance (Buono 
& Jamieson, 2010:224). In addition, consistent with Kotter’s (1996:35) approach, 
through the communication of the discrepant message the change advocate aims to 
enhance commitment and urgency (Armenakis, Harris & Mossholder, 1993), so that 
change can become reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Discrepant nature of information 
Rahschulte (2007:44) supports that realizing and understanding discrepancies is of 
major importance, since they are the crucial initiator for a PC program to occur. Indeed, 
once the discrepancy between someone’s mental representations of a case and the 
reality of that case (sec. 3.1.1) is identified, it produces cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
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1962; Van Overwalle & Jordens, 2002), which due to its motivational attributes (Elliot 
& Devine, 1994) develops an initial impetus to reduce the felt inconsistency and regain 
cognitive control of the case (Carver & Scheier, 1982; George and Jones, 2001). 
However, this otherwise clear cut relation between discrepancies and their concomitant 
reduction tendencies is violated by old schemas, which due to their inherent resistance 
qualities of self-conservation and reluctance to the new (Arzenšek, 2011; Larson, 1994) 
could halt the change process, even before the impetus to change is created. It is these 
resistant qualities that impose the need for significant alterations to Axelrod’s (1973) 
model, so that the potential responses of leaders to discrepant information can be 
reflected.  
Management theorists have already supported that leaders might avoid seeking 
negative feedback in order to prevent their self-esteem from being damaged (Ashford 
& Cummings, 1983) and retain the image of the competent manager (Millward, 
Asumeng & McDowal, 2010). However, seeking feedback is a choice, while in PCs 
compelling evidence is presented by the change advocate, with or without leaders’ 
consent. Therefore, given that schemas preserve their inherent resistance qualities, not 
only during but also after the demonstration of the discordant information (Labianca, 
Gray & Brass, 2000), it is worth wondering which specific mechanisms could prevent 
leaders from accepting the compelling discrepancies that indicate the need for change. 
These issues are analysed in the following chapters (ch.5, 6, 7 & 8) and various resistant 
factors are introduced, which afterwards are integrated with Axelrod’s (1973) model 
for developing a process based model of leaders’ response to compelling evidence. 
Before this analysis, though, it is essential to clarify the fundamentals of the change 
process and the cognitive approach to the resistance to change. 
3.2.2 Rationalization & the three cases of a schema change process 
In principle, once a discrepancy is encountered leaders get motivated to engage in a 
schema change process to develop a new non-dissonant understanding (q.v. sec. 3.1). 
In their effort to do so, they cancel their previous schema-based interpretation, combine 
all the relevant information and then search in their cognitive repository for a schema(s) 
(fig.9) that could provide a new understanding of the evidence at hand (Axelrod, 1973; 
Rumelhart, 1980:43). It should be noted that according to Axelrod (1973) this process 
might lead to a new interpretation, yet it doesn’t shed light on how new schemas are 
created. His claim abides by the mainstream view of schema theory that proposes 
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schema change to occur mainly by the rearrangement of previous mental structures 
(McVee, Dunsmore & Gavelek, 2005). Peterson (1985), on the other hand, mentions 
that, through the previous process, it is also possible for individuals to develop a new 
schema. That is, when there are no relevant schemas in the cognitive repository able to 
provide a new interpretation, the individual will have to build a new mental structure 
(Hastie 1981:45; Spiro, 1980:260). For that reason, the individual invokes subschemas 
analogous to the discrepant evidence and by compiling them, builds a new 
interpretation of the case at hand (Luke, 1985). In this way, the discrepant evidence will 
lead to the development of a new schema that will, on the one hand retain the novel, 
for the individual, qualities of the faced evidence (Krasny, Sadoski & Paivio, 2007), 
and on the other hand be consistent with an internal cognitive logic (Gioia, 1986:56).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The three cases of mind-set change 
A change process in not that straight forward though, since during change efforts the 
received evidence challenges existing schemas, which in their turn can resist change by 
rationalizing the need for change (George and Jones, 2001). The concept of 
rationalization dates back in Bartlett’s (1932) experiments, during which he noticed 
that, when subjects were asked to recall a recently heard story, they tended to omit or 
explain what seemed to be incomprehensible. Despite Bartlett’s (1932) focus on 
memory, his work is considered the incipience of modern schema theory (Roediger, 
2003) and his general notion of schema has been appropriated by psychologists in 
different domains, including information processing (Beals, 1998). Indeed, 
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rationalization’s two major characteristics, omitting and explaining the 
incomprehensible (Bartlett, 1932:68), coincide with the two major functions of 
schemas in information processing (Rumelhart, 1980:51), that is attention to and 
interpretation of information. It can be argued, therefore, that resistance to 
discrepancies could occur during leaders’ processes of attention to and interpretation 
of the discrepant evidence (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988:43).  
Essentially, in case of a “smooth” process, the result will be a schema change and, 
thereby, a new mental model that will lead to different actions. However, if 
rationalization occurs (for “when” it occurs refer to ch.4), the mental model will either 
remain the same or will change insufficiently, and, consequently, a distorted realization 
of the case at hand will be formulated (Doyle & Ford, 1998; Palermo, 1986). Following 
this logic and given the two main fallacies that were identified in the introduction of 
this work (sec. 1.5), three general cases exist (fig.11), based on which leaders can be 
categorized. In the first case belong leaders who do not understand the need for creating 
a new mental model. These leaders are in the precontemplation stage (fig.2) and in 
essence they “bury their heads in the sand” when they face a problem. Logically, then, 
the focus is on leaders’ inability to perceive and understand the need for change (i.e. 
Cummings & Worley, 2008:29), which occurs when rationalization refers to the 
processes of attention to (sec. 5.2), as well as importance (sec. 5.3) and interpretation 
of the need to act now (ch.6).  
On the other hand, if this need for a new mental model is realized, a leader will either 
proceed to the initiation of change (case 3) or will avoid the mental-shift (case 2). In 
the latter case leaders belong to the contemplation stage and they have to go through 
the preparation stage in order to take action (fig.2). The problem is mainly an issue of 
commitment (i.e. Lippit, et al. 1958:131), and occurs when rationalization refers to the 
process of interpreting urgency (sec. 7.2), causal responsibility (sec. 7.3), and, more 
importantly, coping potential issues (ch.8). Note that the stages of urgency and causal 
responsibility entail aspects of realizing the need as well as developing the necessary 
motivational impulses, which prevents their categorization into a specific case. 
3.2.3 Basic cognitive responses to a discrepancy 
The main responses to the evidence could be approached through Piaget’s (1954) 
theory of cognitive development, according to which individuals use two main 
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processes for making sense of the environmental stimuli, namely assimilation and 
accommodation. Assimilation is the process of incorporating, sometimes by distorting, 
evidence into already established schemas, while accommodation is the process of 
changing existing schemas in order to adapt to incoming stimuli (cf. Atherton, 2011). 
Within the literature of change management, assimilation and accommodation 
correspond to what Bartunek & Moch (1987) respectively call first (minor) and second-
third (major-transformational) order changes (q.v. sec. 1.3.2). If these theoretical 
perspectives, which have been widely utilized in order to determine conceptual 
differences regarding change programs (i.e. Beazley & Gemmill, 2005; Gareis, 2010), 
are considered as the two main responses to the received discrepancy, it is possible to 
develop a basic understanding of resistance.  
In particular, transformational, or else second-third order changes (Bartunek & Moch, 
1987), require either accommodation of the currently utilized schemas (Lyddon, 1990) 
or a shift to alternative ones (Lord & Maher, 2005:217). Leaders who undergo the 
process of rationalization, though, either avoid (attention) or distort (interpretation) the 
discrepant evidence, which results in extirpating the need for accommodation and 
consequently constitutes assimilation a sufficient response (Chafetz, Spirtas & Frankel, 
1998), when actually it is not. Apparently, then, if the discrepant nature of the 
information is a given, this manipulation of the evidence in order to achieve the 
necessary and desirable fit with already existing schemas (Axelrod, 1973), indicates a 
case of resistance to the acceptance of the actual discrepancy, which aims to avoid, in 
a general sense, the psychological costs that accompany accommodation (Block, 1982). 
It should be noted that these “psychological costs” will be discussed throughout the 
work.  
Someone could disagree with the idea of resistance, by counter arguing that Axelrod’s 
(1973) model clearly depicts that even in case of no contradiction between new 
information and pre-existing beliefs (fig.9 orange lines), schematic interpretations 
could be extended and modified. While this would have been a valid argument, it 
doesn’t cancel the previous logic, since even in this case, resistance occurs. As Piaget 
argued when individuals assimilate information, they simultaneously undergo a slight 
process of accommodation of their schemas, since the two processes are interrelated 
(Bringuier & Piaget, 1989:36). In other words, assimilation entails incremental 
adjustment of schemas, which is what Axelrod (1973) describes in his model. 
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Essentially, then, leaders who assimilate, apart from distorting the evidence, adjust their 
schemas, but within their own logical boundaries (Johnson, 1988), which leads to the 
belief that an incremental and adaptive change will be enough when a cognitive shift is 
necessary (Sheldon, 1980). However, as already has been stated, in transformational 
and major OCs, respective cognitive reinforcements of current schemas are 
insufficient, since a paradigmatic shift in individual and organizational level is 
mandatory (Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Levy, 1986). Apparently, then, the existence of 
resistance is justified in the sense that there is a conflict of perceptions, since the change 
advocate introduces evidence that indicates the need for a second-third order 
transformation while leaders apply either no or an incremental first order change. 
 
Instigating transformational changes   Page 59 
 
 
4 A cognitive-emotional approach to changing schemas 
It is widely accepted that a challenge to schemas and mental models places the 
individual in an emotional state. Therefore, the aim of the current chapter is to 
understand the role that emotions play in the schema change process. In the first part, 
a critique on the existing pure cognitive approaches will be provided, and a suitable 
theory to “accompany” the already developed cognitive approach will be suggested. 
Following this critique, the chapter will discuss the notion of motivation and the 
respective action tendencies that can be formulated as an outcome of the emotional 
experience. Finally, the researcher will focus on the defensive scenario by explaining 
how the morbid ego-centricity can instigate maladaptive emotion regulation and thus 
lead to the cognitive epiphenomenon of rationalization.  
4.1 Introducing emotions to the schema change process 
4.1.1 A critique on cognitive approaches & the importance of emotions 
According to Axelrod’s (1973) model, the response to the compelling evidence is 
determined by a set of computationally driven questions (fig.9), which reflect, in 
consistency with the underpinning philosophy of the existing change models (sec. 1.5), 
a deterministic sequence of steps (compelling evidence need action). This 
computational logic would have probably been the case, if pure cognition had been the 
only factor to affect the change process. However, neither the link between compelling 
evidence and need for change, nor the one between need and action are straightforward, 
since emotions intervene and moderate the cognitive process (Storbeck & Clore, 2007). 
More precisely, emotions on the one hand could oppose what individuals cognitively 
concede as a need for change (Sloyan & Ludema, 2010:238), and on the other hand are 
determinant factors for a schema change to occur (Poole, Gioia & Gray, 1989).  
Emotions, therefore, should not be treated as positive or negative aspects of a schema 
change process, but as a constant factor which continually interacts with cognition 
during individuals’ efforts to cancel their previous schemas and build a new 
interpretation (Bartunek, 1984). Paradoxically, though, despite cognitive researchers’ 
initial agreement on the crucial role of emotions, they have separated the two concepts, 
a dichotomy which caused fundamental problems to organizational studies (Strati, 
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1998), since neither cognition nor emotion alone is adequate to explain every perceived 
phenomenon (Garreau, 2009). As Gratch & Marsella (2007:231) supports, it was only 
after a period of neglect, that cognitive theorists have reconsidered the importance of 
emotion, and reengaged it in their pure cognitive approaches. This trend has also been 
reflected in recent change management literature, with researchers adopting an 
approach according to which emotion and cognition induce change in common (i.e. 
George & Jones, 2001; Huy, 2001; Liu & Perrewé, 2005; Tobey & Manning, 2009). 
There is no intention, at this stage, to provide a detailed view regarding the relation 
between emotion and cognition but only a brief introduction so that the reader can 
become familiar with the basics of this work’s underpinning logic. In general, the two 
concepts are fundamentally interdependent with the one continually moderating the 
other (Storbeck & Clore, 2007). More precisely, cognition, without being the only 
mechanism able to do so (Izard, 1993), elicits emotions (sec. 4.1), while at the same 
time the produced emotional experience modulates, in terms of driving, cognitive 
processes (Marinier, Laird & Lewis, 2009). If this notion of interdependence is 
transferred to the concept of schema driven resistance (sec. 3.2), it can be argued that 
rationalization is a cognitive epiphenomenon, the motivational impulses of which lie in 
the mechanism of emotion regulation (Gross, 2001; Gross & Barrett, 2011). In essence, 
emotion regulation can be either adaptive or maladaptive (Mauss, Bunge & Gross, 
2007), a bipolarity which respectively determines if what leaders perceive and decide 
will be consistent with the environmental needs or an outcome of cognitive 
rationalization (Brosch, Scherer, Grandjean & Sander, 2013)4. Based on this logic, the 
rest of the work will formulate the precise relationship between the two concepts, 
starting with the following sections which will introduce the general notion of emotion 
and a suitable theory for accompanying the schema change process. 
4.1.2 The component-process approach to emotion 
The nature of emotion has always been a challenging issue for thinkers and 
philosophers, who have tried to understand it since the era of the pre-Socratics in 
                                                 
4 Brosch, et al. (2013) use the phrase “emotions . . . functioning . . . normally” to describe the 
case when emotions operate as rational mechanisms. The slight difference in the terminology 
used, is due to the fact that the current work considers rationality as the ability to take adaptive 
actions in reference to the environmental needs indicated by the objective reality. 
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ancient Greece (Solomon 2010:3). Within the scope of the interrelated, yet novel 
compared to philosophy (Mueller, 1979), scientific discipline of psychology, 
researchers followed a similar path and tried to specify the essence of emotion 
(Gendron, 2010). Characteristically, Kleinginna & Kleinginna (1981) have already 
reviewed more than 100 definitions of emotion, which demonstrates that the 
community of psychologists have widely spread themselves on the subject. The 
existence of countless ways of defining and approaching emotion, as well as the 
concomitant ambiguity of the term, led authors to raise concerns regarding the 
usefulness of studying it as an autonomous scientific concept (i.e. Duffy, 1934; Widen 
& Russell, 2010; Zachar, 2010). Nevertheless, psychologists’ interest in emotion has 
increased over the years (Izard, 2010a). Recently, it became clear that the uncertainty 
regarding the concept is a burden to overcome and therefore they initiated academic 
discussions with the aim of establishing a theoretical basis, which could be used as a 
reference for future research (Russell, 2012). The results demonstrated that, despite the 
important disagreements among the researchers (i.e. Izard, 2010a; Kagan, 2010), there 
is consensus regarding the multi-componential nature of emotion (Izard, 2010b). In this 
sense, Mulligan & Scherer (2012a) were right to support that not only a “partial-real” 
definition but also a general understanding of emotions has to be researched through 
the lens of emotional components. 
Componential theories of emotion enjoy wide acceptance in recent years. Among them 
Scherer’s (2005a) work seems to be the most influential one, as it has widely triggered 
the interest of the psychological academic community (special issue introduced by 
Frijda, 2007a). Despite disagreements on some important details of the theory and the 
need for improvements (Frijda, 2007b; Loewenstein, 2007), which will be considered 
throughout the work, Scherer’s (2005a) theory has conceptualized current 
understanding on emotion and thereby constitutes an insightful basis for guiding future 
research (Gotlib, 2007; Thoits, 2007). In support of these arguments comes the fact 
that, Scherer’s (2005a) list not only incorporates emotional components which have 
been suggested by other authors (app.4), but also, as Moors (2009) demonstrated, major 
theories of the past, despite their differences in respect to the process that intermediates 
between the stimulus (input) and the emotion (output), can be fitted into Scherer’s 
(2005a) componential mould. 
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Organismic 
subsystem 
Emotion Component Emotion Function 
Information 
processing 
Cognitive component Evaluation of objects and events 
Support 
Neurophysiological 
component 
System regulation 
Executive Motivational component Preparation and direction of action 
Action Motor expression component 
Communication of reaction and 
behavioural intention 
Monitor Subjective feeling component 
Monitoring of internal state and 
organism– environment interaction 
Table 12. The component process theory (Scherer, 2005a) 
Due to the many meanings that could be ascribed to emotion, Izard (2010a) suggests 
that each researcher has to contextualize it in the first place. Following Scherer (2005a), 
this work suggests that an emotion is a dynamic process-episode (Mulligan & Scherer 
2012b) of coordinated changes in five organismic subsystems, which is triggered by an 
important stimulus for the organism. Each subsystem underlies an emotional 
component and refers to a specific function (table 12). Contrary to the static 
perspectives (i.e. Reisenzein, 2007), the component process theory suggests that 
emotions are characterized by multidimensionality and a continuous interaction among 
the dimensions’ components (Scherer, 1982). That is, emotions are not a single thing 
(i.e. a feeling or facial expression) but a process that deploys through the interaction of 
emotional components (Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2006:9). 
4.1.3 The appraisal theories of emotion 
The componential approach establishes a generic scope for studying emotional 
reactions to compelling evidence, yet, the need for additional delimitation is necessary. 
This is because the componential theory could be considered a general 
contextualization of emotion, which, however, does not specify the process of emotion 
causation. For that reason, among the various theories that follow the componential 
mould (Moors, 2009), the researcher, without excluding potential contributions from 
other approaches (i.e. Sugu & Chatterjee, 2012), considers the appraisal theories 
(originated by Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1966) to be the most suitable choice given the 
needs of the current work (consistent with Scherer, 2009a). In particular, there are three 
main and interrelated reasons for choosing the appraisal theories.  
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Initially, they seem to be in line with the general cognitive nature of this work, since 
they ascribe a primary role to the cognitive component (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & 
Frijda, 2013). More precisely, an appraisal is a dynamic process, which derives from 
the natural for human beings mode of processing any stimuli received by the 
environment (Frijda, 2013), and, under common and regular conditions, affects and is 
affected by every aspect of emotion (Franks, 2010). During this process a stimulus is 
evaluated on the basis of a specific or a set of dimensions-variables, which results in an 
appraisal output that represents the meaning of the encountered case for the individual 
(basic law of emotion: Frijda, 1988). In its turn, this appraised meaning triggers the 
rest of the components (table 12) and causes the emotional experience (Moors, 2013a). 
In addition, the dynamic appraisal theories have been suggested for, as well as applied 
in, research relevant to change management (Klarner, By & Diefenbach, 2011) and 
cognition (i.e. Hudlicka, 2004). For instance, Liu & Perrewé (2005) critiques the static 
perspective of previous attempts to study emotion in change management theory, and 
proceeds to describe employees’ reaction to change events through the lens of an 
appraisal driven approach. Following a similar logic, Gratch & Marsella, (2007:231) 
critiqued the absence of emotion in cognitive theories and tried to link the two through 
the adoption of an appraisal-based perspective. Both examples suggest that individuals 
will adopt coping strategies, which are determined by the appraisal as well as the 
produced affective experiences, with the aim of responding to the changing 
environment. 
Appraisal theories, thus, add the additional characteristic of adaptation to emotions, 
since they explain, through the cognitive component, how the interrelation of 
environmental and individual variables will lead to specific emotionally driven 
adaptive responses that serve individuals’ well-being interests (Roseman & Smith, 
2001:7). As Folkman & Lazarus (1985) supported, throughout an emotional process, 
individuals evaluate, in a dynamic and continually changing basis, their relationship 
with the environment and by adopting coping strategies they respond to any problem 
they may face (Schorr, 2001:27.29). Essentially, appraisal theories consider emotion 
as a process of continuous evaluations that links the outer with the inner world (Oatley, 
2007) and, through this attribute of mediation, inform the individual regarding the need 
and the potential to respond in the light of novel evidence (Scherer, 1993a). Therefore, 
consistent with the work of Reisenzein, Meyer & Schützwohl (1996), it is suggested that 
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the logic of appraisal theories is suitable for approaching the emotional reaction to 
discrepancies and, thereby, analysing the cognitive-schema change process. 
4.2 The motivational system & its action tendencies 
4.2.1 The interplay between goals, appraisals & valence 
Goals and strivings, play a central role in the emotional process, since through their 
teleological function establish the basis so that appraisals can ascribe the affective 
meaning to the encountered event-stimulus (Campos, Dahl & He, 2010). Essentially, 
in any transaction with the environment, individuals invoke a set of conscious (Barrett, 
et al. 2007) as well as, automatically triggered (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), 
unconscious goals that guide behaviour and adaptive action in reference to the 
environmental needs (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar & Trötschel, 2001). 
The adopted behaviour is part of an emotional episode (Scherer, 2005a; components) 
which, in its turn, is the outcome of a transactional in nature appraisal process (Moors, 
2013b). This notion of transaction implies that general strivings, such as personal 
needs, goals and values, affect appraisals, since they operate in the background of the 
entire process (Scherer, 2009a), while at the same time their fate is determined by the 
outcome of these appraisals (Moors, 2013b). Thus, it seems that appraisals and general 
strivings-concerns communicate on a dynamic basis and shape the outcome of the 
emotional change process. 
It is suggested that the means through which this communication occurs, is a macro 
valence, which underlies the emotional change process and can be either positive or 
negative (Barrett, 2006; Russell, 2009: property of a core affective state). In particular, 
appraisals ascribe, through their in-built micro-valences (Scherer, 2010:57; 2013), a 
sign to the overall macro-valence that is continually changing throughout the process 
(Shuman, et al. 2013). The logic according to which this sign is ascribed is a subjective 
determination of whether the received evidence should be rejected (dislike) or accepted 
(like) in respect to the dimension that is appraised (Jung, 1971: par.724-725). 
Essentially, then, the generated macro-valence reflects the positive (appetitive) or 
negative (aversive) consequences and implications (Scherer, 2009a) of a case at hand 
for someone’s goals and general concerns (Barrett, 2006; Castelfranchi, 2000). In its 
turn, the formulated macro-valence affects subsequent appraisals not only of future 
events (i.e. Kuppens, Champagne & Tuerlinckx, 2012) but also of additional evidence 
Instigating transformational changes   Page 65 
 
or appraisals in reference to different dimensions of the same event (i.e. reappraisal in 
Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003:572; slightly similar argument made by Lazarus, 1999a:8).  
The suggested dynamic interplay between appraisals and macro-valence (affect and 
cognition in Storbeck & Clore, 2007) constitutes a motivational basis (Lazarus, 
2001:57) of “valenced” neural circuits able to drive consciousness (Lang, Bradley & 
Cuthbert, 1998) to either avoid a punishment or approach a reward (Ressler, 2010; 
Frijda, et al. 1989). Upon this basic structure, human beings have developed 
sophisticated motivational systems that can generate complex coping responses able to 
deal with the demands of a case, as this is appraised along a set of evaluative dimensions 
and in reference to its implications for personal goals and concerns (Fontaine & 
Scherer, 2013). It could be argued, therefore, that during an emotional experience, 
motivation, emotion-affect and cognition (triad in Lazarus, 1999a) dynamically 
interact, and navigate leader’s goal-directed behaviour towards change (Tobey & 
Manning, 2009). The holistic form of such a behaviour will eventually be 
conceptualized in a decision to act or avoid responding to an encountered problem-
crisis. 
4.2.2 Emotional “rationality” & a response’s adaptiveness 
It has been argued that the feeling function with its evaluative judgements is both 
rational and logical (Corlett & Kessler, 2009). More recently, Scherer (2011) has also 
supported the notion of emotional rationality and suggested that emotions provide an 
effective basis upon which adaptive decisions (i.e. decisions for change) could be 
taken. In this sense, someone would expect leaders who face a crisis to formulate an 
emotional experience that would eventually lead towards a set of necessary adaptive 
actions (evolution and natural selection in Plutchik, 2001). Yet, this is not always the 
case, since emotions can potentially function abnormally as irrational mechanisms that 
could lead individuals into adaptational troubles (i.e. Brosch, Scherer, Grandjean & 
Sander, 2013). On this basis, it can be suggested that the appropriateness of a leaders’ 
response can be judged based on the specific emotion that is experienced and, hence, 
the rationality that underpins its respective appraisals (see Scherer, 2011).  
Note that the latter suggestion is, in a sense, superficial and can entail a muddle, as long 
as the appraisals are not considered along with the teleological nature of the concerns 
and goals that the appraiser(s) brings into the process (Campos, Dahl & He, 2010). 
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Indeed, rationality is a relative construct that depends on such concerns and goals as 
well as the overall social, political and economic context within which the appraisal 
process takes place and unfolds (de Sousa, 1995; Volz & Hertwig, 2016). For example, 
a behaviour or an action that seems to be rational and adaptive for the leader, who holds 
a specific set of goals, might be, or simply be regarded as being, fundamentally against 
the interests (different goals) of the system or group within which this leader operates 
(i.e. preservation of personal power in Maner & Mead, 2010). It can be argued, 
therefore, that the notion of relativity that accompanies the concept of rationality 
complicates the logical basis for judging a decision as being adaptive or maladaptive 
(Lazarus, 1995b).  
How is it, then, possible to realize the adaptiveness of a response in general and in 
reference to the call for change? In principle, each of the potentially triggered emotions 
has a unique adaptational goal (Malatesta-Magai & Culver, 1995) that needs to meet, 
at least approximately, the objective environmental conditions (Perrez & Reicherts, 
1992:7), as these are expressed by the evidence that the change advocate provides (q.v. 
sec. 3.1). Once the appraisal process comes to an end, this adaptational goal will be 
conceptualized as a coping strategy that aims to change the current relationship between 
individual-leader and the environment (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988a). As a result, 
leaders’ original appraisal of the encounter will also change in the sense that when any 
evidence relevant to the case will be reappraised, the leader would formalize a different 
understanding and, consequently, elicit a different emotional response (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1988b). Therefore, the crucial question that needs to be addressed is how do 
leaders cope and, consequently, move from the perceptual state of “evidence suggests 
transformational change” to the one in which “evidence does not suggest 
transformational change”? 
4.2.3 The bipolar coping style: Defensive vs non-defensive action tendencies 
An answer to the question that was put forward above is not simple, given the 
complexity that characterizes the coping literature (Skinner, Edge, Altman & Sherwood, 
2003). Nevertheless, the current work approaches the coping aspect from a managerial 
point of view (i.e. Tsui & Ashford, 1994), which allows it to narrow the vagueness and, 
in a sense, develop a more definite theoretical approach. In particular, it is argued that 
leaders can cope either adaptively or maladaptively (families of coping in Skinner, et 
al. 2003). From a general point of view, the former category includes those ways of 
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coping that aim to reduce the discrepancy (Tsui & Ashford, 1994) and tackle the 
problem by taking action on the issues at hand (problem-focused coping in Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984:150). On the other hand, maladaptive ways of coping reduce the 
discrepancy mainly by regulating the emotional experience (emotion-focused coping in 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984:150), a response which avoids the actual need for change 
and, thereby, compromises the action on the issue with the aim of defending the honour 
of leaders’ ego (i.e. Tsui & Ashford, 1994).  
It should be clarified that the two families of coping are not mutually exclusive. That 
is, the adaptive coping strategies, simultaneously with any direct action on the issue at 
hand, function as emotion’s regulators as well and vice versa (Skinner, et al. 2003). 
Indeed, the aspect of emotion regulation, which more or less characterizes every coping 
strategy, encumber a clear distinction between maladaptive-defensive and adaptive 
coping (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2001). Nevertheless, despite this hassle, a major 
difference could be traced in the fact that maladaptive coping includes those strategies 
that emanate from the operation of unconscious ego-defences (Cramer, 1998), the main 
aim of which is to protect the self from any discomfort caused by internal psychological 
conflicts (distinction of defences and unconscious aspect of adaptive coping in Kramer, 
2010). Following this point of view, maladaptive emotion-focused strategies are 
distinguished from the emotion-focused function of problem-focused strategies, in the 
sense that they distort reality (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984:150), as they primarily aim to 
regulate the emotion (q.v. sec. 4.3), instead of taking action in order to change what 
causes this emotion in first place (similar distinction recommended by Bond & Bunce, 
2000). 
Both families of coping strategies are underlain by an action tendency, which prepares 
the individual to engage in a kind of action (Frijda, Kuipers & Ter Schure, 1989). These 
action tendencies, as well as their corresponding actual coping responses that change 
advocates can elicit during the process (Skinner, et al. 2003), constitute the core of the 
change process map. From a general point of view, when leaders respond adaptively 
they initiate the change process (cognitive accommodation), an action that offers 
effective fit between individual and environmental needs (Lazarus, 2000), as these have 
been established by the “objective” reality within which the whole individual-
environment transaction occurs (sec. 3.1.1). On the other hand, leaders who respond 
maladaptively are expected to initiate no or inadequate change (cognitive assimilation) 
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since their understanding is the “victim” of some kind of defence mechanism (Cramer, 
1998). It goes without saying that both of these coping behaviours are relevant to the 
change process. Nevertheless, it is the later maladaptive case (analysed in the following 
section) which interests the researcher, since the focus of the whole work is on “why 
change doesn’t occur”.  
4.3 Leaders & the concept of ego-driven defensiveness to change 
4.3.1 Introduction to the ego-centric responses 
It is suggested that an otherwise smooth adaptive navigation to the environmental needs 
(Plutchik, 2001) could be inhibited under conditions of increased attachment to 
someone’s ego identity and personal goals (Lazarus, 1995a; 1995b; see also Young, & 
Logsdon, 2005). Of course, the ego-self should not and cannot be disregarded, since 
emotions are in fact strategies used for protecting self-esteem and dignity (Solomon, 
1993: xvii; 129). However, this doesn’t mean that they are egoistic (see Nussbaum, 
2001:52), but suggests that whether an adaptive action to the need for change will be 
adopted or not depends on the way the ego-system will “treat” the received evidence 
(Young, & Logsdon, 2005). That is, a successful adaptation requires to balance between 
personal values, goals and beliefs, some of which lie in the unconscious mind, and the 
general environmental needs within which the whole emotional transaction occurs 
(Lazarus, 1990:6)5. Indeed, if this balance between self (egoism) and environment 
(altruism) doesn’t exist, efforts to preserve the ego identity can lead to adaptational 
problems (Lazarus, 1995a), within a social (i.e. Jahr, 1929), economic-political 
(Martin Luther King in Korten, 2010:43) as well as leadership (see Avolio & Locke, 
2002) concept. 
                                                 
5 Following the discussion on the legitimization of the need for change (sec. 3.1.1), it arises 
that the environmental needs can be determined either by the evidence itself or by the 
perception of the majority (or by a mix of the two depending on the reader’s position on the 
spectrum). Respectively, maladaptive responses can occur because the leader either distorts the 
objective evidence (objectivist view) or distances from the will of the people (subjectivist view). 
Nevertheless, regardless of someone’s philosophical assumptions, the underpinning reason for 
maladaptation remains the same; that is, the preservation of leaders' ego identity and the 
protection of its honour. 
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In business terms, system-goals, which are served by the evidence that indicate the need 
for change, should be accompanied by group-centric, instead of ego-centric, individual 
goals (consistent with Crown & Rosse, 1995). Of course, as human beings, leaders hold 
a variety of personal goals, yet the idea of an ego-driven resistance led the researcher 
to focus exclusively on the ones that can, when offended, trigger self-enhancing 
defence mechanisms (for cognitive non-motivated biases see Chambers & Windschitl, 
2004). These goals refer to ego-involvements; that is personal commitments, such as 
beliefs, values and life goals, which constitute someone’s ego-identity and play a 
determinant role in the appraisal process (Lazarus, 1991a:150; 2006:92). They are 
mainly expressed as actual or current (i.e. I am a great inerrable leader), ideal or “want 
to achieve” (i.e. I want to prove “x” to my followers/society), and “have to be” or “ought 
to” (i.e. I have to be like “x”) self-representations, which collectively constitute 
someone’s ego/self-identity (Higgins, 1987). 
Special importance to such goals has been given by theorists like Lazarus (1991a; 
2006:92: ego-involvement) and, to a certain extent, Scherer (2001:98: normative 
significance evaluation) who differentiate between ego-oriented goals and other-type 
goals. Instead, other theorists, like Roseman (2013), use a single construct that 
encompasses everything (i.e. motives). Within the scope of the current research, a logic 
of distinction is followed in the sense that ego-commitments are conceptualized as 
individual-oriented goals, which accompany throughout the process other general 
strivings regarding the system-business (Crown & Rosse, 1995), and can be 
distinguished from their social-oriented nature (social species: Scherer, 2001:98). 
Based on this distinction, a theory of resistance based on the defensive impact of 
“threatened” ego-commitments on the appraisal process (Kumar, 2012; Rhine & 
Severance, 1970) is possible to be conceived. 
4.3.2 Contemporary leaders & their ego-identity 
In order to understand how leaders’ higher level goals, values and beliefs impact on the 
appraisal process, a consideration of the affective meaning that characterizes a leader’s 
identity (Rogers, Schröder & von Scheve, 2014) under the societal norms within which 
he/she grows and operates is essential (Robinson, 2014). Castoriadis (1987) suggests 
that societies create a set of social imaginary significations, which, while being 
unjustifiable on a logical basis (i.e. God), are necessary for a society to operate, since 
they determine its reality-world and, consequently, the values as well as activities of its 
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members. Following this logic, the central imaginary signification and, thereby, the 
societal paradigm (i.e. Baumeister & Muraven, 1996) of the modern world, as this is 
reflected and reinforced in business education (particularly in MBAs), is characterized 
by ego-oriented behaviours (ego-centric goals) that serve to a large extent the self-
interests of leaders at any level (Knights & O’Leary, 2006; for a possible explanation 
see Becquemont, 2011). In essence, business students (future leaders) graduate without 
having conquered the necessary balance between self-interest and responsibility to 
others (Giacalone, 2004). On the contrary, they learn to overemphasize personal gains, 
at the expense of other social values like ethos and cooperation (i.e. Giacalone & 
Wargo, 2010; Pfeffer & Fong, 2004). This is the result of an education that, with the 
blessings of the business world (Pfeffer, 2005), has been taken over by the ideology of 
economism, a basic axiom of which is the motivational force of maximizing self-
interest (Hühn, 2013).  
It could be argued that, it is because of this “economistic” mind-set why many leaders 
conduct inaccurate appraisals and, thereby, produce maladaptive emotions that operate 
against societies' sustainable growth (Bracher, 2012; Lazarus, 2001:60). Along this 
line, Scharmer & Kaufer (2013) call for leaders to transcend from an ego-system 
awareness (ego-centric goals), which serves exclusively their self-interests, to an eco-
system one (group-centric goals), which considers the well-being of the whole system. 
In this higher level of consciousness leaders detach from their fixated egos and break 
down any sense of individualization, which consequently nourishes an intrinsic sense 
of otherness (Young & Logsdon, 2005 calls it integral; see also Collins, 2001 level 5 
leaders). Internally, otherness is translated into consideration of followers’ views, 
opinions as well as reactions to leaders’ behaviour (Taylor, 2010). In addition, leaders 
who are driven by minimal egotism expand their impact beyond the limits of the 
organization by suppressing their self-interests in favour of more ethical (Knights & 
O’Leary, 2006) as well as environmentally friendly (Bergman, Westerman, Bergman 
Westerman & Daly, 2013) decisions. 
Every individual, who operates within a specific environmental context, develops from 
an early age an ego-identity, that is a deeply ingrained theory of the self (Schwartz, 
2001), which helps them to cognitively navigate in life (Berzonsky in White & Jones, 
1996). Arguably, then, the educational (Sanford, 1956) as well as the general socio-
cultural forces of the modern world (Baumeister & Muraven, 1996), provide the basis 
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for leaders to formulate an ego-identity that, consistent with the philosophical 
principles of social Darwinism and Taylor’s approach to management (cf. Dent & 
Bozeman, 2014), overemphasizes their self-interest (Miller, 1999). In this sense, 
leaders, who have been taught as well as blindly abide by the current paradigm are 
expected to act defensively when their “super-ego” is threatened by evidence that 
indicates the need for change (Kumar, 2012). Characteristically, Westerman, Bergman, 
Bergman & Daly (2012) found out that business students compared to students from 
other disciplines demonstrate increased levels of narcissism, which makes them prone 
to ego-defensive strategies when this is considered to be necessary. This egotism, or 
else egocentricity, is by no means welcomed since in case of information that threatens 
the ego, it can engage leaders into unbalanced and biased appraisals (Greenwald, 1980). 
4.3.3 Threatened ego-commitments & maladaptive emotion regulation 
A crisis which is appraised as incongruent in reference to the held ego-commitments 
(Lazarus, 1991a) is expected to pose a threat to the leader’s identity (Petriglieri, 2011). 
As a result, negative emotions will be triggered, the regulation of which will determine 
whether the need to change will be addressed successfully or not (Sayegh, Anthony & 
Perrewe 2004). On this basis, it can be argued that defensiveness occurs when leaders 
maladaptively regulate their emotional experience in order to minimize, or totally 
avoid, negative ego-threatening experiences (Koole, 2009). Regarding this proposition, 
it is essential to clarify that human beings use both conscious and unconscious 
processes in order to regulate and control their emotional impulses (Gross, 2001). Yet, 
the notion of “threatened” ego-commitments in the unconscious mind, led the 
researcher to focus on those that occur implicitly (see Koole & Rothermund, 2011). 
This type of emotion regulation occurs in the intuitive and unconscious level (Gyurak, 
Gross & Etkin, 2011) and, thus, it is an inherent aspect of the overall emotion process 
(Gross, 1999; Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch & Ellsworth, 2007) that aims to support the 
efforts of the individual to cope, defensively or not, with the emotional case at hand. 
Implicit emotion regulation, similar to ego defences (Gillett, 1987), is mainly triggered 
and to a large extent formulated in the unconscious mind (Gyurak, Gross & Etkin, 
2011). However, while it can be defensive, it should by no means be considered 
synonymous to ego defences (Gross, 1998). Indeed, the fact that the whole emotional 
change process is regulated by implicit and unconscious functions, does not mean that 
the leader will be either irrational or not able to successfully adapt in a continually 
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changing business world (Bargh & Morsella, 2008). Instead, the adaptiveness of 
individuals’ actions and behaviour depends on whether the implicit emotion regulation 
will be adaptive by supporting appraisals to control the negative emotion and face the 
challenge (consistent with Koole & Fockenberg, 2011) or maladaptive by operating as 
the basis upon which defence mechanisms that distort the perceived evidence will be 
triggered (Mauss, Bunge & Gross, 2007).  
More precisely, in the adaptive scenario, implicit emotion regulation supports the 
enhanced hot ego system, due to the evidence threatening the ego and the subsequent 
increased personal involvement (Leon & Hernandez, 1998; Madrigal, 2008; Williams, 
Bargh, Nocera & Gray, 2009) to accept the threat and cope with the faced crisis. 
However, when someone’s beliefs and implicit theories are threatened (Plaks, Grant & 
Dweck, 2005) the ego can also be unconsciously motivated (Westen, 1998) to perform 
defensively, in order to protect the self from the received offensive stressors 
(Mlodinow, 2012:201). In this maladaptive scenario, the ego unconcsiously formulates 
a defence content which is projected to consciousness (Gillett, 1987) as an inseparable 
part of the overall emotional experience (maladaptive emotion regulation: Gross, 
1999). The outcome is a distorted meaning which on the one hand protects the attacked 
ego (Menninger, 1954) and the existing beliefs (Robinson & Clore, 2001), on the other 
hand diverges from the objective reality (sec. 3.1.1) that calls for action (Lazarus, 
1995a; 1995b; 1991a). 
To elaborate even further, the unconscious ego-commitments not only ascribe, 
similarly to all goals, the affective meaning to the received evidence (Campos, et al. 
2010), but also can implicitly determine what individuals “want” to feel (Tamir, Ford, 
& Ryan, 2012) and, consequently, think (Duncan & Barrett, 2007). They do so by 
acting as “motivational” drivers that lead individuals to formulate, though the appraisal 
process, reasoning (Kunda, 1990) consistent with their “internally represented desired 
states” (definition of goal: Karoly, 1999). In such cases, individuals-leaders enter in a 
self-deceptive state in which, despite being aware of the objective evidence (spoken by 
the change advocate), produce, through cognitive processes that are hidden from 
awareness, an illusionary and rationalized, yet embraced by them, reality (consistent 
with Balcetis, 2008 notion of self-deception). In case of threatened ego-commitments, 
this reality could, at least in the long run, have negative results for the company 
(Williams, 2014). This is because, it is the outcome of unconscious ego defensive 
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evaluations (Greenwald, 1980) that mainly aim to protect leaders’ self-interests 
(Gardner, Avolio, Luthans, May, & Walumbwa, 2005) and the status quo that is 
attached to them (Rhine & Severance, 1970). 
4.3.4 Mapping the maladaptive scenario 
A call for further delimitation of the maladaptive scenario is established as long as its 
non-deterministic cause of elicitation is considered in combination with the fact that 
the actual change process unfolds mainly under the conscious surface. More precisely, 
the appraisals that drive the process as well as their impact on the rest of the emotional 
components occur unconsciously and it is only a part of these unconscious changes 
that, through the experienced subjective feeling (Scherer, 2004), are reflected to 
consciousness (Scherer, 2005b). This notion of unconscious dominance along with the 
fact that there is no need for every appraisal of the change process to occur in order to 
produce an emotion and its concomitant response-coping (Frijda, 2013), raises an 
interesting question. That is, “how can the change advocate understand at which stage-
appraisal the leader appraises maladaptively the evidence?”. Indeed, the fact that 
leaders can exit the change process by maladaptively regulating the emotion (Koole, 
2009) at any stage-appraisal (Frijda, 2013) and without necessarily being aware of the 
reason why (consistent with Scherer, 1995), sets the development of a basic map, a 
necessary task.  
In order to answer the raised question, it is essential to understand the central role that 
defence mechanisms play in the change process. In particular, it has already been stated 
that a response of “no or inadequate change” requires a kind of rationalization (sec. 
3.2), the motivational impulses of which lie in the mechanism of emotion regulation 
(3.3.1). This affective dissociation (emotion regulation), accompanied by a kind of 
cognitive distortion of the evidence (rationalization), constitutes the basis of every 
possible defence mechanism (the precise mechanism is going to be discussed 
throughout the work) that could occur during the change process (Bowins, 2004; 
Northoff, Bermpohl, Schoeneich & Boeker, 2007). However, while their fundamentals 
are similar, each defence mechanism has discrete and unique characteristics (Vaillant, 
1992), which pave the path for observable differentiations that could facilitate mapping 
the change process.  
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Table 13. The components of the change process map 
In essence, it is argued that, while rationalization is an observable cognitive 
phenomenon of leaders that resist learning from shocks (Miller, 1993), its particular 
expression (Scherer, 2005a: cognitive component) depends on the unique 
characteristics of the triggered defence mechanism. Similarly, while every defence 
mechanism belongs to the family of maladaptive coping (sec. 4.2.3) and is underlain 
by the general action tendency (Scherer, 2005a: motivational component) of avoiding 
change, it is expected that the specific coping behaviour-instance will differ 
respectively (Skinner, et al. 2003). Identifying, therefore, with each involved appraisal, 
the associated unconscious defence mechanisms (1st component) and their concomitant 
observable behaviours (2nd component) seems to be essential for mapping the change 
process.  
Last but not least, the stage-appraisal at which leaders exit the change process can be 
traced by the consciously expressed subjective feeling (Scherer, 2005a: feeling 
component). In particular, the change process will include a set of appraisal-
The component Description Reference  
Cognitive 
understanding 
- 
(Defence 
mechanisms) 
Defence mechanisms operate upon the 
appraisals and ascribe a specific 
character to the phenomenon of 
rationalization. Cognitive 
understanding of the need for change, 
therefore, will depend on the specific 
characteristics of the triggered defence 
mechanism. 
Vaillant (1992) 
Coping behaviours 
- instances 
While every defence mechanism 
results in the general coping response 
of “no or inadequate change”, the 
specific coping behaviour depends on 
the characteristics of the triggered 
defence. 
Skinner, et al. 
(2003); Vaillant 
(1992) 
Subjective feelings 
Each defence mechanism operates 
upon a specific appraisal which in its 
turn acquires a special role since it is 
the one that rationalizes the evidence. 
In this case the expressed feeling is 
expected to “denote” the crucial 
appraisal(s) since it will be mainly 
determined by it/them. 
Scherer & 
Ellsworth, (2013); 
Smith & Ellsworth 
(1987) 
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dimensions, a standard combination of which is invariantly linked to the expression of 
a specific emotional experience (Scherer & Ellsworth, 2013; contrary to Kuppens, 
2013) of mixed feelings (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). In addition to that, while it is 
possible, yet not necessary (Frijda, 2013), for every appraisal of the change process to 
occur, some appraisals seem to be more central than others to the expression of an 
emotion (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). Logically, in cases of 
resistance, this “central role” is assigned by the impact of the defence mechanisms, in 
the sense that they indicate which appraisal rationalized the evidence (for the link see 
above) and, consequently produced a specific blend of feeling (see also Scherer’s, 2011 
notion of emphasizing on a specific SEC). Thus, it is argued that the feeling(s) produced 
by the change process will “denote” the most crucial appraisal(s) and, for that reason, 
it is essential to include the feeling component in the map (3rd component). On this 
basis, the rest of this work sets out to research those cognitive constructs that underlie 
the change process and deploy them in the form of a dynamic framework that will 
include the highly interrelated components of the map.    
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5 Building a model of schematic reaction to discrepancies 
This chapter sets out to identify the barriers which could prevent leaders from accepting 
the evidence that indicate the need for change. At this initial phase the individual 
belongs to the pre-contemplation stage, in which he/she is totally unaware of the need, 
and moves towards the contemplation one, in which his/her conscious awareness of the 
need to take action is established (fig.2:26). The transition to a more conscious state 
occurs when the evidence is appraised as discrepant to existing beliefs as well as 
relevant to leader’s concerns. This necessary process, though, could be hindered by the 
impact of various defence mechanisms and cognitive barriers on the appraisals, which 
will be discussed throughout the chapter. 
5.1 Elicitation of the cognitive-emotional process of schematic change  
5.1.1 The relevance check: Determining the level of consciousness 
Various theorists from different disciplines have proposed that any cognitive process 
of human beings could be categorized within two distinct systems of reasoning (see 
Frankish, 2010, Frankish & Evans, 2009). According to this theoretical perspective, 
individuals use cognitive processes which are either, unconscious, automatic and fast 
(intuitive processes) or conscious, automatic and slow (reflective processes), in order 
to make sense of the world and respond to its stimuli6. The logic of the duality as well 
as the concept of interelation between the two systems have been conceptualized in 
different ways by different authors (i.e Carruthers, 2009; De Neys, 2006; Lieberman, 
Gaunt, Gilbert & Trope, 2002: reflxion and reflection; Kahneman, 2011; see also 
Evans, 2008 table 1). Others have also challenged the clear cut distinction between the 
systems and the idea of having only two of them (i.e. Evans, 2006a), and focused 
instead on two different types of processing (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich 2013). 
                                                 
6 Traditionally, the distinction between System 1 and System 2 thinking (first introduced by 
Stanovich, 1999) is used in order to conceptualize the duality. However, recent advancements 
in the field led the researchers to argue in favour of abolishing this terminology and approach 
(default-interventionist tradition: Evans & Stanovich, 2013; parallel-competitive tradition: 
Carruthers 2012). 
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Within the scope of this work, the researcher follows the parallel-competitive tradition 
which seems to be the current trend in dual process theory (Evans, 2008). According to 
the adopted approach, the two systems do not operate in an either/or basis, but 
dynamically interact in order to formulate someone’s understanding and, thus, 
determine the respone to be taken (inspired by Carruthers, 2009; Lieberman, et al. 
2002).  
It can be argued that the intuitive processes, due to their natural primacy (Louis & 
Sutton, 1991), will analyse first the discrepant evidence. The covetable outcome of this 
evaluation is the engagement of the reflective mode of thinking, so that an insightful 
approach towards information processing (Jett & George, 2003) and, thereby, a 
thoughtful reconsideration of the established schemas (Senge. 2006) could be adopted. 
This seems to be necessary, as the schematic and based on existing beliefs intuitive-
experiential thinking (Epstein, 1994) is inadequate by itself to face discrepancies that 
indicate unprecedented crisis (Evans, 2003), such as the ones that the current work is 
interested in (sec. 1.3). Essentially, the main concern at this very first stage of the 
change process is whether the individual will remain in the primitive automatic-
unconscious mode or will transcend to a conscious one, in which the leader reflects on 
the case at hand (Lieberman, et al. 2002).  
Determination of consciousness level 
Appraisal of relevance 
(Dutton, 1993) 
Strategic perspective 
(Scherer, 2001; 2013) 
Description of the check 
Novelty occurrence 
check 
Familiarity of the issue 
(When) Event is sudden, 
(familiar), unpredictable 
Intrinsic relevance/  
pleasantness check 
Level of issue evaluation 
(positive or negative) 
(When) Event is in itself 
un/pleasant for the person 
Concern 
pertinence/relevance 
Level of Self-relevance 
(When) Event is important 
and relevant for person’s 
goals and concerns 
Table 14. The appraisal of concern relevance 
Along similar lines, Dutton (1993) has proposed three factors that determine a decision 
maker’s level of consciousness during the diagnosis of strategic issues. His factors 
correspond to what Scherer (2001:95; 2013) suggests to be the constituent parts, 
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including novelty, intrinsic pleasantness and concern pertinence, of a relevance check 
(table 14). On this basis it is argued that human beings’ inborn unconscious and 
automatic appraising mechanisms (Ekman, 2004:121) evaluate the situation in respect 
to its relevance for someone’s concerns and general well-being (Reisenzein, 2006). The 
appraisals of relevance, which was later on conceptualized by Frijda (1988) as the law 
of concern, plays a determinant role in the elicitation of the emotional experience 
(Deonna & Scherer, 2010; Frijda & Scherer, 2009:142) and, thereby, has a huge 
impact on the schema change process. This is because it directs attention to the received 
threat (Scherer, 2009b), which will allow the leader to reflect on and respond to the 
problem adaptively. 
5.1.2 Facing a discrepancy & the appraisal of concern relevance 
Evidence from neuroscience suggests that novelty and intrinsic pleasantness precede 
other evaluation checks due to their simple, primary and rapid nature (Grandjean & 
Scherer, 2008; Scherer, 1993a). In this sense, when discrepant evidence that issues an 
urgent appeal for change is received (sec. 3.2), the individual will unconsciously and 
automatically evaluate its attributes of novelty, by searching for a schema that could 
explain the case at hand (Axelrod, 1973). Along with the novelty check, the outcome 
of which is the one that determines both the next phase in the model as well as the level 
of consciousness (fig.12), the individual evaluates, almost simultaneously (Ellsworth, 
2013), the intrinsic pleasantness of the evidence (Scherer, 2001:95;2013). While this 
appraisal is not included in Axelrod’s (1973) approach, its consideration is of crucial 
importance, since it provides an initial sense of desirability (Reisenzein, 2001:195) that 
plays a determinant role throughout the relevance check (sec. 5.1.3).  
There are two potential ways for the leader to realize the novel and discrepant nature 
of the evidence and, thereby, to proceed towards the next sub-check. On the one hand, 
if there is no suitable schema the individual’s brain will automatically recognize the 
stimuli as uncommon-novel (Brosch, & Sander, 2013). On the other hand if there is a 
suitable schema the individual understands the faced situation as known and proceeds 
to an automatic (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987) “comparison” of the evidence with the 
schema itself (Axelrod, 1973). Such a comparison, given the discrepant nature of the 
evidence, compared to the established practices, should lead the individual to realize 
novelty in terms of schematic unexpectedness (Frijda, 1993). In this way, the 
unconscious mind understands that “business as usual” in no more the case and, thus, 
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sets the basis for the reflective mind to engage in the process (cavalry in Lieberman, et 
al. 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Appraisals of Novelty and Intrinsic Pleasantness 
From a pure cognitive point of view (consistent with Axelrod, 1973), if the discrepancy 
is acccepted, the individual proceeds to the next phase of the change process, in which 
he/she affixes the blame for the discrepancy either to the self-schemas (adaptive) or to 
the message (maladaptive). However, the current work treats the concept of blaming 
current schemas as an aspect of a dynamic emotional change process (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1985; Lazarus, 1991a) which takes place through a series of cognitive 
evaluations (q.v. ch. 6). In order for this evaluation to take place though, it is necessary 
that the individual conducts an automatic and rapid appraisal (Brosch & Sander, 2013; 
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Epstein, 1994) of the novel stimuli with the aim of determining whether the evidence 
at hand is relevant or irrelevant to his/her goals, concerns and general strivings 
(Laazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2001). The outcome will emerge to the preconscious mind, 
from where it can access consciousness (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur & 
Sergent, 2006). In this way, when the unconscious mind traces something important for 
the self, it can instantly trigger individual’s conscious attention (Afamasaga, 2009; 
Scheele, 2000:103) and, thereby, the individual proceeds to a reflective state, where 
further evaluations of the evidence will occur.  
5.1.3 Defence in the automatic/unconscious state: Denying the discrepancy 
The previous analysis supports that, under normal conditions, no matter if novelty is 
realized directly, as an uncommon situation, or indirectly as discrepant evidence, the 
individual will proceed to a preconscious appraisal of the stimuli in respect to its 
relevance to the individual’s concerns (Scherer, 2001:95; 2013), which afterwards will 
elicit the necessary, for a schema change to occur, emotional episode (sec. 4.1). 
However, neither the schematic comparison nor the sub-check of relevance is that 
clear-cut. As George & Jones (2001) suggest, individuals can rationalize the 
discrepancy and cease the change process even before the elicitation of the necessary 
emotional experience occurs. This is because, via the appraisal of intrinsic pleasantness 
(Scherer, 2001) individuals detect in an unconscious level the painful affect that 
accompanies cognitive discrepancies (Harmon-Jones, 2000; or even the word change 
itself: see Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2007 on affect heuristic), and, thus, 
they can potentially respond defensively to the call for change. 
In particular, this intrinsic to the evidence negative valence (Scherer, 2013) leads 
individuals to regulate their emotional experience, which is not even properly initiated, 
in order to protect themselves from the forthcoming threat (Mauss, Bunge & Gross, 
2007). In this sense, and given the distinction on emotion regulation that has already 
been discussed (ch.4), the fate of the change process depends on whether the regulation 
is adaptive, which means that the change process proceeds, or maladaptive, which 
means that resistance is manifested (refer to sec. 4.3). Regarding the defensive scenario 
at this initial phase of the appraisal process (Scherer, 2001), it is argued that 
maladaptive regulation occurs via the mechanism of attentional deployment (Gross & 
Barrett, 2011), which operates as a basis for the defence of denial to be activated (Leigh 
& Reiser, 1982; Nadler & Tushman, 1989; Wheeler & Lord, 1999). Once individuals 
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engage in denial, they “manipulate” unconsciously their attentional processes/resources 
(Gross & Barrett, 2011), and consequently rationalize the discrepancy by omitting 
undesirable evidence (Bartlett, 1932). Essentially, denial will prevent most, if not all, 
of the disturbing thoughts, which in this case concern the realization of the discrepant 
evidence, from emerging to consciousness (Dorpat, 1983; Vaillant, 1992:271).  
The emotion regulation and the concomitant cognitive rationalization at this stage are 
able to restrict the aim of a discrepancy. That is, to put individuals into a reflective mode 
in which they reconsider their schemas (Senge. 2006) and adopt an insightful approach 
towards information processing (Jett & George, 2003). In such cases, individuals 
remain in a condition of automatic information processing regarding the issue at hand, 
in which existing beliefs drive behaviour (Epstein, 1994). This is not inherently 
negative, however, when the external environment changes dramatically the automatic 
system becomes unable to trace the need for something fundamentally new (Slovic, et 
al. 2007), and, therefore, the necessary new cognitive schemas for triggering change 
have dramatically less chances to be developed (Reger & Palmer, 1996). As a result, 
instead of accepting the need for something new, leaders are expected to counter-
propose arguments picked up “directly” from their inadequate repository of 
experiences and old beliefs, which might have given explanations in the past yet could 
hinder the necessary change in the future (consistent with the paradox of success Audia, 
Locke & Smith, 2000; “Icarus paradox” Miller, 1992). In addition, consistent with the 
concept of schematic rationalization in terms of omitting incomprehensible evidence 
(Bartlett, 1932), these arguments will support a case of no discrepancy at all, which 
indicates that leaders exit the change process without understanding the need for change 
(case 1: refer to sec. 3.2.2). Based on this logic, the following sections will attempt to 
capture the ways according to which the case of no discrepancy (denial) can be 
formulated and expressed throughout the relevance check, so that an understanding of 
the change process in the automatic/unconscious state can be developed.  
5.2 Unconsciously assimilating the discrepancy 
5.2.1 Unconscious assimilation & discrepancy blindness 
As noted above when the individual possesses a schema for the case, an unconscious 
and automatic comparison between evidence and schema will occur (Axelord, 1973; 
Leventhal & Scherer, 1987), which should result in the realization of the discrepant 
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evidence (Frijda, 1993). However, Axelrod (1973) provides an additional outcome of 
this schema-evidence comparison, according to which individuals perceive no 
discrepancy (fig.9: no to the second question) and consequently interpret information 
with the existing schema. This might be absolutely normal for Axelrod’s (1973) model, 
which assumes the neutrality of the incoming information, yet under the current work’s 
assumptions it should be treated as a case of resistance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Assimilation of discrepancies 
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individuals, since the same discrepant situation could be unpleasant for some and 
exciting for others. Consistent with this logic, the initial sense of desirability which 
derives from the appraisal of intrinsic pleasantness (Reisenzein, 2001:195), will 
determine the response at this stage. In general, the very unpleasant and undesirable 
intrinsic pleasantness of the discrepancy will create tendencies to “get less” from the 
faced situation (Scherer, 2001:107). Yet, it is the way that these repulsive intentions 
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hand, the undesirability of the discrepant evidence, could undergo the process of 
adaptive emotion regulation (sec. 5.1.3), which allows the individual to accept, in an 
unconscious level, the existence of the discrepancy (i.e. painful but need to be accepted 
reality) and, thus, proceed to the next phase of the change process (figure 13: Yes: +). 
On the contrary, if the undesirability of the discrepant evidence is regulated 
maladaptively (sec. 5.1.3), the triggered defence mechanism will lead the individual to 
avoid any further interaction with the situation at hand and, thus, exit the change 
process (figure 13: No: -). In this latter case the leader enters into a mindless state in 
which he/she cannot realize the novelty of the evidence (Langer, 1992), which, as it 
will be analysed below, is an outcome of defensive allocation of attentional resources. 
5.2.2 The mechanism of selective attention 
It is argued that resistance could occur due to schemas’ property to lead the individual 
in a state where he/she selectively chooses the stimuli to be processed (Markus & 
Zajonc, 1985:152). As Karlsson, Loewenstein & Seppi (2009) argued, individuals will 
avoid seeking definitive information when the general context, to which this 
information refers to, suggests a potential threat to the self. Indeed, it seems that 
individuals are biased in favour of allocating their attention to schema-conforming 
stimuli (Johnston & Dark, 1986), while simultaneously they tend to ignore any 
exceptions in respect to their schema based expectations (Fiske & Taylor, 1991:150). 
Through this manipulation of attentional processes, leaders “unconsciously” assimilate 
the discrepancy and, thus, inhibit any conscious realization or even consideration of it 
(Bartlett, 1932; Dorpat, 1983; Gross & Barrett, 2011). That is, because selective 
attention naturally comes before any interpretation processes, the distortion of the 
received message will by definition constitute interpretation incapable of understanding 
the need for change (similar to Leigh & Reiser’s 1982 input subsystem).  
Ultimately, schemas play a fundamental role since they can bias someone’s attention 
in favour of specific stimuli and thereby affect subsequent evaluations of the case at 
hand (Phillips & Lord, 1982). Similar issues with attentional malfunctions could take 
place when it comes to organizational and leaders’ cognition as well. Given that 
environmental scanning, from a cognitive perspective, is the process of receiving 
triggers from the environment that could change managers’ cognitive frames (El Sawy 
& Pauchant, 1988), selective attention could prevent a leader from understanding the 
need for change by controlling which stimuli are perceived. Indeed, the choice of what 
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to pay attention to could be a determinant factor for companies’ awakening and 
realization of the need for change (Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007). However, an organization’s 
dominant logic could prevent leaders from noticing stimuli that are different to what 
they were used to or expected to perceive (Prahalad, 2004). Therefore, it could be 
assumed that leaders will demonstrate attention biases, driven by their schemas, when 
they face discrepancies.  
According to the analysis that has been presented above, leaders, driven by their 
schemas, selectively choose the evidence to process and, thereby, deny the existence of 
any discrepancy (rationalization based on omitting Bartlett, 1932). In this sense, 
someone could argue that given the change advocate’s intervention the case of selective 
attention lacks meaning, since the compelling evidence will be presented no matter 
what. It should be clarified though, that this argument lacks validity, since there is a 
difference between avoiding exposure to threatening information from defensively 
manipulating attentional resources to already received information (Balcetis, 2008). 
Indeed, inconsistent information does attract schemas’ attention (Brewer & Lambert, 
1993:256), which suggests that the problem is not individuals not perceiving the 
stimuli. On the contrary, they are aware of their existence but they unconsciously either 
ignore them (Fiske & Taylor, 1991:150), or do not include them in the interpretation 
processes (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982).  
5.3 Disengage from the discrepancy 
5.3.1 Psychological disengagement as resistance to change 
When the appraisal of novelty is completed, the novel evidence, charged with an initial 
sense of un/desirability, will go through the third sub-check of goal relevance or else 
concern pertinence (Lazarus, 1991a:149; Scherer, 2001:95; 2013). This evaluation is 
essential for the emotional experience to occur (Moors, 2007) and, consequently, for 
the leader to engage in further action (Scherer, 2001:110). Relevant and discrepant 
evidence, though, apart from preparing individuals for action (Scherer, 2001:110), 
could also cease any effort, since it poses a challenge to their self-esteem. In this case, 
the unconscious mind has the ability to prevent conscious processing of any thoughts 
that could cause harm (Dare, Dreher, Holder & Sandler, 2012:93), something which 
leads the individual to exit the change process by denying the message’s relevance to 
his/her concerns (Ellsworth, 2013; Frijda, 1986:455). This controversial condition, in 
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which the individual avoids the state of dissonance by distancing him/herself from the 
already perceived discrepant evidence (appraisal of novelty), can be explained by the 
defensive strategy of psychological disengagement (Schmader, Major & Gramzow, 
2001). According to this psychological phenomenon, the individual detaches the self 
from a specific domain (domain of concern in appraisal terms) and its outcomes, with 
the aim of preventing his/her self-esteem from being damaged, in case of negative 
performance in this domain (Major & Schmader, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Discrepancy blindness 
While stigma, prejudices and stereotypes, which directly impact on self-esteem, are the 
basis upon which psychological disengagement is built, resistance to the compelling 
evidence is caused not by self-esteem’s protection per se, but by individuals’ emotional 
disengagement from a challenging domain (Major & Schmader, 1998; Nussbaum & 
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individuals were emotionally invulnerable to negative feedback. In this sense, and 
consistent with Monson & Freman’s (2012:82) claim regarding people who suffer from 
posttraumatic stress disorder, it could be argued that individuals have developed 
mechanisms of disengagement for proactively preventing themselves from 
experiencing additional negative emotions (emotion regulation in Gross & Barrett, 
2011). That is, the leader “isolates the affect”, and its concomitant motivational and 
transformational power (Fosha, 2000:4-22, Herron & Kantor, 1968), from pure 
cognitive thinking, a process which serves as a defensive mechanism against the 
compelling appeals for change (Bovey & Hede, 2001). Instead, a non-reflective and 
defensive response (i.e. getting angry with the messenger), which is driven by the 
negative affect that has already been produced through the evaluative dimension of 
intrinsic pleasantness, will be formulated (the affect heuristic Slovic, et al. 2007). As a 
reuslt, as long as the reflective mind does not get engaged the need for change will 
remain unanswered (see Frijda, 2010a: impulsive vs reflective action). 
It should be clarified that psychological disengagement from a domain and any 
feedback related to it could be either chronic or temporary. The former indicates a 
feedback related to it could be either chronic or temporary. The former indicates a trait 
of the individual’s self and constitutes an automatic protective mechanism (Hyland, 
1987) for dealing with negative evaluations regarding a domain, while the latter is more 
of a situational response to a particular incident (Major, et al. 1998). Although, both 
types could put an end to the change process, chronic disengagement will more likely 
lead to inaction, since temporary, or else situational, disengagement could entail, in the 
long run, motivational attributes and higher efforts for improvement in respect to the 
challenging domain (Nussbaum & Steele, 2007; or else, leads eventually to the next 
stage of the change process: refer to sec. 5.4). Based on this logic, the current work 
focuses mainly on chronic disengagement and argues that there are two mechanisms 
able to explain why leaders can remain passive and take no action towards change, 
while they have already accepted the discrepant nature of the received information 
(fig.14). 
The first mechanism is the discounting hypothesis (sec. 5.3.3), which is consistent with 
what Axelrod (1973) describes as sources’ downgrade. Janis & Mann (1977:54) 
claimed that when individuals face warning information, the credibility of the 
communicator plays a significant role in their decision to proceed into the adoption of 
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protective actions. In a similar sense, within the scope of organizational change, under 
specific psychological as well as business conditions (sec. 5.3.3), leaders could 
discount the diagnostic character of the feedback in respect to a specific situation, by 
perceiving it as an outcome of prejudiced dispositions against them (Crocker & Major, 
1989). In addition, apart from discounting the message, recent research has shown that 
stigmatized individuals who face negative feedback could also disidentify with the 
domain of the inconsistency (Biernat & Danaher, 2012). According to this logic, 
leaders, who suffer from a potential attribution of the failure stigma, could disidentify 
with a specific problematic domain (Steele, 1992) within their business and reorient 
their focus to different ones (sec. 5.3.2). Each mechanism entails various costs, like 
societal and psychological ones, which depend on the conditions characterizing the 
situation at hand and determine which mechanism will be used (Réger & Loose, 2006; 
Tougas, Rinfret, Beaton & De la Sablonnière, 2005). Regardless what the case might 
be, both mechanisms will lead to a state of disengagement (Major, et al. 1998) and a 
concomitant denial (sec. 5.1.3) of the need for change. 
5.3.2 The concept of disidentification 
Steele (1992) developed the theory of disidentification, in his effort to explain the 
difference between African-American and White students in US regarding their school 
progress. Continuous exposure to stereotypes made the former disassociate school 
achievements from self-esteem, in order to proactively protect it. The main logic is that 
they demystify the pursuit of high scoring for avoiding, in case of low performance, 
stereotype confirmation (Steele, 1997), something which apparently will not happen 
with white students. After the publication of this research the concept of 
disidentification has gained wide support in the literature (McInerney & Van Etten, 
2001:251). In a more general view, stigmatized people will disidentify themselves with 
challenging domains (Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999:142) and any feedback related to 
them (Major & Schmader, 1998:236), in order to avert stereotypes’ confirmation and 
protect their self-esteem. Instead, consistent with Steele’s (1988:181) self-affirmation 
theory, individuals maintain their overall self-integrity by affirming their self through 
a different resource. For instance, African-American males who neglect the 
discrepancy of low scoring, given the score-driven education system (Goldstein, 2004), 
focus on other areas, from which they retrieve esteem (Graham, Taylor & Hudley, 
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1998). In this sense, disidentification provides a logical basis for rationalizing the 
coexistence of high self-esteem and poor performance.  
The concept of disidentification can be transferred into the business world. It has been 
suggested that business failure is linked with social stigma and embarrassment for 
entrepreneurs (Martin, 2006), which, as Landier (2005) claims, influences various 
entrepreneurial activities and decisions as well. In addition, it is believed that people 
generally avoid failures in order to protect their self-esteem (Crocker & Park, 
2011:309), and, therefore, it could be argued that in the light of a business failure, 
leaders will take decisions with the aim of avoiding any stigma and embarrassment 
associated with their self. Indeed, if the case of flying away and leaving the company 
is excluded, executives seem to have two available responses when failure is evident. 
On the one hand they could try to fight the problem, which, given that the logic 
responsible for its development is inadequate to solve it (Sterling, 2007:64), implies 
change of the current way of thinking about as well as practicing management 
(potential blame on current interpretation). On the other hand, they could try to 
disengage from any imminent failure (Semadeni, Cannella, Fraser & Lee, 2008), which 
indicates that leaders do potentially detach the self from a challenging domain in order 
to protect their self-esteem and avoid a subsequent attribution of the failure stigma 
(Martin, 2006).  
Detachment as described above, though, could reflect either a case of disidentification 
or its temporary version, called devaluation, which is still an esteem-protective 
mechanism against threatening information, but mainly refers to situational responses 
regarding particular incidences (Aronson & McGlone, 2009:164). This temporary 
mechanism of disengagement can be considered a case of resistance and within the 
scope of this work is treated as an aspect of the defence mechanism of trivialization 
(sec. 7.1). However, given its situational nature, devaluation requires a sense of 
reflective thinking, and, therefore, it is impossible to be treated as a habitual response 
that is produced in an automatic way (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Consequently, 
cessation of any effort for improvement at the unconscious stage occurs when the 
intermediate level of situational disengagement leads, or more accurately has already 
led, to a chronic state of disidentification (Morgan, & Mehta, 2004; Nussbaum & 
Steele, 2007). According to Major & Schmader (1998:221) a state of disidentification 
is developed through continuous exposure to the same problem and disengagement 
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with the domain in question. In other words, disidentification requires previous 
experiences with a challenging domain, and probably is not a situational response, but 
it is part of an individual’s self-definition (Major, et al. 1998). 
It could be argued that chronic detachment with a problematic domain will not prevent 
self-esteem from being damaged, since the failure will occur and the stigma will be 
attributed to the leader. Yet, according to disdentification theory, leaders will focus and 
probably escalate their efforts on the basis of an affirmation resource, which on the one 
hand has been the reason for their past success (Nadler, 2007), and on the other hand 
will work as an “alibi” for the potential failure.  
Steel (1988) supported that the affirmation resource could be either relevant or 
irrelevant to the cause of the initial discrepancy, and it will be used for affirmation as 
long as it is central to the self. On the contrary, Aronson, Blanton & Cooper (1995) 
demonstrated that individuals will avoid any affirmation resource relevant to the 
discrepancy, even if it is central to the self, and will select those which justify and 
“substitute” the initial maladaptive behaviour. The latter argument seems logical since 
a relevant resource could create controversies with individuals’ choice in the first place, 
by making salient the violated rules that caused the discrepancy (Blanton, Cooper, 
Slkurnik & Aronson, 1997). Therefore, transferring these into the business world, 
leaders will not solely focus on domains which could affirm their self-esteem. On the 
contrary, it is possible to see leaders focusing on domains irrelevant, yet supplementary, 
to the discrepancy, which simultaneously serve the company as well as justify the 
apathy towards and ostensibly substitute the inconsistency indicated by the change 
advocate. Finally it should be noted that the defensive response at this stage is not 
caused by the use of an affirmation resource per se. Besides, self-affirmation can 
minimize the need to use ego-defensive biases and, thus, promote adaptive responses 
(cf. Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Instead, it is the use of the affirmation resource as a 
supplement to the process of disengagement.    
5.3.3 The discounting hypothesis 
Similar logic to the disidentification theory underlies the discounting hypothesis, 
according to which individuals reduce the importance and accuracy of negative 
feedback (McInerney & Van Etten, 2001:253). The logic of the theory is that 
stigmatized individuals protect their self-esteem (Major, Kaiser & McCoy, 2003), by 
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attributing the blame not to their inability to meet a specific case’s requirements 
(potential blame on current interpretation), but to assessors’ predisposition, driven by 
their prejudices, to provide negative feedback (Crocker & Major, 1989). No matter if 
there is or there is not a case of unfair assessment, when negative feedback could be 
attributed to prejudices, stigmatized individuals, in their vast majority, will choose to 
do so (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa & Major, 1991). In this sense, the assessed apart from 
being a victim of potential prejudices becomes, at the same time, the immolator, as 
he/she is prejudiced against the assessor, and due to this state of mutual prejudices, the 
understanding of the incoming information is unlikely to reflect the reality (Morton, 
2009:239). 
Competition plays a determinant role in developing prejudices in the business world 
and, thereby, provides the basis for the discounting hypothesis to occur. This statement 
derives from Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif’s (1954/1961) research, which 
demonstrates that groups operating within a competitive environment develop not only 
hostility towards one another but also phenomena of mutual prejudice. While their 
work dates back approximately 55 years, their experiment is widely accepted by recent 
researchers and their book has been characterized as “the most significant book in social 
psychology” (Fine, 2004). An important exception to this general acceptance is 
Tyerman & Spencer’s (1983) critique, who supported that if group members have 
several years of previous acquaintance, competition is not enough to develop 
phenomena of hostility and prejudice. Their argument seems logical, if someone takes 
into consideration the quite young age of their experiment’s subjects, who additionally 
were familiar with each other for years and probably were driven by youth’s innocence. 
However, in a system, like the contemporary one, which leads individuals to isolation 
(Guntrip, 1968:355) with a clear trend to protect their self against any competitor 
(Catalino, 2010:55), hostility and prejudice seem to find a fertile ground for their 
establishment (i.e Bracher, 2012). On this basis, the current work accepts Sherif’s, et 
al. (1954/1961) conclusions and suggests that competition is indeed the basis for 
discounting hypothesis to take place.   
In addition, given this harsh and competitive reality in the world, Sassenberg, 
Moskowitz, Jacoby & Hansen’s (2007) work, which expands Sherif’s, et al. 
(1954/1961) initial conclusions, acquires additional credit. They claimed that even if 
specific competitors do not participate in the development of the competitive climate, 
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individuals will still develop prejudiced and hostile behaviours as long as they had 
previously faced competitive conditions. Therefore, it is not only that everyday life will 
promote what Pinel (1999) called stigma awareness, which enhances an individual’s 
ability to perceive him/herself as a target of discrimination. But the competitive reality 
develops a respective competitive mind-set (Sassenberg, et al. 2007) which leads the 
individual to a state in which perceiving hostility and prejudices against him/herself 
becomes an irrational obsession. Thus, it is possible to see individuals favouring those 
causes of a given effect, which could be explained by the competitive and prejudiced 
reality, and, thereby, consistent with the discounting hypothesis, protect their self-
esteem (Major & Schmader, 1998). 
Competitive conditions, which create a fertile ground for developing similar irrational 
obsessions, can be traced in the world of economics and business as well. While 
competitiveness could have been a journey towards excellence (Zahra, 1999), reality 
is quite different, since it became an obsession responsible for many of society’s 
problems (Krugman, 1994). At a business level competitiveness developed into a war 
among firms, to such an extent that some authors argue that success depends on the 
wise transfer of Sun Tzu’s military theories into business (e.g. Krause, 2005:1; 
McNeilly, 1996:4). Within this competitive environment, it is logical, yet arguably not 
acceptable, to treat direct or indirect competitors with hostility. However, the business 
world “went a step further”. According to Porter’s (1980/2008) five forces (5F), which 
is a popular tool for analysing businesses’ environments and formulating strategies 
(Clark, 1997; Stahl and Grigsby, 1997:145), companies should compete not only with 
competitors but also with suppliers and customers (Ghoshal, 2005). Obviously, this 
approach promotes hostility and prejudice between partners, which instead of 
cooperating and striving for a common goal, they prefer competing and placing their 
selves in a win-lose type of partnership, with devastating results for their performance 
(Deming & Neave, 1990).  
Apparently, the previous discussion corresponds to the highly relevant research area of 
inter-organizational trust and its positive contribution to the inter-firm exchange 
process performance (see Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998). From a complementary 
point of view, it can be argued that lack of trust plays an important role on how leaders 
treat feedback. For instance, research has shown that individuals deny compelling 
evidence that issue an urgent appeal for action regarding human suffering, due to 
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mistrust of the organizations that initiate the campaigns (Seu, 2010;2011). Of course, 
understanding the phenomenon of trust within the business context is not that simple, 
since inter-organizational trust is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that dynamically 
changes as the relationship between the partners-firms unfolds (Huang & Wilkinson, 
2013). Nevertheless, apart from this relational type of trust, which is unique for every 
case-partner, there is also a dispositional type which refers to a relatively fixed among 
various cases characteristic-belief of the individual that others can, or cannot, be trusted 
(Gulati & Sytch, 2008). More precisely, if the individual has a competitive mind-set 
and believes that he/she is in a competitive situation, lack of trust will be manifested 
(i.e. Heneman & Greenberger, 2002:23) and change will not occur.  
Concluding from the previous, it is suggested that the competitive climate among 
stakeholders paves the path for discounting hypothesis to occur. Hilton (1995) argues 
that individuals filter utterances on the basis of their perception of the speaker. 
Similarly, hostility and prejudices among stakeholders affect interpretations during 
business communication. These feelings will be triggered and probably enhanced, in 
the light of negative feedback by a stakeholder, regardless of the existence of previous 
conflicts and negative experiences with the stakeholder him/herself (Sassenberg, et al. 
2007). On the basis of this continuous pressure of competition, which as noted above 
formulates a competitive mind-set, disengagement through the phenomenon of the 
discounting hypothesis abolishes its situational characteristics (Caudroit, Stephan, 
Brewer & Le Scanff, 2010), and takes on more chronic features (Major, et al. 1998). 
That is to say, building imaginary enemies and discounting negative feedback, by 
attributing the blame to the general unfair system and the hostile predispositions of 
various stakeholders (Major, 1994:335), becomes an integrated trait to a leader’s self-
organization (Heneman & Greenberger, 2002:23). Thus, driven by their competitive 
mind-set, executives will constantly tend to discount any negative yet worthy feedback, 
which consequently will lead to denial of any need to learn and change. 
5.4 Towards the next phase: An emotional experience of surprise 
From a cognitive as well as emotional point of view, any evidence discrepant compared 
to schematic representations of reality, will lead to an emotional experience (George & 
Jones, 2001; Mandler, 1990:13, A; Mendonca, 2011:49; Stein & Trabasso, 1991:52). 
More, precisely, when a leader faces unexpected evidence and realizes a potential 
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blame of the existing interpretation, he/she is expected to experience the emotion, or 
more accurately pre-emotion (Lazarus, 1991a:83), of surprise which is independent 
from further appraisals (Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996). Note that the main logic 
behind this transitional stage, and its consequences (fig.15), is consistent with the 
cognitive-psychoevolutionary model of surprise (Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 
1997; Reisenzein, 1996).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. The steps after the appraisal of relevance (Based on Reisenzein, 2000) 
The cognitive appraisals that led to the emotion of surprise will affect the rest of the 
emotional components. The unconscious processes will be reflected in the conscious 
mind through the subjective feeling of surprise, and, thereby, the individual will 
become aware of the discrepancy (Reisenzein, 2000). This transition to consciousness 
will be accompanied by a physiological arousal, which is an expected reaction to the 
cognitive discrepancy (Cappella & Greene, 1982; Christenfeld & Mandler, 2013:191; 
Croyle & Cooper, 1983; MacDowell & Mandler, 1989), and could also be expressed 
by a facial expression of surprise (Batty, & Taylor, 2003). This synchronization will 
lead to a complete emotion of surprise which in its turn will function as an interruption 
mechanism that will capture individual conscious attention to the discrepant evidence 
(Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph, & Schützwohl, 1991).  
In essence, the ongoing cognitive processing will be interrupted (Reisenzein, 2000; 
Simon, 1967), and a state of action readiness (Frijda, 1988) that will create a desire to 
further analyse and thereby understand the discrepant evidence will be developed 
(Brocas & Carrillo, 2003:211; George & Jones, 2001; Roseman, 2013; Warneryd, 
2008:55). Furthermore, through the component of arousal, the “heat” to unfreeze the 
necessary motives for change is provided (Tobey & Manning, 2009), while at the same 
time the individual “gets cognitively prepared” to face the change by accommodating 
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his/her schemas (Mandler, 1990:15). In such cases, the intuitive processes go into the 
back and the reflective mind, which initially operates in a lower level (Kahneman, 
2011:24), comes in the cognitive foreground (Croskerry, 2009). The expected outcome 
from engaging in this state of higher cognitive ability and conscious engagement (Louis 
& Sutton, 1991) is to construct a new mental model of hypothetical understanding 
regarding what is necessary to be done in order to face the unknown-novel crisis at 
hand (Evans, 2003). That is, though a set of additional cognitive appraisals (analysed 
in the following chapters) action able to deal with the new evidence (Sternberg, 
Roediger & Halpern,, 2007:12) and the concomitant cognitive dissonance produced by 
the discrepancy (George and Jones, 2001) should be triggered. 
5.5 Compiling the theory: A model of schematic reaction to discrepancies 
The previous sections described the process according to which leaders appraise 
discrepant evidence at an unconscious level. In particular, the appraisal of novelty, 
accompanied by the one of intrinsic pleasantness, will orient leaders’ attention (Smith 
& Ellsworth, 1985) towards the discrepancy (sec. 5.1 & 4.2). These appraisals though, 
are insufficient to initiate the necessary emotional process (Campos, et al. 2010; Moors, 
2007) since it is only when the received information is evaluated as significant to 
someone’s well-being (sec. 5.3) that the emotion of surprise is experienced. Three 
general alternatives have been formulated for leaders who face discrepant evidence 
(fig.16). That is, leaders could: 
1. Have no interpretation of the case. Novel situation is faced. 
2. Realize potential blame of their old interpretation. No resistance is expressed. 
3. Insist on their old interpretation. Resistance is expressed. 
The first two paths indicate cases where individuals could realise the discrepancy 
without any symptoms of resistance while the third one indicates a case where 
resistance to the identification of the discrepancy could arise and the change advocate’s 
intervention is necessary. No matter which path the individual may follow, and of 
course given the successful intervention of the change advocate in case of resistance, 
the outcome will be for the individual to proceed to the second phase of the change 
process. More precisely, a perceived discrepancy (Jett & George, 2003), or a novel 
incoming message (Croskerry, 2009), will transfer the individual from an unconscious  
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Figure 16. Schematic reaction to discrepancies
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state to a cognitively conscious one, in which individuals evaluate the evidence from a 
reflective perspective (sec. 5.4).  At this stage, the current chapter comes to an end, 
since its aim to analyse the process which leads to the identification of the compelling 
evidence, has been met. The rest of this work aims to conceptualize the process 
according to which the individual develops a new understanding that will lead to action. 
This new understanding will be constructed based on schematic and reflective 
cognitions, the analysis of which is the main research focus of the following chapter. 
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6 The change process in the reflective state 
The realization of the discrepancy transfers the individual from an unconscious to a 
conscious state. In this chapter, the qualities of cognitive appraisals in the later 
reflective system are explicated with the aim of understanding why leaders that face 
the same evidence could be led to different responses regarding the need for change. 
The concepts of subjectivity and defensive response will be elaborated from a 
psychological as well as a philosophical perspective. Based on these theoretical 
foundations, the chapter will conclude with the illustration of an emotional change 
model and a discussion on the underlying mechanisms that could cause maladaptive 
responses to the need indicated by the received evidence.   
6.1 The cognitive component as a duality in the reflective state 
6.1.1 Introduction to the concept of duality 
It has been argued that the emotion of surprise, which is triggered in the unconscious 
and automatic state, will lead the individual into a reflective and conscious mode of 
thinking (q.v. ch.5). While in principle this transition seems to be valid the either/or 
distinction doesn’t explain the complexity of human mind (see Carruthers, 2012). As 
Lieberman, et al. (2002) suggests, based on their conceptualisation of the cognitive 
duality, when the reflective mind (C-system) gets engaged the non-reflective mind (X-
system) continues to operate. From a consistent perspective, Evans (2008) challenges 
the traditional distinction between system 1 and system 2 thinking, by supporting that 
it is possible to have a system 2 which involves not only conscious, slow and controlled 
cognitions, but also, fast, uncontrolled and unconscious ones. It seems, therefore, that 
whilst the individual has become consciously aware of the potentially discrepant 
evidence, unconscious and intuitive cognitions affect the change process in this latter 
reflective state (i.e. Marcel, 1983). This idea will be elaborated in the following 
sections. However, before proceeding in the analysis of how the two systems 
dynamically interact, it is essential to present them “in isolation” and explain how they 
are conceptualized within the scope of this work.  
Researchers in dual theories have suggested various characteristics according to which 
the cognitive processes could be categorized (see Evans, 2008 for a review). Recent 
The change process in the reflective state              Page 100 
 
scientific evidence on change readiness, though, advocates a main distinction between 
cognitive and affective evaluations (Rafferty, Jimmieson & Armenakis, 2013; Stevens, 
2013). Similarly, LeDoux (2007) argues that emotional-affective cognitions, which 
belong to intuitive-experiential thinking (Evans, 2008; Epstein, 1994), are different 
from various cognitive functions that are well developed in humans. These emotional 
cognitions evaluate the evidence in reference to someone’s well-being (Cunningham & 
Kirkland, 2012; LeDoux, 2007) which, not only results in some sort of feeling (the 
classic notion of appraisal) but also determines if the evaluated reality will be accepted 
or not (Frijda, 2007b).  
Table 15. Various considerations of the duality 
 Ego-driven mind Gnosis-driven mind Reference 
C
h
an
g
e 
th
eo
ri
e
s Affective evaluations 
Cognitive 
Interpretations 
Gibson (1995);  
Rafferty, et al. (2013); 
Stevens (2013) 
A
p
p
ra
is
al
 t
h
eo
ri
es
 o
f 
em
o
ti
o
n
 
Affective appraisal Cognitive evaluation Castelfranchi (2000) 
Associative Rule - Based Smith & Neumann, (2005) 
Emotional processing Cognitive Processing LeDoux (2007) 
Intuitive Appraisal Deliberate appraisal Arnold (1960) 
Schematic system Propositional system Schaefer, et al. (2003) 
Appraisal Inferential strategies Lazarus & Smith (1988) 
Implications for 
someone’s well-being 
Non- evaluative and 
fact oriented 
Kuppens & Van Mechelen 
(2007) 
Reinstatement  Computation Clore & Ortony (2000) 
D
u
al
- 
P
ro
ce
ss
 t
h
eo
ri
es
 
Hot Cold Abelson (1963) 
Experiential Rational Epstein (1994) 
System 1 System 2 Stanovich (1999) 
Type 1 Type 2 Evans (2008) 
X-system C-system Lieberman, et al. (2002) 
Intutive systems Reflective architecture Carruthers (2009) 
Accosiative Propositional 
Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen (2007) 
Hot “Go” system Cool “Know” system Metcalfe & Mischel (1999) 
P
h
il
o
so
p
h
y
 Protagorian 
Subjectivity 
Platonic Objectivity 
Versenyi (1962); Goldstein & 
Alexander (2006) 
Current perspective to 
which individual is 
beholden 
Considers additional 
perspectives 
Nagel (1989); Nietzsche (in 
Anderson, 1998) 
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Following the duality which is recommended by change management theorists, it is 
argued that an individual, during the reflective state, not only cognitively interprets the 
evidence for change but also emotionally evaluates it in the light of personal concerns 
(Gibson, 1995). This proposed cognitive-affective duality is conceptualized in two 
systems, the ego-driven (hot) and the gnosis-driven (cold), the properties of which are 
demonstrated in table 15. Generally speaking, the systems consist of cognitive and 
affective processes which continually interact (Goel & Dolan, 2003) and jointly 
determine behaviours (Pessoa, 2008) as well as create mental-models of conscious 
understanding (Christensen & Olson, 2002). Consequently, any action that an 
individual may undertake, like accept or decline the proposed evidence for change, 
depends on the mental model that will be triggered (Senge, 2006:8) as a result of their 
function (analysed throughout the chapter). It should be noted, though, that the 
suggested categorization is by no means restrictive since there are important differences 
between concepts that belong in the same column (cf. Evans, 2008). Thus, each box 
should not be considered an absolute representation of the general system to which it 
belongs, but as a building block for its development. 
6.1.2 The ego-driven system 
The ego-driven mind comprises the implicit and personal schematic beliefs (Lazarus, 
1991a:140; Lazarus & Smith, 1988: General Knowledge), or else the unconscious 
mental models which are developed mainly through past experiences (Fiske & Linville, 
1980) and influence someone’s understanding about how the world works (Senge, 
2006:8). In addition, it includes superordinate goals (ego-ideals: refer to sec 4.3), 
which along with the previous construct a global meaning system (enduring 
knowledge) that guides schematic interpretations as well as associations and, thereby, 
formulates understanding of a particular encounter (Park, 2010; Park, & Folkman, 
1997; Cervone, 2004). Similarly, individuals in organizations, like leaders, hold 
schematic beliefs and mental constructs in order to make sense of their organizational 
life (see Harris, 1994). Based on them, they generate, automatically and fast, the stream 
of consciousness (Lieberman, et al. 2002: X-system) in the context of their 
organizational environment, and proceed to actions that have been developed after 
years of accumulated learning and experience (Lieberman, 2003).  
The ego-driven system precedes the gnosis-driven one, since it consists of rapid and 
automatic cognitions and takes place in the intuitive-experiential mind (Evans, 2008; 
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Epstein, 1994). Its processes refer to hot-affective cognitions (Abelson, 1963), the core 
of which is the automatic (Lazarus, 1991b; Moors, 2010), schematic (Leventhal & 
Scherer, 1987) or else intuitive (Arnold, 1960:182) appraisals. They are necessarily 
evoked and evaluate the evidence based on past experiences, current goals and 
unconscious schematic expectations (Ellsworth, 2013; Smith & Neumann, 2005) that 
belong to someone’s global meaning system, as described above. Consistent with the 
classic notion of appraisals (i.e. Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013), their role 
is to evaluate the implications of an encounter for someone’s well-being by considering 
any kind of concerns and, thereby, to produce an emotional experience. Following this 
logic, the word “ego” aims on the one hand to conceptualize the close relation between 
“hot” cognitions and the self-ego (Chandler, & Birch, 2010:695), on the other hand to 
separate these cognitions from other ‘colder’ ones, like various attributional and 
inferential strategies (Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 2001:57), which within the 
scope of this work will be included in the gnosis-driven system.  
If an individual could appraise evidence only with ego-driven processes, the outcomes 
would be extremely susceptible to ego-centric subjectivity (see subsequent sections for 
in depth analysis). Apparently, ego-driven cognitions are consistent with the classic 
notion of appraisal and, therefore, are based on subjective, instead of objective, 
evaluations of the evidence at hand (Kuppens & Van Mechelen, 2007; Scherer, 1999a). 
More precisely, appraisals draw upon various types of information, like personal goals, 
that lie in the “repository” of the unconscious (Borgh, & Borndollor, 1996) global 
meaning system in order to subjectively evaluate specific stimuli (Moors, 2013b), and, 
thereby, construct the personal and unique reality for any individual (Ben-Ze'Ev, 
2003:155). Thus, consistent with the concept that “the man is the measure of all things” 
(Protagoras famous doctrine in Versenyi, 1962), it could be argued that the close 
relationship between the self-ego and the appraisals make the outcomes of this system 
subjective in their very essence.  
6.1.3 The gnosis-driven system 
Awareness of (emotional) mental processes (Scherer, 2004) along with any contextual 
knowledge (Lazarus & Smith, 1988), or else understanding, of a particular encounter 
at a given moment are realized in the conscious gnosis-driven system (consciousness: 
Schneider & Velmans, 2008). From a traditional theoretical perspective, it could be 
argued that various construal related cognitions, such as inferential strategies and 
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attributions, evaluate the received evidence by drawing upon the personal global 
meaning system (Lazarus & Smith, 1988: General Knowledge; Park, 2010; Park, & 
Folkman, 1997) and formulate what individuals understand (Lazarus, 1991b). This 
seems to suggest that inferential strategies and attributions function similarly to 
appraisals (sec. 6.1.2), which explains why various authors have treated them as either 
being the same thing or the cold counterparts of appraisals (Lazarus, 1991a; Lazarus 
& Smith, 1988). Within the scope of this work, a distinction between the processes of 
the two systems will be accepted without though falling into the trap of the illusionary 
competition between hot/heart and cold/mind reasoning (Phelps, Lempert & Sokol-
Hessner, 2014).  
In essence, the cognitive processes of the gnosis-driven system allow human beings to 
reflect on the stream of consciousness that has already been produced by the ego-driven 
system (Lieberman, et al. 2002: non-reflective consciousness) and, thus, offer the basis 
for a “re-evaluation” of the evidence (Lieberman, et al. 2002: reflective consciousness). 
In contrast to Lazarus & Smith (1988; but see Smith, Haynes, Lazarus & Pope, 1993), 
this revaluation defers from previous ego-driven appraisals by coming later and 
consistent with the main characteristics of system 2 thinking, is reflective, conscious 
and deliberate (Evans, 2008). That is, cognitions in the gnosis-driven system are able 
to place the individual in a relative distance, compared to intuitive appraisals, from the 
object-ego and its activities (Sartre’s notion of reflection in Morris, 1985) and, thereby, 
review the emotional outcomes of the ego-driven system (refer to sec. 6.1.2) in a 
thoughtful and strategic way (Evans, 2006b). On this basis, it can be argued that 
reflective cognitions refer to a “cold” processing of the already generated emotion that 
aims, mainly yet not exclusively (analysed below), to regulate and control (Smith & 
Neumann, 2005) rather than produce the emotional experience (Schaefer, et al. 2003). 
Let’s for a moment leave aside the notion of reflection and consider an imaginary 
scenario in which a situation is appraised solely with gnosis-driven processes that 
operate autonomously and without the support or contribution of the ego-driven 
system. It is argued that in such imaginary cases, the absolute objectivity as this is 
reflected in nature’s unchanging true “forms” (Plato’s “external” conception of truth 
in Goldstein & Alexander, 2006) would have been approximated or even realized (if it 
exists at all). This is because, this kind of cognition is mainly, yet not exclusively (see 
below), driven by the evidence (Kuppens & Van Mechelen, 2007) that describes the 
The change process in the reflective state              Page 104 
 
objective reality which is distanced, or more precisely separated, from the individual 
(Ben-Ze'Ev, 2003:155). Yet, this is probably impossible, as the ego even in the 
conscious and reflective state affects understanding and continues to ascribe meaning 
to the world (Husserl in Ratcliffe, 2002). As Lazarus (1991b) supports, attributions and 
inferential strategies which are responsible for producing “cold” contextual knowledge 
include to a limited extent the self, which, as it will be analysed in the following section, 
is mainly due to the fact that gnosis-driven evaluations are intertwined with ego-driven 
appraisals (Lazarus, 1991a; Storbeck & Clore, 2007).  
6.2 The emotional change process & the logic of cognitive duality 
6.2.1 The change process: A set of intuitive & reflective cognitions 
Before proceeding to explain the logic of duality and how resistance could occur, it is 
essential to set the overall context by briefly discussing the intuitive appraisals and 
reflective evaluations that constitute the change process (table 16). The process is 
underpinned by the main principle of appraisal theories that wants emotions to be 
differentiated based on a set of criteria-variables according to which individuals 
evaluate a case (i.e. Frijda, 1987; Lazarus, 1991a; Scherer, 2001; Roseman, 2013; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). While from an emotional point of view there is a fair 
agreement among appraisal theorists on the number and variety of these criteria 
(Moors, et al. 2013), the current research aims to approach the process from the 
perspective of change management (i.e. Liu & Perrewé, 2005), which makes the choice 
of the appropriate dimensions special. In order to face this issue, the researcher 
followed a logic suitable for interdisciplinary analysis (sec. 8.2) and developed a 
change process that combines literature from the fields of management and appraisal 
theories of emotion. In general, the change process follows Scherer’s (2001) four main 
phases of appraisal, with two significant modifications, one of which were stimulated 
by Lazarus’s (1991a) work and refers to changes in the last variable, while the other 
refers to the inclusion of a regulatory mechanism (first column table 16).  
Before the process starts, the leader is initially either experiencing another emotion, or 
lies in a default mental/feeling mode, which is then interrupted by an appraised 
discrepancy (Scherer & Ellsworth, 2013). In particular, the leader through a set of 
preconscious appraisals (q.v. ch.5) will evaluate the relevance of the evidence for  
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Phases  
(Scherer, 
2001) 
Steps of leaders’ 
Change Process 
Intuitive appraisal 
(Ego-driven) 
Reflective 
evaluation 
(Gnosis-driven) 
Relevance 
detection                                             
(Chapter 5) 
Identify (Sense) the 
discrepancy                          
(Cowan, 1986) 
Novelty                                                
(Scherer, 2001) 
No reflective
evaluation 
Intrinsic pleasantness                            
(Scherer, 2001) 
No reflective 
evaluation 
Concern relevance                                  
(Scherer, 2001) 
No reflective 
evaluation 
Regulatory Mechanism 
(Section 6.3) 
Implications for ego-commitments 
(Based on Lazarus, 1991a; 2006:92; Scherer, 
2001:98) 
Implication 
assessment                            
(Chapter 7) 
Problem detection                                           
(Cowan, 1986; 
Klein, et al. 2005) 
Ego-commitment 
congruency (Lazarus, 
1991a; Scherer, 2001) 
Business goal 
congruency 
(Lazarus, 1991a; 
Scherer, 2001) 
Evaluate urgency 
rate (Kotter, 
1996;2008) 
Effort considerations 
(Ortony, et al.  1988; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) 
Urgency check                                               
(Scherer, 2001) 
Responsibility 
diagnosis 
(Kiecolt, 1994; 
Wood & Winston, 
2005) 
Blame & credit                                        
(Lazarus, 1991a) 
Attribution of 
responsibility                                                   
(Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; 
Scherer, 2001) 
Coping 
potential 
               
(Chapter 8) 
Assess situational 
control 
(Bandura & Wood, 
1989; Thomas, et 
al. 1993) 
Anchored controllability  
(Gratch & Marsella 
2004; Lisetti & 
Gmytrasiewicz, 2002) 
Control                                                      
(Scherer, 2001) 
Evaluate change 
efficacy 
(Weiner, 2009) 
Power concerns                                                     
(Scherer, 2001; 
Roseman, 1991;1996) 
Manageability                            
(Frijda, 1987) 
Decision 
making – 
Coping 
(sec. 6.2.3) 
Decision to change 
(Lazarus, 
1991a:112) 
Accumulated 
unconscious core affect 
(Shuman et al., 2013) 
Conceptualized 
conscious 
understanding 
(Park, 2010) 
Table 16. Steps & appraisals for change
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his/her well-being and thereby will transcend to a conscious and phenomenally 
reflective, state (sec. 6.1). This phase corresponds to the identification-sense of the 
discrepant evidence that indicates the need for change (Cowan, 1986). Afterwards, in 
the higher cognitive state the leader evaluates the implications of the evidence from a 
personal (intuitive appraisal) as well as systemic-business (reflective evaluation) 
perspective by classifying the discrepancy to a problem or not a problem (Cowan, 1986; 
Klein, et al. 2005) and thereby verifying the already sensed discrepancy (Reisenzein, 
2000). If the verification is successful, the leader will realize the need for change 
(Kilmann & Mitroff, 1979: felt need), and, consequently, will proceed to the following 
phases which refer to the aspect of commitment to action (sec. 3.2.2). 
As far as commitment is concerned, the evaluations of urgency rate (Kotter, 1996:2008) 
and causal responsibility diagnosis (Kiecolt, 1994; Wood & Winston, 2005) are central. 
In particular, they complement the classification of the discrepancy (implication 
assessment: Scherer, 2001) by consolidating a sense of personal-leader responsibility 
to act “now”. In addition, the appraisal of coping potential (Lazarus, 1991a) seems to 
be a determinant of change initiatives, since it provides the essential sense of perceived 
capability to apply change in a given situation (i.e. Armenakis, et al. 1993; Vardaman, 
Amis, Dyson, Wright & Van de Graaff Randolph, 2012:837; but see Walinga, 2008 & 
ch.8). More precisely, following Scherer’s (2001) distinction it is argued that a leader 
will evaluate whether control over the case can be exerted (i.e. Bandura & Wood, 1989; 
Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993) as well as the organization’s and his/her own efficacy 
to apply change effectively (i.e. Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005; Weiner, 2009). 
Finally, the outcomes of the previous steps will determine leaders’ response to the case 
at hand (Lazarus, 1991a:112) and could result in either taking or avoiding action. 
The previous paragraph described briefly (for an in depth analysis see ch.7 & 8) a 
dynamic emotional change process (Scherer, 2009b), throughout which a leader can 
experience various emotional episodes and feelings (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003:575). 
Immediately, justifiable questions are raised regarding the order in which these 
appraisals occur. Following Scherer’s (1999b) argument about cognitive economy, it 
is suggested that the phases of the appraisals (first column) will follow a typical order 
with the output of each phase constituting the input of the following one. For example, 
it seems pointless to determine the capability of taking action if the existence of the business 
problem has not been realized in first place. On the other hand, the order of the appraisals 
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within the phases themselves (what Scherer, 2001 calls checks) is not stable, but 
depends on the cognitive demands and general conditions that dominate the 
relationship between agent and environment (consistent with Marsella & Gratch, 2009; 
see also Marinier, Laird & Lewis, 2009). Nevertheless, despite this dynamic 
conception of order, the need for simplifying the analysis led the researcher to follow 
the order presented in table 16. On this basis, the rest of this section will shed additional 
light on the change process by discussing the interdependence between intuitive 
appraisals (ego-driven system) and reflective evaluations (gnosis-driven system). 
6.2.2 On the dynamic interdependency of the two systems 
In general, it is suggested that intuitive appraisals and reflective evaluations are used in 
order to assign personal meaning to a specific event (Park, 2010). Specifically, the two 
systems receive information, evaluate them, by drawing upon individuals’ general 
unconscious (Hamilton, 2006:241) knowledge system (Cervone, 2004; Cervone, et al., 
2008), and determine values in reference to various appraisal dimensions (Moors & 
Scherer, 2013:136). They do so by loading on different, yet highly interdependent 
paths, regarding on the one hand the level of reflection and consciousness, and on the 
other hand “proximity” to the self (Lazarus, 1991a:147). In this sense, affective (hot) 
and cognitive (cold) evaluations are not operating in an either/or basis (as they are 
presented above) but run simultaneously and dynamically contribute, in their own 
special way, to a common process (Storbeck & Clore, 2007). That is, to formulate an 
emotional response able to deal with the requirements of the faced case (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1985), and, thereby, secure survival and prosperity for the involved entity 
(Damasio, 2010). 
Everything starts (t1) when the controlled processes, which have been triggered by the pre-
emotion of surprise (q.v. ch.5), create an imagistic representation of the act of changing 
(Carruthers, 2009:118), the evaluation of which constitutes the necessary motivational 
goal so that the unconscious thought can be engaged (Bos, Dijksterhuis & Baaren, 2008). 
This suggests that any information relevant to the envisaged act of changing will be 
initially (Louis & Sutton, 1991) evaluated (fig.17: orange continuous line), in reference 
to a specific appraisal dimension (t2), from an ego-driven perspective (Ben-Ze'Ev, 
2003:155). During this evaluation the gnosis-driven system (fig.17: orange dashed 
line) operates in a lower level (Kahneman, 2011:24) and, thus, creates an illusion of 
conscious will (see Wegner, 2004 and commentaries for a comprehensive discussion 
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on the illusion of conscious will). That is, the individual consciously experiences the 
occurrence of the reflective evaluation (tip of the iceberg), when it is the corresponding 
(table 16) to this evaluation unconscious (below waterline) appraisal that actually 
governs information processing (consistent with Velmans’, 2003; 2014 symbolism of 
the iceberg). In essence, by reacting to excessive changes in the organismic subsystems 
that get synchronized (Grandjean, Sander & Scherer, 2008; Sander, Grandjean & 
Scherer, 2005), the unconscious mind produces an emotional experience that 
communicates to consciousness (fig.17: green arrows) interesting realizations and 
adaptive behaviours regarding a social encounter (Rauterberg, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. The interdependence of the two systems 
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Nagel (1989:4); Nietzsche in Anderson (1998) 
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The gnosis-driven mind plays almost no role on the evaluation of the evidence at this 
very first stage, apart from appropriating the results (t3) of the preconscious appraisals, 
as these are projected into consciousness (fig.17: green dashed line) through the 
subjective feeling of emotion (Scherer, 2005b; Mandler, 1997). Whether cognition in 
the reflective state is autonomous or dependent on the unconscious ego-driven 
appraisals (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Magda Arnold in Reisenzein, 2006) will be 
discussed in the following section. Be that as it may, once (t3+) the lateral gnosis-
driven processes are actually engaged (fig.17: blue continuous lines), the unconscious 
ones are attenuated (fig.17: blue dashed line) and a process of re-evaluation (t4) takes 
place. This re-evaluation considers normative beliefs and applies reasoning 
(Carruthers, 2009; 2012; Lieberman, et al. 2002) in order to control the emotional 
experience by regulating (fig.17: azure dashed lines) the unconsciously produced 
inferences (Barrett, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007:181; Kalisch, Wiech, Critchley & Dolan, 
2006).  
Drawing on Gawronski & Bodenhausen’s (2007) notion of validative propositional 
reasoning, it is argued that the regulative impact of the reflective mind can take two 
main forms. On the one hand, it affirms the intuitive and affective inferences of the 
ego-driven mind, and conceptualizes evaluative judgements based on their impact 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007). In this case, regulative processes simply apply 
normative logic and reasoning in order to control the “animal response” that has been 
produced by the affective mind (Damasio, 2010), without though changing the core of 
the appraised meaning that comes with it. As dual-process theorists suggest while 
conscious, or phenomenally conscious (Carruthers, 2007), regulations could occur, 
most of the times the reflective mind does nothing more than translating the 
unconscious dictations into conscious responses (Evans, 2006b). On the other hand, 
when, and if, the reflective and “self” free, not in an absolute sense but compared to the 
ego-driven one (Lazarus, 1991b), system is “actively” engaged the produced affective 
inferences are getting rejected (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007). In such cases, 
individuals reflect on their initial ego-driven view (Lieberman, et al. 2002) of an 
encounter and build a more detached understanding (fig.17: red lines) of expanded 
consciousness (Nagel, 1989:4; Nietzsche in Anderson, 1998).  
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6.2.3 The unconscious affective mind & the notion of reflection 
Dual-process theorists suggest that the intuitive-unconscious processes impact on 
someone’s actions profoundly enough to constitute any perception of conscious control 
largely an illusion (Evans, 2010; see also Carruthers, 2007; 2009). From a consistent 
point of view, Scherer (2005b) argued that emotional processes occur mainly 
unconsciously and, therefore, while individuals get to know some of the emotional 
outcomes, they remain barely aware of what produced these outcomes. As it has already 
been mentioned, the messenger of this described “transaction” is the subjective feeling 
that reflects to consciousness any changes in the emotional components, including the 
appraisal itself (Scherer, 2004). Consequently, what individuals consciously think is 
only phenomenally distinct (Duncan & Barrett, 2007) from what feelings “carry” from 
the unconscious to consciousness (Kuppens, 2010; Storbeck & Clore, 2007). In other 
words, thoughts are nothing more than simple one-dimensional reflections of 
complicated and multi-dimensional affects that are produced in a higher mental level 
(Friedrich Nietzsche in Thiele, 1990:55; Rauterberg, 2010).  
Someone would expect that once the individual engages in reflection, controlled and 
conscious cognitions intervene and regulate the initial emotional response (Smith & 
Neumann, 2005), so that adaptive appraisal results, in reference to the objective reality 
at hand, can be generated (Scherer, 2011). Regulation and control of emotional 
responses, though, is not an outcome of solely conscious cognitions, but unconscious 
processes contribute as well (Gross, 2001). More precisely, if emotion regulation is 
perceived as a continuous effort of appraisal refinement that will change the quality 
and/or intensity of the emotional experience (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2011), then the 
inclusion of intuitive appraisals for the elicitation of a counter emotional impulse is 
necessary (Hume, 2003:295). As Magda Arnold suggested, reflective processes are 
able to generate emotions, but they do so only by bringing into operation intuitive 
appraisals (in Reisenzein, 2006; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987) and, thereby, involving 
the self-“ego” in the interpretive process (Smith, et al. 1993).  
Such a perspective advances a rather intriguing theorization, according to which the 
impositions of passion over reason are equally true even when self-management 
enables conscious modes to actively (fig.17) intervene (Deecke, 2012) and regulate the 
initial impulses (Hume, 2003). However, in such cases conscious understanding is 
projected on a reflective basis (fig.17: azure lines), in the sense that the intuitive 
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appraisal is (re)engaged by a reflective evaluation (inspired by Arnold, in Reisenzein, 
2006), a process which is able to generate more controlled emotional experiences and, 
thus, targeted actions in order to deal with the issue at hand (i.e. Aristotle 1998:32 on 
controlled anger). Ultimately, it can be argued that the self is not a mere slave of 
intuitive affective impulses (Frijda, 2010b), but can exert control, at least indirectly, 
over them and their concomitant actions by deploying reflective reasoning and 
conscious deliberation (see Damasio, 2012:332; Scherer, 2011). The outcome of such 
successful reflective regulations will be an emotional impulse (t5) that is able to re-
determine someone’s understanding and, consequently, re-define the course of action 
to be taken (Hume, 2003:295). 
6.2.4 Leaders’ motivation & the decision for (in)action  
The described dynamic process should lead to what Faulkner (2001) described as the 
essential characteristic of any crisis situation; that is a point when (t6) decisive change 
to tackle the issue is taking place (fig.17: golden box). Whether such a point will come 
or not depends on how the component of motivation (Scherer, 2005) will be “carved” 
by the evaluation of the case in reference to the imaginary act of changing (Rangel, et 
al. 2008). In this way, a set of action tendencies will be formulated (Frijda, et al. 1989) 
and, thus, the appetitive-attractive or repulsive intention as regards to the change issue 
at hand is established (Castelfranch, 2000). More precisely, each evaluative dimension 
comprises a micro valence (Scherer, 2010; 2013) that is integrated in a holistic core 
affect (Russell, 2003) that informs through conscious as well as unconscious paths 
(Duncan & Barrett, 2007) the necessary decision to be taken (macro valence: Shuman, 
et al. 2013).  
In the unconscious intuitive level, the valences formulate an overall action tendency 
(fig.17: accumulated unconscious core affect) to either enhance (appetitive) or decrease 
(aversive) interaction with the issue at stake (motivational system: Lang & Bradley, 
2010; Frijda, 2010a). This action tendency is an affective impulse that carries 
information regarding the value of the situation-crisis under evaluation and how the 
individual feels about it (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). Such information plays an 
important role on the decision to change because it establishes the acceptability or non-
acceptability (Frijda, 2007b) of the need to take action as this is described by the 
received evidence. Along with the affective impulse though, the subjective evaluations 
in the preciosncous mind (Scherer, 1999a; 2005b; Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 2007) will 
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also generate an emotional experience (this can also be a mix of different emotions), 
which is an important aspect of the decision process as well (core affect in the 
foreground: Duncan & Barrett, 2007). 
More precisely, the emotional experiences project to consciousness (fig.17: 
conceptualized conscious understanding) a unique understanding-meaning (Frijda, 
1988) of the relation between the individual and the crisis at hand. Lazarus (1991a) 
calls this relational understanding “core relational themes”. Respectively, within the 
context of this work they will be treated as “core relational change themes” in order to 
reflect the nature of the model. By projecting this subjective in nature and 
unconsciously formulated meaning (Kuppens, 2010; Moors, 2013b), feelings colour 
someone’s conscious understanding (Ewert, 1970), and, thereby, construct the unique 
for every individual subjective apperception of reality (see Rasmussen, 1998). In this 
way, they bring to consciousness our intuitive wants and desires, and, thereby, 
determine our actions (Arnold, 1971). Ultimately, it is only when the impulsive action 
tendencies are accompanied by a conscious understanding that points towards a 
deliberate decision (information that is offered through the conscious core affect 
Duncan & Barrett, 2007) to act (inspired by Arnold, 1960:245; 1971) that change will 
occur. Yet, as it will be discussed below, neither this synchronization nor the process 
itself is that straightforward.  
6.3 The regulatory mechanism: Implications for the ego-identity 
6.3.1 Response inhibition & the process of objectification 
It has been argued that while cognition and affect cannot actually be separated 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2007), with emotion always dictating the way to reason, alternative 
conceptions can exist and in plenty of cases individuals do follow them (Frijda, 2010b). 
In general, it seems that there are two main processes responsible for the production of 
such reflective actions. On the one hand, it is the ability of human beings to control the 
emotional impulses through reflective reasoning and conscious deliberation (Damasio, 
2012:332). On the other hand, it is the generation of a counter emotional impulse that 
is able to re-determine someone’s understanding and, consequently, re-define the 
course of action to be taken (Hume, 2003). The latter argument presupposes the 
engagement of the affective ego-driven mind in the process of reflection, which leads 
to the suggestion that along with any cognitive control strageties, a determinant 
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unconscious “approval” for the inhibition of the initial emotional response is also 
necessary (Velmans, 2014; also consistent with Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).  
More precisely, Velmans (2014) claims that a conscious “veto” to unconsciously 
produced intentions (i.e. Libet, 1985) has its own unconscious antecedents (fig.17: red 
rhombus). Indeed, according to recent evidence, response inhibition, which includes 
the phenomenon of emotion regulation, is caused by unconscious processes (i.e. 
Hughes, Velmans & De Fockert, 2009). The only requirement for the unconscious mind 
to determine whether or not a “veto” should be put, is a conscious experience (Velmans, 
2014) that can be genuinely novel and needs not to have been associated with specific 
responses in a particular context in the past (Hepler & Albarracin, 2013). In essence, 
the conscious mind re-broadcasts the act of changing along with the already generated 
response, which both, then, become inputs to a new cycle of unconscious evaluations 
(Carruthers, 2009). In this way, the conscious experience gives a kind of feedback to 
its own unconscious triggering mechanisms (fig.17: black small arrow) and, thereby, 
influences, rather indirectly, subsequent thoughts and actions to be taken in response to 
a faced situation (Young, 2004).  
Following the distinction between adaptive and maladaptive implicit emotion 
regulation (sec. 4.3), it is argued that the re-engaged processes of the unconscious ego-
driven mind can produce two different outcomes. In the adaptive scenario, alternative 
conceptions can be produced though objectification (Nagel, 1989:4), a gradual process 
which the more it occurs the more the initial ego-attached perspectives tend to become 
ego-free (objectification: fig.17) and align with the objective reality of the case at hand. 
As a result, the individual can enter to a potentially perpetual process of reflection, in 
which he/she revaluates the evidence in the light of the previously produced 
conception(s) (Nagel, 1989:4) and, thereby, enhances the formulated internal truth by 
taking into consideration additional perspectives of the same case (Nietzsche in 
Anderson, 1998). At the same time, though, it is also possible that ego-threatened 
commitments impact on the appraisal process (Kumar, 2012; Rhine & Severance, 
1970) and prevent the process of objectification and thus, reflection from taking place. 
That is, defensive motivation can inhibit the reflective processes from either engaging 
at all or, if engaged, overriding/suppressing (Carruthers, 2009; Stanovich, 2009) the 
initial ego-attached understanding and its ego-centric response. 
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6.3.2 The two ways towards an ego-driven defensive response 
Following the arguments in the previous section, it is possible to conceive two distinct, 
yet similar in their fundamentals, ways according to which defensive responses can be 
manifested. On the one hand, when the reflective mind does not engage, individuals 
have no conscious realization of having conducted a defensive appraisal(s) and, thus, 
become victims of an illusion that wants the formulated perception to be the one and 
the only objective representation of the faced case (Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 
1987:302). This notion of illusionary reality suggests a kind of deception that is based 
on the notion of cognitive duality and the dominance of the ego-driven intuitive mind 
(Carruthers, 2007; Evans, 2010), as well as on the drawn distinction between ego-
commitments, which are the ones that entail the necessary “defensive” motivational 
impulses (sec. 6.2.3), and other goals (Crown & Rosse, 1995). Specifically, given that 
someone’s ego-identity springs from the unconscious (Schwartz, 2001), leaders could 
be deceived by consciously realizing the goal of pursuing business improvement, while 
their cognition and behaviour is actually motivated (unconscious goal pursuit: Custers 
& Aarts, 2010) by the unconscious desire to preserve their ego “integrity” (Von Hippel 
& Trivers, 2011; i.e. Bargh, Raymond, Pryor & Strack, 1995). In such cases, then, the 
individual remains unware of the fact that his/her emotional experience is driven by 
unconscious defensive appraisals (Andersen, 1995), while at the same time the 
formulated conscious understanding is underlain by a feeling (see Duncan & Barret, 
2007) of coherence and logic (see Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004).  
On the other hand, there can be leaders who objectify their view (Nagel, 1989) and, 
thereby, manage to formulate a relatively more rational and, thus, non-defensive 
meaning of the case at hand (Lazarus, 1995b: double logic). The realization of such a 
meaning does not ensure any conscious awareness of the core processes behind the 
defensive appraisals, which, similar to the scenario described above, remain in the 
unconscious (Lazarus, 1991b). However, as long as a second contradictory meaning 
exists, leaders will not become victims of an illusionary objectivity (Pyszczynski, & 
Greenberg, 1987:302), but will experience a conflict between a relatively subjective 
(hot) and a more objective (cold) perception (Nagel, 1989:89) of the very same change 
issue (Fiol & O'Connor, 2002). In essence, the initial emotional response that serves 
exclusively the needs of the ego-commitments (defensive) conflicts with a counter 
emotional response (non-defensive) that serves the needs of the overall system (Berrios, 
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Totterdell & Kellett, 2014). That is, a conflictual distinction between ego-commitments 
and business goals (Crown & Rosse, 1995), which is conceptualized as a repulsion for 
what benefits and/or attraction for what harms the overall system (inspired by 
Castelfranchi, 2000:97), is made.  
How the individual will respond when hot-defensive (first-order) and cold-rational 
(second-order) appraisals collide, has rarely been discussed by appraisal theorists (de 
Sousa, 2013). However, researchers from other disciplines have been based on dual 
theories, and more precisely on the notion of conflict between the two systems (see 
Lieberman, et al. 2002; Stanovich, 2009), in order to explain human behaviour in 
various contexts. For instance, Moore & Loewenstein (2004) utilized the logic that 
wants the actions of an individual to depend on which system is in dominance (Martin, 
Sirakaya-Turn & Woodside, 2011:54), in order to explain why someone’s self-interests 
(automatic processing) take precedence over ethical responsibilities for the common 
benefit (thoughtful processing). Commencing from a similar conflictual logic, Wang & 
Murnighan (2011) go a step further to suggest that both greedy (aka exclusively ego-
driven) and socially moral (aka towards gnosis-driven) behaviours emanate from the 
unconscious mind, with the former simply having “a split second edge” over the latter. 
Here it is argued that any conflict of this kind is underlain by the common phenomenon 
of contradictory motivational valences (fig.17: blue dashed lines in core affect), which 
occurs in emotional experiences with mixed feelings (see Shuman, et al. 2013) that 
serve opposing goals (Berrios, et al. 2014). For example, the leader can enter into an 
ambivalent state, in which the understanding of the need to procced with the 
transformational change is accompanied by a feeling that the loss of ego and status 
from such a change is too much to deal with (Piderit, 2000). Ultimately, despite any 
differences with the extreme case of illusionary objectivity (Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 
1987:302), the problem, as the current research considers it, is again the unconscious 
impact of ego-driven defensive mechanisms on the change process.  
6.3.3 Defence in the reflective state: Rationalizing the discrepancy 
Consistent with the notion of cognitive duality that characterizes the reflective state, 
Madrigal (2008) has argued that in case of discrepant evidence (negative valence), the 
expected negative emotion (Roseman, et al. 1996; Roseman, 2013: motive 
inconsistency) is better predicted by appraisals (table 16: ego-driven appraisals) rather 
than attributions (table 16: gnosis-driven evaluations). In this work’s terms, the 
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inconsistency and its subsequent ego-threat enhance, through stressful emotionality, 
the hot ego-driven system (Mischel & Shoda, 1999:204), and, thereby, make its 
intuitive appraisals “potentially” incompatible with what the relatively objective and 
ego-free gnosis-driven system (sec. 6.1.3) would have appraised if it operated in 
isolation (conflict between hot and cold systems: see Fiol, & O'Connor, 2002). That is, 
the increased personal involvement doesn’t deteriorate attribution’s ability to predict 
emotion, but rather enhances intuitive appraisals which in their turn dominate the 
process and drive its outcome (Leon & Hernandez, 1998). In this sense, the response 
of the leader to the threatening evidence depends on how the mechanism of implicit 
emotion regulation (adaptively or maladeptively) will respond to the increased stress 
(Arnold, 1970:170; Parrott, 1995) that is, nevertheless, necessary for change to occur 
(i.e. Losch & Cacioppo, 1990 on attitude change).  
In particular, when regulation is adaptive leaders face the increased stressful 
emotionality that enhanced the hot ego-driven system (Mischel & Shoda, 1999:204), 
without repressing the necessary emotional vigilance (Koole, & Jostmann, 2004) 
regarding the need to change, and by balancing between ego-commitments and general 
environmental needs within which the emotional transaction occurs (Lazarus, 1990:6). 
In this way, the individual who might, or might not, formulate an initial intuitive ego-
centric evaluation, can engage in the process of objectification (Nagel. 1989) and 
eventually realize the need to act (see Scherer, 2011 on rationality). On the other hand, 
maladaptive regulation drives leaders to avoid their negatively charged emotional 
experiences, by engaging in the process of motivational reasoning (see the impact of 
ego-commitments on the appraisal process in sec 4.2), in which egocentric evaluations 
(Parrott, 1995) try to defend irrationally the honour of the attacked ego-commitments 
(Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts & Hamann, 2006). 
Expressed in terms of appraisal, leaders who respond defensively during the reflective 
state utilize the regulatory mechanism of cognitive change (Gross & Barrett, 2011). 
Unlike selective attention (automatic state: sec. 5.1.3), defences that are based on this 
paradigm reinterpret a case’s meaning so that the ongoing emotional response can be 
regulated (spectrum in Ochsner & Gross, 2005) in favour of the attacked ego (Westen, 
et al. 2006). That is, leaders rationalize the discrepancy (sec. 3.2.2) by interpreting it as 
being in favour of their schemas-mental models (Fiske & Taylor, 1991:150). Indeed, 
schemas (schematic ego-driven processes: see Berzonsky in White & Jones, 1996) can 
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regulate leaders’ interpretation processes and thereby, given the subjective reality in 
which leaders operate (Chaffee, 1985: interpretive strategy), play a significant role in 
their interpretation of and the concomitant response to the compelling evidence (Daft 
& Weick, 1984). For instance, Barr & Huff (1997) demonstrated that an event, which 
objectively had impact for every organization in a specific industry, was interpreted 
differently and, therefore, didn’t lead to action in every case.  
6.4 Compiling the theory: The emotional change process 
The analysis conducted in the previous chapters enables the creation of an accumulative 
model that describes the change process in the reflective state (fig.18). In particular, the 
analysis demonstrated that cognition breaks down into two highly interrelated parts 
(sec. 6.1.1). On the one hand, there is an ego-driven system (upper level in fig.18) which 
is associated with hot-emotional cognitions and evaluates the evidence from a personal 
and subjective perspective. Given its characteristics, it was suggested that the basis of 
this system is what appraisal theorists of emotion call intuitive appraisals (sec. 6.1.2). 
On the other hand, there is a gnosis-driven system (lower level in fig.18) which consists 
of cold cognitions that provide the basis so that the (re)evaluation of the evidence can 
occur. This system consists of various inferential strategies which have been 
encompassed under the umbrella of reflective evaluations and are mainly responsible 
for regulating rather than generating the emotional experience (sec. 6.1.3). 
The two systems are highly interdependent. Initially, the ego-driven system produces 
an intuitive appraisal, the outcome of which is projected through the subjective feeling 
to consciousness. There, it is processed by the gnosis-driven system in the sense that 
the formulated conscious experience is provided back to the unconscious mind, which, 
in its turn, will determine whether to revise the initial subjective appraisal or directly 
arrogate it and constitute it an objective reality (sec. 6.2.2). This is a potentially 
perpetual process, in which the more it occurs the more the initial ego-driven processes 
tends to detach from the ego and, thus, approaches the objective reality (sec. 6.2.3), as 
this could have been appraised by an organism with “only” the gnosis-driven system in 
operation (sec. 6.1.3). Also, this notion of duality occurs for a set of dimensions, the 
compilation of which was formulated based on the necessary steps for a leader to 
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Figure 18. The emotional change process in the reflective state 
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analyse the evidence that indicates the need for change (middle row in fig.18) and 
resulted in the emotional change process of this work (sec. 6.2.1). Each of these 
dimensions produces a micro valence which is accumulated into an unconscious core 
affect and along with the cognitive understanding that is projected in consciousness, 
defines leaders’ final decision regarding change (sec. 6.2.4). 
The last two sections of this chapter attempted to explain the phenomenon of ego-
driven defensiveness based on the concept of duality and the subsequent notion of 
reflection (sec. 6.3.1). In a general sense, defensiveness occurs when inconsistent, or 
else threatening for the ego, evidence produces stress that is confronted through the 
mechanism of maladaptive implicit emotion regulation. This type of regulation, which 
is synonymous to the defence mechanisms, results in driving appraisals to produce 
distorted evaluations and, thereby, maladaptive responses that aim to defend the 
honours of leaders’ ego (sec. 6.3.3). In such cases, leaders can either appraise a single 
illusionary objective meaning or formulate two contradictory meanings, one hot and 
defensive and another cold and objectified, of the case (sec. 6.3.2). 
With these in mind, the current chapter comes to an end, since its aim, that is to analyse 
the change process in the reflective state, has been met. The following two chapters 
will provide a detailed map of the process so that the change advocate can understand 
in which step leaders defensively appraise the evidence. This is expected to facilitate 
the development of a toolkit that will enable change advocates to face cases of 
resistance to the evidence that indicate the need for action. 
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7 Towards the acceptance of the urgent need for change 
The first phase of the change process in the reflective state (q.v. ch.8 for the second 
phase) encompasses a set of steps that, according to the modified TTM model (fig.2), 
will enable the individual to establish the need for change and formulate the initial 
intentions for action (contemplation). By following the logic of cognitive duality and 
the concept of emotion regulation, the current chapter sets out to analyse the appraisals 
(intuitive & reflective) that take place in these steps as well as identify and discuss the 
respective ego-defences that could be triggered and cease the change process. As a 
result, a map of the core feelings, behaviours and cognitive understandings that leaders 
could experience and consciously express throughout the phase will be developed.    
7.1 Problem detection: Identifying the need for change 
7.1.1 Detecting the crisis & its importance 
The first step for realizing that a system experiences a crisis and that the need for taking 
action is evident, is reached in the unconscious level, during which leaders sense the 
triggering event of an existing or imminent change (Keown-McMullan, 1997). As it has 
already been demonstrated (ch.5), the triggering event is understood as a discrepancy 
(Armenakis & Harris, 2002; Armenakis, Harris & Feild, 2000) that elicits the basic 
emotion of surprise. Once this essential feeling of surprise is experienced (Faulkner, 
2001; Hermann, 1972:13; Reilly, 1987), the conscious and phenomenally reflective 
mode of analysis is set in motion (ch.6). At this state, leaders establish, or have to 
establish, the perception of a crisis through a set of evaluations of the already sensed 
discrepancy regarding its “seriousness” for the involved unit (distinction between 
discrepancy detection and further evaluations inspired by Billings, Milburn & 
Schaalman, 1980).  
The first of the necessary appraisals refers to the acceptance of the problem-crisis. In 
his problem-recognition model Cowan (1986) suggests that realizing the existence of a 
problem requires one to classify the sensed discrepancy as such (fig.18, Process step: 
problem detection). Indeed, a situation can be called a crisis, if, and only if, the 
triggering event constitutes a threat to the survival and the important goals of the 
involved unit (Faulkner, 2001; Hermann, 1972:13; Keown-McMullan, 1997). It is 
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argued, therefore, that leaders who sense a discrepancy precociously, have to 
reflectively verify its impact (Reisenzein, 2000), by evaluating the level of congruency 
(Lazarus, 1991a:150; Scherer, 2001:97) between the discrepancy at hand and already 
established business goals (fig.18, Gnosis-driven evaluation: Business goal 
congruency). In this way, they develop the necessary awareness regarding the 
problematic status of the situation (Majone, 1980:9) and, consequently, set a crucial 
steppingstone towards the initiation of the necessary cognitive reframing (Klein, 2005) 
and, thereby, problem-solving process (Smith, 1989).  
7.1.2 Ego-involvement & trivialization of the discrepancy 
The realization of the problem-crisis, though, is not that straightforward. More 
precisely, along with their impact on business goals, faced discrepancies will have 
implications for leader’s exclusively personal motives and concerns (Liu & Perrewé, 
2005). On this basis, it is suggested that the whole phase of problem detection will be 
driven by an intuitive appraisal (logic of duality: sec. 6.2) that evaluates the type of 
leader’s ego involvement with the evidence at hand (Lazarus, 1991a:150). As it has 
already been demonstrated (sec. 6.3), leaders hold various personal goals (Crown & 
Rosse, 1995), or else ego-commitments, which, similar to business goals, can be either 
promoted or inhibited by the faced situation (self-discrepancy theory: Higgins, 1987). 
In this sense, the intuitive appraisal at this stage is, also, an evaluation of the case’s 
congruency with goals that are held by the individual (Schere, 2001; Lazarus, 1991a). 
However, instead of having exclusively business-“cold” goals at stake, the individual 
engages personal-“hot” motives as well (term from Roseman, 2013), which within the 
scope of this work refer to personal ego-commitments (fig.18, Ego-driven appraisal: 
Ego-commitment congruency) that reflect a self-ideal (q.v. sec. 4.3). 
As long as a relationship of threat is appraised (negative valence: Higgins, 1987), a 
motivational impulse to respond defensively by trivializing the importance (Simon, 
Greenberg & Brehm, 1995) of the discrepant evidence that indicate a need for change 
will be formulated (defence mechanism: Trivialization). In particular, a discrepancy 
that challenges a fundamental aspect of the ego-self (i.e. attitude, belief, act, behaviour 
cognition; Starzyk, Fabrigar & Soryal, Fanning, 2009), will indicate the existence of 
underlying psychological costs of changing (Zell, 2003). Thereby, leaders will be 
driven to protect the held “cognition” by responding with trivialization (Draycott, & 
Dabbs, 1998) to the cognitive dissonance that has already been produced (sec. 5.4) due 
Instigating transformational changes   Page 123 
 
to the experienced discrepancy (George and Jones, 2001)7. In this way, the sensed 
discrepancy remains in existence but its importance, as an indicator of a need for 
personal and business change is minimized (Baumeister, Dale & Sommer, 1998). Also, 
this could be accompanied by a simultaneous devaluation of the domain that the 
discrepancy refers to (Nussbaum & Steele, 2007; sec. 5.3.2). Consequently, then, the 
adopted response is by no means adaptive, since in crisis situations the magnitude of 
the problem is high (Reilly, 1987), and, thus, a large scale change is required (sec. 3.2). 
7.1.3 Mapping problem detection: The three potential outcomes 
Following the previous analysis, it is suggested that the classification of a discrepancy 
could produce three potential outcomes (table 17). On the one hand, there is the 
adaptive scenario according to which leaders realize the crisis and its negative impact 
on held goals (Faulkner, 2001). It should be clarified that a precise understanding of 
the problem and the way it should be solved follows after the realization of the 
problematic situation (Majone, 1980:9) and, therefore, does not interest the current 
research. Nevertheless, a mere realization of the incongruence between stimulus-event 
and goals, personal or business ones, is achieved at this stage, which automatically 
prepares leaders for a large scale action (Bartunek & Moch, 1987). In addition, this 
realization is expected to be accompanied by negative emotions-feelings, which are 
brought on due to the incongruent nature of the evidence (terminology adopted by 
Lazarus, 1991a).  
On the other hand, there is the maladaptive scenario which is separated into two distinct 
cases. This distinction is legitimized as long as the variation regarding the l evel of goal 
obstruction that is caused by the case at hand (Scherer, 2001:96), is considered along 
with the way cognitive psychologists have treated trivialization. In particular, theorists 
like Starzyk, Fabrigar, Soryal & Fanning (2009) propose that cognitive change and 
trivialization could occur simultaneously. From this perspective, it is possible to have 
leaders that minimize the magnitude of the discrepant evidence, which, in its turn, will 
                                                 
7 Theorists have used the aspect of trivialization mainly, if not exclusively, within the concept 
of cognitive dissonance. In their papers they discuss specific types of change, such as attitude, 
belief and sometimes cognitive. This terminology is not followed here, since the current 
research considers trivialization from a wider perspective, which derives from the fact that 
change refers to an alteration of current mental representations and business practices. 
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drive them to accept the need for minor adjustments in cognitive schemas (Johnson, 
1988).  As a result, schemas and mental models (Senge, 2006) are not challenged and 
change adequately enough (George & Jones, 2001) to trigger a transformation, and, 
hence, smaller scale changes will take place (Sheldon, 1980). In contrast, theorists like 
Joule & Martinie (2008) treat trivialization and cognitive change as alternate modes of 
dissonance reduction (Simon, et al. 1995). The researcher adapts this latter view to the 
logic of this work, and recommends the case of extreme assimilation (Piaget, 1954; 
sec. 3.2.3), in which the already sensed discrepancy is trivialized to such an extent that 
a realization of no need for change is reached.  
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Table 17. Map for the classification step 
Regarding the emotional experience, the initial step of classification provides a crucial 
distinction between the two basic coping tendencies of seeking more (positive emotion) 
vs less (negative emotions) of the faced situation (Roseman, 2013), or else the 
problematic status quo. Correspondingly, the emotions of happiness (Heading toward 
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the realization of goals: Lazarus, 1991a:267) or sadness (Irrevocable loss of the current 
status quo: Lazarus, 1991:248), which are general and independent from any causal 
attributions, are expected to be felt at this stage (Weiner, Russell & Lerman, 1979; 
Weiner, 1985). Respectively, in case of slight trivialization, similar to the adaptive 
scenario, sadness is promoted (Lazarus, 1991a), which, nevertheless, differ in terms of 
intensity compared to cases of full realization of the problem (level of obstruction 
Scherer; 2001:96). While in case of extreme trivialization, leaders appraise the 
evidence as goal congruent (no need for change), and, therefore, happiness is promoted 
(Lazarus, 1991a). 
In addition, apart from this basic distinction, special attention should be paid to goal 
incongruent cases, where fear is triggered (Lazarus, 1991a:235), in terms of both fright 
(Physical consequences from the loss of resources) and anxiety (Threat to the ego-
identity and uncertainty regarding the response and the future). Essentially, the 
uncertainty that characterizes change initiatives (Liu, Perrewé, 2005) render the sense 
of fear and anxiety a matter of course for the individual (Senge & Kaeufer, 2000). How 
the experience of loss (Bailey & Raelin, 2015) as well as the uncertainty and the 
concomitant ego-threat, which are manifested as fear for the unknown, will be treated 
(Eagle, 1999), is going to play a determinant role on the outcome of the change process 
(q.v. subsequent sections & ch.8). Such considerations, though, exceed the step of 
discrepancy classification and call for additional appraisals to specify the emotional 
experience and the coping response to be adopted (Moors, De Houwer, Hermans & 
Eelen, 2005). 
7.2 Evaluate urgency rate: Formulating the intentions for change 
7.2.1 An analysis of urgency: The perspective of cognitive appraisals 
The importance of urgency for change initiatives has been widely discussed in the 
introduction of this work (ch.1). In sum, a sense of urgency, which essentially is a 
feeling of doing something “now” in order to face hazards or turn to advantage 
opportunities (Kotter, 2008:7), is mandatory for change to occur (Luecke, 2003). Of 
course, the way urgency has been conceptualized by theorists focuses mainly, yet not 
exclusively, on its dissemination throughout the organization (i.e. Kotter, 1996). 
However, this work’s research interest (sec. 1.5.2) along with the top-down 
characteristic of PCs (Mehta, 2009:66), suggests that, before anything else, the urgency 
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of the case at hand has to be realized by top leadership (fig.18, Process step: Evaluate 
urgency rate). In this sense, within the scope of this section, urgency will be approached 
as a cognitive dimension (Scherer, 2001:97) based on which the evidence at hand is 
evaluated by leader(s) in the system (fig.18, Gnosis-driven evaluation: Urgency check). 
Through this evaluation, leaders are expected to comprehend that the problematic 
situation-crisis, which has already been identified (appraisal of goal incongruence), 
requires immediate attention (Reilly, 1987). That is, any decision, regarding the 
necessary adaptive response (Scherer, 2001), has to be taken fast, since the situation at 
hand is a crisis that highly threatens organization’s survival (Billings, et al. 1980; 
Faulkner, 2001; Hermann, 1972). 
From its “cold” perspective, urgency can be conceived as a pressure that derives from 
the gradually increasing costs, produced by any kind of delay in deciding to initiate the 
necessary revolutionary or transformational change (Miller, 1982). This logic of cost-
benefit analysis is indeed central when it comes to develop decisiveness for change 
(Weinstein, et al. 2008). However, an exclusive consideration of numerical-rational 
factors is inadequate to explain leader’s behaviour at this stage. As Anderson (2003) 
has elegantly demonstrated, any intentions to approach or avoid a decision are 
formulated based on a set of dynamically interacting rational (cold) and emotional (hot) 
factors (italics reflect the terminology used in this work). In order to conceptualize these 
complex foundations of urgency check (Scherer, 2001), the current work theorizes that 
an underlying appraisal of the necessary effort for responding to the need for change 
occurs in the cognitive background as a relatively “hot” evaluation of the case’s 
urgency (fig.18, Ego-driven appraisal: Effort considerations). More precisely, the 
appraisal of effort considerations is a combination of Smith & Ellsworth’s (1985) 
appraisal of anticipated effort and Ortony, Clore & Collins’s (1988:62) appraisal of 
proximity, both of which have been associated with the appraisal of urgency (Scherer, 
1993b: table 1; 1999: table 30.1). Their interrelation is perceived through the lens of 
this work’s notion of cognitive duality (sec. 6.2) and any further details regarding their 
logic will be explicated throughout the following paragraphs.  
In its basis urgency could also be realized as the event’s temporal proximity (Ortony, 
et al. 1988:62), which in terms of effort considerations, reflects “how soon” the 
necessary effort (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) has to be exerted (Smith, 1995). Despite 
their obvious correlation (Scherer, 1993b) though, proximity differs from cold urgency, 
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in the sense that it is susceptible to emotional impulses, which mainly come from the 
appraised threat (goal incongruence) and infuse a sense of emotional subjectivity to the 
appraisal (sec. 6.3). Respectively, cold urgency sticks to rational calculations and, 
therefore, represents the actual temporal closeness (Cole, Balcetis & Dunwsning, 
2013)8. This difference could be responsible for the emergence of panic (Kotter & 
Cohen, 2002:27), as the threatening crisis can “over-burn the platform” by magnifying 
the subjectively appraised urgency of the case at hand (Cole, et al. 2013). Nevertheless, 
any “potential” implication from this distortion concerns subsequent steps of the 
change process, since, either magnified (false) or not (right), urgency (Kotter, 2008: 
issue is discussed in sec. 8.3) will be sensed. It is, therefore, left to the second aspect of 
the effort considerations, which refers to the level of effort required for facing the case 
at hand (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), to determine the outcome of the change process at 
this stage. 
7.2.2 Urgency, anticipated effort & defensive procrastination 
It is proposed that through the dimension of anticipated effort (Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985), the case at hand is evaluated along three different, yet highly interrelated, 
criteria, which are able to manipulate the levels of urgency. In particular: 
 From a general point of view, solely the acceptance of the need for exerting effort 
signifies a threat to the ego (negative valence - aversive) and establishes the basis 
(see subsequent bullets for additional requirements) for perceiving the change 
process as a generally aversive task (1st criterion). This is partially because it 
vindicates the existence of the crisis (sec. 7.1) and, thereby, revives the ego-threat 
that this brought on. 
 In addition, and more importantly, the acceptance of exerting effort places the 
leader in front of his/her primary responsibility of leading change (Yukl, 2010). 
This responsibility emanates from leaders’ crucial role during change (Gill, 2002) 
and takes the form of an obligation (Schlenker, et al. 1994) to lead the company 
                                                 
8 Cole, Balcetis & Dunning (2013) demonstrated that the actual physical distance from a 
threatening object could be distorted and perceived as shorter. In the current work a similar 
argument is made but in terms of temporal proximity. This is legitimized since proximity is 
treated as a general psychological construct (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988), while also the 
idea is susceptible to the concept of cognitive duality which seems applicable. 
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towards the new by accomplishing the transformation (Deming, 1994:116). 
Acknowledging this obligation holds leaders accountable for future outcomes 
(Wood & Winston, 2005) to a relevant audience (Schlenker, et al. 1994: 
accountability pyramid – answerability; see also sec. 7.3). That is, an evaluative 
notion (2nd criterion), which indicates potential ego-threatening judgements of 
performance, is ascribed to the imminent change effort, and, thus, leaders may 
delay the change process in order to avoid any psychological harm to the ego 
(Ferrari, Johnson & McCown, 1995). 
 Lastly, leaders are expected to realize that the imminent change, similar to the vast 
majority of transformational changes, involves huge amount of effort that needs to 
be exerted over a long period of time (Eckel & Kezar, 2003:165; Harmon, 
2003:214). On the one hand, these high levels of effort enhance the aversiveness 
of the change process by revealing to leaders the difficulty of leading change 
(Carnall, 2007:37; Yukl, 2012). This difficulty is reflected in the literature by the 
recommended crucial activities that leaders have to undertake during change (e.g. 
Eisenbach, Watson & Pillai, 1999). Morevoer, although the oft-quoted failure rate 
of 70% for change efforts has not been statistically proven, there is agreement in 
the change management literature that probability of failure of transformational 
change efforts is high (Hughes, 2011). On the other hand, the concept of exerting 
effort over a period of time suggests that, despite any small wins during the change 
process, transformational changes will mainly pay back in the long run (Kotter, 
1996). According to Beer, et al. (1990) the acknowledgment of long-run payoff on 
leaders’ behalf is a determinant for change to be successful (3rd criterion). 
However, this mind-set apparently is absent among leaders in the contemporary 
era (Deming, 2000), which led Kotter (1995) to claim that once the long term 
nature of major changes is realized urgency levels drop down. 
The listed issues of effort intervene and manipulate temporal realizations through the 
activation of the cognitive, affective and behavioural phenomenon of procrastination 
(Solomon & Rothblum, 1984). Indeed, as long as a generally aversive task (Wilson & 
Nguyen, 2012), for which the individual will be evaluated (Ferrari & Tice, 2000), is 
expected to provide delayed rewards (Steel, 2007) the ground for triggering the defence 
mechanism of procrastination is established and, thereby, any necessary efforts towards 
change are delayed (defence mechanism: Defensive procrastination). It is worthy of 
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clarification that procrastination is not a well understood phenomenon the essence of 
which is still debatable (Steel, 2007; 2010). Despite this vagueness and the various 
ways that someone could follow in order to approach procrastination (e.g. Uzun, Unal, 
& Tokel, 2014), the researcher of this work adopts a rather unusual perspective and 
treats it as a defence mechanism that aims to protect the self from potentially 
threatening evaluations (Fee & Tangney, 2000).  
As a defence mechanism, procrastination regulates the already produced stress, but it 
does so in favour of individuals’ temporary psychological stability and at the expense 
of his/her long-term benefits (Sirois & Pychyl, 2013). At the same time, it distorts the 
perception of urgency, as it reduces individuals’ ability to focus on future needs-goals 
(Sirois, 2014), which makes the determination, or even anticipation, of a definite future 
an almost impossible task (Beardsworth, 1999). Due to this cognitive malfunction, the 
“current self” is not informed about the need to formulate the necessary set of intentions 
for proceeding to a course of action that will respond adaptively to the environmental 
challenges (Sirois, 2004; Sommer, 2013; Sommer & Haug, 2012). In this sense, it might 
be useful to perceive the concept of urgency (Kotter, 2008) through Gollwitzer’s (1999) 
theory of intentions. From this perspective, urgency can be understood as the 
establishment of goal intentions to face the crisis that have already been formulated 
(what) accompanied by a set of implementation intentions to act urgently whenever 
issues regarding this crisis are faced from now on in the future (when).  
Specifically, the already achieved awareness of the need for change is accompanied by 
a general idea regarding “what” the company has to do (aka respond to the crisis), but 
clear and established intentions have not yet been formulated (Sommer & Haug, 2012). 
It is argued that for their formulation a sense of urgency, and the concomitant 
acceptance of the need to exert effort, are essential, which will be the case unless 
procrastination intervenes and inhibits the formulation of implementation intentions 
(Sommer, 2013). This will bring an end to the change process, since implementation 
intentions are essential for initiating difficult tasks (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997), 
such as transformational changes. In respect to this approach, it should be noted that 
some theorists could disagree with this approach (Lay & Brokenshire, 1997), since it is 
widely accepted that procrastination presumes an intended course of action (Steel, 
2007; Klingsieck, 2013). Nevertheless, recent evidence has demonstrated that the 
process of formulating intentions could be susceptible to procrastination (Sirois, 2004 
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Sommer, 2013; Sommer & Haug, 2012), especially when it comes to decision making 
(Steel, 2010). 
7.2.3 Mapping urgency rate: Accept negative emotionality & act now 
The appraisals of problem detection elicit an emotional valence which encompasses 
action tendencies that dynamically interact with the urgency check (refer to sec. 4.2.1). 
Essentially, the valence of positive emotions (e.g. happiness, pride gratitude) creates 
the tendency to seek more (Roseman, 2013) from the current paradigm, and, therefore, 
allow the individual to relax and enjoy the illusionary success (Scherer, 1987; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985). In other words, if the initial appraisals promote positive emotions, 
urgency levels will be low (Scherer, 2001), and, thus, the change process will not occur 
(Kotter, 1996). On the contrary, valence of negative emotions (e.g. guilt, same, anger, 
fear) creates the tendency to seek less (Roseman, 2013) of the current paradigm, and, 
as a result, call for immediate action that will aim to ameliorate the problematic 
situation (Scherer, 1987; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The core question, then, is whether 
these tendencies for action will be allowed to set in and impel the individual towards 
the next stages, or whether procrastination will suppress their emergence with the aim 
of protecting the honours of the ego (Fee & Tangney, 2000).  
Leaders who allow the development of the necessary intentions of urgency and effort 
exertion prepare themselves for action (Smith, 1989). That is, they understand the need 
as well as feel the desire to act “now”, which is translated into a fast and alert behaviour 
so that the crucial issues concerning the faced crisis can be tackled (Kotter, 2008:10). 
Urgency is experienced through the elicitation of fear (Scherer, 2001), which allows 
the individual to realize the imminence of the faced threat (Lazarus, 1991a). If, 
however, procrastination is triggered, the lack of urgency will become the case, which, 
subsequently, will lead to the total cessation, or significant constraint, of any further 
decisional attention to the crisis (Dutton & Duncan, 1987). Note, though, that this 
notion of decisional attention derives from the fact that procrastination, as it was 
conceptualized within the scope of this work, impacts on the formulation of initial 
intentions (Sommer, 2013) to decide (Steel, 2010) about changing. Therefore, its 
function shares similar characteristics with the psychology of decisional avoidance 
(Anderson, 2003), which means that lack of awareness regarding the crisis does not 
occur, at least not immediately, as it might be the case with defensive denial (Vaillant, 
1992).  
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Table 18. Map for the urgency rate step 
On the contrary, defensive procrastination creates discomfort to the individual 
(Klingsieck, 2013), since the emotional system continues, for some time, to signify 
(Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003) the need to take action in order to reduce the existing 
cognitive dissonance and, thereby, face the crisis (Elliot & Devine, 1994). However, 
instead of responding to this call, leaders who procrastinate (Bliss in Ferrari, Johnson 
& McCown, 1995:8) remain indifferent (Indifference: No or minimum intention to 
respond to the need & initiate change) about imitating change (low urgency: Scherer, 
2001), while at the same time allocate their attention towards subordinate pressing 
concerns which take precedence over the initial core discrepancy (George & Jones, 
2001). Of course, such a response can be an adaptive preparation for the forthcoming 
loss (anticipatory grief: Shepherd, Wiklund & Haynie, 2009) in which case action will 
be eventually taken (adaptive). Yet, consistent with the classic Freudian logic, it can 
also be said that this is a period of repressing the discrepancy and gradually forgetting 
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about its existence (Elkin & Leippe, 1986). Essentially, the leader enters into a state of 
apathy where, after the initial shock and stress that comes from realizing the crisis, lack 
of emotion and, thus, motivation (Sperry, 2016) for formulating a response to deal with 
the crisis eventually becomes the case. 
7.3 Causal responsibility diagnosis: The self at the core of the problem 
7.3.1 The importance of internalizing causal responsibility 
The next stage of the change process refers to an evaluation (Scherer, 2001; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985), of who or what is responsible for the causation of the event-crisis 
(fig.18, Process step: responsibility diagnosis) that is able to determine the direction of 
the already generated (sec. 7.1 & 7.2) emotional action tendencies (Roseman, 2013). It 
is argued that in order for a problematic situation to be attended and change to occur at 
an individual (Kiecolt, 1994) and, consequently, business level (George & Jones, 2001; 
Whelan –Berry, et al. 2003), leaders have to evaluate (fig.18, Gnosis-driven evaluation: 
Attribution of causal responsibility) and acknowledge personal responsibility for the 
problematic performance of the organization (Kouzes & Posner, 1993:204). This is 
because, by internalizing responsibility, leaders realize that blame, in case of a 
problematic situation, or credit, in case of an achievement, lies within themselves 
(Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis & Gruen, 1986). As a result, they will 
direct any action tendencies towards internal causes (Roseman, 2013), which, 
ultimately, derive from inaccurate mental models (Senge, 2006:8) and, thus, they are 
more likely to engage in reorientation of business strategy and practices (Barker & 
Barr, 2002). In addition, such an outcome seems essential for the necessary 
transformational change to occur (Barr, et al. 1992), since the issues that the current 
work tries to address (sec,1.3), fall within the spectrum of top leaders’ strategic 
functions (Adair, 2011:98; 165), upon which even leaders in lower levels of the system 
have no or little control (Harrington, 1995). 
While extensively discussed, responsibility seems to be an equivocal theoretical 
construct (Sousa, 2009). This complexity along with the multidimensional nature of 
responsibility (Gailey & Falk, 2008) necessitates a foreordination of its 
conceptualization within the scope of this work. First of all, the basis of responsibility 
is the dimension of causal agency (Roseman, et al. 1996; Roseman, 2013), which is 
inherent in leaders’ role as key decision makers of the system (Bennis, 2009). Once 
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causal involvement is granted, responsibility is ascribed according to additional 
cognitive elaborations (Frijda, 1993). For instance, according to appraisal theorists a 
crucial dimension is intentionality (i.e. Lazarus, 2006:93; Scherer, 2001; Weiner, 
1985), which, nevertheless, has to be excluded given this work’s presupposition 
regarding leaders’ conscious positive intentions (consistent with NLP in Alder, 1992).  
In light of the previous “restriction”, Malle, Guglielmo & Monroe (2014) have argued 
that blame, which is responsibility for negative events (Lazarus, 1991a:148), can still 
be attributed as long as the agent had the obligation and the capacity to act otherwise 
(Lazarus & Smith, 1988 have made a similar claim). In this sense, and consistent with 
the highly utilized and verified in practice (i.e. DeZoort, Harrison & Schnee, 2012; 
Planas, Kimberlin, Segal, Brushwood, Hepler, Schlenker, 2005; Wohl, Pritchard & 
Kelly, 2002) triangle model of responsibility (Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy & 
Doherty, 1994), it is argued that leaders’ responsibility for an already accepted 
problem-crisis is determined based on the main dimensions of personal control and 
obligation (Alicke, Rose & Bloom, 2011). As far as obligation is concerned, it can be 
said that by definition leaders ought to take the necessary actions in order to avoid 
and/or face a problem-crisis (e.g. Conger, 1992:18; Cribbin, 1981; Hersey & 
Blanchard, 1988: 86). Characteristically, the EFQM excellence model (2009: criterion 
1b) suggests that leaders have to “monitor, review and improve” their organization’s 
performance (Baldrige Award in Brown, 2009). It is, therefore, left to controllability, 
which requires some further analysis since it is not as straightforward as obligation is, 
to determine whether causal responsibility will be accepted or not. 
More precisely, controllability here is not equated with intentionality, but is considered 
as the potential ability to prevent a crisis from occurring (Malle’s, et al. 2014; Weiner, 
1985). According to the 85-15 axiom of quality philosophy (Martin, 1993) such an 
ability lies “almost” exclusively with top leadership. Indeed, as Deming (Deming 
Institute, 2014b) and Juran (Garwood & Hallen, 1999) have advocated and research 
has verified in practice (Harrington, 1995), 80 to 85 percent of the problems, including 
the major ones that interest this work, are embedded in the system and, therefore, are 
under management’s control and responsibility. Even in extreme cases, in which 
failure’s causation is highly affected by the external environment and/or outside 
managerial control factors (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004), it is still strategic management 
that “should” and “could” take the necessary either predictive or adaptive actions for 
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meeting the environmental changes (Jennings & Beaver, 1997). In this sense, it could 
be argued that no matter what the scenario might be, leaders should by virtue of their 
responsibilities be able to hold themselves accountable and willingly accept 
responsibility for those strategic (Adair, 2011:98; 165) decisions and actions, or non-
decisions and non-actions, that brought the organization to a crisis stage (Wood & 
Winston, 2005). Before proceeding any further, it should be noted that the dimension 
of causal control impacts on the subsequent appraisal of coping potential (Scherer, 
2001). Logically, then, the appraisal of coping potential is expected to entail 
retrospective implications regarding causal responsibility, which will be discussed in 
the following chapter (sec. 8.2).  
7.3.2 Blame: The hot side of responsibility & its misattribution 
Having described the concept of responsibility, it is time to focus on its “hot” aspect. 
According to Alicke (2000) any thoughtful conscious analysis of the criteria that 
underlie blame attribution is preceded, and therefore highly affected, by spontaneous 
and “relatively” unconscious evaluations of the same criteria, which are considered 
along with additional affective elements that characterize the event and the actors 
involved. Specifically, as Alicke, et al. (2011) argue, consistent with the current work’s 
notion of duality (ch.6), spontaneous evaluations (intuitive appraisal) formulate a 
blame hypothesis, which is, afterwards, revaluated, and “sometimes” mitigated 
(objectification), by a system of deliberate (reflective evaluation) cognitive analysis 
(Alicke, 2014). On this basis, and by considering the appraisal of blame and credit 
suggested by Lazarus (1991a), it is argued that the conscious experience of 
responsibility attribution is underlain by an intuitive appraisal of accountability (fig.18, 
Ego-driven appraisal: Blame & Credit). This intuitive appraisal shares similar 
characteristics with the attribution of responsibility (Smith, et al. 1993), but at the same 
time is hot (Lazarus & Smith, 1988), in the sense that it also evaluates the impact of a 
potential acknowledgement of responsibility on the appraiser’s social image, as this is 
judged by an audience (Schlenker, et al. 1994: accountability pyramid – answerability).  
Logically, then, inasmuch as it takes place in the ego-driven system, the spontaneous 
evaluation of responsibility becomes susceptible to various biases that derive from the 
influence of personal motives and individual interests (Alicke, Rose & Bloom 2011; 
sec. 6.3). The result is an appraisal prone to blame misattributions that aim to protect 
the appraiser’s ego when this is necessary (Epstein, 1994). Essentially, accepting 
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responsibility for an already appraised problem (link with goal incongruence), which 
also refers to the company led by the appraiser (Wagner III, J. A., Gooding, 1997), will 
indicate, apart from the necessary hypothesis (Alicke, et al. 2011) for formulating a 
blame signal of personal responsibility (e.g. problematic situation in my company), a 
threat to leader’s ego (negative valence – aversive). In this case, individuals are 
expected to act “egoistically” and defend the honours of their ego by attributing 
responsibility to external issues-agents (Miller, 1976; Snyder, Stephan & Rosenfield, 
1976). Also, note that the ambiguity of causes which characterizes crisis situations 
(Pearson & Clair, 1998) leaves ample room for formulating defensive excuses. Indeed, 
as Alicke (2014) suggests, biased-defensive blame attributions are more likely to occur 
in ambiguous cases (crisis characteristic) and/or when there are strong evaluative 
reactions (ego threat). Anyhow, through this unconsciously motivated (sec. 4.3) self-
serving bias (defence mechanism: Self-serving attribution), which is a validated 
phenomenon within the leadership context (Martinko, Harvey & Douglas, 2007), 
leaders deny responsibility and, thereby, reduce the already produced cognitive 
dissonance that still exists in the system (Gosling, Denizeau & Oberlé, 2006).  
7.3.3 Mapping causal responsibility diagnosis: The self-conscious emotions 
Following the previous analysis, it is suggested that there are three potential responses 
at this stage (table 19). Firstly, leaders could acknowledge responsibility, and, thereby, 
hold themselves accountable for the outcomes of the system as these are produced by 
their “subordinates” (Kraines, 2001). If this is the case, top leaders will direct emotional 
tendencies towards the self (Roseman, 2013) and, thus, will make a step towards the 
necessary strategic (Adair, 2011:98) and cultural (link between leadership & culture in 
Bass & Avolio, 1993) changes for overcoming the crisis (change in mental models: 
Senge, 2006). On the other hand, leaders could come up with various excuses that aim 
to eliminate any sense of personal responsibility (Schlenker, Pontari & Christopher, 
2001). In this latter situation, leaders direct the produced action tendencies towards 
others (e.g. blame employees, stakeholders) or external circumstances (i.e. blame the 
general economic & political environment) and, therefore, compromise their response 
to the crisis (argument driven by quality philosophy axiom described above; see also 
Pate & Stajer, 2001).  
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Pride  Gratitude 
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Note: The cognitive-behavioural elements on this table refer only to 
goal incongruent cases. Congruent ones are non-essential for this work.  
Table 19. Map for the responsibility diagnosis step 
As far as the experienced feeling is concerned, the already sensed emotion of happiness 
or sadness will now change to a more distinct one (Weiner, Russell & Lerman, 1979; 
Weiner, 1985). In particular, it is argued that an internalization of responsibility 
promotes mainly, yet not solely (Lazarus, 1991a), the elicitation of self-conscious 
emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2004). This is logical, since personal responsibility for the 
causation of the case at hand will either falsify or vindicate a self-representation held 
by the individual (ego commitment in sec. 4.3; Higgins, 1987). Arguably, then, the 
leader is expected to experience pride (Taking credit for the positive results), either 
hubristic or authentic (see Tracy, Shariff & Cheng, 2010), in the face of goal congruent 
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incidences, or shame (Failure to fulfil the ego-ideal of being a successful leader) and/or 
guilt (Harmed the company and its people) in case of incongruent ones (Lazarus, 
1991a:240-271). Note that the supported distinction between the emotional change 
themes of shame and guilt follows the view that shame requires public exposure (i.e. 
social ego-ideal invalidated) while guilt is more of an internal realization of the 
wrongdoing (Smith, Webster, Parrott & Eyre, 2002).  
On the contrary, when external (mis)attribution takes place, the triggered defence 
mechanism fortifies the self-ego which remains relatively intact (Miller, 1976) and, 
therefore, basic emotions, which are directed towards others are promoted (Roseman, 
2013). These include gratitude towards external agents (Appreciation for facilitating 
business prosperity: Weiner, 1985) in case of goal congruent evidence or anger 
(Offense against organizational goals and ego-identity: Lazarus, 1991a:222) in case 
of an incongruent one. In addition, the defensive basis upon which anger is generated 
may allow some non-defended remnants, as it is the case with the unconscious blame 
hypothesis (Alicke, et al. 2011), to become consciously available. The outcome is 
expected to be the expression of a secondary emotion of shame that will underlie anger 
(shame and anger in Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007). Last but not least, it should 
be noted that anger can also be internalized and, thereby, accompany the experience of 
shame and guilt (Lazarus, 1991a:224). 
While leaders who act defensively will, most of the times, find a “scapegoat” to blame 
for the crisis (Lazarus, 1991a:225), cases in which blame attribution becomes vague 
and responsibility is placed on impersonal factors (i.e. general circumstances instead 
of others: Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder & Elliot, 1998) should also be considered. 
Under such conditions, leaders are expected to experience only the emotions of sadness 
and fear/anxiety (Lazarus, 1991a; Roseman, 2013), which, despite being inherent and 
essential aspects of the change process, are inadequate by themselves to instigate 
transformational changes. In particular, by manifesting the irrevocability of the status 
quo’s loss (Lazarus, 1991a) and, thus, the concomitant “internal death” of leaders’ ego 
(Zell, 2003), sadness sets the basis for triggering the process of grieving (Jenkins, 
Wiklund & Brundin, 2014). This response is indeed crucial, since grief is a coping 
response for coming to terms with the loss (Lazarus, 1991a) and its successful 
completion is a prerequisite for learning from failure and revising existing knowledge 
constructs (Shepherd, 2003). However, even if the grieving process leads to the 
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covetable outcome of disengaging from the established paradigm’s commitments 
(Albert in Bell & Taylor, 2011, 1984; Smith & Lazarus, 1990), the “omission” of 
attributing causal responsibility will not allow the “new” to emerge.  
Essentially, the acceptance of the irrevocable loss should also be accompanied by a set 
of active intentions, which presuppose the direction of any response tendencies towards 
either the self (adaptive) or the others (defensive) during the current stage of the process 
(Roseman, 2013). This is because, by misattributing responsibility to general 
circumstances (Sedikides, et al. 1998) and, thus, eliciting solely the emotion of sadness 
accompanied by a sense of fear (Lazarus, 1991a; Roseman, 2013; sec. 7.1.3), leaders 
direct action exclusively towards overcoming the pain of losing the old paradigm (grief: 
Shepherd, 2003). According to this logic, sadness refers to an irrevocable loss (Lazarus, 
1991a:247), and, therefore, while it necessitates extremely high effort (Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985), is underpinned by low urgency (Scherer, 2001), as taking action 
“now” seems to be in vain. Ultimately, unless an agent(s), or an entity(s), is held 
responsible for the crisis (Roseman, 2013), so that other negative emotions like anger 
(external) or, preferably, shame and guilt (internal) can accompany sadness, tendencies 
for actively responding to the crisis will not arise (Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Also, in 
this way the sense of high urgency that characterizes the emotion of fear (Scherer, 
2001) is set free to impact on the change process and drive the formulation of an active 
response to the faced crisis. 
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8 Establishing commitment and desire for action 
While essential, neither the awareness of the need for change (problem detection) nor 
the internalized intentions for taking transformational action (causal responsibility) nor 
(urgency) are adequate to drive the leader towards the initiation of the change process. 
Characteristically, as it has been suggested in the modified TTM model (fig.2), desire 
and commitment have to be developed so that change can be instigated (preparation). 
On this basis, the current chapter discusses the steps that take place in the second phase 
of the reflective state (q.v. ch.7 for the first phase) and analyse the appraisals (intuitive 
& reflective) that complement the initial intentions for change, as these have been 
formulated in the urgency check. In addition, the respective ego-defences that could 
reduce these intentions will be identified and discussed. The result, will be a map of 
feelings, behaviours and cognitive meanings that leaders could experience and 
consciously express during this phase.  
8.1 Coping potential determination: Evaluating the level of controllability  
8.1.1 Complementing urgency: Responsibility for action & controllability 
In the previous section the discussion about the importance of urgency focused 
exclusively on the appraisal’s ability to formulate the necessary intentions regarding 
the initiation of the change process (Smith, 1989; Kotter, 2008:10). While the 
requirements to explain the logic behind a potentially defensive response 
(procrastination) led to an in-depth analysis of the urgency check, the core of its 
contribution could be traced to a specific function. That is, through its underlying 
dimension of accepting the obligation to exert the necessary effort for change (sec. 
7.2.2), the appraisal of urgency locates the locus of responsibility for action internally 
and, thereby, drives the individual (intentions) to formulate a problem-focused 
response to face the threatening event-crisis (consistent with the PrE model: Mulilis & 
Duval, 1995; 1997). This notion of action responsibility is essential for the change 
process, since according to the distinction made by Brickman & his colleagues’ (1982) 
as well as the arguments promoted by various leadership theorists (see Wood & Winston 
2005:88) the acceptance of causal responsibility (sec. 7.3) is inadequate in its own to 
trigger the change process. As it has already been mentioned, leaders should also realize 
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the importance of their role in leading change (Gill, 2002) and acknowledge the 
inherent in this role responsibility to accomplish the transformation (Deming, 
1994:116; Yukl, 2010:296). 
What is then left so that change can be instigated? Of course, the fundamental 
contribution of urgency to the change process is beyond dispute. However, the 
covetable sense of responsibility will not be consolidated (Lalwani & Duval, 2000) and 
the concomitant problem-focused strategies will not be effectuated (Mulilis & Duval, 
2003) unless the resources and the effective mechanisms for controlling the identified 
threat-crisis are appraised as sufficient relative to its magnitude (Weitzel & Jonsson, 
1989). Controllability has been widely accepted by management theorists as a 
determinant for the initiation and successful completion of a change process (see 
Vardaman, et al. 2012:837). This is because, in situations that are amenable to 
modification, individuals tend to generate higher levels of problem-focused coping 
strategies (i.e. Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, 
DeLongis & Gruen, 1986) and take active steps (Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989: 
active coping) in order to contend with the already appraised inconsistency (sec. 7.1). 
On the contrary, an appraisal of inadequate controllability betokens that any effort to 
change is in a sense futile (Roseman, 2013), and, therefore, emotion-focused strategies 
are formulated, while the current problematic situation is accepted as it is (Folkman, et 
al. 1986). In this sense, it seems logical to advocate that a crucial step in the schema 
and, consequently, organizational change process is the phase of coping potential 
(George & Jones, 2001), during which leaders appraise whether and how the perceived 
threat-crisis can be managed (Lazarus, 1991a:150).  
8.1.2 The distinct reflective evaluations of controllability 
It might be true that coping potential, and its core element of controllability, has been 
treated as a single evaluative dimension by some theorists (i.e. Folkman, 1984: 
personal control; Lazarus, 1991). However, within the scope of this work a distinction 
between the dimensions of control and power that is similar, yet not identical, to the 
one made by Scherer (2001) is adopted. In this way, an essential line between the 
appraisal of universal controllability by natural agents and the one of personal-
company’s ability to perform an adaptive action in response to the situational needs is 
drawn (Scherer, 2001; see also universal vs personal helplessness in Abramson, 
Seligman & Teasdale, 1978). In addition, research on organizational change (Bandura 
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& Wood, 1989) and employees’ adaptation to it (Terry & Jimmieson, 2003) have 
demonstrated that a distinction between situational controllability and self-efficacy is 
legitimate, since the two appraisals make discrete contributions to the coping process 
(i.e. Terry, 1991; 1994).  Obviously, then, an analysis of the schema change process 
has to adjust and adapt to the logic that underlies the difference between these two 
dimensions9. 
Within the context of organizational change and management in general, the distinction 
between the dimensions of controllability originates in the works of Bandura & Wood 
(1989; Bandura, 1991; Wood & Bandura, 1989). Their theorization, which has also 
been adopted and applied in various business studies (i.e. Jenkins, 1994; Paglis & 
Green, 2002; Parker, 1998; Pearlmutter, 1998; Wang & Netemyer, 2002; Weick, 
1993), wants the perception of being in control over a change issue to be determined 
by the distinct, yet interrelated, aspects of environmental changeability and efficacy to 
effect change (Bandura & Wood, 1989). While both aspects encompass the notion of 
evaluating control, a difference in the way this notion is approached arises once 
someone draws upon Gist & Mitchell’s (1992) analysis. More precisely, the former 
considers whether the issue at hand is under management’s decisional control (Callan 
& Dickson, 1993; “some determinants are not controllable by anyone”: Gist & 
Mitchell, 1992) as this is determined by the characteristics of the situation (fig.18, 
Process step: Assess situational control). The latter refers to change-efficacy appraisals 
(Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005; Weiner, 2009), according to which leaders evaluate 
if the company and its members are capable of exercising control and implementing 
change effectively (fig.18, Process step: Evaluate change efficacy). It should be noted 
that these phases constitute the two core aspects of controllability in the process of 
formulating efficacy judgments (Gist & Mitchell, 1992), which resembles the 
                                                 
9 Scherer (2001) suggests that control and power have been treated as a single appraisal under 
the umbrella of “controllability”; not the one of coping potential. His phase of coping potential 
includes the additional check of adjustment, which here has not been considered. This is 
because, the adjustment check is mainly necessary when control and power are low. Within the 
scope of this work this can happen only as a result of defensive appraisals, in which case 
“illutionary” adjustment can be considered as secured, due to the impact of the triggered 
defence mechanisms on the process.  
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evaluation of coping potential that has been advocated by the appraisal theories of 
emotion (Lazarus, 1991a:225)10. 
Based on the recommended phases, the research will now try to identify what are the 
corresponding reflective evaluations that leaders conduct. It is argued that an equivalent 
to the phase of environmental-situational changeability is the check of control (Scherer, 
2001; also Smith & Ellsworth, 1985: Situational control), during which leaders 
evaluate if the faced situation could be influenced by human decisions (fig.18, Gnosis-
driven evaluation: Control). A sense of decisional control is essential for the change 
process, since it allows leaders to consider a wider range of alternatives for coping with 
the stressful event (Callan & Dickson, 1993: logical analysis) and, consequently, 
proceed to sophisticated large-scale changes (Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993; see also 
sec. 8.3). Also, although it does exist, the impact of control on the subsequent response-
tendencies is not direct, but is mediated by the aspect of efficacy (Wood & Bandura, 
1989). Indeed, if control is possible (Scherer, 2001), coping potential will be 
determined by the appraisal of capability to manage and cope with (Frijda, 1987) the 
change-issue (fig.18, Gnosis-driven evaluation: Manageability). Essentially at this 
stage, leaders develop the necessary readiness for action by evaluating the 
organization’s collective efficacy to implement the change process effectively (Weiner, 
Amick & Lee, 2008). In this respect it should be clarified that within the scope of the 
                                                 
10 Efficacy is a wider concept compared to the appraisal of coping potential. Here the phases of 
efficacy and control are perceived as evaluations that, despite carrying beliefs from past 
experiences, are formulated dynamically in the light of task requirements and relevant evidence 
(Gist & Mitchell, 1992). However, control (locus of control: Rotter, 1966) and efficacy 
constitute also generalized traits (i.e. I am capable of completing tasks successfully) of the 
individual (see Chen, Gully & Eden, 2001) or are formulated, based on past experiences and 
domain-specific beliefs (Experience shows that I am capable of managing my company) that 
pre-exist the appraisal (Bandura & Wood, 1989). If considered as individual beliefs, they can 
be the reason why defence occurs (according to the logic of this work: sec. 6.3). On the other 
hand, as individual variables or as non-defensive beliefs (accepting the shock: Hardy III, 2014) 
they play a role to the process of coping with organizational change (Judge, Thoresen, Pucik 
& Welbourne, 1999), mainly through their impact on the appraisals of control and power 
(Wranik & Scherer, 2010). Yet the analysis of this impact lies outside the scope of this work 
(some thought is given in sec. 11.7.2). 
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current work, judgments of collective efficacy refer to the individual’s appraisal of the 
organization’s joint capability to cope with the change at hand, instead of shared beliefs 
about this capability (see Bandura, 2000; Holt & Vardaman, 2013). That is, they do 
not facilitate the enhancement of an organization’s readiness for change per se (i.e. 
Weiner, 2009; a subsequent step in change processes fig.2), but motivate the leader to 
initiate the necessary transformational-strategic change in the first place (Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan, 2005). 
8.1.3 Innate uncontrollability & hope: Responding to chaos 
While a perception of control is necessary for responding adaptively to the crisis 
(Vardaman, et al. 2012), the disruptive nature of change (Sharma, 2006:9) is expected 
to produce, rather contradictorily, an initial sense of uncontrollability that needs to be 
accepted for change to occur (consistent with Walinga, 2008). Specifically, the chaotic 
in essence (Bütz, 1995) and continuously in flux (Heraclitus in Osborne, 2003:99) 
reality can constitute any system incapable (breakdown in Farazmand, 2003:339 & 
362) of exerting everlasting control without questioning, as well as changing, when 
necessary, its practices (quantum paradigm in Fris & Lazaridou, 2006). For a company, 
the very same challenge arises once a crisis is faced, since the call for transformation 
in such cases (Gopinath, 2005) is underlain by the notion that the existing paradigm is 
unable to control and cope with the chaotic (Gersick, 1991; Murphy, 1996) crisis at 
hand (Faulkner, 2001; Reilly, 1987). From the individuals’ perspective the experienced 
uncontrollability (sadness) and uncertainty (fear), as these derive from the crisis (Liu, 
Perrewé, 2005; sec. 7.1), create a motivational impulse to restore the diminished levels 
of order and structure (Whitson, Galinsky & Kay, 2015) by formulating a more accurate 
mental model about how the world operates (schema change: see ch.3). If 
procrastination does not arise, this impulse will be expressed as a set of goal and 
implementation intentions (Gollwitzer; 1999) that indicate the need to take action and 
respond to the crisis “now” (Kotter, 1996).  
Once the need for change is developed, appraisals of coping potential get involved in 
order to determine, along with the already (sec. 7.3) attributed causal responsibility 
(Scherer, 2001), the most adaptive way to face the issue at hand (secondary appraisals: 
Lazarus, 1991). In particular, the highly problematic and uncertain characteristics of 
the crisis (Gersick, 1991; Murphy, 1996) necessitate an emotional response of hope 
(Fear the collapse but yearning for the better: Lazarus, 1991a:282; 1999b). What the 
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exact mode of this hope and, hence, the distinct cognitive and behavioral features of 
the action to be taken (Eaves, et al. 2014; Webb, 2007) will be, depends on how its 
element of agency will be realized (Snyder, 2002). By extension, then, the mode of 
hope, and consequently the nature of the response, is defined based on the way the 
already formulated (urgency check: sec. 7.2) intentions for action, which are reflected 
in agency (Rand & Cheavens, 2009), are shaped by the appraisals of coping potential 
(Efficacy & agency: Bandura, 1989). That is, the appraised outcomes will trigger a 
specific mode of hope (Eaves, et al. 2014; Webb, 2007) that will entail a respective 
motivational approach towards the imaginary conception, or non-conception, of 
alternative courses of action (Snyder, 2002; et al. 1991). Note that the course of action 
is not an actual one, but the very first outcome of individuals’ mental capability to 
temporally extend their agency in the future (Bratman, 2000) and, thus, plan and write 
the script of their life (Kennett & Matthews, 2009:329)11. 
In broad terms the potential modes of hope can be either adaptive or maladaptive 
(Lazarus, 1999b), depending on whether uncontrollability will be realized as a benign 
reality that vindicates the need to change or as a threat to the self (Walinga, 2008). In 
its basis, innate uncontrollability is stressful for the leader (Keown-McMullan, 1997), 
as it poses a threat to the established order and the ego attached to it (Leary, Terry, 
Allen & Tate, 2009). If this emotionality is not adaptively regulated, leaders will aim 
to control the experienced threat (Walinga, 2008), mainly by defending against its 
source; the chaotic nature of the crisis (defences are analysed below). In such cases, 
hope is invoked in order to enhance irrational beliefs in status quo’s viability and 
facilitate, or else justify, leaders’ reluctance to let go (necessary for change: Mavrinac, 
                                                 
11 According to Snyder (2002) hope requires agency thinking and the existence of workable 
pathways for achieving the desired goals. Here Bandura’s (1989) logic is followed and more 
emphasis is given to agency. That is, an initial experience of hope can be triggered on the basis 
that when there is agency (will) there is, potentially, an imaginary alternative pathway (Snyder, 
et al. 1991; emphasis added) to achieve the goal of changing. Whether or not a precise pathway 
actually exists, so that hope can be sustained (hope is part of an emotional process: Folkman 
& Lazarus, 1985), will be determined after the instigation of change, which is a step that lies 
outside the scope of this work (fig.2). On the other hand, when capacity to achieve change is 
appraised as low, individuals can still construct illusionary pathways with the “hope” that they 
will lead to the covetable outcome (defences analysed below).  
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2006) of any old commitments (Lazarus, 1991a:283). Hence, this kind of hope prevents 
leaders from seeing the benefits of a potential alternative course of action (Lazarus, 
1999b), and, ultimately, drives a decision against the instigation of the change process. 
On the contrary, if innate uncontrollability is accepted as a benign reality, the 
inadequacy of the status quo to respond adaptively will be acknowledged (see above) 
and, ergo, change will occur (Walinga, 2008). In these cases, hope has nothing to 
vindicate and, thus, can only serve as a yearning for the better that escorts the 
uncertainty about the future (Lazarus, 1991a; 1999b) which is inherent to any decision 
(Walker, et al. 2003). 
Before proceeding to further analysis, it is essential to discuss the implications of causal 
responsibility attribution, as it highly interacts with coping potential (Scherer, 2001), 
on the mode of the hope to be triggered. Specifically, a misattribution of causal 
responsibility, apart from maintaining self-value (motivational impulse for the defence: 
sec. 7.3.2) by externalizing the blame to an agent, is also expected to decrease the 
experienced chaotic disorder and the concomitant uncontrollability, that characterizes 
the faced crisis (idea derives from Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan & Keefer, 2012). This 
is because, leaders perceive the issue at hand not as an outcome of inaccurate mental 
models (self-conscious emotions shame-guilt: Lazarus, 1991a:240-271; Tracy & 
Robins, 2004) that need to be reconsidered and restructured (schema change: ch.3), but 
as an offence (anger: Lazarus, 1991a:222) from an external agent to an otherwise 
workable and in order status quo (sec. 7.3). As a result, coping potential concerns the 
capacity of launching a counter-attack (Lazarus, 1991a) so that the self and the 
company can be protected from the external threat, while the logic of responding to a 
chaotic crisis becomes applicable only to internally attributed cases. Ultimately, hope 
in externally attributed cases will not be an outcome of defensive responses to crisis’s 
chaotic disorder (refer to sec. 8.3.3). On this basis, the following sections discuss how 
the ego-driven mind treats uncontrollability, what defences could be triggered, as well 
as how hope is experienced and expressed. 
8.2 Assessing situational control: Active vs Passive intentions 
8.2.1 The inherent need for control & the notion of anchored controllability  
Commencing from his libertarian beliefs, Noam Chomsky (1988a) supports that human 
beings possess an “instinct for freedom” that creates a want for an autonomous control 
Establishing commitment and desire for action    Page 146 
 
over their personal affairs, without externally imposed authoritative influences 
(Chomsky, 1999: on language & freedom). While Chomsky’s politico-philosophical 
theorization is debatable (Edgley, 2005), recent evidence (Leotti & Delgado, 2011) 
seems to “indirectly” vindicate his beliefs on human instincts, by demonstrating that 
the opportunity to choose freely and, thus, exercise active control over a case, is 
inherently valuable for individuals (Aoki & colleagues, 2014; Fujiwara & colleagues, 
2013). Among the numerous implications these results may have, particularly 
important for this work is Leotti, Iyengar & Ochsner’s (2010) argument that the desire 
for exerting control – through choice - in threatening situations and, subsequently, 
regulating the accompanied negative affect are biologically motivated processes which 
serve the promotion of adaptive behaviour (Leotti & Delgado, 2011; 2014). Given, 
then, a case that is objectively susceptible to direct human-leader influence12, it is worth 
wondering under what circumstances leaders who experience negative affect produced 
by previous non-defensive appraisals (sec. 7.1-7.3) could suppress their “natural” 
instincts (consistent with Chomsky, 1998) and deny the perception of situational control 
that is so essential for change initiatives (Vardaman, et al. 2012:837). 
On this basis, it is argued that controllability could be repudiated as the unconscious 
mind formulates (fig.18, Ego-driven appraisal: Anchored controllability) the requisite 
motivational (Eitam, Kennedy & Higgins, 2013) commitment for actively exercising 
control through (Leotti, et al. 2010) a self-determined choice (Murayama, et al. 2013). 
In essence, simultaneously with an appraisal of modifiability (Frijda, 1987), which 
mirrors the conscious control check (Scherer, 1993b: table 1), the unconscious mind 
triggers, or more accurately has to trigger, a motivational impulse for action, by 
evaluating whether a need for active (vs passive) engagement with the concern at hand 
is necessary (Gratch & Marsella, 2004; 2007: changeability). According to these 
appraisals and given the faced crisis, a perception of active situational control (i.e. the 
case is controllable and I have to do something about it) is expected to be established, 
unless the past, which comes along with the appraisal of modifiability (Lisetti & 
Gmytrasiewicz, 2002), intervenes and manipulates the response tendencies (consistent 
with Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Its potential impact is consolidated upon an initially 
                                                 
12 The reader at this stage should consider the argument regardless of how he/she believes the 
objective reality to be actually established (q.v. sec. 3.1.1). 
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unconscious recognition that the faced crisis is uncontrollable (Faulkner, 2001; Reilly,  
1987), given  the capacity of  the “existing”, and for some time in operation (past in 
Lisetti & Gmytrasiewicz, 2002), organizational routines, processes and course of action 
in general (Booth, 1993). As it has already been discussed (sec. 8.1), this recognition 
entails an ego-threat which has to be regulated to prevent leaders from helplessly 
surrendering to the experienced disorder (Murphy, 1996) and the concomitant status 
quo’s inability to exert control (Walinga, 2008). 
8.2.2 Defending the status quo: Heteronomous compensation of control 
An adaptive regulation will allow leaders to realize that, despite the perceived 
uncontrollability (Walinga, 2008), autonomy over a response, which will face the 
challenge and restore a new equilibrium (Lewin, 1947), still exists (idea drawn from 
Kuntz & Gomes, 2012). On the contrary, an unregulated threat will enhance the already 
produced aversive emotionality (non-defensive appraisals sec. 7.1-7.3), and along with 
the leader’s psychological ego attachment to the organization, will set the basis for 
justifying the status quo (Proudfoot & Kay, 2014). Specifically, the perceived 
uncontrollability and the sensed ambiguity-uncertainty of effect (Pearson & Clair, 
1998) regarding the case (refer to sec. 7.1) could make leaders act defensively 
(Walinga, 2008) by devaluing the opportunity of taking action based on an autonomous 
and free choice (Leotti & Delgado, 2014). If this is the case, it is expected to see leaders 
compensating the identified uncontrollability (consistent with Kay, et al. 2008; 2009; 
2010) through the invocation of an imaginary and external to social beings system 
(defence mechanism: Heteronomous compensation of control). Being external, these 
systems constitute a reality that is invulnerable to the flux of the social world, within 
which meanings of various entities (i.e. paradigm or aspects of it in an organization) 
are dynamically and continually (re)constructed by human beings (heternomomy in 
Castoriadis, 1987). Therefore, such systems attach a predetermined meaning of order 
(Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan & Laurin, 2008) to a crisis incident that is inherently 
chaotic (Gersick, 1991; Murphy, 1996; see also above), and, thereby, prevent the 
already formulated tendency for action (appraisals ch.7) from being fully deployed. 
This is achieved by:  
 Mainly making the current status quo seem as what it should actually be 
(justification in Proudfoot & Kay, 2014), given the fact that what challenges its 
ability to exert control is beyond (George & Jones, 2001) the issues upon which 
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human beings can actively influence and manage (manipulation of modifiability & 
changeability). For instance, leaders could invoke McGregor’s (1960 in McGregor 
& Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2006:43-59) theory x beliefs about human nature (beyond 
human beings’ influence: see Sartre, 1975) in order to justify the status quo and, 
thereby, reject change even when the problem has been accepted (Kitsos, 2011). 
 Alleviating the stress caused by the internalization of causal responsibility. Scherer 
(2001) suggests that the ability to control a case greatly depends on the appraisal 
of causal attribution. Although this seems and probably is valid, here it is argued 
that low levels of autonomy can also trigger self-serving bias (link in Knee & 
Zuckerman, 1996) retrospectively. More precisely, driven by the need to find 
structure and order in the faced case, leaders formulate imaginary constructs that, 
apart from compensating control, serve as a kind of “illusionary” enemies that are 
believed to undermine the success of the organization (Sullivan, Landau & 
Rothschild, 2010). Ultimately, the imaginary construct provides a convenient 
scapegoat upon which the blame for the crisis can be placed (idea drawn from 
Sullivan, et al. 2010; Rothschild, et al. 2012). It should be noted that such a 
misattribution shares similar characteristics with the case of self-serving attribution 
(sec. 7.3.2). However, it is not equally direct, in the sense that the leader rejects 
only the idea of being free to choose the action to be applied (volitional behavior 
control), while the view that causal control lies with him/her is retained (distinction 
in Alicke, 2000). That is, leader’s choices, which are accepted to have brought the 
crisis, are justified as the only possible ones, given the unchanged reality (George 
& Jones, 2001) instituted by the external controlling system (i.e. human nature: 
Kitsos, 2011). 
 Providing a concept that could be used as an excuse for managing the 
psychological costs of a potential future failure (collateral implication). 
Individuals who are low on autonomy resort more often to self-handicapping (Knee 
& Zuckerman, 1998) for proactively coping with a threat (Nosenko, Arshava & 
Nosenko, 2014). That is, leaders know that any imminent failure could be attributed 
to the reality justified by the external system, which in turn offers a sense of 
proactive safety for the potentially threatened ego (Siegel, Scillitoe, & Parks-
Yancy, 2005:589). Along the same lines, Feldman, Baumeister & Wong (2014) 
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claim that the denial of free will is a way to avoid responsibility for the potentially 
negative outcomes that a choice (in which case is taking no action) might entail.  
8.2.3 Mapping situational control assessment: Feel the fear and do it anyway 
As it has already been analysed mapping the emotional experience in the later phase of 
the change process will be based mainly on the emotional experience of hope and, more 
precisely, on how its element of agency is differentiated during the appraisal of coping 
potential (sec. 8.1.3). The first crucial distinction is drawn during the appraisal of 
situational control assessment, the outcome of which determines the passive or active 
nature of the formulated hope (Ratcliffe, 2013:598). That is, high control shapes agency 
as an active engagement to actualize the covetable future (McGeer, 2004), while low 
control creates a passive and wishful anticipation for something outside the self 
(McGeer, 2004), and probably the entire social institution (transcendence in hope: 
Eaves, et al. 2014), to resolve the faced issue (Ratcliffe, 2013:598). Consistent with the 
Greek tradition, this distinction and its impact on the response to be taken are sufficient 
to specify the adaptability of hope (Pandora’s Box in Vance, 2010: 413), as this is 
demonstrated in the following two scenarios.  
Autonomy, which is the quintessence of democratic societies, requires the explicit 
recognition that there is nothing but the society-organization, and the individuals within 
it, to ascribe meaning to the abyss-chaos of its own existence, and, thereby, institute 
the laws that will govern its own reality (Castoriadis, 1993). By abolishing 
transcendence, thought and action are liberated (Homer in Castoriadis, 1983), since 
any reality is acknowledged to be a derivative of human theorization, and, thus, 
becomes susceptible to challenge and revision (Dauenhauer, 1985:468; Tasis, 2012). 
Ultimately, hoping for salvation from something outside the social fabric becomes by 
definition inconceivable (Homer in Castoriadis, 1983), which, leads to a view that 
whatever the situational constraints might be, control over the response and agency for 
action lies “always” with the individual(s) of the society-organization (Ober, 2008:8). 
It could be argued, therefore, that leaders who accept the chaotic nature of a crisis 
(Gersick, 1991; Murphy, 1996) and come to terms with the concomitant innate 
uncertainty-uncontrollability (sec. 8.1.3), emancipate themselves from the current 
order by incarnating the outlook that things are “capable of being otherwise” (Aristotle 
in Ross, 2009). Such an understanding is realized as the necessity for and viability of 
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undertaking an autonomous response (Kuntz & Gomes, 2012), accompanied by an 
experience of challenge (Lisetti & Gmytrasiewicz, 2002) which is behaviourally 
expressed as a strong desire-intention to achieve a resolution of the faced issue (Smith 
& Kirby, 2001:124).  
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Table 20. Map for the control assessment step 
Further clarification of a human control response can be achieved once the highly 
interrelated appraisal of causal responsibility (Scherer, 2001) is taken into 
consideration. In particular, if causal responsibility has been attributed internally, 
human control will allow the completion (sec. 8.2.2: second bullet) of the emotional 
experience of guilt and/or shame (Roseman, 2013) as well as will promote a response 
for their mitigation (Lazarus, 1991a). That is, responsibility for the crisis, as this is 
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expressed through the emotions’ relational change themes (sec. 7.3.3) will be fully 
accepted, while a motivational impulse to apologize (shame the adaptive case: 
Nathanson in Tangney, et al. 2007) and respond for setting the issues straight (guilt) 
will be promoted (Silfver-Kuhalampi, Fontaine, Dillen & Scherer, 2013). In this work’s 
terms, such a response presupposes that the leader will embrace the need (Whitson, et 
al. 2015) of formulating a more accurate representation (schema change: ch.3) 
regarding how the world works (Senge, 2006:8). On the contrary, an appraisal of human 
control over an externally attributed issue promotes the emotional experience of anger 
(Roseman, 2013; Scherer, 2001). Along with this emotional experience comes a 
cognitive conceptualization of the need as well as the viability of proceeding to a 
response in order to protect the offended personal and organizational goals (Lazarus, 
1991a; sec. 7.3.3). In general, both cases create the behavioural intention to undertake 
the challenge and willingly seek a resolution of the imminent struggle with the faced 
issue (Lazarus, 2001:44; Smith & Kirby, 2001:124). Yet, what the response as well as 
the mode of active hope (Ratcliffe, 2013:598) will be, is going to be determined by the 
subsequent phase of change efficacy determination (sec. 8.3.3).  
When the chaotic nature of a crisis (Gersick, 1991; Murphy, 1996) is treated 
defensively, leaders invoke external mechanisms that are able to formulate a perception 
of things being in order despite the low levels of control (Kay & colleagues, 2008; 
2009; 2010). In such cases, the need to restore order and structure (Whitson, et al. 2015) 
through the use of personal and/or facilitative means (human control) that will 
(re)enable control (Rothbaum, Weis & Snyder, 1982) over future outcomes and, thus, 
allow to manage the crisis (Fink, 1986:15) becomes by definition inconceivable. This 
is because the chaotic nature of the crisis is concealed behind illusionary patterns which 
originate in imaginarily constructed extrasocial systems (Castoriadis, 1993). By lying 
outside the social flux, these systems institute indisputable absolute realities 
(Castoriadis, 1987) that “annihilate” in advance the ability to conceive alternative ways 
(this is how things are) of organizing and responding to the crisis (Tajfel, 1974; 
2010:6). As a result, an excuse for the impotency of the current schemas and practices 
to exert control is provided and the crisis at hand is accepted as something that leaders 
have to bear and live with (George & Jones, 2001). The inability to conceive an 
alternative way to exert control and respond to the accepted need of facing the crisis 
now (sec. 7.2) can lead to an experience of despair (Scherer, 2001).  
Establishing commitment and desire for action    Page 152 
 
In order to avoid this painful state (Lazarus, 1999b), leaders rely on the transcendental 
reality (Eaves, et al. 2014) to hope (Criticize the negative & patiently expect a 
deterministic negation) for a future that leaves the possibility of a wishful (McGeer, 
2004) outcome open (open-ended hope: Webb, 2007). Basically, by perceiving the 
imaginary construct as a saboteur of business success, leaders find a scapegoat 
(Sullivan, et al. 2010; Rothschild, et al. 2012) to blame, not for causing the crisis per 
se (who of agency), but for influencing (why of agency) their disastrous choices (Lee, 
& Reeve 2013). This retrospective transfer of responsibility is expected to alleviate any 
motivational forces prompted by guilt and shame (Rothschild, et al. 2012). Instead, the 
individual will become critical of the extrasocial reality (critical hope: Webb, 2007), 
which is perceived to prevent the otherwise accurate and potentially successful 
schematic beliefs from being deployed (George & Jones, 2001). At the same time, the 
convenient uncontrollability and the concomitant passive acceptance of the faced issue 
(George & Jones, 2001) are complemented with an active anticipation (Waterworth, 
2004) for the eventual vindication of the current status quo (Webb, 2007). Such an 
anticipation neither does nor needs to entail concrete plans about how the wishful 
outcome will occur (McGeer, 2004) or a precise description of the visionary future to 
be achieved (Eaves, et al. 2014). Instead, the individual makes do with the absurd belief 
that despite the inability to exert control and actively engage, everything will be fine at 
the end, as the crisis will “somehow” get resolved (patient hope: Webb, 2007). 
8.3 Evaluating change efficacy: Allowing a collective response to emerge 
8.3.1 The inadequacy of heroic leadership to manage a crisis 
As it has already been discussed (sec. 8.1.2), the appraisal of coping potential loads on 
a second dimension of control that considers the “collective capability”, or efficacy 
(Weiner, Amick & Lee, 2008), of a company to manage and cope with the crisis at hand 
(Manageability: Frijda, 1987). Driven by the logic of cognitive duality (sec. 6.2), the 
current work advocates the unconscious formulation of this “collective capability” 
based on a two-dimensional intuitive appraisal (fig.18, Ego-driven appraisal: Power 
concerns), the core of which is Scherer’s (2001) power check. Specifically, the basic 
dimension of the suggested appraisal evaluates the adequacy of the available means 
and resources, as well as the capability to mobilize them (Weiner, 2009), so that control 
over the physical and social requirements posed by the faced crisis could be 
“potentially” exerted (Lazarus, 1991a:13; Scherer, 2001). Notably, because of its focus 
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on the “potential” to control, this dimension elicits the emotional experience (Roseman, 
1996), without considering (most appraisal theorists do not: Brody, 1997) what impact 
the evaluations of “actual” interpersonal power (i.e. Kemper, 2006), and the 
concomitant ego-threat (see below), could have on the change process (Lawler, 1992). 
Consequently, this dimension in itself remains immune to the influences of the socially 
constructed ego (sec. 4.3), and, thus, mirrors (Scherer, 1999b: table 30.1) the conscious 
and relatively ego-free evaluation of manageability (Frijda, 1987)13, which enables the 
trace of the objective reality as this is established by the evidence (sec, 3.1.1).  
Given the previous, it is worth wondering, under what circumstances could leaders who 
face an objectively manageable case act defensively. In this respect, it is argued that 
the essential change capability (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005) will not emerge to 
consciousness, unless its “collective” premise, which is manifested to the leader as an 
inability to cope with the chaotic nature of a crisis (Gersick, 1991; Murphy, 1996) 
solely based on his/her own heroic actions (Yukl, 2010), is accepted. As Senge (1996) 
characteristically claims, the complex issues faced by contemporary institutions require 
systemic changes, and, therefore, the notion of hierarchical authority is questioned (By, 
Burnes, & Oswick, 2011), in the sense that its inadequacy to provide sustainable 
solutions is more obvious than ever before (Cooperrider, Barrett & Srivastva, 1995; 
Paraskevas, 2006). Indeed, by being a response to inherently chaotic crises (Gersick, 
1991; Murphy, 1996), transformational changes do not, and probably cannot, 
encompass the luxury of knowing in advance the final destination to be reached, let 
alone the precise steps/actions towards it (Chapman, 2002). This journey into the 
unknown contradicts the traditional approach to change, according to which leaders-
agents possess an objective truth that simply has to be deployed down to the ignorant, 
resistant and apathetic masses (Bartunek, et al. 2011).  
Instead, consistent with the democratic imperative, the call for a collective and dynamic 
co-construction of the new organizational reality to be attended is justified (Bushe, & 
Marshak, 2009). Essentially, then, once a crisis is faced, any notion of coercive and 
authoritarian power that springs from the established organizational hierarchies loses 
its legitimacy (Chomsky in Kreisler, 2010:9). Of course, this failure of commandism 
                                                 
13 Scherer (1993) links power check with Frijda’s (1987) dimension of controllability. Here it 
is linked with the overlapping and more specific dimension of manageability (sec. 8.1.2). 
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does not imply the total abolishment of power (Tannenbaum, 1956), but suggests its 
wide distribution (Raelin, 2011) to autonomous and locally operating self-organized 
teams, the purpose and “coordinated” function (leader-conductor: Deming, 1994) of 
which have to be facilitated by top-leadership (Nonaka, 1988). Under such democratic 
orders, leaders have to empower the people to undertake ownership over and get 
directly involved with the process, while at the same time become “methodological 
agents” (Haiman, 1951:33) who promote and secure the overall ongoing democratic 
proceedings so that autonomous units can operate efficiently (Gastil, 1994 on 
democratic leadership). As a result, top-level commitment which is fundamental for 
change (Crosby, 1984:98) is not and cannot be exercised through forced control (Choi, 
2007:245). But it becomes “top-down” support (Luecke, 2003:33) that fosters the 
autonomous operation of the involved units, with the aim of formulating a dynamic, 
coordinated and collective response to the faced crisis (see Paraskevas, 2006). 
8.3.2 A threat to leaders’ personal power & its protection 
Whether the necessary “collective” notion will be accepted or not depends on a 
secondary, in terms of eliciting the emotional experience (Roseman, 1996), yet 
fundamentally important, appraisal of own power (appraisal inspired by Roseman, 
1991). Own power supplements the evaluation of “collective capability” (Holt & 
Vardaman, 2013) by introducing, or more accurately emphasizing, the distinct 
contribution of leader’s self-efficacy to the initiation and implementation of change 
(Pearlmutter, 1998). Of course, self-efficacy is part of and dynamically interacts with 
collective capability-efficacy (Bandura, 2000), an interrelation that supports as well as 
is supported by the overlap between the evaluative dimensions of power check and own 
power (Scherer, 1993b: table 1). However, apart from common evaluations of 
“potential” control (see above), self-efficacy by definition, similar to own power 
(Roseman, 1991; 1996), pertains primarily to the “self”, which, due to its social essence 
(Castoriadis, 2007:156), enables considerations of “actual” interpersonal power to 
emerge (Lawler, 1992). These are established through social comparisons (Bandura & 
Jourden, 1991) with individuals who share similar roles/identities and under an 
individualistic mind-set could entail detrimental effects regarding the perceptions of 
efficacy (Bandura, 1991) and, thereby, the initiation of change.  
The concept of social comparisons under the logic of this work (sec. 5.3) betokens the 
propensity of leaders who follow the prevailing social norm and embrace the “heroic” 
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view of their role to oppose a collective response (Senge, 1990:10). More precisely, 
“heroic” leaders will comprehend the chaotic nature of a crisis (Gersick, 1991; Murphy, 
1996) not as a call for a collective effort (analysed above), but as a force for a 
“threatening” redistribution of power (Tushman, Newman & Romanelli, 1986) towards 
their subordinates (Saracer, Karacay-Aydin, Asarkaya & Kabasakal, 2011:215). Such 
a perception arises due to the unique quality of democratic orders to reconcile the 
principle of equally distributed power and control with the potential emergence of 
distinct individuals (difference with distributed leadership: Woods, 2004). Hence, a 
threat consists in that the source of power departs from pre-established and privileged 
hierarchical positions and is relocated to the demonstration of excellence and merit 
(Pericles in Meagher, 2008:15). These qualities are not entrenched rights that come 
with leader’s positional power, but can be claimed by everyone alike after a continuous 
process of dynamic interactions among equals (discourse paradigm: Ober, 2002:86)14.  
Apparently, the emerging “smell of freedom”, while essential for responding to a crisis 
(Bolton & Stolcis, 2008), is adequate and able to make “heroic” leaders feel ego-
threatened and, thus, defend the need for change (Pasmore, 2011). Specifically, leaders 
who do not identify with the externally specified choice for a collective response 
(Averill, 1973) will experience reduced discretion (agency in Barlas & Obhi, 2013) to 
produce the desired effects via direct personal control (“heroic” power to: Overbeck 
& Park, 2001). On the one hand, the leader can accept this “default” (adaptive 
regulation: sec. 8.1.3) sense of powerlessness (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015) as a force for 
abolishing commandism (Liberation: Mavrinac, 2006), and, thereby, can allocate the 
coping resources towards the resolution of the crisis at hand (Walinga, 2008). On the 
other hand, the perceived lack of power can be explained, and rationalized, as a logical 
consequence of the fact that the leader is not, or seems to lose the privilege of being, in 
“managerial” control (misconception in Oswick, 2013). Arguably, this persistence on 
the heroic paradigm is expected to generate an ego-threat (sec. 8.1.3), which, could 
motivate leaders to act defensively in order to secure their positional-social power and, 
by extension, protect their ego-centred interests (Williams, 2014). 
                                                 
14 The researcher acknowledges that the analysis at this stage is rather a simplistic 
demonstration of how power is instituted in democracies (i.e. Thorley, 2004). The argument, 
though, about the equal right to claim the power should be clear. 
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Given that the restriction of the highly valued discretion to exert “heroic” control 
(Ashforth & Saks, 2000) cannot be justified (sec. 8.2) as an outcome of uncontrollable 
deterministic forces (Obhi, Swiderski & Brubacher, 2012), reacting to restore it 
becomes the most adaptive defensive response (Laurin, Kay & Fitzsimons, 2012). In 
such cases, leaders enter into a motivational state (Defence mechanism: Heroic 
Reactance) of psychological reactance (Miron, & Brehm, 2006), in which, contrary to 
the dictations for abandoning the heroic paradigm, they enhance their belief in it 
(Fitzsimons & Lehmann, 2004). The outcome is an excessive escalation of control over 
(power in Dahl, 1957) the environment with the aim of protecting the self-ego from the 
faced threat (Feeding a need: Mavrinac, 2006). More precisely, an initial response of 
reactance will manage to regulate the stress (emotion-focused strategy: sec. 4.2), as the 
threatening low levels of “control to” apply the change process (Walinga, 2008) will 
be substituted with the exercise of authority (Inesi, Botti, Dubois, Rucker & Galinsky, 
2011). At the same time though, the necessary schema change process will not be 
addressed (Nesterkin, 2013), provided that the main concern of reactance is to deal with 
the threat (Walinga, 2008) that derives from the restriction on the freedom to exert 
heroic control (Miron, & Brehm, 2006). As a result, the innate uncontrollability of the 
crisis remains unanswered and, thereby, the leader gets entrapped in a vicious cycle of 
continuous control substitution, which is fulfilled through the escalation of 
commitment in an inadequate heroic paradigm that is disastrous for the company 
(Zhang & Baumeister, 2006).  
8.3.3 Mapping efficacy evaluation: An urgent appeal for democratic praxis 
From the perspective of feelings, appraising an issue as humanly controllable secures 
the necessary motivation (Eitam, et al. 2013) and establishes responsibility for action 
(sec. 8.1) so that recovery from shame can be achieved (Van Vliet, 2009). Consistent 
with Leeming & Boyle (2013), it is argued that such a recovery requires from leaders 
to either reinterpret the case, for example by rejecting the discrepant evidence (sec. 7.1) 
or externalizing blame (sec. 7.3 & 8.2), or reconsider their power in relation to their 
employees. The way the latter, which refers to the current stage of the process, will 
occur depends on whether the leader will relinquish power and chase collectivistic 
goals, or escalate the heroic paradigm and serve his/her egoistic needs (Ratcliff & 
Vescio, 2013). The result will be a respective conceptualization of organizational 
members’ efficacious agency that, in its turn, can give rise (Dauenhauer, 1985) to two 
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distinct emotional responses of hope; one aiming to individually and another to 
collectively driven transformation (consistent with resolute vs utopian hope in Webb, 
2008). Note that an appraisal of high power can generate two additional modes of 
hopes, which differ from the ones discussed above in the sense that they are not a 
response to the chaotic nature of a crisis (refer to sec. 8.1.3). 
 According to Roseman (1996) reactance derives from the “belief” that, despite the 
appraised uncontrollability of a case (i.e. low power), establishing control is still 
possible. Within the context of this work, such a belief is realized as an emotional 
response of heroic hope (Absurd belief in a heroic-based resolution of the issue), which 
“fuels” leader’s pursuit of a self-originated resolution of the crisis (resolute hope: 
Webb, 2007). Essentially, leaders who engage in reactance become victims of an 
illusion that the overall control is restored only when personal control is achieved 
(inspired by Oswick, 2013). In consequence, instead of abandoning the heroic 
paradigm, leaders are expected to enhance their belief in it (Fitzsimons & Lehmann, 
2004) and, accordingly, centralize control and increase authoritarian practices (Staw, 
Sandelands & Dutton, 1981). That is, leaders take advantage of their entrenched 
positional power (Williams, 2014) in order to enforce their will over (Dahl, 1957) the 
employees (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015) and, thus, compel them to accept and follow 
what they believe to be the right way of acting (Bartunek, et al. 2011).  
Along the same lines French (2001) demonstrated that the inability to manage the 
emotional impact of the uncertainty, like the one in a crisis situation (Gersick, 1991; 
Murphy, 1996), leads to intensive, yet unproductive and non-reflective, organizational 
activity that is mainly directed from the top within an overall culture of bullying. It 
seems that change initiatives under this paradigm will include elements of what Kotter 
(2008) described as false sense of urgency (link with sec. 7.2). Hence, an emotional 
sub-loop, which is expressed as intangible fights among the leader(s) and lower-level 
employees, should be expected to accompany the heroic hope (Rivero, 2014). This rests 
on the logic that any burden to the realization of a self-originated resolution to the crisis 
has to be treated with aggression (Reactions when having the goal-directed behaviour 
thwarted) and, if necessary, punished and/or eradicated (frustration-aggression 
hypothesis: Berkowitz, 1989). 
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Table 21. Map for the efficacy evaluation step 
On the other hand, an appraisal of high power can generate three different types of 
hope, the mode of which depends on whether or not a defence mechanism has occurred 
in previous stages of the process. Initially, pragmatic hope (Expect resolution with(in) 
current practices) indicates a response to a discrepancy that has been minimized 
through “slight” trivialization (Starzyk, et al. 2009). As it has already been discussed 
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(sec. 7.1), in such cases the leader realizes a need and prepares for smaller-scale 
adjustments in cognitive schemas (Johnson, 1988). Ergo, schemas and mental models 
(Senge, 2006) are not challenged and change adequately enough (George & Jones, 
2001) to trigger a transformation, and, thus, smaller scale changes will take place 
(Sheldon, 1980). A crucial characteristic of smaller-scale changes is that their 
procedural and linear nature (sec. 1.3.2), does not comprise or correspond to the high 
levels of chaotic uncertainty (Doğru, 2013). Therefore, hope is expressed as an 
expectation of highly probable outcomes (Wiles, Cott & Gibson, 2008), which lie 
within the realm of a rationality that is shaped by current practices and knowledge 
(realistic hope: Eaves, et al. 2014). Secondly, martyrial hope (Wishful belief in the 
potentiality of the current paradigm to withstand & face the attack) indicates a response 
to a cognitive dissonance that has been reduced through self-serving attribution 
(Gosling, et al. 2006). On its basis, the existence of a scapegoat formulates the 
perception that the faced issue is an offence from an external agent (anger: Lazarus, 
1991a:222) to an otherwise workable and in order status quo (sec. 7.3). Ergo, hope in 
this mode is not required to vindicate anything old, but to serve as a yearning for the 
better that escorts the uncertainty about the future (Lazarus, 1991a; 1999b) that is 
inherent to any decision (Walker, et al. 2003). Also, while a scapegoat reduces crisis’s 
innate uncontrollability (sec. 8.1.3) by providing a clear causal explanation of the issue 
at hand (Rothschild, et al. 2012), it retains the magnitude of the problem (dissonance 
reduced through self-serving attribution), which, logically compared to pragmatic 
hope, will generate higher levels of uncertainty regarding the future. Ultimately, it is 
suggested that martyrial hope will refer to a wishful desire (higher levels of uncertainty 
but still possible: Eaves, et al. 2014; Wiles, et al. 2008) that the current status quo will 
manage to withstand and cope with the externally originated attack (Shaluf & Said, 
2003)15. 
                                                 
15 The argument was also inspired by the distinction that Shaluf & Said (2003) has drawn 
between crises and disasters. Specifically, an internal attribution of causal responsibility 
suggests the inadequacy of the current paradigm and calls for its change in order to face the 
issue. On the other hand, an external attribution is about withstanding an attack and coping with 
an issue, probably under harsh conditions, but nevertheless through the existing workable 
practices. 
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Finally, democratic hope (Faith in individuals’ potentiality for radical change) 
indicates the absence of any kind of defense mechanism during the change process and, 
thus, the catholic embracement of a crisis’s chaotic and uncertain nature (Gersick, 
1991; Murphy, 1996). Similar to heroic hope (see above), the leader enters into a mode 
of “Heraclitian flux” (Osborne, 2003:99), where every existing absolute, related to the 
company and its operations, is challenged (quantum paradigm in Fris & Lazaridou, 
2006). However, in the democratic paradigm the leader will also reject hyper-
individualism, or else the myopic liberal independency (Doyle, 2012), which in the 
heroic mode is retained as an over-concentration of power (Williams, 2014) that results 
in a “desperate” pursuit of a self-originated resolution of the crisis (Webb, 2008). In 
essence, the leader acknowledges his/her intersubjective social condition (Zilioii, 
2002), and places hope on the collective efficacious agency of interdependent 
individuals to conceive as well as actualize a radically different future (Dauenhauer, 
1985). Ultimately, hoping means to have a profound confidence in the transformational 
power of the democratic praxis (Webb, 2007), according to which the crisis can, and 
will, be faced through the autonomous, free and on an equal basis participation of every 
single individual within the organization (inspired by Appadurai, 2007). 
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9 Designing the expert opinion study  
The aim of this chapter is to present the methodological approach that was followed in 
order to verify the produced theoretical understanding of this work. It should be 
considered as a continuation of research methodology chapter 2, in the sense that it 
completes Repko’s (2006) suggested process for interdisciplinary studies. The 
approach that has been adopted comes under the generic model for conducting 
evaluative research suggested by Trochim (2000). Under this model three methods have 
been utilized; including expert opinion, literature review and gap analysis. The outcome 
was the development of a sophisticated process that can offer external validity to the 
theoretical framework that has been developed in the previous chapters. The 
underpinning logic and the steps of this process will be presented and discussed.  
9.1 The logic behind the evaluation of the model 
According to Cronback (1982) there is no unique approach to evaluation, a claim that 
justifies, as well as is justified by, the existence of various perspectives on how 
formative assessments can be conducted (Brown & Gerhard, 2002). Given the absence 
of a standard plan to be followed, the researcher adapted the general model of research 
evaluation (Trochim, 2000) so that the general requirements of this work can be met. 
Specifically, the purpose sought (Newby, 2014) 16 was to design a methodological 
approach that would enable to receive fruitful feedback on the logic and, thereby, 
accurately revise the “form” (Sanders & Cunningham, 1973) of the interdisciplinary 
understanding that had already been generated (Development design: Greene, 
Caracelli & Graham, 1989). The result was an evaluative process (table 22; further 
analysis of the steps in section 9.3) that consists of three highly interactive methods 
(fig.19); expert opinion (main method), literature review and gap analysis (supportive 
methods).  
                                                 
16 The logic at this stage was inspired by Newby’s (2014) argument that evaluation could be 
understood by considering the types of goals it can potentially address. On this basis, the design 
of the evaluation study was driven by the aim (and its sub-aims) to deliver a methodological 
approach that will be able to meet the needs of verifying the interdisciplinary understanding of 
this work.  
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Table 22. The steps of the formative evaluation research 
Inviting experts from the various disciplines and fields of study that have been used in 
this work to provide their “expert opinion” on the already generated interdisciplinary 
understanding, was chosen to be the principal method at this stage (Simon, 2003:208). 
This is because, apart from being a suitable method for conducting formative 
evaluations (Tessmer, 1993; 1994), expert reviews can maximize the benefits of an 
interdisciplinary research (Simon, 2003:208). Specifically, although the theoretical 
framework was developed according to a well-designed and sound research approach 
Theory building 
phases 
(Lynham, 2002) 
General steps of 
research journeys 
(Bourner, 2002) 
Formative Evaluation Research  
(based on Trochim, 2000) 
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(ch.2), the common feeling for many solo interdisciplinary researchers of “relevant 
ignorance” regarding the results wasn’t absent (Bazerman, 1988:244). In particular, 
“theoretical insecurities” derived from efforts to master knowledge, which not only 
were missing from the researcher’s academic background (Golde & Gallagher, 1999) 
but also required thorough reviews so that theoretical disagreements could be overcome 
(Wilson, 1996; i.e literature on emotion). When theory building processes face such 
complex interdisciplinary issues, an expert opinion study is useful, as it can verify 
(Greene, et al. 1989) and potentially extend an initial theorization (Okoli & Pawlowski, 
2004), by engaging experts in providing their knowledge on an imperfect and ill-
defined conceptual framework (Simon, 2003:208). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Mix methods for the formative evaluation research 
The methods of literature review and gap analysis were also included in the research 
design in order to support the expert opinion study. As it has already been mentioned, 
the process of reviewing the literature is an inherent aspect of the entire research 
process (Randolph, 2009), with differences taking place on its focus throughout the 
various stages (University of Leicester, 2015). Here a change in the focus was triggered 
Coding: 
Gap Analysis 
Literature 
review 
Expert opinion 
Suggested 
framework 
Reflection & 
integration 
Theory testing 
Revised 
framework 
Formative 
Evaluation 
Initial 
framework 
Bourner (2002); Lynham (2002) 
 
Schwaninger & Groesser (2008) Sec. 2.1; Greene, et al. (1989) 
 Refer to ch.8 Simon (2003:208) 
Leads to 
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reasoning 
Sets the scope 
Inductive 
reasoning 
Support
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Provides 
feedback 
 
Establishes 
the questions 
 
Bates College, 2015; Van der Pas & colleagues (2012) 
Knopf (2006) Ritchey (2013) Randolph (2009) Refer to sec. 2.1 
Actually 
is 
 
Ought to 
be 
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by the feedback of the experts, since additional literature, which previously was either 
trivialized or ignored, was highlighted for review (Bates College, 2015). In its turn, the 
additional review of the literature provided a basis upon which the experts’ opinions 
could be critically analysed (Randolph, 2009) and, thus, validated and/or even extended 
(i.e. Van der Pas & colleagues 2012). Through their continuous interaction, the 
experiences of the experts (inductive reasoning) and the established theories in the 
literature (deductive reasoning) facilitated the formulation of specific suggestions 
regarding the theory building process (Schwaninger & Groesser, 2008). Ultimately, 
what seemed essential was to identify and understand the gap (Ritchey, 2013) between 
these suggestions (ought to be) and the initial theoretical framework (actually is). The 
aim of such an analysis was to build on and/or revise, with the support of the literature, 
the initial theoretical construct (Knopf, 2006).  
9.2 The process of evaluating the interdisciplinary understanding  
The aim of the work at this stage was to develop a methodological approach that will 
verify the produced theoretical understanding and, thus, complete Repko’s (2006) 
suggested process for interdisciplinary studies (see table 4). For that reason, an 
evaluation research was designed based on Trochim’s (2000) general model that was 
modified accordingly in order to reflect the utilized methods of expert opinion (Simon, 
2003:208), literature review (Randolph, 2009) and gap analysis (Ritchey, 2013). The 
result was a set of steps that contributed to the theory building process (fig.6) by 
fulfilling the requirements imposed by the phases of operationalization and 
confirmation-disconfirmation (Lynham, 2002). These steps are illustrated in fig. 20 and 
will be analysed below (q.v. app. 6).  
9.2.1 Stage 1: Formulate evaluative propositions & criteria 
The first step of the evaluation research process was to formulate a set of propositions 
and criteria that could be presented to the experts, who, in their turn, would deliberate 
over them and, thereby, provide feedback on the interdisciplinary understanding 
(Trochim, 2000). To start with, the suggested propositions are a direct outcome of the 
theoretical advancements of this work (Shields & Tajalli, 2006), and reflect the logic 
behind every stage that contributed to the development of the interdisciplinary  
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Figure 20. The process of evaluation research 
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understanding (Bailey, 1994). Note that propositions were preferred to hypothesis due 
to their abstract nature (Sapp, 2015), which enabled experts who were not that familiar 
with the literature of a specific discipline to avoid an in-depth analysis and comment 
solely on the reflected logic. The propositions are listed in appendix 6.1. 
Also, apart from the step-based logic behind the conceptualization of the 
interdisciplinary understanding, it was also essential to verify whether the proposed 
theorization was able to meet the requirements of a well-constructed theory (idea 
inspired by Holton & Lowe, 2007). Therefore, the researcher, along with the specific 
propositions, considered the criteria for evaluating the interdisciplinary understanding 
that have been already developed as part of the theoretical aspect of this work (sec. 2.4) 
and have been presented in table 10.  
9.2.2 Stage 2: Conceptualize understanding in a testable framework 
The aim at this stage was to design a research framework that would enable the 
verification of the generated interdisciplinary understanding. For this reason, a Likert 
scale (Likert, 1932) was developed by utilizing the suggested propositions and 
evaluative criteria (refer above) as the basis for creating a set of straightforward and 
unambiguous statements for which experts’ opinion could be sought (suitability of the 
tool in Kothari, 2004:86). The need for formulating these statements was that the 
propositions were considered as complex enough to abide by a set of basic principles, 
such as simplicity, short length and avoidance of double-barreled claims, which are 
necessary for the questions of a Likert scale (Johns, 2010; Oppenheim, 1992). As a 
result, the complex propositions were broken down into direct statements (app. 6.1) 
that enabled the experts to state the level of their agreement or disagreement without 
having to face issues that could make the evaluation process unduly difficult (fig.21). 
Despite the existence of evidence suggesting that Likert scales with 7 to 10 point 
response options produce superior results (Preston & Colman, 2000), there were 
several factors that led to the use of a 5-point response format. In general, the qualitative 
dominant methodological approach of this work (Johnson, et al. 2007) reduced the need 
for a response format that will enable a sophisticated statistical analysis. Also, the high 
number of scale items (statements) suggested that the necessary variability could be 
captured with a smaller than 7-point response format (DeVellis. 2012:89). At the same 
time, a 2-point response scale seemed inadequate for capturing an accurate level of 
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feedback analysis (Preston & Colman, 2000), especially given the theoretical 
complexity of the evaluative propositions. Finally, the expert nature of the respondents 
(Simon, 2003:208) eliminated concerns regarding any potential negative impact from 
including a neutral-middle point (Garland, 1991; Johns, 2005), which along with the 
previous led the researcher to choose a 5-point response format as the most suitable for 
the needs this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. The general form of the Likert scale items  
The responses of a Likert scale provide a quantification of the qualitative opinions and, 
thus, allow some basic numerical analysis to occur (Ghuman, 2010:147). Yet, the 
qualitative dominant methodological approach that was followed within the scope of 
the current work (Johnson, et al. 2007) could not be based solely on this type of data. 
Therefore, the researcher asked the experts to comment, when they deemed it as 
necessary, on their choices and justify their reasoning, a practice that according to Okoli 
& Pawlowski (2004) enhances the results of an expert opinion study. 
 Please tick one box to show how 
much you agree or disagree with 
the following statement(s) 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(3) 
Agree 
strongly 
(5) 
Agree 
(4) 
Disagree 
strongly 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
     
Please comment (if you think it is necessary) on the reasoning behind your choices 
and your general view regarding the suggested proposition: 
S(Px)1: Statement 1 of proposition x  
S(Px)2: Statement 2 of proposition x 
     
     
Px: Proposition x 
S(Px)y: Statement y of proposition x 
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9.2.3 Stage 3: Identify and contact the experts  
Keeney, Hassonn & McKenna (2006) suggest that a core lesson learned from previous 
studies is that there is no single absolute rule on how to identify and select the experts 
of a review panel. Within the scope of the current work, the researcher followed a step-
based approach (inspired by Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004) the main aim of which was to 
recruit individuals who, on the one hand have the necessary knowledge, on the other 
hand were willing to engage in the evaluation process (Goodman, 1987). Note though 
that the element of knowledgeability should not be considered under a restrictive prism 
of logic. This is because, expertise is not a single category but comes in different levels 
(Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton & Klein, 1995). As a result, the abstract nature (Sapp, 
2015) of the used propositions, compared to the hypotheses which are more specific, 
will enable the experts, who are not that familiar with the literature of a specific 
discipline, to contribute in other aspects of the work (Beyer, 1995). 
In total, seventeen experts were identified according to the sub-disciplines and fields of 
study that were used in order to construct the interdisciplinary theoretical 
understanding. The aim was to have at least one expert for each part of the proposed 
model. Specifically, the researcher reviewed the sources that were used for the 
development of the model and decided who the participants could potentially be. These 
experts were then approached via the contact details that they provide in their 
professional web-pages. In particular, e-mails were sent with the following 
information:  
 An invitation letter the aim of which was to invite the expert to participate. This 
was the main body of the email.  
 An introduction to the work the aim of which was to brief the expert about the 
research. 
 A Participant Information Leaflet the aim of which was to inform the expert 
about the the study and what would happen to them if they took part. 
The experts that will agree to participate, will recieve a second email with the 
evaluation study was sent. This include the following elements: 
 A PowerPoint with the actual study. In this document the propositions that have 
been described above, are dynamically linked with text analysis and illustrative 
diagrams so that the expert could have a full understanding of the propositions.  
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 Basic instructions on how to navigate and complete the study.  
 The full thesis with the theoretical understanding, and a set of supportive maps 
that graphically illustrated the framework that had been produced at that stage.  
Finally, the experts will be asked to complete the study and send their reviews back to 
the researcher within 3 months’ time. All the documents that are relevant to this stage 
of the research have been included in appendix 6.2. Also, the PowerPoint with the 
evaluation study has been submitted along with the PhD thesis, in a CD-ROM form.  
9.2.4 Stage 4: Collate and analyze the feedback 
The received raw data will be collated into two separate tables, one with the 
numerically coded ratings of the Likert items and another with the respective comments 
of the experts, so that the subsequent statistical and qualitative analysis can be 
facilitated (Mackenzie, 2005:15). Initially, regarding the statistical analysis of Likert 
scales theorists have followed two main schools of thought. On the one hand there are 
those who argue that the produced data is ordinal and, thus, non-parametric statistics 
should be used (i.e. Jamieson, 2004). On the other hand, there are theorists who have 
suggested that even though the single items are ordinal, the scale as a whole produces 
interval data and, thus, parametric tests are suitable (i.e. Carifio & Perla, 2007). Given 
this debate, the researcher decided to use non-parametric tests for the analysis of the items, 
and parametric ones for the scale (Boone & Boone, 2012). In addition, following the 
suggestions of various researchers, Pearson’s parametric analysis of correlation 
coefficients was utilized in order to describe the items’ internal consistency and the 
level of agreement between the respondents (Murray, 2013; Norman, 2010; 
Oppenheim, 1992:195).  
The statistical analysis of the Likert scales will be utilized as a guide for a subsequent 
in-depth qualitative analysis of the experts’ responses (qualitative dominant paradigm: 
Johnson, et al. 2007). That is, for those statistical results that will be perceived as 
indicators of special patterns (i.e. low median, big range or low correlation), the 
researcher will collect every relevant comment, and after triangulating them with data 
from the literature, will develop a solid understanding of the case (Mathison, 1988). By 
returning to the literature after the collection of the empirical data, the researcher 
expects to be able to discuss the comments of the experts on a creative basis (Powell, 
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2003) and, therefore, increase the validity and reliability of the findings (McCarthy & 
Golicic, 2002).     
Type Test What the test describes Reference 
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Boone & 
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(2012); 
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Mode (Si) 
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various opinions that the experts hold 
regarding a specific statement 
Frequencies 
(Si) 
R
es
p
o
n
d
en
ts
 
Median (Ri) The average opinion (central tendency) of 
each expert regarding the suggested 
theoretical propositions Mode (Ri) 
Range (Ri) The consistency between the opinions that 
an expert holds for the various suggested 
theoretical propositions 
Frequencies 
(Ri) 
P
ar
am
et
ri
c 
te
st
s 
S
u
m
s 
o
f 
th
e 
sc
al
es
 Mean 
Each scale will produce a sum, the mean 
of which will provide an indication of the 
general level of respondents’ agreement/ 
disagreement with the suggested theory 
Boone & 
Boone 
(2012); 
Carifio & 
Perla (2007) 
Standard 
deviation 
Each scale will produce a sum, the 
standard deviation of which will indicate 
the consistency (distance from the mean) 
between respondents’ overall opinions 
about the suggested theory 
 P
ar
am
et
ri
c 
an
al
y
si
s 
o
f 
co
rr
el
at
io
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 (
P
ea
rs
o
n
) 
Items’ 
internal 
consistency  
 
Measures the consistency between each 
item and the scales as a whole. Low 
consistency (<0.4) indicates that the item 
is a special issue that needs to be further 
analyzed, so that its retention, 
modification or rejection can be decided 
Oppenheim 
(1992:195) 
Experts’ 
level of 
agreement 
The level of agreement between a pair of 
experts. Low agreement-consistency 
(<0.4) indicates that further analysis of the 
pair should take place 
Norman 
(2010); 
Murray, 
(2013) 
Table 23. Statistical tools used & their logic 
After the suggestions from the experts will be captured, discussed and conceptualized, 
the researcher will conduct a gap analysis with their corresponding parts in the initial 
theoretical framework (steps of a gap analysis in Ritchey, 2013). The analysis of the 
gap can lead either to further consideration of the raw data (fig.20: yes to Q.4) or 
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towards the completion of the work (fig.20: yes to Q.4). The former represents the need 
for additional reflection on the expert opinion study in the light of the results from the 
gap analysis, a cycle which took place several times during the analysis. The latter 
indicates that the acceptance that the current research should head towards the end by 
illustrating what the necessary revisions to the initial theory are and proceeding to the 
final discussion of the work.  
9.3 Ethical Considerations 
Finally, ethical considerations needed to be addressed. The researcher designed the 
expert opinion study in such a way that the participants can be protected from any kind 
of potential harm. In sum, the nature of this investigation does not entail serious ethical 
risks apart from some procedural considerations, which are discussed at appendix 6.2.3. 
On this basis, the current study has been reviewed and granted ethical approval by the 
University of Warwick’s Biomedical and Scientific Research Ethics Committee 
(BSREC): REGO-2015-1626; approved on 13th of October 2015. 
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10 An unsuccessful expert opinion study 
The initial intention of this chapter was to present and analyse the data from the expert 
opinion study. However, the application of the empirical part of this research was 
unsuccessful. The experts that were contacted either did not respond to the invitation 
at all or responded negatively. On this basis, the current chapter will present the process 
that was followed and will discuss the various implications that were faced. Finally, the 
decisions that the researcher had to make in order to cope with this adversity will be 
presented and justified. Briefly speaking, this includes the transition from an empirical 
to a purely theoretical PhD. 
10.1 The process of contacting the experts 
10.1.1 Before the expert opinion study 
Wilson (1996) discusses the unique features and challenges of conducting a solo 
interdisciplinary research. Bracken & Oughton (2006) focus on the language issues and 
argue that interdisciplinary projects need to allocate time in order to develop a shared 
understanding of different terms. The researcher faced similar difficulties during the 
developmental stages of the conceptual framework. The result was almost three years 
were spent on extensive literature review and thorough theorization for building the 
proposed understanding. Given that the developed understanding required empirical 
validation, an expert opinion study was designed and submitted for ethical approval. 
10.1.2 Approaching the first tier of experts 
Once the ethical approach was granted (mid-October), the researcher contacted the first 
tier of experts. This tier included 8 experts who specialize on the various disciplines 
and fields of study that have been used in the current study. The researcher gave four 
weeks for the experts to respond, during which time he was also writing up the 
theoretical part of the doctoral thesis. Unfortunately, no response was received from 
the experts.  
A difficult decision had then to be made regarding the next step. More precisely, the 
immediate reaction was an intention to send a follow up email. However, such an 
approach was considered to entail the risk of being perceived as extra pressure for 
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responding to the questionnaire and, thus, could introduce response bias into the study 
(Paulhus, 2013:17). For that reason, the researcher decided to phrase the second email 
in a way that would minimize such negative implications. Specifically, the follow up 
email included a clear reminder of when the first email was sent, what it was about, as 
well as the following notice:  
“I am concerned that I have not heard from you. My email may have been 
directed to your junk e-mail box or it may have failed to reach you for other 
reasons. If you are interested in participating in the research, please reply to 
this email and I will forward to you all the necessary information.” 
Three weeks were given for the experts to respond. Unfortunately, two of them came 
back with a negative response.  
10.1.3 Approaching the second tier of experts & the pursue of internal help 
After the efforts for approaching the first tier of experts were proven fruitless, the 
researcher decided to approach a second tier. This second tier also included 8 experts, 
most of whom focus on the area of organizational management and change. Two of 
them have also published papers on the appraisal theories of emotion and their 
implications for change management. Three weeks were again given for responding to 
the invitation. Yet, the results were the same; none responded.  
Having the experience from the first tier the researcher decided not to send a follow up 
email this time. Instead, he tried to search for help internally in the University of 
Warwick. Three members of staff were contacted; one from the department of 
Psychology and two from the Business School. Specifically: 
 A meeting with a professor at the Psychology department took place. After a 
quick look at the model he stated that the effort for developing the conceptual 
framework is clear. However, neither could he help with the verification process 
nor could he think of someone being an expert in this area at the department. He 
suggested to come in touch with people from the Business School. 
 An email was sent to a professor at Warwick Business School requesting an 
appointment. A brief description of the work was also included. The professor 
responded by stating that he does not work on emotions and he pointed to a 
colleague of his that would be able to provide some help.   
Instigating transformational changes   Page 175 
 
 The researcher had two informal meetings with the second professor at the 
Business School. In this meeting some aspects of the model were discussed and 
feedback was received (informally). After these two initial meetings the 
researcher asked the professor whether he would be able to participate as an 
expert. Note that during one of the meetings, the professor stated his positive 
intention to help, but when a formal request was made there was no response.   
10.2 The case for completing a theoretical PhD 
10.2.1 The three different options after the unsuccessful expert opinion study 
The process of contacting the two tiers of experts and seeking an internal reviewer 
lasted around 5 and a half months. During this period, the researcher was writing up his 
thesis and he had not received any empirical evidence for the verification of the 
conceptual framework. There were three possible options at this stage: 
 Apply to a third tier of experts (rejected). Even if experts from a third tier had 
been willing to contribute, time constraints would have made such an option 
impossible to be completed successfully. The risk was perceived as too high and, 
thus, this option was rejected.  
 Seek internal help from members who are familiar with the research subject, 
yet not experts according to the core definition of the term (rejected). The 
decision to seek internal help after the second tier of experts, was based on the 
fact that the presence of the researcher at the university could work as a catalyst 
for the study to be completed faster. On the same basis, and given that the experts 
of the university neither agreed to participate nor pointed out someone who could 
help, the researcher thought that he could address the questionnaire to members 
of staff who are not experts but who are familiar with the subject area. Such a 
choice was rejected mainly due to the suggestions of this work’s supervisor. His 
basic argument, which after a discussion was also accepted by the researcher, was 
that the inclusion of non-experts would have minimum, if not negative, impact 
on the work (Goodman, 1987).  
 Complete a theoretical PhD (accepted). In the light of time constraints and a 
huge amount of theoretical work, researchers in the past have chosen to conduct 
a theoretical PhD (i.e. Savage, 2012: 289). On this basis, the researcher came to 
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an agreement with his supervisor to pursue a theoretical PhD and explore any 
empirical contributions after graduation.  
10.2.2 Justification of the choice to pursue a theoretical PhD 
It should be mentioned that the researcher was quite hesitant about the option of 
continuing purely theoretically. Instead, he insisted on choosing the second option that 
is listed above. This was mainly due to the awareness that the existing paradigm 
regarding doctorate research in the field of management and business requires some 
sort of empirical contribution to be achieved (Remenyi, Williams & Money, 1998). 
However, there were three arguments that made him turn in favour of this choice:  
 Initially, theoretical PhDs, while the rare exception, have been awarded in the 
two major fields of study that have been used in this work; psychology (i.e. 
Boden, 2006) and management (i.e. Silverman, 2013).  
 Secondly, the supervisor of this work argued that this thesis is not a theoretical 
PhD per se, given that the original intentions were to include empirical evidence 
as well as that the actual study has been designed and discussed. Instead, it is an 
empirical research that did not happen due to causes outside researcher’s control.  
 Thirdly, according to the supervisor and the researcher, the theoretical part of this 
research is a contribution to knowledge by itself. A new theory has been 
formulated and there is no need for the safety that empirical research provides in 
case of failure to conceive novel ideas (Harcourt, 1990).   
On this basis, the researcher decided to complete the rest of the process without any 
additional efforts to empirically validate the model. The informal feedback from the 
professor at Business School has been considered and changes have been applied in the 
model; especially in the concept of cognitive duality. Then, the researcher proceeded 
to the discussion of the work where an appeal for empirically validating the model has 
been made and a plan for that reason has been suggested.  
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11 Thinking about change instigation anew 
The current chapter aims to conclude the thesis by critically discussing the implications 
of this research. Initially, the main objective of this work to challenge and advance the 
current understanding behind the dominant notion of “establishing a sense of urgency 
in order to instigate change” will be elaborated. On this basis, the most significant 
contributions of this thesis to theory as well as practice will be discussed. Afterwards, 
there will be a reflection on the followed approach and its main limitation will be 
considered. Finally, having identified the limitations, the chapter will conclude with a 
set of suggestions for either improving or expanding the current conceptual 
understanding in future research.  
11.1 On challenging the concept of urgency 
Consistent with Hendry’s (1996) claim, a review of twenty-three PC models revealed 
that transformational changes commence with the acceptance of a “felt need” able to 
unfreeze the current paradigm (Burnes, 2004c). The most influential conceptualization 
(By, Hughes & Ford, 2016) of this diachronic common denominator has been offered 
by Kotter (1996), who suggests that advocates of change have to establish a sense of 
urgency through the demonstration of compelling evidence that indicates a crisis in the 
system. However, even though Kotter’s (1996) approach has been widely praised in 
the literature as well as used in practice (Nitta, Wrobel, Howard & Jimmerson-Eddings, 
2009), concerns over its unchallenged assumptions have recently been raised (By, et al. 
2016; Hughes, 2016). In alignment with these concerns, this work argues that the 
concept of urgency suffers from bias, mainly because it has been developed and 
validated based on anecdotal experiences (Kelman, 2005) with leaders who have been 
in favour of change. As a result, it takes as granted the existence of an all knowing 
(fallacy 1) and committed (fallacy 2) leadership, and thus it cannot explain or provide 
any substantial help with cases where unwilling senior managers do not instigate the 
necessary transformation in the first place (i.e. Beugelsdijk, et al. 2002; Hodgkinson & 
Wright, 2002).  
On this basis, the current thesis sets out to identify why some business leaders avoid 
taking action even when evidence that indicates an urgent need for change has been 
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established. The complexity of the research problem made clear that any potential 
solution was going to lie beyond the borders of the change management’s field 
(Hansson, 1999). Therefore, an interdisciplinary research approach (Repko, 2006), 
which brought together ideas that lie in the distinct disciplines and fields of 
management, psychology and, to a certain extent, philosophy, has been adopted 
(Rhoten & Parker, 2004). In particular, knowledge from these areas was systematically 
reviewed and used as an input for conducting reflective (Buckley, et al. 1976) sequential 
“thought trials” (Weick, 1989) which, in their turn, facilitated its gradual meta-synthesis 
(Walsh & Downe, 2005) into a solid interdisciplinary understanding able to address the 
research question. Through this process, the researcher was able to provide an outside 
perspective to the issue under investigation which ultimately led to the development of 
a conceptual framework that challenges, informs and expands the concept of urgency 
(Nissani, 1997).  
The development of an interdisciplinary methodological approach that could meet the 
research needs of this work was the first objective to be addressed. Afterwards, having 
established the research framework, the thesis set out to deliver the following: 
 Objective 2: Research within the general scope of schematic information 
processing how schemas change and construct a revised mental model. 
 Objective 3: Establish the basic cognitive – emotional principles that underpin the 
schema change process at individual level. 
 Objective 4: Determine the barriers that prevent leaders from perceiving and 
accepting the need for change. 
 Objective 5: Determine the barriers that prevent leaders from committing to action. 
The coming section will provide an overview of the interdisciplinary understanding. 
Then, the rest of the discussion will expand more on this understanding and will present 
its contributions as well as respective implications for theory and practice. 
11.2 An overview of the individual change process 
Overall, the research results confirm that the notion of urgency, as this has been 
developed and reflected in the literature (Kotter, 1996), offers limited guidance on how 
transformational changes are instigated. Instead, it is argued that more emphasis should 
be placed on the psychological demands behind the challenging mental shift that 
leaders “have to” undergo when a crisis is faced (Thompson & Ryan, 2012). If such a 
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perspective is adopted, researchers need to consider that apart from indicating a need 
for change, compelling evidence also presents an ego-challenge for the leaders, as it 
questions established mental models and schemas (George & Jones, 2001) concerning 
the self and the current status-quo within which these leaders have flourished (Hill & 
Jones, 2011:11). As a result, while proceeding to change in order to secure the 
continuation of business seems to be the only logical outcome, in some cases it is 
possible to see leaders either rejecting the need for change (Pasmore, 2011), or 
responding in ways that might go against organizational interests, but protect their 
threatened ego and secure their interests (i.e. Levay, 2010).  
What the leaders’ response in the light of compelling evidence will be, depends on a 
complex cognitive-emotional change process in which:  
a) subjective appraisals of the threatening evidence in reference to both business 
and personal-ego goals and concerns in general (Scherer, 2001; Lazarus, 1991a),  
b) adaptive (Koole & Fockenberg, 2011) or maladaptive (Mauss, et al. 2007) 
implicit regulations of the aversive emotionality (Gross, 1999),  
c) as well as problem and/or emotion focused coping strategies (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1988a; b), 
dynamically interact in order to construct the meaning of the case at hand. These 
advancements in theory and practice have been conceptualized in a model, a generic 
overview of which is illustrated in figure 22. Specifically, the figure includes the 
following elements:  
 The 6 core evaluative dimensions of the change process that have been 
suggested (yellow boxes at the top), along with the respective potential 
appraising outcomes: 
o Adaptive appraisals (green). 
o Defensive appraisals (red). 
o Appraisals the outcome of which has been pre-defined based on the 
impact of previous (defensive or adaptive) evaluations (blue). 
o Appraisals that occur in the background of the process and need to be 
emotionally accepted and regulated (light purple). 
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Figure 22. An overview of the individual change process 
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 The implications for the ego that each evaluation entails (light purple boxes at 
the bottom left side of the figure). 
 The emotions that can be generated by the appraisals, with their core relational 
change themes (boxes with black line).  
 The main coping responses to the call for change (right side of the model). For 
each response, the chart presents the respective: 
o Overall characteristic/description of the response (title in bold black or 
green). 
o If applicable defence mechanism (red letters inside brackets).  
o Main cognitive understanding & behavioural responses (bullet-points). 
As it can be seen in the figure, a structural and classified approach of the basic responses 
that leaders can adopt when compelling evidence that call for a transformational change 
is faced is provided. More precisely, the evaluative dimensions, the expected emotions 
as well as the coping responses have been patterned (Scherer, 2009b) into two main 
categories. On the one hand, there is the adaptive scenario which essentially is an 
accumulation of adaptive responses in reference to every single evaluative dimension 
(colour coded with light green and linked with green arrows). On the other hand, there 
are the maladaptive scenarios which reflect a number of defensive appraisals that can 
occur throughout the change process (colour coded with colours other than light 
green). This distinction is grounded in an ecological view of emotion (Volz & Hertwig, 
2016), in the sense that the adaptive appraising outcomes reflect a realization of the 
qualities that characterize a crisis situation (i.e. Faulkner, 2001; Reilly, 1987), while 
the maladaptive ones reflect a defensive distortion of this reality. On this basis, the 
following section will discuss the model and the implications that emerge from it in 
detail. 
11.3 Instigating transformations: A dynamic & complex emotional process 
11.3.1 Focus on the individual  
In his Pamphlets, the famous writer Leo Tolstoy (1900) reflected on the concept of 
internal revolution, as the only enduring one, and concluded that human beings need, 
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first and foremost, to adopt an intrinsic approach to change17. The current thesis is 
grounded on a similar premise according to which “true” (Levy, 1986) organizational 
transformations commence with a profound, yet challenging, shift in top leaders’ 
internal mental representations (Karp, 2006) of what reality is and how the individual 
should act within it (Senge, 2006). Specifically, consistent with George & Jones’ 
(2001) seminal article, it is argued that at the individual level, compelling evidence that 
indicate a crisis (Kotter, 1996) is experienced as discrepant information that triggers 
cognitive dissonance. In its turn, such an experience motivates the leader to engage in 
a cognitive-emotional change process (Hendry, 1996), during which their existing 
schemas are extensively challenged. From this perspective, a successful response to the 
crisis would require that leaders overcome these challenges and accommodate their 
schemas, instead of simply assimilating the discrepant information (Piaget, 1954). It is 
only when such drastic changes in a leader’s schemas will be achieved that the process 
for a second or third order change in organizational schemas (Bartunek & Moch, 1987) 
will be initiated in the first place. 
By focusing on the subject the current work illustrates that research on change needs to 
reconsider its approach towards the concept of compelling evidence. For Kotter (1996), 
and the burning platform school of thought in general (Kelman, 2005), change happens 
when evidence manifest a gap between the current and the expected reality that 
eventually becomes too big to be ignored or defended (Wright, et al. 2004). This 
approach, may be useful when heroic leaders utilize their coercive power (Lamprou, 
Leitch & Harrison, 2013) to purposefully create an artificial crisis with the aim of 
establishing a sense of urgency and, thus, bringing on-board unwilling employees 
(Kotter, 1996:45). Yet, as the establishment of the research problem demonstrated, the 
concept of top-executives feeding discrepant evidence to the organization is inadequate 
to address cases where the advocates for change are not the same people as the potential 
sponsors (Conner, 1993). Indeed, as a crisis escalates dangerously for the company, 
leaders can keep rejecting the need for change, until it is too late for any action to be 
taken (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). Ultimately, this thesis argues that if this issue is to be 
addressed, research needs to accept that crises are not purely objective phenomena 
(Mumford, Scott & Hunter, 2006). That is, although the existence of discrepant 
                                                 
17 His famous quote “. . . everybody thinks of changing humanity, and nobody thinks of changing 
himself”. 
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evidence is crucial, the motivation for change does not lie in the manifestation of the 
crisis per se, but behind the perception of this crisis by the individual subject.  
11.3.2 A dynamic integration of cognition and emotion 
George & Jones’ (2001) schema oriented approach to individual change could advance 
significantly the scientific understanding regarding how leaders instigate 
organizational transformations. However, despite the fruitful contributions that their 
model offered within the scope of this research, after a point it was clear that a mere 
adoption of such approaches is more likely to produce outcomes that will remain 
captive of the established, yet fallacious, theoretical paradigm that tends to over-
simplify, or even totally ignore, the role of emotion (Bailey & Raelin, 2015). Indeed, 
in George & Jones’ (2001) model, as well as in other similar models in the literature 
(i.e. Bovey & Hede, 2001), the relationship between cognition and emotion is linear 
and non-dynamic, with the latter mainly playing a secondary role in a principally 
cognitive sense-making process (Tobey & Manning, 2009). A characteristic example is 
Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron & Byrne’s (2007) model which illustrates the cognitive 
processes that leaders follow in order to deal with a crisis but gives no attention to the 
emotional dynamics that underlie these processes. After reflecting on this mistreatment 
of emotion, the theorization efforts of this thesis align with recent research in both 
organizational cognition and strategic management (i.e. Hodgkinson, 2015) as well as 
decision making (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo & Kassam, 2015), and, as a result, urge for a 
thorough integration of emotions in the field of change instigation. 
It should be noted that emotion has recently been considered as an important element 
of change management. For example, Tobey & Manning (2009) argue in favour of a 
change process that is primarily driven by affective arousal and valence that is 
generated in the unconscious mind. A similar transition from cold to hot can be 
perceived in Kotter’s work as well. Kotter’s (1996) traditional approach of creating a 
crisis to induce urgency neglects, to a large extent, the emotional self and emphasizes 
the rational evaluations of the compelling evidence that are expected to construct a 
conscious understanding of the need to change. Recently, though, he took into 
consideration the “hot” side of the equation, by introducing the distinction between 
false and true urgency (Kotter, 2008) and, more importantly, the idea of using a big 
opportunity to galvanize unconscious positive emotions (Kotter, 2014). Whilst the 
inclusion of emotion is a welcome step, the logic of the previous analysis reflects the 
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classic debate between Lazarus and Zajonc on the primacy of affect vs cognition (see 
Lazarus, 1999). This debate though, and the distinction between cognitive and affective 
processes that it presupposes, bears little validity, as recent research suggests that the 
two are highly integrated and ontologically inseparable (Gu et al. 2013). 
On this basis, this work suggests that if the essential shift in top leaders’ internal mental 
representations is to be understood, futile distinctions of the past between cognition and 
emotion (Phelps, Lempert & Sokol-Hessner, 2014) need to be overcome. Rather, it is 
argued that the multi-componential nature of emotion (Scherer, 2005a) needs to be 
adopted for unlocking new perspectives to change that are not restricted by the existing 
paradigm of theorizing change as either cognitively (i.e. George & Jones, 2001) or 
affectively (i.e. Tobey & Manning, 2009) driven. Consistent with this view, the current 
thesis utilized the conceptual logic behind the appraisal theories of emotion in order to 
construct an individual change process during which the components of cognition, 
feeling and motivation dynamically interact (Lazarus, 1999a) in order to define the 
coping response to be adopted (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988a; b). In particular, it is 
proposed that, along a set of evaluative dimensions, valence-charged appraisals of the 
compelling evidence construct an emotional experience that, in its turn, informs and 
influences (motivation), through feeling, subsequent evaluations of the case at hand 
(Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008). By adopting such an integrative approach, this research 
aligns the field of change instigation with recent theoretical developments in 
psychology that make a case in favour of abolishing established distinctions between 
affect and cognition (i.e. Duncan & Barret, 2007; Forgas, 2008; Pessoa, 2008; 
Storbeck & Clore, 2007), and, thereby, leads to a better understanding of the change 
phenomenon under investigation (Fugate, Harrison & Kinicki, 2011).  
11.3.3 Goals, ego-implications & the concept of emotion regulation 
Following Lazarus’ (1999a) triad, it has been argued that along with cognition and 
affect, motivation needs also to be considered in order to understand the emotional 
change process. According to this work, motivation depends on a valence-modulated 
mechanism which generates approach or avoidance action tendencies as the emotional 
experience unfolds (Elliot, Eder & Harmon-Jones, 2013) in reference to the goals that 
the individual holds and wants to achieve (Rabideau, 2005). Therefore, emphasis needs 
to be placed on the crucial role that goals play in orchestrating action (Oatley, & 
Johnson-Laird, 2014). As it has been demonstrated here, the teleological nature of 
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goals puts the entire appraisal process of change into context (Campos, et al. 2010). 
Specifically, in case of a crisis, leaders appraise the compelling evidence as regards to 
its implications and consequences for their goals (Scherer, 2009a), while the fate of 
these goals is simultaneously determined by the appraising outcomes (Moors, 2013b). 
If, therefore, emotions are rational mechanisms that promote the adaptational interests 
of the individual (Scherer, 2011), their action tendencies should promote information 
processing (appraisals) and prepare the individual for undertaking coping actions 
(Lang & Bradley, 2013) that will eventually secure the goals at stake (Bagozzi & 
Pieters, 1998). For example, once a leader who abides by the organizational goal of 
generating wealth and being prosperous (Karoly, 1999) receives compelling evidence 
that indicates a crisis, he/she is expected to realize the need for change and proceed to 
action that will promote the company’s success.  
The previous scenario supports Kotter’s (1996) concept of urgency, yet it seems that 
the instigation of transformational changes is not that straightforward. This is because, 
the contentious appraisal process does not occur solely in reference to business goals, 
but, consistent with the distinction drawn by Crown & Rosse (1995), it also takes into 
consideration leaders’ personal goals. Some of these goals may refer to the business, 
yet some others can refer to personal ego-commitments, which in their majority lie in 
the unconscious (Austin & Vancouver, 1996) and construct the leader’s ego identity 
(Lazarus, 1991a). By drawing upon this distinction as well as reflecting on the ego-
centric paradigm that characterizes the contemporary theory and practice of leadership 
(sec.4.2), the current thesis proposes that the need for change can potentially be 
defended due to concurrent efforts of attaining conflicting business goals and ego-
commitments (Boudreaux & Ozer, 2013). More precisely, the latter might be fed by 
the current status quo, and, thus, once they are included in the appraisal process 
(Lazarus, 1991a) they can promote experiences that reflect leaders’ emotional 
attachment to the existing paradigm and, consequently, their inability to see an 
alternative conception of conducting business (Hill & Jones, 2011:11). Compelling 
evidence, therefore, does not always lead to action. Instead, the motivational tendencies 
that have been proposed above can promote coping actions that can be (sec. 4.2.3); a) 
either adaptive, in the sense that the leader responds to the need for change and thus 
promotes organizational goals; b) or maladaptive, in the sense that a defence 
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mechanism is triggered in order to protect the leader’s ego at the expense of the 
organizational interests (Tsui & Ashford, 1994).  
In order to understand how the response (dichotomy presented above) of the leader is 
decided, the current research suggests that the motivational attributes of emotion 
regulation need to be considered (Lozo, 2010). If a crisis is indeed a situation that calls 
for change in leaders’ mind-set, then it is logical to assume that the disengagement from 
the pursuit of the desired state that a malfunctioning ego-commitment represents is 
necessary (Brandstätter, Herrmann & Schüler, 2013). Straightforward as it may sound, 
abolishing or devaluating ego-commitments does not come without pain. In such cases, 
the ego is most likely to experience a threatening identity loss that can trigger a 
defensive response to the need for change (Bailey & Raelin, 2015). Consistent, 
therefore, with recent research on strategic change it is argued that the instigation of 
transformational changes presupposes that leaders control these ego-protective 
tendencies (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). They can do so by regulating the negative 
emotionality that arises from the threat that the faced crisis imposes (Sayegh, et al. 
2004). As a result, two different scenarios, which correspond to the two potential types 
of responses that have been mentioned in the previous paragraph, can be formulated. 
That is, leaders who struggle with the emotional change process can either adaptively 
regulate the stressful emotionality, bear the ego-loss and, thereby, proceed to change 
(Karp, 2006), or trigger unconscious defence mechanisms that regulate the emotional 
experience by distorting the evidence, and, thereby, respond inappropriately to the call 
for action (i.e. Dunn, 2009; Hodgkinson & Wright, 2002; Kitsos, 2011).  
11.3.4 Ιnto two interdependent minds 
In order to understand the dynamic integration between emotion and cognition as 
regards to the motivational impulses for instigating a transformational change or 
resisting the need for it, it is essential to consider the highly corresponding distinction 
between unconscious/ automatic and conscious/deliberative processes (Hodgkinson, & 
Healey, 2011). In this respect, the current research reflected on relevant dualities (refer 
to table 15) that have already been established in various fields of the literature and 
formulated a dual-process approach according to which the mind works in two 
interdependent levels-systems. These include, an ego-driven system which is 
unconscious, intuitive, and highly affective, and a gnosis-driven one which is 
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conscious, reflective and relatively, yet not entirely, cold. The following figure 
describes the elements of the suggested duality.  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. The elements of the dual system 
Due to the nature of this work, the two systems were approached from an emotional 
perspective and under the need to dynamically integrate affect and cognition (Phelps, 
et al. 2014). Therefore, as Hodgkinson & Healey (2014) advise, the parallel-completive 
tradition was adopted, according to which the two systems do not operate on an 
either/or basis, or else in a kind of hot vs cold approach, in order to make a decision 
(i.e. McCabe & Chen, 2015). Instead, they work in parallel and, by continually 
interacting, generate a response in common (Strack, & Deutsch, 2004). In addition, this 
notion of dynamic interaction triggered the interest to construct an approach that not 
only superficially rejects the either/or logic behind the operation of the two reasoning 
systems but also explains their overlapping areas. As a result, the researcher had to 
challenge the established notion that affective processes lie exclusively in the 
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fast/impulsive system, whilst cold rational cognition is a privilege solely of the 
slow/deliberate mind (Palkovics & Takáč, 2016). In order for this to be achieved, the 
following theoretical foundations, and their respective implications for change, 
regarding the dynamic interplay between the two systems are suggested: 
 In alignment with Arnold (1960), it has been argued that the basis of the 
emotional experience is a set of intuitive appraisals that occurs in the 
unconscious ego-driven mind (red part: figure 23). However, these appraisals 
are not only cognitive (cold) but also entail a built-in valence (hot) dimension 
(Scherer, 2010, 2013), which makes perception of and feeling about an object 
ontologically inseparable (Duncan & Barrett, 2007). By making intuitive 
appraisals the core of the emotional change process a chain of further theoretical 
advancements was able to be conceived (see below), which, ultimately, supports 
Akinci & Sadler‐Smith’s (2012) claim that the inclusion of intuition can be 
beneficial for the field of change management.  
 It has been argued that intuitive appraisals give rise to a) affective impulses that 
construct an unconscious valence-modulated motivational system (golden part: 
figure 23) of appetitive (like) or aversive (dislike) tendencies (Lang & Bradley, 
2010), b) an emotional experience that emerges to consciousness (Sherer, 2005) 
through the subjective feeling (pink part: figure 23). The individuals are able to 
distinguish between knowing (cold of intuition) and feeling (hot of intuition) as 
they experience the emotion, but in the unconscious the two are inseparable and 
drive consciousness in common (Duncan & Barrett, 2007). According to this 
work, this phenomenological distinction in experience (purple part: figure 23) 
is responsible for the potential initiation of the reflection process, in the sense 
that it sparks thoughts such as “should I feel like that about this case” (cognitive 
deliberation in Damasio, 2012:332).     
 Reflection though is not that straightforward but it is determined by some 
intermediate steps. To start with, the intuitive appraisals are projected to 
consciousness as affectively charged judgements (Dane & Pratt, 2007). There, 
they are appropriated (yellow part: figure 23) by the processes of the reflective 
gnosis-driven mind, a phenomenon that creates what Wegner (2004) calls an 
illusion of conscious will. Essentially, the conscious self believes that it is the 
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one which has created the judgements based on rational and logical deliberation 
(the traditional view of cold rational cognition), when actually their true source 
and originator remain well hidden in the unconscious “irrational” mind 
(Carruthers, 2007). Reflection processes, then, might be hindered at the current 
stage, which means that conscious understanding will derive directly from the 
ego mind.  
 Not only does the conscious mind appropriate the intuitive outcomes, but as the 
parallel/competitive approach advocates, even when the reflective processes get 
actually engaged (green part: figure 23) their operation remains dependent on 
the intuitive mind (Lieberman, et al. 2002). By following Velman’s (2014) 
approach to consciousness and recent empirical evidence on response inhibition 
(Hepler & Albarracin, 2013), the researcher formulated a notion of reflection 
that depends on both deliberate guidance and intuitive approval. More 
precisely, this occurs as the conscious mind formalizes the ongoing experience 
with its cognitive content, which, then, returns to the unconscious (blue part: 
figure 23) for a second-level intuitive evaluation that aims to regulate the 
ongoing emotional experience (Gross, 2015). This approach follows Watts’ 
(2012) logic, according to which an adaptive regulation will drive the leader to 
reflect on the ego-dictations and, thus, make better decisions regarding the 
crisis. Unlike Watt (2012) though, the reflective processes are not 
conceptualized as purely cognitive, but require both cognitive and affective 
processes (Luo & Yu, 2015), which further supports the call for dynamically 
integrating the two in the context of management research.  
By integrating cognition, emotion and motivation in this way, this work helps the 
academic and business community to understand how transformations are instigated. It 
does so by explaining the process of formulating the decision in response to the crisis, 
which will be discussed in the following two subsections.  
11.3.5 Decision to change and implications for research 
In principle, the previous theorization makes a case where cognitive and affective 
processes are fundamentally ingrained into two reasoning systems. These systems 
formulate a response to the crisis by engaging in a dynamic interplay that takes place 
outside an individual’s awareness, with the intuitive mind having the primacy (Sinclair 
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& Ashkanasy, 2005). It is possible, therefore, to imagine a scenario in which leaders 
take decisions that go against the organizational interests (O'Connor, Mumford, Clifton, 
Gessner & Connelly, 1996) without though having the conscious intention to do so 
(main assumption of NLP in Alder, 1992). On this basis, the current thesis expands on 
the idea that Bass & Steidlmeier (1999) put forward in their seminal article and provides 
a theoretical framework that aims to explain how pseudo-transformational leaders can 
“unconsciously act in bad faith”. More precisely, leaders will not necessarily resist 
change by taking a conscious decision, for example, to suppress thinking in the 
organization and, thus, promote their own interests (i.e. Christie, Barling & Turner, 
2011). Instead, it is possible that the unconscious dictations of the ego will drive this 
decision, when actually the conscious mind remains passive and simply appropriates 
the results of the former (sec. 6.3.2: first way towards resistance). In such cases the 
leader enters into a state of illusionary objectivity, in which he/she has no awareness of 
the subjectivity that underlies the decision (Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 1987:302). 
Ultimately, the theoretical framework of this work has the potential to explain cases 
where the leader has all the good intentions for supporting the organizational interests 
but eventually adopts a defensive response to the need for change (i.e. Kitsos, 2011).  
Individuals do not always remain in an illusionary state though. As it has been argued, 
based on the philosophical works of Nagel (1989:4) and Nietzsche (in Anderson, 1998), 
leaders who may initially formulate an ego-attached perspective of the faced crisis can 
potentially reflect on the unconscious dictations of their ego and, thereby, objectify 
their views. As a result, the individual might end up with two contradictory meanings 
of the same case, one relatively hot and another relatively cold. This kind of differences 
between hot and cold perceptions have been discussed in change management under 
the logic of how insiders as compared to outsiders see the need for change (Fiol & 
O'Connor, 2002). Similarly, Whelan-Berry, Gordon & Hinings (2003) argued that the 
initiation of a change process might fail since what is urgent for executives might be 
dealt with indifference at lower levels. Consistent with various concepts in the parallel-
competitive tradition, such as Sloman’s (1996) notion of Criterion S and the 
antagonistic operation of the impulsive and the reflective processes in Strack & 
Deutsch’s (2004) work, the current thesis argues that the same conflict can take place 
within the leader. In particular, conflict is an outcome of contradictory motivational 
valences; one of which derives from an ego-centric response to avoid change, whereas 
Instigating transformational changes   Page 191 
 
the other one refers to the inhibition of this primitive response and aims to serve goals 
that will secure the organizational prosperity (Corr, 2013). If the former prevails, a 
defensive response to change is expected to be triggered (sec. 6.3.2: second way 
towards resistance). 
11.3.6 Bounded rationality & change instigation 
What does the previous analysis mean for the concept of change instigation though? 
The integrative theorization that was formulated here portrays individuals as bounded 
rational due to the human’s natural cognitive limitations as well as the dependence of 
the deliberate system on the content that the intuitive system brings under its processing 
attention (Dhar & Gorlin, 2013). At the same time though, the current thesis argues in 
favour of two additional characteristics, including; a) the coexistence of hot and cold 
processes in the intuitive system as well as; b) the fact that a reflective counter valence 
that aims to inhibit the initial ego-centric responses requires both cognitive deliberation 
(active system 2) and an ego-driven approval (system 1) in order to be generated (refer 
to sec. 11.3.4), From this perspective, the results of this research support Hodgkinson 
& Healey’s (2011) claim that bounded rationality should be perceived as driven and 
manifested through emotional processes. Such an approach suggests that if change 
instigation is to be understood, emphasis needs to be paid on the ego-driven system, as 
well as on the moderators that affect exclusively its operations (Ferreira, Garcia-
Marques, Sherman & Sherman, 2006) and, more importantly, their affective elements 
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee & Welch, 2001).  
In particular, the logic of providing more compelling evidence in order to make a case 
for change is based on the assumption that leaders who act as rational and deliberate 
thinkers will make sense of the threat (gnosis-driven) and, thus, will procced to change 
(Kotter, 1996). However, as Schwarz (2012) demonstrated, leaders can deliberately 
rationalize their choice to stick with the current organizational structure, or paradigm 
in general, despite any pressures for taking urgent action. The results of this research 
provide a potential explanation for this controversy. That is, Kotter’s (1996) work 
neglects the fact that while the presentation of compelling evidence makes a plea for 
the rational system to engage, the concurrent operation of the ego-driven affective mind 
cannot be avoided. Therefore, the severity of the case at hand can trigger ego-defences 
in the unconscious mind, which, given its primacy, can drive rational thinking in a way 
that will prevent change from happening. In this sense, it can be argued that relying 
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more on, or inducing, rational thinking in order to overcome defensive resistance might 
have the opposite effect, as the individual is motivated, according to the current 
unconscious, to vindicate the choices that support the current status quo (Wong, Kwong 
& Ng, 2008). 
Conceptualizing bounded rationality as affectively driven, may advance existing 
understanding on how ego-defences operate. In their effort to reconcile cognitive biases 
with ego-defences, Klaczynski & Narasimham (1998) concluded that self-serving 
biases are not adequate to explain the phenomenon of bounded rationality. Individuals 
who are capable of making rational decisions, they claim, use this ability selectively. 
Similarly, Karlsson, Gärling, & Bonini (2005) call for research on the reasons why 
individuals make irrational decisions even when the viability of the alternatives that 
they have is clear and straightforward. As a response to these questions, this work 
argues that biases need to be considered as the cognitive processes of the ego defences 
(Cramer, 2000), which are larger constructs as they also include affective and 
motivational elements. Here for example, rationalization, either as omitting a 
discrepant message, or explaining the incomprehensible (Bartlett, 1932:68), was 
treated as a cognitive epiphenomenon, the motivational impulses of which lie in the 
mechanism of emotion regulation (Lozo, 2010). This logic comes into conflict with 
Scherer’s (1995) argument that an exclusive focus on ego-defences might lead research 
to overlook cognitive biases that can cause similar disturbances in an emotional change 
process. Rather, the two need to be considered as aspects of a single entity in order to 
further understand cases of irrational defensive decisions from leaders.  
11.4 Unfolding the entire emotional change process 
11.4.1 Introduction to the discussion of the change process 
From the previous it can be argued that the results of the current work support and 
further expand Keller’s, et al. (2012) claim that appraisal theories of emotion provide 
an integrative framework for conceptualizing affect, cognition and motivation which is 
able to inform knowledge in already established fields in the literature. Indeed, the 
interdisciplinary understanding that has been developed here retains the important 
contributions of cognition in a mental change process, while at the same time it does 
not treat the information processing as a machine-like and affect-free phenomenon 
(Walsh, 1995). As a result, the researcher was able to conceive new propositions that 
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address the recent call for additional research on how schemas react to discrepant 
information and, thereby, affect change (Hammond & Farr, 2011). Ultimately, these 
propositions enrich the current understanding concerning the instigation of 
transformational changes as well as pave new avenues of knowledge. The following 
sections will further elaborate on the dynamic emotional change process that leaders 
undergo, by discussing its evaluative dimensions and their special relationship with the 
concepts of cognitive duality and (adaptive or maladaptive) emotion regulation. 
11.4.2 The inadequacy of urgency & the evaluative dimensions  
The evaluative dimensions that are suggested as elements of the change model, have 
been decided based on already established dimensions in the appraisal theories (mainly 
Scherer, 2001) as well as a reflection on the concepts of urgency and change. More 
precisely, according to Kotter (2008:10) urgency is a state where individuals not only 
are aware of opportunities and hazards but also desire to produce change by behaving 
in a fast and focused way. In this sense, urgency seems to encompass two additional 
elements that have been traditionally considered as necessary for change to occur; that 
is a recognition of the need to change (refer to sec. 1.4) as well as leaders’ commitment 
to action (Crosby, 1984:98). However, this all-in-one perspective is not validated when 
the individual change process is perceived through the lens of the appraisal theories. In 
fact, for Scherer (2001) urgency is only one out of the many evaluative dimensions that 
occur during an emotional process, each one of which has its own distinct contribution, 
characteristics as well as cognitive demands. Consistent, therefore, with Buchanan & 
Denyer’s (2013) claim on implementing change after dramatic events, it is argued that 
the evaluation of urgency is an important, yet insufficient, construct for explaining how 
leaders instigate change as a response to a crisis.  
Instead, the assertions behind its all-inclusive concept need to be clarified and relevant 
evaluative dimensions need to be conceptualized. In this respect, appraisal theories of 
emotion (i.e. Lazarus, 1991a; Roseman, 2013; Scherer, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985) provide clear and straightforward guidance on how the dimension of urgency can 
be complemented. Specifically, alongside the evaluation of urgency, additional 
evaluations that reflect how the leader perceives the signals of a crisis and accepts the 
concomitant threat for the company (awareness), as well as formulates the respective 
initial response/action tendencies (commitment) to cope with it are suggested as 
essential for change to occur (Gaspar, Barnett & Seibt, 2015). These include the 
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evaluations of relevance and problem detection (Cowan, 1986), which establish the 
awareness of the need to change, as well as the evaluations of urgency (Kotter, 
1996;2008), responsibility diagnosis (Wood & Winston, 2005), situational control 
(Bandura & Wood, 1989) and change efficacy (Weiner, 2009) that formulate the 
fundamental intentions to action. By breaking down urgency and clarifying its 
assumptions, the current research elaborates the emotional process that leaders undergo 
once they face compelling evidence and, thereby, extends the restrictive paradigm of 
“establishing a sense of urgency” that currently dominates the field of change 
instigation.  
11.4.3 Awareness of the need: Appraising relevance & incongruence 
In his classic book, Aguilar (1967) argued that information is of no use unless it is 
related to the concerns of the individual-leader and/or the organization. His claim 
clearly reflects recent results in psychology (Mazzietti, Sellem & Koenig, 2014) 
according to which attention is not driven by the received stimuli per se, but depends 
on them being appraised as relevant. In alignment with this argument, the current thesis 
demonstrated that the first stage of the change process refers to an evaluation of 
relevance, which, given a set of specific appraisal outcomes, can direct leader’s 
attention to the evidence that indicates the need for action (figure 22: evaluative 
dimension of Concern relevance). This call for specific appraisal outcomes reflects the 
researcher’s realization during the theorization process that a mere adoption of the 
relevance check is not adequate by itself to explain a schema change process. Instead, 
the relevance between compelling evidence and current concerns or goals needs to be 
established based on a fast and intuitive appraisal of the discrepant (novelty) and 
negative (intrinsic valence) nature of this evidence (Scherer’s, 2001 break down of 
relevance). Under these conditions, relevance gets into the service of a schema change 
process. That is, it generates a (pre)emotion of surprise in reference to the faced 
unexpectedness and, thus, informs consciousness about the discrepancy as well as 
motivates the self to engage into a meaning-making process (further appraisals) with 
the aim of responding to the case at hand (Reisenzein, Meyer, & Niepel, 2012).  
Regardless of its importance, surprise is a primitive response and, therefore, does not 
guarantee by itself that the leader has made sense of the evidence and the respective 
call for action (Noordewier, Topolinski & Van Dijk, 2016). Therefore, after reflecting 
on the appraisal theories of emotion, this work conceptualized an additional evaluative 
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dimension, according to which the acceptance of the need to change depends on 
appraising the incongruency between received evidence and “business” goals. This 
approach echoes Cowan’s (1986) model, as it reflects the idea that the recognition of a 
problem requires not only to identify the discrepancy but also to classify it as such. In 
addition, it sheds some light on Klein’s (2005) challenge regarding the legitimacy of 
distinguishing between the processes of identification and classification. More 
precisely, under the logic of this work their overlap is accepted as well as explained 
and justified by applying Reisenzein’s (2000) cognitive-psychoevolutionary model of 
surprise. That is, the classification of a discrepancy, which has been detected at the 
unconscious level, as a problem (incongruency) or not a problem (congruency) can be 
seen as the reflective verification of this discrepancy in the conscious mind. 
By working on these two overlapping levels, this work was able to distinguish between 
cases where the possibility of change is not reflectively considered by the top level (i.e. 
Vuori & Huy, 2015) and cases where the possibility of change is entertained but the 
response is to a large extent a compromise (i.e. Beugelsdijk, et al. 2002; Donahue & 
O'Leary, 2012). In essence, the two cases are triggered by the distinct defences of denial 
and trivialization that occur at different stages in the change process. To elaborate even 
further, the former is able to manipulate attentional processes, which impact on the 
appraisal of concern relevance (sec.5.1.3). In this way, two potential scenarios that can 
answer Park’s (2010) question regarding the conditions that make individuals omit 
discrepancies emerge: 
 In alignment with Van Peer, Grandjean & Scherer’s (2014) claim regarding the 
amplifying effects of novelty on intrinsic pleasantness, it is argued that a 
discrepant message will intensify the emotional system by putting too much 
pressure on intrinsic pleasantness. If this negative emotionality is not adaptively 
regulated, the mechanism of selective attention will be triggered and, therefore, 
the discrepancy will be unconsciously assimilated (sec. 5.2.2).  
 An accepted discrepancy needs to be related to the concerns of the individual 
as well. This will lead to an involvement of the conscious self with the 
problematic situation (McCabe, & Chen, 2015), which is necessary, but at the 
same time entails psychological costs (sec. 5.1), In such cases, the self might 
choose to disengage from the case either by disidentifiying from the domain of 
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concern (sec. 5.3.2) or by discounting the message (sec. 5.3.3), which will 
prevent reflective thinking from occurring and, thus, will trigger a defensive 
response to the need for change. 
On the other hand, the latter defence mechanism acts after the individual realizes the 
discrepancy. This is because the acceptance of relevance will give rise to the emotion 
of surprise, which will reflect the discrepant message to consciousness and, thereby, 
will inform the self about the faced threat (Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; 
Topolinski & Strack, 2015). As it has been argued above, in such cases the individual 
intentionally conducts a reflective appraisal of goal congruency in order to verify the 
discrepancy. However, according to the concept of duality, the actual mechanisms of 
this appraisal lie in the unconscious ego-mind (Moors, 2005) where the self takes also 
into consideration the dissonance between the compelling evidence and the ego-
commitments. Therefore, it might be that from a business perspective the threat 
promotes action (Kotter, 1996), yet from the perspective of the self a defence of 
trivialization can be triggered to minimize the magnitude of the threat (trivialization) 
and, thus, reduce the already formulated dissonance (sec. 7.1.2). Ultimately, the leader 
will rationalize the need to take revolutionary action which will most likely lead to a 
compromised response of a smaller scale (in response to O’Reilly, Leitch, Harrison, 
Lamprou, 2015:8). 
11.4.4 Preparing for change: Urgent tendencies directed towards the self 
Whereas organizational literature is vocal about top management commitment when it 
comes to change (Lozano, 2013), research has largely ignored how individuals, and 
subsequently leaders, detach from the current status quo and develop the necessary 
desire for action when faced with compelling evidence (Jaros, 2010). In response to 
this gap, the current work aligns with recent theorizations that place emotion at the core 
of organizational commitment (Mercurio, 2015) and suggests that the instigation of 
transformational changes is the outcome of emotional action tendencies that are shaped 
by a dynamic appraising process. These tendencies are expected to arise with the 
realization of the need to change, due to the elicitation of sadness and fear, which call 
for ameliorative action (sec. 11.4.3). Yet, despite being a crucial aspect of the change 
process, plain initial tendencies are not enough to trigger a transformation. Instead, it 
has been demonstrated that these tendencies need to set in and impel the individual 
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towards urgent action (Kotter, 1996) as well as get directed towards the self (Kouzes, 
& Posner, 1993). 
11.4.4.1 Urgency is a distinct yet interrelated evaluation 
From the perspective of the appraisal theories, urgency comes from an emotional 
experience of fear. Indeed, although both sadness and fear are elicited when the leader 
accepts the need for change, the latter is established only when the case is also appraised 
as highly urgent (Scherer, 2001). In this way, the individual not only understands the 
irrevocable loss of the current status quo (sadness), but also realizes the imminent threat 
that is indicated by the faced crisis, in terms of both resources’ deprivation as well as 
uncertainty about the future (Lazarus, 1991a). If this distinction between the two 
dimensions is to be retained as well as the role of fear is to be acknowledged, then it 
can be said that the results of this work advance Kotter’s (2014) recent efforts to 
reconceptualise urgency through a big opportunity. They do so by elaborating on how 
compelling evidence, awareness and the establishment of urgency are interrelated, as 
well as explain their impact and role on the change process. Therefore, they offer useful 
advice regarding the actions that could be taken in order to shape the discrepant 
message in a way that will reduce, to the extent that this is possible, the emergence of 
fear (Farkas, 2013). 
In particular, it is probably accurate to claim that individuals who are unaware of an 
issue or a problem will lack the necessary sense of urgency (i.e. Kremers, et al. 2006). 
This is because, an appraisal of urgency bears little meaning without an appraised 
incongruency, given that positively charged emotions (congruency) restrain the 
individual from undertaking ameliorative action. It is obvious then that the advocates 
of change need, first and foremost, to focus on making the existence of a crisis obvious, 
which according to Kotter (1996) can be achieved by presenting compelling evidence 
and, thus, establishing a state of urgency. However, an immodest investment in 
compelling evidence might eventually be problematic. Indeed, urgency might be 
related to congruency, yet at the same time it is a distinct evaluation with different 
cognitive and emotional demands. According to the current thesis, these demands refer 
to considerations of aversive effort, such as accountability for the future outcomes of 
an uncertain change process (caused by fear) and the need for a long term investment, 
which underlie the sense of urgency in the context of transformational changes. If the 
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aversive emotionality from these considerations remains unregulated, it could 
potentially trigger the mechanism of defensive procrastination that would prevent 
intentions for action from being formulated and, thus, would drive the individual into 
a state of apathy (sec. 7.2). Pressures of urgency, therefore, in their excess entail 
psychological costs for the individual that could prevent the change process from 
happening, which means that change advocates need to be careful when they try to 
establish urgency by using compelling evidence (Murphy, 2015). 
11.4.4.2 Internal causal responsibility: a necessary evil 
Once urgency is established, the action tendencies need to be directed towards the self. 
Quite often leaders try to face a problem by reflecting on their current mental models 
and, thus, applying practices that have worked in the past but maybe are inadequate to 
face the new challenges. The current thesis agrees with Whetten’s (1980) claim that 
leaders who accept the problem yet intensify their commitment to the old practices, are 
driven by a fear to attach blame to their own schematic beliefs on the basis that this will 
have a negative impact on their reputation. As a result, leaders externalize blame for 
the discrepancy to a scapegoat (Trahms, Ndofor & Sirmon, 2013) which, from an 
emotional perspective, leads to anger (sec. 7.3.3) and, ultimately, in a kind of hope that 
the old practices will respond adequately to the external threat (sec. 8.3.3). Note that a 
precise attribution of causal responsibilities in neither necessary nor possible at this 
stage, since the ambiguity of causes inherent in crisis situations (Pearson & Clair, 
1998) suggests that an in-depth causal diagnosis comes in subsequent steps of the 
problem-solving process (Smith, 1989). However, if a mind-set shift is to be achieved, 
leaders have to acknowledge that as the chief decision makers of the organization they 
bear a considerable amount of responsibility for the mistaken decisions that led the 
company to its current condition (Hunter, Tate, Dzieweczynski & Bedell-Avers, 2011).  
By elaborating on the process of acknowledging responsibility in the context of the 
emotional change process for dealing with a crisis, this work raises two major 
implications. On the one hand, the model facilitates alternative approaches to the 
established practice of replacing a CEO who is inadequate to deal with a crisis 
(Schoenberg, Collier & Bowman, 2013). This is important, as such replacements are 
not always possible (i.e. the CEO is the owner of an SME: Kitsos, 2011). Sometimes 
change advocates have to work with the current CEO in order to promote change by 
Instigating transformational changes   Page 199 
 
intervening, for example, in their mental representations and understanding of the faced 
situation (Stanwick, 1996). In addition, it makes a case for researchers to differentiate 
between crisis that are imposed by external events and the ones that are caused by 
improper management. That is, it might be true that both cases offer an opportunity for 
learning and renewal, as Seeger, Ulmer, Novak & Sellnow (2005) argue, yet the journey 
towards this goal is different. Specifically, external events, such as the attack of 9/11, 
might not pose a threat to a leader’s ego. Rather, leaders might find a good opportunity 
to become the heroes that people need in order to identify with, create meaning and 
deal with the issue at hand (Shadraconis, 2013) which, ultimately, boosts their ego.  
However, when the crisis is caused due to internal issues, leaders are the ones who have 
to abolish the old and search for new meaning in the first place, which presupposes an 
open acknowledgement of the current paradigm’s inadequacy and, thus, the threat to 
their ego. In this case a defensive response is much more likely to arise. 
11.4.5 Proceeding to action: Commitment & the different types of hope 
One of the main premises of this work is that even if awareness of the crisis and urgency 
are established, change may still not happen due to lack of commitment (fallacy 2: sec. 
1.5.3). Looking at this puzzle from the perspective of the appraisal theories, led the 
researcher to conclude that even though urgency, along with internal responsibility, 
prepares the leader for action (refer above), a crisis will remain unanswered unless the 
coping potential is positively evaluated (Gaspar, et al. 2015). Following Scherer’s 
(2001) model, coping potential has been separated into the sub-checks of control and 
power. In this sense, the leader has to; a) accept managerial control over the decision 
to be taken (Bandura & Wood, 1989) as well as; b) believe in a company’s power to 
lanch a response for dealing with the issue at hand (Weiner, 2009). Therefore, 
consistent with Armenakis & Harris (2009) it is suggested that efficacious beliefs 
contribute to the formulation of commitment to change. Indeed, efficacy consolidates 
a sense of responsibility for active response, which complements the tendencies that 
have been produced by urgency and internal causal responsibility and, thereby, enables 
the individual to construct a problem-focused coping strategy to deal with the crisis at 
hand (refer to sec. 8.1.1).  
Why is it so difficult, then, for senior managers to formulate the necessary 
responsibility for action and, thus, commit to change? In principle, the results of this 
thesis echo Hodgkinson & Healey’s (2011) claim that commitment to the new requires 
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first and foremost that the leader deviates from the existing paradigm of action by 
abolishing any ties with the old status quo. On the basis of Kotter’s (1996) assumptions, 
this might sound straightforward given that the crisis has been accepted and urgency 
has been established, yet from the perspective of the emotional change process the 
leader has to deal with three core challenging hassles (sec. 8.1.3). These are:  
 Accepting that the innate uncontrollability of the current status quo to deal with 
the case at hand, which arises from the very existence of the crisis, is a benign 
reality that calls for change (Walinga, 2008). This innate uncontrollability is an 
essential part of the change process as it underlies the appraisals of control and 
power and alarms the individual about the ego-threat that the crisis poses to the 
system and, thereby, the self.  
 Avoid succumbing to fear (Kotter, 2008) and the concomitant chaotic 
uncertainty that characterizes a crisis. Essentially, the acceptance of an urgent 
crisis reduces the levels of structure and order and, therefore, calls the leader 
and the company to dive into the unknown and engage in a sense making 
process, through which the new paradigm will eventually emerge (Burnes, 
2004b). Fear of this unknown needs to be controlled, as it is one of the main 
factors that could hold the leader entrapped in a fallacious commitment to an 
inadequate status quo (Armenakis, Harris & Field, 2000).  
 Managing and dealing with the blame that has been assigned to the self from 
internalizing causal responsibility. While supplementary to the points raised 
above, it is still crucial, since unregulated blame might lead to disastrous results 
for the self and, thus, the company (Smith & McElwee, 2011).  
In order to understand how the leader could cope with these challenges, the researcher 
reflected on the different types of hope (i.e. Webb, 2007) that could be elicited by 
various appraising outcomes. Generally speaking, the results of the analysis 
demonstrated that hope can be either adaptive or maladaptive, depending on how the 
appraisals of control and power shape its element of agency (Snyder, 2002). In the 
former case (high control and high power), hope facilitates the individual to let go of 
the old, cope with the emotional challenge at hand and, finally, dive into the uncertainty 
of the new reality (Folkman, 2013). As a result, the leader is able to conceive the 
potential of an alternative course of action that is achievable through the collective 
efforts of the organization and, therefore, instigates the change process (Democratic 
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hope). Instead, hope as a maladaptive emotion (low control and/or power) enables 
leaders to retain their commitment to a problematic status quo (Lazarus, 1999b). It does 
so by promoting the imaginary construction of alternative pathways that could be 
followed through the existing course of action under the comforting belief that they 
would lead to the covetable outcome (respectively: Transcendental or Heroic hope).  
Finally, Scherer’s (2001) distinction between control and power offers significant 
insights for change leadership. To start with, the current thesis agrees with Sheaffer & 
Brender-Ilan (2014) that leaders who accept control over the resolution of the crisis are 
more likely to formulate adaptive responses to it. This is because, they see the issue at 
hand as amenable to alteration by human beings and, thus, prepare for undertaking 
action. On the contrary, externalizing control to uncontrollable realities promotes 
justification of the current system by giving rise to various rationalizations about why 
an alternative course of action is destined to fail, and why everything will eventually 
be fine (sec. 8.2.2). Therefore, control over the response is indeed crucial. At the same 
time though, control should not be equated with the misleading, yet popular, belief that 
the contemporary challenges can be faced by all-powerful heroic CEOs (Chia, 2014; 
Uhl-Bien, Marion & McKelvey, 2007). Indeed, after reflecting on the distinction 
between control and power, the thesis argues that the overconcentration of control is 
more of an ego-defensive response which persuades the self that the disorder from the 
crisis will be faced only when personal power is restored (sec. 8.3.2). Rather, an 
adaptive response requires that leaders reflect on the assumptions of heroism and accept 
their inability to control and predict everything (Knights & McCabe, 2015). Upon this 
acceptance, they are expected to abolish fruitless efforts to resolve the crisis on their 
own and, thus, they will conceptualize leadership as a practice executed by agents who 
collectively make sense of events (Mumford, Scott & Hunter, 2006) and respond to the 
faced challenges (Raelin, 2014).  
11.5  Practical implications 
As a theoretical piece of work, the current thesis offers some important contributions 
to practice as well. The map that has been presented in figure 22 constitutes a structured 
view of the change process (Scherer, 2009b), which could be used as a tool to translate 
observable behaviours and actions (left side: response to the call for change) to specific 
unconscious cognitive and affective processes (right side: the appraisal process). 
Following Eubanks & Mumford’s (2010) logic, by providing an in depth understanding 
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of these underlying processes and their links, the researcher hopes to facilitate change 
agents in their efforts to overcome problems of resistance by the top management. For 
example, a leader who behaves in an autocratic way (observable behaviour) is very 
likely to face internal power issues (cognitive & affective processes), upon which the 
change agents could take action in order to galvanize change.  
It is also possible that change agents are not external individuals but people in lower 
levels of the organization. From this perspective, the understanding that has been 
proposed here could further advance theory and practice on how change issues could 
be sold to top management (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill & 
Lawrence, 2001). Specifically, the structural change process may provide middle 
managers and lower level employees with the capability of directing CEOs’ attention 
to the issues that matter, without though triggering defensive responses. It might also 
allow them to elicit novel or alter established narratives and meaning-making processes 
and, thus, trigger a mind-set change. These qualities are extremely important given that 
the complex business world of the contemporary era makes the instigation of bottom-
up changes a necessary reality that organizations need to widely endorse (Moon, 2008). 
Indeed, as it has been argued throughout the research, new ideas and innovation may 
be generated and conceptualized at lower levels, in which case the ability of selling 
issues to the top management becomes essential.  
The current thesis entails implications for managerial education too (Siegal, et al. 
1996). To start with, it demonstrates that business schools need to reflect on their 
teachings of leadership. Nourishing future leaders’ ego will not make a huge difference 
in a world where a significant number of corporations are led by narcissists that focus 
mainly on personal gains (refer to sec. 4.3.2). Rather, it is time to consider leaders as 
moral critical thinkers who challenge established norms and co-create, with their 
employees, alternative and more beneficial organizational realities (Cunliffe, 2009). On 
a more practical note, leadership training could also incorporate the advancements of 
this work. As Probert & James (2011) claim leadership development programs should 
build upon the opportunities from crisis to challenge established assumptions and alter 
current schemas about the concept of leadership. Thus, consultants may wish to reflect 
on the model and promote relevant training to leaders. Finally, it would be 
advantageous for modules on change management to include the current model in their 
curriculum. For example, the PowerPoint that has been developed for the needs of the 
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expert opinion study could be conceptualized into an e-learning module that would 
drive students through the model. Indeed, making change agents aware of its underling 
processes, may lead them to improve their practices on introducing change and, thus, 
reduce the level of resistance they face (Ford, Ford, & D'Amelio, 2008).  
11.6 The limitation of lacking empirical validity 
Similar to any research the current thesis is by no means free of limitations. In principle, 
this work was a big challenge for the researcher, given that he has a managerial 
background and, thus, had little knowledge of the disciplines that have been used in 
this work. Immediately, questions regarding the appropriate use of complex, and 
sometimes vaguely defined, constructs such as emotion (Izard, 2010a), unconscious 
mind (Seebohm, 1992), dual-process theories (Evans & Stanovich, 2013) and ego-threat 
(Leary, et al. 2009), could be raised. In addition, the interdisciplinary approach 
magnifies the theoretical insecurities. As Bracken & Oughton (2006) demonstrate, 
researchers in interdisciplinary projects have to challenge their assumptions, 
deconstruct their disciplinary understanding, and, then, work together to create a more 
complete picture by synthesizing knowledge anew. This means that not only had the 
researcher to master novel constructs, but also there was the need to make the necessary 
assumptions that would allow him to cross the disciplinary boundaries without 
distorting the core of the theories. Therefore, it needs to be acknowledged that while a 
robust methodological approach has been followed (chapter 2), it is possible that the 
advocated interdisciplinary understanding suffers from biases and misconceptions.  
Given these issues, the researcher decided to design and run an expert opinion study 
that would validate the produced interdisciplinary theorization. Unfortunately, 
although the process had been carefully designed (chapter 9), causes that lie mainly 
outside the researcher’s control made the attempt unsuccessful (chapter 10). As a result, 
the empirical objective of this work (sec. 1.6.5) has not been met, and, therefore, 
questions could be raised regarding the validity of the proposed model. This does not 
mean that the model should be rejected, given the rigorous process that has been 
adopted for its development as well as the fact that all of its components are grounded 
in established research. However, it needs to be accepted that the whole picture still 
remains to be empirically tested (see also Thompson & Hunt, 1996). Commencing from 
this major limitation, the researcher strongly advocates that future efforts should focus 
on validating the theory of this thesis. Ideally, a research team, with members from all 
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the involved disciplines and study fields, would be formed and awarded the necessary 
funding in order to do so (app. 6.1). Critical discussions among researchers on topics 
for which the available knowledge is imperfect would validate as well as extend the 
initial theorization. Furthermore, such a research team could include practitioners and 
change agents from the business world. In this way, theory that is developed in the 
research lab could be applied into practice and get revised based on the feedback, a 
dynamic interaction which would narrow the gap between what science knows and 
what business does (Marques, 2012). 
11.7 Recommendations for future work 
Similar to any new theory (Imbir, 2016), the current thesis provides a set of novel 
propositions that, according to the researcher’s view, establish the ground for 
understanding the process of change instigation. It is acknowledged that the major step 
after the conclusion of this work is to engage in empirical research for validating the 
current theorization. At the same time though, a number of opportunities for future 
research arise at the theoretical level. On this basis, the following sub-sections will 
provide some suggestions for researchers who want to build upon and expand the 
understanding that this thesis offers.  
11.7.1 Further advance the current theorization 
The first type of suggestions refers to research ideas that could further improve the 
theorization of this work. Given that the current thesis is a pioneer attempt, it is logical 
that many elements of the interdisciplinary understanding could be further analysed, 
complemented or expanded. In particular, future research could focus on the following 
issues.  
11.7.1.1 Integrate more ego-defences in the process  
The current thesis utilized specific defences and provided a potential explanation 
regarding their impact on the process of change instigation. However, the field of 
psychodynamics has discussed more defences than the sub-set that has been examined 
here. The potential implications of these defences provide an opportunity for fruitful 
future research (Brown & Starkey, 2000).  
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11.7.1.2 Develop a detailed “ways of coping” scale  
The map in figure 22 offers an overview of the behaviours that leaders could adopt as 
a response to change. However, as Skinner, et al. (2003) claim, the specific coping 
instances can potentially be countless. From this perspective, future work could focus 
on expanding the map. This could be done theoretically, by appropriating existing 
coping responses from the literature (i.e. Vitaliano, Russo, Carr, Maiuro & Becker, 
1985) in the context of change management, or empirically, by engaging in research 
with companies in which top leaders face compelling evidence.  
11.7.1.3 Include the appraisal of future expectancies  
The current model depends on the outcome of six evaluative dimensions to determine 
the fate of the change process. It seems, though, that there is room for at least one more. 
Specifically, Haleblian & Rajagopalan (2005) argue that change initiation is more 
likely to happen when efficacy is high as well as future expectations are positive. It is 
true that these two appraisals overlap (Lazarus, 1991a), which led to the assumption 
that if a crisis is recognized and the coping potential is high, then future expectancies 
are necessarily positive, given that change is the only way. Yet, as it has been proven 
here, such assumptions are to be challenged, and, thus, further work needs to 
conceptualize the distinct contributions of future expectations (Bandura, 2006) into the 
change process.  
11.7.1.4 Reflect on the field of neuroscience  
Organizational neuroscience is an emerging concept that could significantly contribute 
to the advancement of the current theorization. A closer look at the mechanisms of the 
brain that underlie the evaluations and generate the subsequent behaviours could offer 
many insights to the change process. It should be noted, though, that while neuroscience 
can play an important role in understanding the phenomenon of change, researchers 
should avoid the fallacy of reducing everything down to neurophysiological processes. 
Instead, the complex social nature of organizations need to be acknowledged and 
included in the analysis (see Healey & Hodgkinson, 2014;2015).  
11.7.1.5 Understand the operation of the ego in its context 
The current thesis focuses on a single individual, and more precisely on the CEO, in 
order to study the instigation of a transformational process. However, the CEO does 
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not operate in a vacuum. Rather, he/she dynamically interacts with the board of 
directors and the overall organizational, political, social, cultural and economic 
environment. Therefore, future research, could investigate how team mental models 
(i.e. McNeese, Reddy & Friedenberg, 2014), various elements at group or 
organizational level (Hunter, Tate, Dzieweczynski & Bedell-Avers, 2011), as well as 
the overall social and cultural contexts (Scherer & Brosch, 2009) influence the 
establishment of urgency and thus the decision-making process.  
11.7.1.6 Consider the operation of the ego from a relative perspective  
The main premise of this work is that ego-centric leaders will defend the need for 
change while the ego-free ones will proceed to action. However, relying solely on this 
dichotomy in order to understand change instigation can offer a sufficient yet 
incomplete picture of the issue (Folger & Salvador, 2008). For example, Rosenthal & 
Pittinsky (2006) argue that narcissist leaders could potentially engage in 
transformational leadership as long as their personal interests are served by the aims of 
the transformation. It might be useful to research these cases and take into consideration 
any relevant implications.  
In sum, the researcher believes that future research along the previous lines would 
significantly improve the interdisciplinary understanding of this work. 
11.7.2 Explain the vulnerability in the appraisals 
The identified components of the map (sec. 4.3.4) allow the change agent to trace the 
“vulnerable” appraisal that rationalizes the evidence, but leaves unexplained why this 
kind of “vulnerability” exists in the first place. On this basis, some interesting questions 
arise; “why the leader regulates the negative emotionality maladaptively instead of 
adaptively?”, or “what are the moderators that determine whether the leader will 
succumb to the ego-threat and, thus, appraise the case defensively?”, or “why the 
change agent exits the change process at a specific stage-appraisal, instead of another 
one”? In order to approach these issues, future researchers can follow Wranik & 
Scherer’s (2010) logic and try to identify the “individual change variables”, that is 
personal traits and characteristics, which underlie the evaluative dimensions of the 
model (Cervone, et al., 2008). As Hodgkinson & Wright (2002) claim, the personality 
of a CEO can play an important role in triggering a defensive response to the need for 
change. It is suggested, therefore, that if the suitable individual variables are combined 
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with the logic behind the ego-driven defensiveness, a better understanding of the 
change process as well as a more advanced tractability of the vulnerable evaluations 
will be achieved (Kuppens & Tong, 2010). Appendix 7 explains how such an analysis 
could happen by providing a specific example on how expertise can impact on the first 
stages of the change process.  
11.7.3 Develop a toolkit 
 Traditionally, individual change is considered as a time consuming process, which 
starts with high energy, turns into despair, and then ends up in the necessary mind-set 
shift (Elrod & Tippett, 2002). As a result, a leader who initially responds defensively 
could potentially let the old go and proceed to change. Such a response though would 
have been adaptive, only if the urgent qualities of a crisis did not impose the need to 
take action as soon as possible (Kotter, 1996). On this basis, it is proposed that future 
work should focus on developing a toolkit that could be used to deal with defensive 
responses at a very early stage and, thus, accelerate the individual change process. For 
example, researchers could: 
 Adopt tools and practices from the discipline of psychology that could be useful 
in changing leaders’ schemas. For example, in his paper Padesky (1994) 
discusses a set of methods that change agents could adapt and use in order to 
frame compelling evidence in a less defensive and at the same time more 
straightforward way.  
 Develop a set of creative questions and practices that change agents could use 
in order to approximate the unconscious mind (i.e. Ellsworth, 1995). In this 
way, change agents may focus their efforts on the specific issues that cause 
resistance to change.  
 Emotionalize tools and approaches that already exist in the literature. For 
example, Hodgkinson, Wright & Anderson (2015) modified the repertory grid 
technique in a way that it can include not only the cognitive but also the 
affective elements of a decision maker’s strategic knowledge. This reflects a 
more complete picture of the inner mind and, thus, enables change agents to 
offer better coaching. 
Finally, once the toolkit is developed, researchers could engage in further empirical 
research. For example, case studies could be run with the aim of validating hypotheses 
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that derive from the current theoretical framework (app. 6.1) as well as the toolkit itself 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
11.7.4 Cascading the model to lower levels 
Finally, the current thesis has focused exclusively on how leaders’ change their mental 
models in order to face a crisis, yet the suggested theorization has some potential 
implications for change management at lower levels of the organization. Main 
overlapping concepts include the following: 
 Traditionally change has been perceived as a cognitive shift in the existing 
organizational paradigm and schemas (i.e. Johnson, 1990; Labianca, Gray & 
Brass, 2000; Lau & Woodman, 1995).  
 Researchers have already tried to understand how cognition, affect and 
behaviour could be integrated under the prism of appraisal theories in order to 
promote organizational change and deal with resistance (i.e. Liu & Perrewé, 
2005; Smollan, 2006).  
 It has been argued that change leaders need to pay more emphasis on emotional 
arguments, alongside with the rational ones, if they want to persuade their 
employees to support change (Fox & Amichai-Hamburger, 2001). 
 Resistance to change can be caused by threats to the self-concept, or else the 
ego, of the employees (Eilam & Shamir, 2005). 
The previous points are core elements of the model that has been developed within the 
context of this work. In this sense, future research could investigate how the current 
thesis informs theory and practice of change management at the lower levels of the 
organization.  
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12 Concluding remarks 
To date, much of change management research assumes that once compelling evidence 
that indicates the urgent need for a transformation is faced, heroic leaders would 
immediately raise the necessary levels of awareness and proceed to action. According 
to this tradition, any problems and hassles concern mainly the lower levels of the 
organization and, thus, the job of a successful leader is to overcome the resistance from 
the bottom and bring the employees on board. Despite the importance and applicability 
of such research, the underlying assumption led the field to pay little attention to cases 
where compelling needs are established and urgency is raised, yet leaders either totally 
reject the evidence or avoid instigating change until it is too late. Commencing from 
this gap in the literature, the current thesis adopted a solo interdisciplinary research 
approach, which brought together theoretical insights and knowledge from the 
disciplines and fields of psychology, philosophy, leadership and change, in order to 
provide a theoretical explanation of the reasons why resistance at the top could 
potentially occur.  
In principle, this work argues that transformational changes are the subsequent 
outcomes of drastic shifts in leaders’ mental models and schemas. If, therefore, 
instigation of such changes is to be understood, the psychological demands of such 
shifts need to be captured and explained. More precisely, once a crisis is faced, leaders 
engage in a dynamic emotional change process during which they appraise the 
discrepant evidence that indicates the need for change. According to the prevailing 
norm in change management literature such evaluations should lead to both a 
realization that change is necessary as well as a desire to take action now in order to 
protect the organizational interests. However, it seems that the change process is not 
that straightforward. This is because, the contentious evaluations do not occur solely in 
reference to the business needs, but they also take into consideration the personal ego-
commitments that leaders hold. As a result, while proceeding to change in order to 
secure the continuation of business seems to be the only logical action, in some cases 
it is possible to see leaders responding in ways that might go against organizational 
interests, but do protect the threatened ego.  
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What the response of a leader will be depends on the motivational attributes that 
underlie the mechanism of emotion regulation. Specifically, the evaluation of ego-
threatening evidence that indicates the existence of a crisis is expected to trigger 
psychological stress, which will be experienced via negatively charged emotions. Some 
leaders manage to regulate this emotionality adaptively and, ultimately, take on the 
personal costs and proceed to change. In some other cases, though, the unconscious 
mind can intervene and trigger defence mechanisms, which also regulate the emotional 
experience, yet they do so in favour of the attacked ego. This is considered as 
maladaptive emotion regulation, which leads to a distorted perception of the faced 
reality and, consequently, promotes coping responses that are unable to deliver 
appropriate or adequate actions for dealing with the crisis at hand. Collectively, the 
elements that were mentioned above construct a dynamic and complicated emotional 
change process, the underpinning logic and mechanisms of which have been captured 
and discussed within the scope of this research. 
By explaining how individuals subjectively appraise and cope with discrepant 
evidence, this work opens a new path for understanding how leaders instigate 
transformational changes. Nevertheless, the current theorization is only the beginning 
of an interesting, yet highly demanding, journey. Initially, future research is necessary 
to empirically validate the suggested model and, thus, overcome the main limitation of 
this thesis. Researchers should also reflect on the offered insights with the aim of 
enriching and expanding the current understanding. In any case, this work makes an 
appeal for reconceptualising the established norm of perceiving leaders as all-knowing 
heroes. It might be that leadership has been a crucial contributor to organizational and 
societal success. Many companies and systems have flourished under the influential 
guidance of charismatic individuals who in times of crises led change successfully. At 
the same time though, it is also true that in many cases oppressive leaders have opposed 
progress and led their people into troubling conditions. If humanity is ever going to 
overcome such issues and focus on things that really matter, such as poverty, inequality, 
advances in technology and science as well as space exploration, it needs to nourish 
leaders who will value the whole more than their ego. This thesis is the first step 
towards an understanding of how this could be achieved.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Operational definitions 
This appendix aims to exhibit the definitions of change, organizational change and 
change management as they were identified in the literature. For every definition there 
will be a demonstrative table as well as a matrix that links the affinity processes’ results 
with the definitions themselves. 
1.1 Change as a term  
Both definitions and etymological analysis indicate an approach of two substances for 
change. On the one hand change could mean alteration of the shape, on the other hand 
movement to a different state.   
The word change comes from the Latin one “Cambire” (Skeat, 2005:84), which in its 
turn has its origin in Proto-Celtic word “Kamb or Kemb” (Miller, 2012:155 & 20) or 
the ancient Greek “Κάμπτειν” (Diez, 1864:109; Lehmann, Hewitt, 1986:175), and 
means crook. On the other hand the Greek work for change “Αλλάζω” comes from the 
ancient Greek word “Αλλάσω”, which consists of two part (Patakis & Tzairakis, 
1999:38). The first one is "αλλ-" which means different (Pagoulatos, Giakos, 
Katroulikos, 2005:196) and the second one is "άγω" which means lead or drive (Patakis 
& Tzairakis, 1999:10).  
Definition Source 
An alteration of the state of any thing Smith (1918) 
To change is to move from the present to the future, from a 
known state to a relatively unknown state 
Harigopal (2006:43) 
Change is understood as making the form, nature , content, 
etc. of something different from what it is or what it would 
be if left alone 
Sambaiah, as cited in 
Singla  (2009:138) 
An act or process through which something becomes 
different 
Stevenson (2010) 
Change is crooking or bending the shape Etymology  
Change is Leading towards a different direction Etymology          
Definitions of change as a term 
Nevertheless, the approaches are complementary and through the affinity diagram they 
were combined and created a holistic definition:  
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Alteration of 
the state 
Moves to a new and 
relatively unknown state 
Desired 
condition 
Is an act or 
process 
Etymology X X  - 
Smith (1918) X   - 
Harigopal (2006)  X  - 
Sambaiah (2009) X   - 
Stevenson (2010)  X  X 
Times Mentioned 4 2 1 1 
Link between Definitions and Elements derived by the Affinity Process 
Change seems to be defined in two different but complementary ways. It is considered 
as either the process through which something becomes different (Stevenson, 2010; 
Sambaiah, cited in Singla, 2009:138) or a movement towards another state (Harigopal, 
2006:43; Smith, 1918). Etymological analysis of the word supports the existence of 
both definitions. On the one hand change means crooking (bending), in the sense of 
being able to adapt your shape, on the other hand is leading towards a different 
direction, which constitutes the imperative call for both resilience (Hornell & Orr, 
1997; Stoltz, 2004) as well as leadership (Gill, 2002; Stichler, J.F., 2011) during 
change. As a result, the following definition will be used: 
 “Change is an act or process through which an entity “moves” towards a new 
and relatively unknown altered state” 
1.2 Organizational Change 
It seems that there is consensus on how organizational change could be defined. Most 
of the authors support that it is about an alteration of practices and/or behaviors 
dominating in the organizations’ status quo. At the same time other authors focused on 
the organization’s movement to a new state which, apparently, includes changes in 
organization’s status quo as well.   
Furthermore, while neither the necessity of OC for organization nor its aim for 
improvement are not mentioned widely, they have been identified and should be 
considered as important characteristics as well. 
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Definition Source 
Change is an any significant alteration in the status quo which is 
intended to benefit the people involved 
Havelock 
(1973:4) 
Change is the modification of, deletion of, or addition to attitudes 
and behaviours 
Lindquist 
(1978:1) 
Change describes everything that needs to be different in 
organizations 
Anderson & 
Ackerman 
(2010:51) 
Large scale change is a lasting change in the character of an 
organization that significantly alters its performance 
Mohrman, et al. 
(1989:2) 
Change, one type of event, is an empirical observation of 
difference in form, quality, or state over time in an organizational 
entity 
Van de Ven & 
Poole (1995) 
Organizational change involves moving from the known to the 
unknown, from the relative certainty to relative uncertainty, from 
the familiar to the unfamiliar 
Cohen, Fink, 
Gadon &Willits 
(1995:396) 
Change is a deviation from the norm or from the traditional 
behaviour of a group or organization 
Freeman 
(1999:363) 
Change is a reordering or reorganization of aspects of an 
organization 
Davies (2001:12) 
Organizational change is new ways of organizing and working 
Dawson 
(2003:16) 
Change refers to an ongoing process whereby there is an intention 
to alter something from a current state to a new state 
Basford & Thrope 
(2004:192) 
Change is seen as an ongoing process that unfolds over time, 
revealing periods of greater and lesser instability, in which the 
restlessness of a system is an instinctive response toward survival 
in a continually changing internal or external environment 
Ferdig & Ludema 
(2005) 
Change is about aligning people, resources and culture with a 
shift in organizational direction 
Dealy & Thomas 
(2006:52) 
The adoption of an idea or behaviour by an organization Draft (2005:619) 
Planned alterations of organizational components to improve the 
effectiveness of the organization 
Ingols, Cawsey & 
Deszca (2011:2) 
Definitions of organizational change 
Defining OC becomes a difficult task, since it varies according to the model someone 
chooses to approach it (Kezar, 2001:12). Most of the definitions agree that OC refers 
to the alteration of practices and behaviours in an organizations’ status quo (Davies, 
2001:12; Dawson, 2003:16; Draft, 2009:619; Freeman, 1999:363; Lindquist, 1978:1; 
Van de Ven & Poole, 1995), with the aim of benefiting performance (Havelock, 
1973:4). Authors have, also, focused on the organizations’ movement to a new and 
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relatively unknown state (Cohen, Fink, Gadon & Wiillits, 1995:396). Dealy and 
Thomas (2006:52) adds that this movement requires alignment of resources and 
culture, while Ferdig & Ludena (2005) stresses its crucial contribution to business 
survival.  
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Havelock (1973) X X       
Lindquist (1978) X        
General view before 80s   X      
Mohrman, et al. (1989) X X       
Van de Ven & Poole (1995) X        
Cohen, Fink, Gadon & Wiillits (1995)     X    
Freeman (1999) X        
Davies (2001) X        
Dawson (2003) X        
Basford & Thrope (2004)     X  X  
Ferdig & Ludema (2005)   X X   X X 
Dealy & Thomas (2006)     X X   
Draft (2009) X        
Ingols, Cawsey & Deszca (2011) X X       
Times Mentioned 9 3 2 1 3 1 2 1 
Link between OC Definitions and Elements derived by the Affinity Process 
As a result, through the affinity process these different but complementary approaches 
to define organizational change where combined and produced the following 
definition: 
 “Organizational change is an ongoing and necessary process, of altering 
organizational practices and behaviours with the aim of achieving a new 
improved state of performance” 
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1.3 Change Management 
In general CM deals with the facilitation of change in individual, team and 
organizational level. It has a proactive and structured character and aims to gain 
benefits for the company and its employees.  
Human resource management has been emphasized as one of the CM’s priorities during 
the change process. This clearly depicts the fundamental role that people play during 
change. 
Definition Source 
The management of change and development within a 
business or similar organization. 
Stevenson (2010) 
"The coordination of a structured period of transition from 
situation A to situation B in order to achieve lasting change 
within an organization" 
BNET as cited in 
Ljungblom, Isaksson 
& Hallencreutz 
(2012) 
It is the visualisation, planning, and implementation of 
transitions throughout an organization or business until, via 
innovative management practices 
Hiam (1997) 
All measures concerned with the initiation and the realization 
of new strategies, structures, systems, and modes of 
behaviour, are subsumed under the term change management 
Gattermeyer & 
Ayad (2001) as cited 
in Finke & Will 
(2003:69) 
For an organization change management means defining and 
implementing procedures and or technologies to deal with 
changes in the business environment and to profit from 
changing opportunities 
Kotska & Monch 
(2002) as cited in 
Schwerditzch & 
Alonso (2003:24) 
Change management is about managing people in a changing 
environment so that business change are successful and the 
desired business results are realized 
Hiatt & Creasey 
(2003) 
Change Management is a systematic approach to dealing with 
change from the perspective of an organization and at the 
individual level. 
Schweditsch & 
Alonso (2004) 
Change management means the process of helping a person, 
group, or organization change 
Rothwell & Sullivan 
(2005) 
Change Management is the proactive identification and 
management of modifications to your project 
Baca (2005) 
The process, tools and techniques to manage the people-side 
of change processes, to achieve the required outcomes, and to 
realize the change effectively within the individual change 
agent, the inner team, and the wider system 
Nauheimer (2006) 
as cited in Feldman 
(2008:104) / Atkin 
& Brooks (2009) 
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Change management is an organized, systematic application 
of the knowledge, tools, and resources of change that provides 
organizations with a key process to achieve goals and 
objectives 
McManus (2006) / 
Mohapatra & Singh 
(2012) 
Organizational change management is the process needed to 
enable the people in an organization to transition from their 
current environment and adopt the new work environment or 
desired state 
Tuncer (2007) as 
cited in 
Hallencreutz, 
Turner & Garvare 
(2012) 
Change management is a systematic approach to dealing with 
change from the very beginning of a change program and 
during all planning and implementation stages. 
The World Bank 
(2008) 
The process through which a proposed change is effected, is 
treated as the management of change 
Sambaiah (2009) 
Change management is a structured, proactive, coordinated 
approach to transition individuals and organizations from a 
current state to a desired future state to achieve lasting change 
Ensaola & Atchley 
(2011) 
Change management is a structured approach to transitioning 
individuals, teams, and organizations from a current state to a 
desired future state. 
Rathbone (2011) / 
Hill (2011) / 
VanZant-Stern 
(2011) 
Change management is the process of planning and 
coordinating the implementation of all changes through 
individuals, teams and organizations 
Malek & 
Yazdanifard (2012) 
Change management is a set of processes, tools and 
mechanisms that are designed to make sure that when you do 
try to make some changes, A, it doesn't get out of control and 
B, the number of problems associated with it doesn't happen 
Kotter (2012b) 
Definitions of change management 
In its broad sense, CM is an ongoing (The World Bank, 2008:169), proactive (Baca, 
2005:2) and systematic approach or process (Malek & Yazdanifard, 2012:149; Singla, 
2009:138) for managing, developing and dealing with change (Stevenson, 2010; 
Schweditsch, Alonso, 2004:24).  As Rothwell & Sullivan (2005:17) have supported CM 
generally aims to facilitate change at individual, team and organizational levels. Also, 
plenty of authors have supported that CM is about managing the transitions from the 
current to a desired future state (Hill, 2011:67; Rathbone, 2012:1; VanZant-Stern, 
2011:168). Transitions should create, via innovative management practices (Hiam, 
1997:8), lasting change and positive results for benefiting both the organization 
(Ljungblom, Isaksson & Hallencreutz, 2012) and its people (Ensaola & Atchley, 
2011:53).  
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Stevenson (2010)           X X       
BNET Business 
Dictionary 
      X         X   
Hiam (1997) X     X     X       
Gattermeyer & Ayad 
(2001) 
X         X         
Kotska & Monch (2002) X         X X     X 
Hiatt & Creasey (2003) X         X       X 
Schweditsch & Alonso 
(2004) 
        X X X       
Rothwell & Sullivan 
(2005) 
  X       X X       
Baca (2005)         X X         
Nauheimer (2006) / Atkin 
& Brooks (2009) 
X X       X X     X 
McManus (2006) / 
Mohapatra & Singh 
(2012) 
X       X X       X 
Tuncer (2007)   X   X     X       
The World Bank (2008)     X   X X         
Sambaiah (2009)   X       X         
Ensaola & Atchley (2011)       X X   X   X   
Rathbone (2011) / Hill 
(2011) / VanZant-Stern 
(2011) 
      X X   X       
Malek & Yazdanifard 
(2012) 
  X       X X       
Kotter (2012b)   X       X   X     
Times mentioned 5 6 1 5 6 13 10 1 2 4 
Link between CM Definitions and Elements derived by the Affinity Process 
As a result, through the affinity process these different but complementary approaches 
to define change management where combined and produced the following definition: 
 “Change Management is a proactive and structured approach for facilitating a 
person, group and/or organization to change and achieve the desired outcomes” 
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Appendix 2: Planned change models’ analysis 
This appendix aims to present the steps, which were followed to analyse the PC models 
(table 2). The main approach was to break down the different steps of the models and 
then synthesize them again by starting from a common basis.  
The first step was to capture the most important phrases in each model and isolate them. 
For that reason, the coding process were followed. The results are depicted on the 
following table: 
Model Phrase 
Lewin's 3 step model 
Felt Need 
Unfreeze 
The Phases of planned 
change 
Translate difficulties into problem awareness 
Desire to change 
Desire to seek help from outside the system 
Ambivalent about the need 
Problem awareness is not automatically translated into a 
desire for change 
Unfreezing 
The organizational change 
process 
Translate symptoms into a coherent picture 
Sort out the developmental problem 
Dynamic Seven-stage 
model 
Sense of the problem 
A model for OD 
Manager's perception that the organization is somehow in a 
state of disequilibrium or needs improvement 
Only felt needs convince individuals to adopt new ways 
Beckhard & Harris Change 
model 
A good diagnosis of a set of conditions causing a need for 
change 
The CAP 
Ensuring that employees around the organization understand 
the reason for change 
Enhanced Planning Model Begins with the awareness of a need or a problem 
10 Commandments for 
change 
Analyse the organization and its need for change 
Crisis facilitate change's initiation 
Generate a sense of urgency 
The critical Path to Change Clearly define business problems 
United Model for OD 
Disagreements about the need for change surface 
Understanding Organizational problems 
Gathering analysing and feeding back information to 
managers and employees 
Kotter 8 Step 
Eliminate complacency 
Establish a sense of urgency 
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Change start more easily with a crisis (natural or not) 
The change management 
process model 
Establish the need to change 
A process model to change 
Recognition that circumstances require change to take place 
Translate the need for change into a desire for change 
A framework for change 
7-steps to Change 
Highlight the idea for what needs to be changed 
Clear definition of the business problem 
 Change won’t happen without urgency 
 
Leading Change model 
We have to do this- like it or not 
Leaders must focus on creating a sense of urgency 
Highlighting the awareness about the need to move in a new 
direction 
 
C.H.A.N.G.E. 
The ICEBERG approach 
Unzreeze the perception that the status quo is adequate to 
meet the challenges of the present and future 
Identifies a Need for change 
A diagnosis of the current state 
A framework for change 
management 
Using a compelling reason 
Illustrate the need in a dramatic way 
The action Research model 
Steps for Leading & 
Managing Change 
Awareness of a Need for Change 
Use tangible - dramatic evidence  
Breed anxiety / uncertainty 
Recipe for Strategic 
Change 
Establish Urgency for the true current position 
Coding Results for Change Models 
The focus was on identifying phrases referring to the initiation of a PC program and 
this objective guided the coding process. After the phrases had been isolated, the 
affinity process were used to group them back. The specific approach enabled to create 
the group-elements and not stick the phrases under already developed groups (see: 
Cowley and Domb, 1997:170). That is to say, the group elements emerged from the 
phrases and arguably represent a holistic concept of the proposed initial steps developed 
in the PC literature.  Lastly, the elements were linked with the models for enabling 
further analysis (table 3). 
Element Phrase 
Identifying 
the 
Compelling 
Need 
  Felt Need 
  Manager's perception that the organization is somehow in a state of 
disequilibrium or needs improvement 
  Sense of the problem 
  Only felt needs convince individuals to adopt new ways 
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  Begins with the awareness of a need or a problem 
Identifies a Need for change 
  Recognition that circumstances require change to take place 
Diagnosing 
& analysing 
the 
Compelling 
Need 
Maps out what needs to happen 
  Clear definition of the business problem 
  Understanding Organizational problems 
  Translate symptoms into a coherent picture 
  Identify the subparts of the system where the problem is located 
  Sort out the developmental problem 
  A good diagnosis of a set of conditions causing a need for change 
Clearly define business problems 
  A diagnosis of the current state 
Disseminate 
the 
Compelling 
Need & 
Increase 
Awareness 
Awareness of a Need for Change 
Establish the need to change 
  Translate difficulties into problem awareness 
  Highlighting the awareness about the need to move in a new direction 
  Ensuring that employees around the organization understand the reason for 
change 
  Gathering analysing and feeding back information to managers and  
Infuse & 
Establish 
Urgency 
Shocking the members with a statement or action that creates anxiety 
  Establish a sense of urgency 
  Generate a sense of urgency 
  Change won't happen without urgency 
  Establish Urgency for the true current position 
  Leaders must focus on creating a sense of urgency 
  Using a compelling reason "to increase urgency" 
Unfreeze - 
Eliminate 
Inertia 
  Eliminate complacency 
  "Unfreeze" 
  Break the status quo 
  Unzreeze the perception that the status quo is adequate to meet the 
challenges of the present and future 
Sense of 
Need 
  Disagreements about the need for change surface 
  Ambivalent about the need 
Requires 
Desire for 
change 
  Problem awareness is not automatically translated into a desire for change 
  Desire to change 
  Desire to seek help from outside the system 
  Translate the need for change into a desire for change 
Enforcing 
the 
Compelling 
Need 
  Illustrate the need in a dramatic way 
  We have to do this - like it or not 
  Crisis facilitate change's initiation 
  Change start more easily with a crisis (natural or not) 
  Use tangible - dramatic evidence  
  Breed anxiety / uncertainty 
Affinity Process Results for Change Model 
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Appendix 3: Examples of need’s legitimization 
The following paragraphs aim to demonstrate an example which will clarify the 
distinction, discussed in section 3.1.2, between the world views of an objectctivist and 
a subjectivist concerning the legitimization of the need for change. It should be noted 
that the example doesn’t indicate a need for a transformational change, which is the 
area of this work’s concern. On the contrary, it was purposely designed to be simple 
since its main aim is to explain in the best possible way the distinction. Initially, the 
reader has to imagine the following scene: 
 Manufacturing process: A plastic sheet is placed on a vacuum thermoforming 
machine. The machine warms the plastic and a mould gives the necessary shape 
to the sheet. Then a fan cools the plastic sheet which, according to the targets 
established by the management, has to be taken off after “t” minutes.  
 Discrepancy: The time-target most of the times is not met.  
 Explanation (Operator) – Need for change: The plastic sheet is too hot, so the 
operator has to wait t+2 minutes in order to take it off the machine. 
 Counter explanation (CEO) – No need for change: There is no problem with the 
process. The operator is unproductive because he/she doesn’t try enough. 
The need for changing the process is legitimized when the explanation provided by the 
operator is validated. The operator’s perception is validated in the following two ways: 
 Objectivist perspective (Plato): A thermometer will be used and the results will 
be compared with a scientific scale which establishes, in an absolute sense, what 
temperatures the human body-skin can stand. The numerical evidence 
(temperature), compared with the established by the scientists absolute, has the 
power to legitimize the need for change, regardless of what the operator and the 
CEO believe.  
 Subjectivist perspective (Protagoras): Let’s assume that there are two people in 
the organization who have used the machine, which makes a sum, including the 
CEO, of three people. If both of them (majority: 2 out of 3) say that it is hot and 
this is the reason why the time-targets are not met, the need for change is 
immediately legitimized and any other explanation is a product of defence. In this 
case, it doesn’t matter what the actual temperature really is.  
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The previous examples refer to the legitimization of a need according to the two 
extremes of the subjectivist-objectivist spectrum. The reader has to moderate 
appropriately his/her thinking according to the philosophical assumptions that he/she 
holds. For example, if the temperature of the plastic sheet is around 34°C, when the 
scientific standard is 35°C (hypothetically speaking), but the majority suggests that it 
is indeed hot, then the need for change is legitimized, because the observed numerical 
difference can simply be natural variation (for further analysis regarding statistical 
process control rules refer to Wheeler & Chambers, 1990:96).     
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Appendix 4: The components of emotion 
This appendix aims to present the emotional components that have been identified in 
the literature. As it has been stated in the main body of this work, Scherer’s (2005a) 
list seems to be the most complete one. However, it was deemed essential to present 
additional lists, which have been recommended by various authors, so that the reader 
can have a more complete view of the componential approach.    
Author                             
(Reference) 
Component Description 
Kleinginna & 
Kleinginna 
(1981) 
Cognitive Generate cognitive processes 
Feeling Feelings of arousal and affect 
Physiological 
Activate physiological adjustments to the 
arousing conditions 
Behavioural Lead to behaviour 
Buck, (1989); 
Gross & 
Barrett (2011);                         
Kring & 
Gordon (1998)                
(*widely 
accepted 
components) 
Subjective 
Experience 
Subjective felt responses (to stimuli) 
Expressive 
behaviour 
E.g. Facial, bodily, verbal - Reflects the 
extent to which individuals outwardly 
display their emotions 
Peripheral 
physiological 
responses 
E.g., heart rate, respiration 
Ben-Ze'ev 
(2001:49) 
Cognitive 
Supplies the requires information about a 
given situation 
Evaluative 
People are not moved by things but the 
views which they take of them 
Motivational 
Refers to the desire or readiness to 
maintain or change present past or future 
circumstances 
Feeling 
Awareness of tactile qualities, bodily 
sensations, emotion, moods 
Scherer 
(2005a) 
Cognitive 
component 
Evaluation of objects and events  
------>Information processing 
Neurophysiological 
component 
System regulation ----> Support 
Motivational 
component 
Preparation and direction of action  
--------> Executive 
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Motor expression 
component 
Communication of reaction and 
behavioural intention ------> Action 
Subjective feeling 
component 
Monitoring of internal state and 
organism– environment interaction  
----> Monitor 
Fontaine, 
Scherer, 
Roesch & 
Ellsworth, 
(2007) 
Appraisal of events 
Similar to Scherer (2005a) 
Psycho-
physiological 
changes 
Motor expressions 
Action tendencies 
Subjective 
experiences 
Emotion regulation 
Control of the emotional expressions  
*hidden behind more general components 
in Scherer’s theory  Frijda (2007b) 
Moors (2009) 
Cognitive Stimulus appraisal/ evaluation 
Somatic 
Consisting of central and peripheral 
physiological responses 
Motivational 
Action tendencies or states of action 
readiness 
Motor Consisting of expressive behaviour 
Feeling Referring to emotional experience 
Wierzbicka 
(2010) 
Thinking Someone thinks something at some time 
Feeling 
Because of this, this someone feels 
something for some time 
Bodily Happening 
Something is happening somewhere in 
this someone’s body because of this 
Durand & 
Barlow 
(2010:60) 
Behaviour 
Basis patterns of emotional behaviour 
(freeze, escape, approach, attack)                                           
Physiology 
Emotion is a brain function involving the 
more primitive brain areas 
Cognitive 
Appraisal, attribution and other ways of 
processing the world around you that are 
fundamental to emotional experience 
Emotional components identified in the literature 
The list is by no means exhaustive. However, it represents a diachronic perspective on 
the componential notion of emotions. It starts with the review conducted by  Kleinginna 
& Kleinginna (1981), then moves to the general accepted components which were 
developed in late 80s (Buck, 1989) and remain till our days influential (Gross & Barrett, 
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2011), and concludes by considering theories of the last decade.  Despite the differences 
concerning the expression of the components, it is clear that there is an overlap between 
Scherer (2005a) and the rest of the theories.                     
 
Components suggested by Scherer (2005a) 
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Kleinginna & Kleinginna (1981) X X X X X 
Buck, (1989); Gross & Barrett (2011);Kring 
& Gordon (1998) 
*widely accepted basic components 
 X  X X 
Ben-Ze'ev (2001:49) X  X  X 
Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch & Ellsworth, 
(2007) 
X X X X X 
Moors (2009) X X X X X 
Wierzbicka (2010) X X   X 
Durand & Barlow (2010:60) X X  X  
Matrix analysis with additional component theories 
Therefore, Scherer’s (2005a) list seems appropriate to be used as the guiding list for 
this work, since it successfully represents other componential theories. 
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Appendix 5: Research methodology for the interdisciplinary research 
This appendix sets out to go into detail regarding the research methodology of this 
work. It supports the chapter of methodological design (ch.2) by providing evidence 
which complement it, so that the reader could understand the logic that guided the 
research in greater depth.  
The specific part of this appendix aims to present the logic behind the steps of the 
interdisciplinary research (figure below) in detail. It works as a complementary for 
section 2.3. 
5.1 Identifying relevant steps + Q.1: Is there a need for an additional disciplinary 
perspective? 
The processes of choosing which disciplinary perspectives are necessary to be involved 
in this research, was a dynamic one. That is, while the work was proceeding new sub-
disciplines came to play important role. This logic is graphically illustrated by the link 
between the questions 1 “Is there a need for an additional disciplinary perspective?” 
and 2 “Is the problem researchable?”. More precisely, Q.1 was unimportant 
immediately after the selection of the first three fields of study. However, once the 
researcher started analysing the problem based on the initial disciplinary perspectives 
he came up against Q.2, something that changed the importance of Q.1. More precisely, 
a negative answer to Q,2, which leads to Q.1, made the later, to raise the following 
dilemma “Is the problem un-researchable due the need for additional studying under 
the already chosen (sub)disciplines and fields of study or there is a need for an 
additional (sub)disciplinary perspective. This cyclical process, in which disciplines 
were added in order to fill gaps of understanding, took place several times and led to 
an expansion of the research scope.  
The following presents the logic behind the selection of each discipline. The analysis 
is focusing on the sub-disciplines and fields of study for deeper analysis. It should be 
noted that there are disciplines which are not explicitly referred in the thesis but 
underpinned its logic (Philosophy-phenomenology) and played an important role in the 
development of the interdisciplinary understanding. 
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The list of disciplines and fields of study is depicted below: 
  Leadership, Change Management (Business) & Cognitive Psychology 
(Psychology): These first three sub-disciplines were chosen based on the 
research question as well as the experience of the researcher and his supervisor 
with the problem itself (Tress, Tress & Fry, 2006:246). The logic behind their 
choice could be captured in the following sentence. It was clear that “cognitive 
disorders” which make “leaders” resisting “change” exist (q.v. ch.1).   
 Psychology of emotion - Appraisal theory (Psychology): The pure cognitive 
approach (Axelrod,1973) was essential in establishing the basic logic, yet 
insufficient to determine specific aspects of the change process. Consistent with 
Marinier, Laird & Lewis (2009), questions like, “What information proceed to 
conscious level?”, “Why someone choose to modify schemas instead of 
assimilate discrepant information?” or “how new understanding is built?”, 
emerged. Appraisal theories seemed suitable for clarifying the abstract 
cognitive model (q.v. ch.3). 
 Deep Psychology & Dual - Processes Theory (Psychology): The inclusion of 
the appraisal theories developed the need for a deeper understanding of the 
unconscious mind. Therefore, apart from the cognitive perspective on the 
unconscious, it was necessary to review the field of deep psychology (i.e. 
Lazarus, 1995b). In addition, dual processes theory (System 1 – System 2) 
played a role in understanding the distinction between conscious and 
unconscious mind (q.v. ch.6).  
 Various Philosophical Schools & Epistemology (Philosophy): The 
philosophical aspect of this work was clear since its incipience. Questions like, 
“What is subjectivity and what are the relations between subject and object?”, 
couldn’t be approached solely on a psychological basis. Therefore, 
philosophical schools and epistemological considerations (i.e. constructivism) 
has been integrated in the work (q.v. ch.6).  
5.2 Conduct a literature search 
The main aim at this stage was to reach the right literature by using the appropriate key 
words. The following table demonstrates the main key words that were used. 
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Main 
Category 
Key Words 
Leadership 
& 
Management 
theories 
Change 
Desire, Types, Need, 
Models, Barriers, 
Transformational, 
Planned, Individual, 
Resistance, 
Organization 
Urgency, Crisis, 
Compelling 
evidence, Chaos, 
Uncertainty 
Leader Management, Mind-set Strategic 
Cognitive 
theories 
Psychology 
Cognition, Cognitive 
frames, Inertia 
 
Schema 
Subjectivity, Model, 
Information Processing, 
Mental Models, Change, 
Discrepancy 
 
Assimilation-
Accommodation 
Rationalization 
Attention, 
Interpretation 
Psychological 
Disengagement 
Disidentification 
Self-esteem, 
Dissonance, 
Stigma 
Discounting 
Self-esteem, Stigma, 
Competition 
 
Cognitive 
theories 
+  
Depth 
psychology 
Defensive 
Trivialization, ,  
Blame attribution, 
responsibility 
Procrastination 
Delay, Greif, 
Escalation of 
commitment 
Self-serving bias 
Blame, 
responsibility 
Control Compensation 
Order, 
controllability, 
Autonomy 
Reactance 
Power allocation, 
Change, 
Democracy 
Motivation Goals 
Goals in Business 
schools’ studies 
Conscious/ 
Unconscious 
Illusion/ Deception 
Emotion 
Define Component, Process  
Emotion 
Regulation 
Unconscious  
Implicit /Explicit 
Automatic/ Deliberate 
Motivation 
Surprise 
 
Cognitive-
psychoevolutionary 
model 
Interruption 
Hope Modes, Types 
Efficacy, agency, 
Passive/ active 
Core affect valence Macro/ Micro 
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Appraisal 
theories 
Appraisal 
 
Search on specific 
appraisals 
 
Appraisal 
Unconscious 
 
Intuitive, Automatic, 
Reflective, Attributions 
 
Defence mechanism,  
Preconscious -
Unconscious 
Coping 
Adaptive/ maladaptive 
Defensive 
Emotion/ Problem 
focused 
Action tendency  
System 1 / System 
2 
(Dual theories) 
Affective/ Cognitive 
Fast/ Slow 
Associative/ Rule based 
Intuitive/ Reflective 
Various 
dichotomies (table 
15) 
Ontology 
Objectivist/ Subjectivist 
Plato/Protagoras 
Absolutism/ 
Relativism 
Philosophy 
Epistemology 
Positivism/ 
Constructivism/ 
Evaluativism 
Elite/ Majority 
(Truth 
establishment) 
Free Will 
Illusion  
Conscious/ Unconscious 
Affect, Reflection 
Emotional impulse 
Objectification 
Reflection, Response 
inhibition 
Regulation of 
emotion 
George & Jones 
(2001) 
Citation analysis 
& Use of key words 
from the paper 
 
Crucial 
theories 
 
Axelrod (1973) 
Citation analysis 
& Use of key words 
from the paper 
 
Scherer (2005a; 
2001) 
Lazarus 
(1991a;1995a) 
Alicke (2000) 
Simon, Greenberg 
& Brehm (1995) 
Steel (2007; 2010) 
Walinga (2008) 
Kay & colleagues 
(2008; 2009; 2010) 
List of main Key words 
The list is by no means exhaustive, yet it is a good indicator of the main key words that 
were used in this work. In addition, it should be noted that due to the integrative nature 
of the review, combinations of key words that belong in different categories/sub-
disciplines, took place. Lastly, the theories listed in the table played important role as 
well. For each of these theories, after their thorough review, the researcher was 
conducting citation analysis by using key words deriving from the paper itself. This 
was leading to new searches for relevant literature (new blue cycle fig.8).  
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5.3 Develop understanding in each relevant discipline and field of study  
When studies reached this stage, were going through a thorough review with the aim 
of contributing to the sub-disciplinary understanding. The acceptance of a study’s 
arguments was based on the following criteria.  
Criterion Questions 
Provenance 
What is the author’s credibility? Are arguments of the study 
based on evidence (i.e. reference list or empirical evidence) or are 
they the outcome of author’s experience? 
Objectivity 
Is there an equal consideration of opposing evidence or does the 
paper present a one-sided view? Did the researcher(s) followed a 
robust research approach? 
Persuasiveness 
Are the author's arguments and conclusions convincing? Which 
of them are most/least convincing? How did the author come to 
such conclusions? 
Value 
Does the work contribute to the understanding of the 
interdisciplinary problem at hand and the field in general?  
Criteria for evaluating a study (Based on University of California, Santa Cruz, 2013) 
While the previous criteria was used to evaluate any type of study, in this work specific 
theories have been utilized (i.e. Axelrod, 1973; Scherer, 2001). Therefore, it was 
necessary to use specific rules in order to decide which theories should be used. The 
following table presents the criteria. 
Criterion Questions 
Reliability 
Is the theory reliable? Has the theory been tested empirically?  
Can it be trusted? Has it been recommended by other authors?  
Convenience 
Is there available knowledge regarding the theory?  Does the 
theory contribute to the understanding of the problem? What is its 
implications? 
Established 
Status 
Has the theory been used in the field? If yes, to what extent?  
How many times has it been cited?  
Criteria for assessing theories (Based on Stahl, B. C., Al-Amri, J., & colleagues 2008) 
5.4 Analyse the problem and evaluate disciplinary insight into it 
Mind maps were utilized for noting down and structuring into categories important 
arguments and ideas. The dynamic use of mind maps is illustrated in the following 
example. More precisely, the example consists of a series of steps that led to the 
argument of the duality at sec. 6.1   
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The very first step was to have a sub-question in mind, which in the specific case was 
“How does an individual perceives and evaluates information in the reflective state?”. 
The boxes describe the disciplinary contribution to the question. In addition, each box 
is accompanied by specific notes which expand and clarify its concept. Once the 
researcher was satisfied with the disciplinary level of analysis the research was ready 
to proceed to the next phase. 
 
Disciplinary contributions to the question 
5.5 Identify conflicts & discover or create common ground 
At this stage the disciplinary contribution depicted in the previous map were analysed 
and their links were captured. The process included to understand differences and seek 
for common ground. The result was to draw lines between the boxes in the mind-map, 
which, was now ready to create a new interdisciplinary understanding of the question.  
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Links between disciplinary contributions 
5.6 Integrate insights & produce an interdisciplinary understanding of the 
problem 
Once common ground was achieved the map was reconceptualised in its 
interdisciplinary form. That is, the logic behind the links has been explicitly analysed 
and a formal structure has been developed (the following map corresponds to sec. 6.1).   
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Interdisciplinary understanding of cognitive duality in the reflective state 
Note that conceptual diagrams have also been used at this stage. For the diagram that 
corresponds to this mind-map conceptual diagram please refer to fig.18.  
5.7 Evaluate the interdisciplinary theoretical construct 
The table below presents the evaluative criteria that were used in order to verify 
whether the proposed theorization was able to meet the requirements of a well-
constructed theory. The suggested criteria were developed based on the modification 
and combination of already existing theories (right columns of the table), a process that 
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took place under the general logic of developing something that will reflect the special 
needs of the current work. Before proceeding to any further details on this construction 
process, it is essential to provide the basic principles behind the colour-coding of the 
table: 
 Green cells include criteria that were directly contributed to the construction 
process 
 Yellow cells include criteria that supported, yet not directly contributed to, the 
creation of the proposed list 
 Red cells indicate criteria not suitable for the needs of this work  
 Red-coloured words indicate the most important part of a criterion 
In principle, the criteria of Lincoln & Lynham (2011) which have been developed, in 
contrast to the positivistic approach of Patterson (1986), in order to address the need 
of assessing a theory that has been conceptualized under the a interpretivistic paradigm, 
were utilized as a basis. At the same time, influences from the abductive reasoning that 
was followed within the scope of this work (criteria for pragmatism in Jayanti, 2011), 
the intention to develop mainly a formal theory (Brookfield, 1992), as well as a set of 
specific criteria for assessing the conceptualization phase of theory development 
(Dubin, 1978) were taken into consideration. All these along with the very 
interdisciplinary nature of the suggested understanding (Repko, 2006) led to the 
development of ten criteria that are listed below.  
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Criteria used in this work Criteria from the literature- Building blogs 
1
. 
Im
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an
ce
 &
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ea
n
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g
fu
ln
es
s 
A theory is important, or else 
significant, when it is related to 
(Patterson, 1986), as well as 
provides scientific explanation 
(Mansilla, 2005) and deep 
understanding of (Lincoln & 
Lynham, 2011), "actual" events, 
behaviours and general phenomena 
that concern social life. 
Meaningfulness 
& understand-
ability 
. . provide explanation and deep understanding of actual events, 
behaviours, or the meaning-making activities of stakeholders 
and respondents; be accepted by professionals and stakeholders 
(co-constructors of the theory) 
Lincoln & 
Lynham 
(2011) 
Disciplinary 
grounding 
Deeply informed by disciplinary expertise 
Mansilla 
(2005) 
Importance 
. . . not be trivial but significant, and have some relevance to life 
or real behaviour 
Patterson 
(1986) 
Discreteness 
. . a body of theoretical ideas is seen to refer to a phenomenon 
that is discrete, distinct, and separate; that is, one which stands 
apart as not being susceptible to explanation through any other 
existing theoretical framework 
Brookfield 
(1992) 
2
. 
 L
o
g
ic
al
ly
 c
o
n
si
st
en
t 
in
si
g
h
tf
u
ln
es
s The “traditional” inductive and 
deductive reasoning to theory 
development were complemented 
by abductive logic, which allowed 
imaginary creativity to emerge and 
formulate new theoretical 
interdisciplinary constructs 
(pragmatism: Jayanti, 2011) of 
higher and leveraged understanding 
(Mansilla, 2005). These constructs 
need to be insightful and can 
accommodate "some" ambiguity 
(Lincoln & Lynham, 2011), without, 
though, losing internal consistency 
Thick 
description and 
insightfulness 
. . . . . be understandable and insightful; exhibit reasonable 
structural corroboration (be internally and contextually 
consistent); accommodate some ambiguity (a hallmark 
characteristic of human affairs) inherent in the sense and 
meaning-making and socially constructed activities of 
respondents and stakeholders 
Lincoln & 
Lynham 
(2011) 
Integrating 
leverage 
In interdisciplinary work, disciplinary perspectives are not 
merely juxtaposed. Rather they actively inform one another, 
thereby leveraging understanding 
Mansilla 
(2005) 
Precision and 
clarity 
. be understandable, internally consistent and free from 
ambiguities 
Patterson 
(1986) 
Empirical 
grounding 
. . .  a formal theory is grounded in some kind of observed and 
documented experience 
Brookfield 
(1992) 
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Criteria used in this work Criteria from the literature- Building blogs 
(Patterson, 1986) or their logical 
basis to other-external literature 
(Dubin, 1978) & practice 
(Brookfield, 1992). 
Prescriptive 
policing 
. . a theoretical statement makes clear the difference between 
prescriptive injunctions which grow out of personal or 
philosophical convictions and empirically grounded insights 
concerning how a phenomenon and its constituent processes are 
to be understood 
Logical 
consistency 
The choice of concepts has immediate implication for the 
eventual testing or confirmation of the theory. The choice of 
units must have some logical basis in other theories, research, 
practice or literature                                                                                                                                           
Dubin 
(1978) 
Criterion for 
pragmatic 
reasoning 
Uses abductive logic and allows for the creativity of the 
abductive process and discontinuity of insight, rather than 
requiring extensive description of literature search and logic 
approach which is commonly a feature of quality 
postpositivistic research, and may inadvertently reward 
incrementalism rather than discontinuous change 
Jayanti 
(2011) 
3
. 
N
ar
ra
ti
v
e 
&
 i
ll
u
st
ra
ti
v
e 
el
eg
an
ce
 
The complex theorization needs to 
be narratively elegant, and 
conceptually rich, provocative and 
evocative (Lincoln & Lynham, 
2011), with adequate use of 
illustrative techniques (i.e. 
figures/images, tables, examples 
when necessary) to facilitate the 
establishment of a clear 
understanding (Jayanti, 2011) as 
Narrative 
elegance 
be either simple or complex, depending on the matter or 
phenomenon being theorized; be understandable beyond the 
scientific community (i.e. accessible in natural language), 
narratively elegant, and conceptually rich, provocative and 
evocative 
Lincoln & 
Lynham 
(2011) 
Parsimony and 
simplicity 
. . . contain a minimum of complexity and few assumptions 
Patterson 
(1986) 
Communicative 
clarity 
the language used in the documentation and description of a 
formal theory is clear and accessible Brookfield 
(1992) Assumptive 
awareness 
. . . the assumptions underlying formal theoretical elaborations 
are made explicit 
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Criteria used in this work Criteria from the literature- Building blogs 
well as make any assumptions clear 
(Brookfield, 1992). Parsimony 
Parsimony in theory building refers to the fact that a minimum 
number of units is used to build the theory as well as 
relationships among these concepts 
Dubin 
(1978) 
Criterion for 
pragmatic 
reasoning 
Pairs description with images 
Jayanti 
(2011) 
Uses analogy to aid understanding, as a thing may not be 
understood in terms of itself, but in terms of its connection with 
other things 
4
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The complex theorization and its 
formalized outputs (Jayanti, 2011) 
should be conceptualized in 
propositions (Brookfield, 1992) that 
are clear and explicit enough 
(Lincoln & Lynham, 2011), so that 
they can: 
1) Be Put into action by 
practitioners 
2) Be Used and tested by other 
researchers. 
Mutuality of 
concepts and 
descriptive logic 
display mutuality of concepts and descriptive logic; be made 
operational, i.e. the descriptive and explanatory framework 
(concepts, logic and propositions) are made explicit and thus 
able to be put into action; be capable of being tested by other 
researchers, and enjoy stakeholders assent to its usefulness for 
their lives & contexts 
Lincoln & 
Lynham 
(2011) 
Operationality 
. . . be capable of being reduced to procedures for testing its 
propositions or predictions 
Patterson 
(1986) 
Assumptive 
awareness 
. . . the assumptions underlying formal theoretical elaborations 
are made explicit 
Brookfield 
(1992) 
Researchability 
. . a body of theoretical propositions can be examined for 
accuracy and validity by people other than those who have 
advanced these propositions 
Criterion for 
pragmatic 
reasoning 
Produces outputs which may take the form of patterns, 
microworlds, computational models, or mixed-method outputs 
to the extent that these mixed-methods designs actually combine 
deductive and inductive reasoning approaches or use a 
specifically abductive approach, rather than relying solely on 
deductive or inductive reasoning …… 
Jayanti 
(2011) 
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Criteria used in this work Criteria from the literature- Building blogs 
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Theoretical elaborations must be 
fruitful and provocative, in the 
sense that they not only illuminate 
some aspect of social life but also 
allow room for critique (Mansilla, 
2005) and, thus, suggest new 
avenues of research and/or action 
(Lincoln & Lynham, 2011). 
Fruitfulness and 
provocativeness 
. .. . be fruitful and provocative, i.e. illuminate some aspect of 
social life, and suggest new avenues of research and/or 
description and/or action 
Lincoln & 
Lynham 
(2011) 
Critical stance 
With this complexity in mind, interdisciplinary student work 
must also be assessed in terms of the work's self-critical stance - 
its clarity of goals, conscious judgments about the process of 
integration, and healthy skepticism about its outcomes. . . . . 
.their meta-disciplinary awareness and their critical view of the 
overall composition of a piece of integrative work.. 
Mansilla 
(2005) 
Fruitfulness 
. have the capacity to lead to predictions that can be tested, 
leading to the development of new knowledge, and to provoke 
thinking and the development of new ideas 
Patterson 
(1986) 
Invitational tone 
. . any theoretical elaboration invites refutation, further analysis, 
critique, and refinement 
Brookfield 
(1992) 
Criterion for 
pragmatic 
reasoning 
Produces outputs which may take the form of patterns, 
microworlds, computational models, or mixed-method outputs 
to the extent that these mixed-methods designs actually combine 
deductive and inductive reasoning approaches or use a 
specifically abductive approach, rather than relying solely on 
deductive or inductive reasoning (thus being more properly 
evaluated by Positivist or Postpositivist boilerplates) 
Jayanti 
(2011) 
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Criteria used in this work Criteria from the literature- Building blogs 
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The theoretical framework should 
illustrate, clearly enough, its 
usefulness for other users (in their 
own situation/context) and, thus, 
invite them (Brookfield, 1992) to 
conduct additional research 
according to the following 
dimensions (Lincoln & Lynham, 
2011):                                                                                                                    
1) Transferability: the ability in 
individuals, through interaction 
between the knower and the known, 
to carry propositional and/or tacit 
knowledge from one context to 
inform another, or multiple other, 
contexts, 
2) Transportability: the applicability 
to different populations, of utility in 
varying contexts, with varying 
populations. 
Transferability 
and 
transportability 
. . . . . able transferability – i.e. the ability in individuals 
(through interaction between the knower and the known) to 
carry propositional and/or tacit knowledge from one context to 
inform another, or multiple other, contexts; and transportability 
–, i.e. the applicability to different populations, of utility in 
varying contexts, with varying populations Lincoln & 
Lynham 
(2011) 
Transferability 
. . . . . be as complete as is possible, given its intended range 
(local, regional or other), so that other users may see the extent 
to which the theory may be useful in their own 
situation/context; enable individuals to carry propositional 
and/or tacit knowledge from one context to inform another, or 
multiple other contexts 
Comprehensive-
ness 
. . . be complete, including all known data in the field 
Patterson 
(1986) 
Invitational tone 
. . any theoretical elaboration invites refutation, further analysis, 
critique, and refinement 
Brookfield 
(1992) 
Criterion for 
pragmatic 
reasoning 
Produces outputs which may take the form of patterns, 
microworlds, computational models, or mixed-method outputs 
to the extent that these mixed-methods designs actually combine 
deductive and inductive reasoning approaches or use a 
specifically abductive approach, rather than relying solely on 
deductive or inductive reasoning (thus being more properly 
evaluated by Positivist or Postpositivist boilerplates) 
Jayanti 
(2011) 
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Criteria used in this work Criteria from the literature- Building blogs 
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During an interdisciplinary study 
distinct disciplines collaborate and, 
without abolishing their 
autonomous operation, generate a 
collective understanding of a 
research issue (Aboelela, et al. 
2007; Repko, 2006). From this 
perspective, and by following the 
6th criterion of transferability & 
transportability (Brookfield, 1992; 
Lincoln & Lynham, 2011), it can be 
argued that interdisciplinary 
transferability concerns the extent to 
Transferability 
. . . . . be as complete as is possible, given its intended range 
(local, regional or other), so that other users may see the extent 
to which the theory may be useful in their own 
situation/context; enable individuals to carry propositional 
and/or tacit knowledge from one context to inform another, or 
multiple other contexts 
Lincoln & 
Lynham 
(2011) 
Comprehensive-
ness 
. . . be complete, including all known data in the field 
Patterson 
(1986) 
Invitational tone 
. . any theoretical elaboration invites refutation, further analysis, 
critique, and refinement 
Brookfield 
(1992) 
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Criteria used in this work Criteria from the literature- Building blogs 
which theorists from the involved 
disciplines can realize: 
1) Contributions of their own 
discipline and field of study to the 
addressed problem, 
2) Advances in their discipline due 
to the generated interdisciplinary 
understanding and, thus, become 
able to conduct further research on 
the basis of carrying knowledge 
from the interdisciplinary to the 
single-disciplinary level and vice 
versa. 
Criterion for 
pragmatic 
reasoning 
Produces outputs which may take the form of patterns, 
microworlds, computational models, or mixed-method outputs 
to the extent that these mixed-methods designs actually combine 
deductive and inductive reasoning approaches or use a 
specifically abductive approach, rather than relying solely on 
deductive or inductive reasoning (thus being more properly 
evaluated by Positivist or Postpositivist boilerplates) 
Jayanti 
(2011) 
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The theory should generate new 
knowledge (Patterson, 1986) that 
match some element of socially 
constructed life, as this is judged 
based on the ‘lived experience" 
(reflect personal experience, 
meaning-making, or general 
observations) of the respondents 
(Lincoln & Lynham, 2011). 
Empirical 
verifiability 
be supported by ‘lived experience,’ be verified by the 
respondents that it ‘rings true,’ or that it reflects some aspect of 
their experience, meaning-making, or observation; match some 
element of socially constructed life; generate both new social 
scientific knowledge, and new respondent learning 
Lincoln & 
Lynham 
(2011) 
Empirical 
validity or 
verification 
. . eventually be supported by experience and experiments that 
confirm it; must generate new knowledge 
Patterson 
(1986) 
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Criteria used in this work Criteria from the literature- Building blogs 
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The theoretical advances must be 
useful and applicable for ordinary 
persons, suggesting ways of being 
in the world, or ways of altering 
one’s circumstances in some 
context (Mansilla, 2005). 
Specifically, it should provide 
(Lincoln & Lynham, 2011): 
1)  new ways of seeing old 
situations, such that meaningful 
change can occur, 
2) models for human flourishing, as 
living knowledge, and for practical 
application and high organizational 
performance. 
Usefulness and 
applicability 
be useful and applicable to ordinary persons, suggesting ways of 
being in the world, or ways of altering one’s circumstances in 
some context; provide new ways of seeing old situations, such 
that meaningful human change can occur; provide models for 
human flourishing, as living knowledge, and for practical 
application and high organizational performance 
Lynham 
Performance 
Builds on performance view of understanding. It privileges the 
capacity to use knowledge over that of simply having or 
accumulating it. From this perspective, individuals understand a 
concept when they are able to apply it—or think with it—
accurately and flexibly in novel situations 
Mansilla 
(2005) 
Practicality 
. . . be useful to practitioners in organizing their thinking and 
practice by providing a conceptual framework for practice 
Patterson 
(1986) 
Connectedness 
. . formal theoretical assertions can be understood by 
practitioners as having some kind of connection to their own 
activities 
Brookfield 
(1992) 
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 The theoretical framework should 
provide a good conceptual 
understanding of practice and create 
a prompt to action on the part of a 
wider set of audiences/stakeholders 
who have a legitimate stake in the 
findings. Essentially, it should 
Prompt to 
action 
. . .provide a good conceptual understanding of practice; 
proceeding from compellingness (an inextricably linked 
criterion) such that researchers and respondents understand 
where and how to move next in a given context, including how 
to refine, hone, sharpen, and revise practice, and to alter 
performance in the light of new information; connect theory 
with action and learning for continuous refinement and 
improvement, illustrating practicality of the theory 
Lincoln & 
Lynham 
(2011) 
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Criteria used in this work Criteria from the literature- Building blogs 
connect theory with action and 
learning for continuous refinement 
and improvement, illustrate 
practicality of the theory (Lincoln & 
Lynham, 2011) by assisting in the 
realization of certain social and 
political values (for a better world) 
and in improving social and 
political condition (Brookfield 
1992). 
Value-
judgmental 
explicitness 
. .. formal theorizing is informed by attention to the role which 
theoretical understanding can play in assisting in the realization 
of certain social and political values and in improving social and 
political condition 
Brookfield 
(1992) 
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Appendix 6: Research methodology for the formative evaluation plan 
This appendix aims to present the steps of the formative evaluation research in detail. 
It works as a complementary for ch.9. 
6.1 Formulate evaluative propositions & present them to the experts 
The table below demonstrates the propositions that the researcher developed in order 
to operationalize the theoretical understanding of this work. Specifically, the table 
includes: 
 1st column – A code for each proposition that simplifies the processes of cross-
referencing with and traceability of the corresponding text in the main body of the 
work. The codes take the form of “PC.Sn” (P=proposition; C=Chapter; S=section; 
n=A numerical order that was used in order to distinguish between propositions 
that refer to the same section and subsection: i.e. a1, a2, b1, b2, c). Also, the range 
of pages that each proposition refers to is mentioned. 
 2nd column – The proposition in detail. 
 3rd column - The simple statements to which the complex propositions were broken 
down so that the evaluation process could be facilitated. The coding for each 
statement takes the form of “S(Px)n” (S=statement; Px=the proposition that the 
statement refers to, which also abides by the coding logic that was described in the 
first bullet; n= A numerical order for distinguishing between the statements that 
refer to the same proposition, i.e. 1, 2, 3.  . . ).  
The statements were conceptualized in an electronic format and were presented to the 
experts so that the latter can evaluate them. The electronic version of the evaluation 
study was designed on PowerPoint under the main principle that the evaluator should 
be guided through the logical steps that led to the development of the theoretical 
framework of the current work, as this is illustrated in the figures that were presented 
throughout the thesis. Therefore, each statement was presented along with its 
corresponding part of the figures, which enabled a visual understanding of the 
statement under evaluation. In addition, the option to refer in the complete text from 
which the statement derived was also provided. The electronic version of the evaluation 
study has been submitted along with the thesis in a CD-ROM. A copy can also be send 
through e-mail after request. Please contact the researcher at V.Kitsos@warwick.ac.uk. 
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Chapter 
& 
Section 
Proposition Statement 
1   P1 
Even when evidence issue an urgent appeal for 
change (crisis), there can be cases in which 
business-leaders avoid instigating action. 
P1 
Even when evidence issue an urgent appeal for change 
(crisis), there can be cases in which business-leaders 
avoid instigating action. 
3 2 
P3.2a 
The existence of a discrepant message not only 
establishes the necessary conditions for change to 
occur but also can make cognitive schemas to 
(re)act defensively. 
S(P3.1)1 
The existence of a discrepant message establishes the 
necessary conditions for change to occur. 
S(P3.1)2 
The existence of a discrepant message can make 
cognitive schemas to (re)act defensively. 
P3.2b 
Resistance to a schema change process occurs 
when leaders rationalize the discrepancy; either by 
omitting it (attention) and, thus, completely 
rejecting the need for change, or by 
(mis)comprehending it (interpretation) and, thus, 
avoiding any fruitful action. 
S(P3.2a)1 
Resistance to a schema change process occurs when 
leaders rationalize the discrepancy. 
S(P3.2a)2 
Rationalization can take the form of omitting the 
discrepancy (attention) and, thus, completely rejecting 
the need for change. 
S(P3.2a)3 
Rationalization can also take the form of 
(mis)comprehending the discrepancy (interpretation) 
and, thus, avoiding any fruitful action. 
P3.2c 
Rationalization prevents transformational action 
by constituting assimilation (incremental 
adjustments of schemas) an adequate response to 
the need for change, when actually 
accommodation (paradigmatic shift of existing 
schemas) is necessary. 
S(P3.2b)1 
S(P3.2b)1: Transformational action requires cognitive 
accommodation (paradigmatic shift of existing 
schemas). 
S(P3.2b)2 
Rationalization prevents transformational action by 
constituting cognitive assimilation (incremental 
adjustments of schemas) an adequate response to the 
need for change. 
4 1 P4.1 
Schema change is an emotional process, during 
which cognitive appraisals of the received 
evidence dynamically interact with the generated 
affective-emotional impulses, and in common 
S(P4.1)1 
Schema change is an emotional process during which 
cognitive appraisals of the received evidence 
dynamically interact with the generated affective-
emotional impulses. 
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.determine the emotionally driven coping response 
to the faced discrepancy. S(P4.1)2 
The outcome of the dynamic interaction between 
cognitions and affective impulses is an emotionally 
driven coping response to the faced discrepancy. 
2 
P4.2a 
Each evaluative dimension entails positive or 
negative implications for a leader’s goals and 
strivings, which are reflected in a micro-valence 
that is able to influence subsequent appraisals and, 
thus, the response to be adopted. 
S(P4.2a)1 
Each evaluative dimension entails positive or negative 
implications for a leader’s goals and strivings, which are 
reflected in a micro-valence. 
S(P4.2a)2 
 This is able to influence subsequent appraisals and, 
thus, the response to be adopted.  
P4.2b 
Emotions are rational mechanisms that promote 
coping activity based on the goals help by the 
appraiser. This activity aims to change the leader-
environment relationship on the basis of moving 
from the perceptual state of “evidence suggest 
transformational change” to the one in which 
“evidence does not suggest transformational 
change”. 
S(P4.2b) 
Emotions are rational mechanisms that promote coping 
activity based on the goals help by the appraiser. This 
activity aims to change the leader-environment 
relationship on the basis of moving from the perceptual 
state of “evidence suggest transformational change” to 
the one in which “evidence does not suggest 
transformational change”. 
P4.2c 
Broadly speaking, a coping strategy-response can 
either take the form of direct action that aims to 
tackle the faced problem (adaptive), or be the 
outcome of an ego-defence, which driven by the 
need to regulate the experienced emotional 
distress, rationalize the appraised message and, 
thereby, produce a compromised response 
(maladaptive). 
S(4.2c)1 
In the adaptive scenario, a coping response-strategy 
takes the form of direct action that aims to tackle the 
faced problem. 
S(P4.2c)2 
In the maladaptive scenario, the coping response-
strategy is the outcome of an ego-defence, which, driven 
by the need to regulate the experienced emotional 
distress, rationalizes the appraised message and, 
thereby, produces a compromised response. 
3 P4.3a 
Leaders should align personal ego-commitments 
(i.e. individual-oriented beliefs, values and life 
goals) which constitute someone’s ego-identity 
and mainly have a social-oriented nature, with the 
S(P4.3a)1 
Leaders should align personal ego-commitments (i.e. 
individual-oriented beliefs, values and life goals) which 
constitute someone’s ego-identity and mainly have a 
social-oriented nature, with the needs of their 
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needs of their organization, in general and in 
reference to the case they face. This balance is 
necessary for avoiding ego-centric evaluations that 
lead to maladaptive responses in the light of 
evidence that indicate the need for change. 
organization, in general and in reference to the case they 
face. 
S(P4.a2)2 
This balance is necessary for avoiding ego-centric 
evaluations that lead to maladaptive responses in the 
light of evidence that indicate the need for change. 
P4.3b 
“Leaders” who have been taught, as well as 
blindly followed the current societal paradigm, 
will perceive the world through an ego-centric 
perspective. As a result, when the evidence that 
indicate the need for change are perceived as 
threatening for the ego, this morbid egocentricity 
is able to engage leaders in responding defensively 
to the need for change. 
S(P4.3b) 
“Leaders” who have been taught, as well as blindly 
followed the current societal paradigm, will perceive the 
world through an ego-centric perspective. As a result, 
when the evidence that indicate the need for change are 
perceived as threatening for the ego, this morbid 
egocentricity is able to engage leaders in responding 
defensively to the need for change. 
P4.3c1 
A crisis will pose a threat to the leader and, thus, 
will promote negative emotions that need to be 
adaptively regulated for transformational change 
to occur. 
S(P4.3c1) 
A crisis will pose a threat to the leader and, thus, will 
promote negative emotions that need to be adaptively 
regulated for transformational change to occur. 
P4.3c2 
Specifically, the adaptiveness of individuals’ 
actions and behaviour depends on whether the 
implicit emotion regulation will be adaptive by 
supporting appraisals to control the negative 
emotion and face the challenge or maladaptive by 
operating as the basis upon which defence 
mechanisms that distort the perceived evidence 
will be triggered. 
S(P4.3c2) 
Specifically, the adaptiveness of individuals’ actions 
and behaviour depends on whether the implicit emotion 
regulation will be adaptive by supporting appraisals to 
control the negative emotion and face the challenge or 
maladaptive by operating as the basis upon which 
defence mechanisms that distort the perceived evidence 
will be triggered. 
P4.3c3 
“Threatened” ego-commitments can motivate the 
construction of a reality that ignores the discrepant 
of the evidence for change and fortifies leaders’ 
self-interests in the status quo. 
S(P4.3c3) 
 “Threatened” ego-commitments can motivate the 
construction of a reality that ignores the discrepant of 
the evidence for change and fortifies leaders’ self-
interests in the status quo. 
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P4.3d 
The specific nature of the adopted maladaptive 
response depends on the triggered ego-defence 
and can be differentiated upon the consciously 
expressed emotional dimensions-components of 
cognitive understanding, coping behaviour and 
subjective feeling. 
S(P4.3d) 
The specific nature of the adopted maladaptive response 
depends on the triggered ego-defence and can be 
differentiated upon the consciously expressed emotional 
dimensions-components of cognitive understanding, 
coping behaviour and subjective feeling. 
5 1 
P5.1a 
Due to their natural primacy, unconscious 
processes will be invoked first to appraise the 
faced evidence regarding its novelty, intrinsic 
pleasantness and relevance for leader’s concerns, 
and, thereby, will determine if the essential for 
change emotional experience as well as the 
concomitant conscious and reflective 
consideration to the discrepancy at hand will be 
triggered. 
S(P5.1a)1 
Due to their natural primacy, unconscious processes will 
be invoked first to appraise the faced evidence regarding 
its novelty, intrinsic pleasantness and relevance for 
leader’s concerns. 
S(P5.1a)2 
Transformational changes as responses to a crisis 
require an insightful approach to information processing 
and a reflective reconsideration of the established 
schemas which presupposes an emotional reaction to the 
discrepancy. 
S(P5.1a)3 
The initial preconscious appraisals will determine if 
conscious and reflective consideration to the 
discrepancy at hand will be given. 
P5.1b 
Leaders who appraise the negative valance of a 
discrepancy could respond defensively in order to 
avoid the forthcoming "painful" emotional 
experience, by engaging in the process of 
maladaptive attentional deployment (denial) and, 
thus, omitting any undesirable evidence 
(rationalization) that indicates the need for change.  
S(P5.1b)1 
Leaders who appraise the negative valance of a 
discrepancy could respond defensively in order to avoid 
the forthcoming "painful" emotional experience. 
S(P5.1b)2 
Defensive appraisals at this stage occur when the 
individual engages in the process of maladaptive 
attentional deployment (denial). 
S(P5.1b)3 
Denial leads to the omission of any undesirable 
evidence (rationalization) that indicates the need for 
change. 
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2 P5.2 
Denial could be caused by the mechanism of 
selective attention, which is effectuated through 
the ability of cognitive schemas to make 
comforting information more salient and/or drive 
the individual-leader to avoid including (omit) 
discrepant evidence in the interpretation process. 
In this case, the discrepant message is 
unconsciously assimilated and, hence, the leader 
expresses no conscious consideration of the need 
to take action. 
S(P5.2)1 
Denial could be caused by the mechanism of selective 
attention, which is effectuated through the ability of 
cognitive schemas to make comforting information 
more salient and/or drive the individual-leader to avoid 
including (omit) discrepant evidence in the 
interpretation process. 
S(P5.2)2 
In the case of selective attention, the discrepant message 
is unconsciously assimilated and, hence, the leader 
expresses no conscious consideration of the need to take 
action. 
3 
P5.3a 
Denial could be caused by the mechanism of 
psychological disengagement, in which case the 
leader disengages emotionally from the domain 
that is challenged by the discrepant message, with 
the aim of preventing a potential blame of the 
current schemas from being ascribed and, thus, 
his/her self-esteem from being damaged. 
S(P5.3a)1 
Realizing the relevance of the faced discrepancy for 
personal goals/concerns and, thus, staying emotionally 
engaged, is a necessary step for the leader to challenge 
his/her schemas. 
S(P5.3a)2 
Relevant and direpant evidence poses a challenge to 
leader's self-esteem, which can be avoided by triggering 
the mechanism of psychological disengagement. 
S(P5.3a)3 
When the mechanism of psychological disengagement is 
triggered, the leader disengages emotionally from the 
domain that is challenged by the discrepant message, 
and, thus, prevents the necessary challenge to his/her 
schemas and any further action from being actualized. 
P5.3b 
Disengagement could occur due to the mechanism 
of disidentification, according to which leaders, 
who try to protect themselves from the failure 
stigma, neglect or miss discrepancies in the 
challenged domains, and focus on those 
supplementary ones, with which they feel more 
confident, for protecting their esteem. 
S(P5.3b) 
Disengagement could occur due to the mechanism of 
disidentification, according to which leaders, who try to 
protect themselves from the failure stigma, neglect or 
miss discrepancies in the challenged domains, and focus 
on those supplementary ones, with which they feel more 
confident, for protecting their esteem. 
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P5.3c 
Disengagement could occur due to the mechanism 
of discounting hypothesis, according to which 
leaders discount and, hence, deny a negative 
discrepant message that comes from 
customers/suppliers by attributing it to imaginary 
prejudices and/or lack of trust against their 
company. 
S(P5.3c) 
Disengagement could occur due to the mechanism of 
discounting hypothesis, according to which leaders 
discount and, hence, deny a negative discrepant message 
that comes from customers/suppliers by attributing it to 
imaginary prejudices and/or lack of trust against their 
company. 
4 P5.4 
A discrepant message that is accepted as relevant 
will generate the pre-emotion of surprise (element 
of a crisis), which, in its turn, establishes the 
general conditions for the schematic change to 
occur by capturing attention to the faced issue, 
unfreezing the basic motives for change as well as 
driving the leader into a state of higher cognitive 
ability and conscious engagement. 
S(P5.4)1 
A discrepant message that has been appraised as 
relevant will generate the (pre)emotion of surprise, 
which is an ingerent element of any crisis situation. 
S(P5.4)2 
The emotion of surprise will make the leader aware of 
the discrepancy by directing his/her attention towards it 
S(P5.4)3 
Apart from the conscious awareness, the emotion of 
surprise will unfreeze the basic motives for change as 
well as drive the leader into a state of higher cognitive 
ability and conscious engagement. 
6 1 
P6.1a 
In the reflective and conscious state, cognition 
breaks down into two interdependent types-
systems that, respectively, represent a basic 
distinction in human mind; one that cognitively 
interprets the evidence (gnosis-driven mind), and 
another that affectively evaluates it in reference to 
personal implications (ego-driven mind). 
S(P6.1a) 
In the reflective and conscious state, cognition breaks 
down into two interdependent types-systems that, 
respectively, represent a basic distinction in human 
mind; one that cognitively interprets the evidence 
(gnosis-driven mind), and another that affectively 
evaluates it in reference to personal implications (ego-
driven mind). 
P6.1b 
The ego-driven mind comprises an individual’s 
unconscious mental models, general knowledge 
and superordinate goals (global meaning system), 
upon which unconscious and intuitive (hot) 
cognitions draw to appraise the faced evidence. 
S(P6.1b)1 
The ego-driven mind comprises an individual’s 
unconscious mental models, general knowledge and 
superordinate goals (global meaning system), upon 
which unconscious and intuitive (hot) cognitions draw 
to appraise the faced evidence. 
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The outcome is an emotional experience that 
projects to consciousness a self-ego attached and, 
therefore, highly subjective understanding of 
reality. 
S(P6.1b)2 
The outcome is an emotional experience that projects to 
consciousness a self-ego attached and, therefore, highly 
subjective understanding of reality. 
P6.1c 
Conscious experience and understanding are 
realized in the gnosis-driven mind, where various 
construal related (cold) cognitions, which follow 
the ego-driven intuitive appraisals, draw upon an 
individual’s global meaning system in order to 
(re)evaluate the evidence on a reflective and 
relatively ego-detached basis. The outcome is a 
controlled-regulated emotional experience that 
entails a more objective meaning of the 
encountered reality. 
S(P6.1c)1 
Conscious experience and understanding are realized in 
the gnosis-driven mind, where various construal related 
(cold) cognitions, which follow the ego-driven intuitive 
appraisals, draw upon an individual’s global meaning 
system in order to (re)evaluate the evidence on a 
reflective and relatively ego-detached basis.  
S(P6.1c)2 
The outcome is a controlled-regulated emotional 
experience that entails a more objective meaning of the 
encountered reality. 
2 P6.2a 
The instigation of change requires a set of basic 
steps (evaluative dimensions), which correspond 
to specific intuitive appraisals and reflective 
evaluations, to occur. These are the classification 
of the identified discrepancy as a crisis (Problem 
detection) that calls for an urgent response 
(Evaluate urgency rate), and for which the leader 
accepts causal responsibility (Responsibility 
diagnosis) as well as realizes that control can be 
exerted (Assess situational control) and 
efficacious change can be applied (Evaluate 
change efficacy). 
S(P6.2a) 
The instigation of change requires a set of basic steps 
(evaluative dimensions), which correspond to specific 
intuitive appraisals and reflective evaluations, to occur. 
These are the classification of the identified discrepancy 
as a crisis (Problem detection) that calls for an urgent 
response (Evaluate urgency rate), and for which the 
leader accepts causal responsibility (Responsibility 
diagnosis) as well as realizes that control can be exerted 
(Assess situational control) and efficacious change can 
be applied (Evaluate change efficacy). 
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P6.2b1 
The two minds do not operate on an either/or 
basis. Instead, for each evaluative dimension 
(step) of the emotional change process the 
corresponding intuitive appraisal (ego-driven) and 
reflective evaluation (gnosis-driven) dynamically 
interact and in common determine the “emotional” 
response to be taken. 
S(P6.2b1) 
The two minds do not operate on an either/or basis. 
Instead, for each evaluative dimension (step) of the 
emotional change process the corresponding intuitive 
appraisal (ego-driven) and reflective evaluation (gnosis-
driven) dynamically interact and in common determine 
the “emotional” response to be taken. 
P6.2b2 
The pre-emotion of surprise will engage the 
conscious and controlled (gnosis-driven) cognitive 
processes which, in their turn, create an imagistic 
representation of the act of changing that needs to 
be appraised. 
S(P6.2b2) 
The pre-emotion of surprise will engage the conscious 
and controlled (gnosis-driven) cognitive processes 
which, in their turn, create an imagistic representation of 
the act of changing that needs to be appraised. 
P6.2b3 
Any evidence relevant to the act of changing will 
initially be evaluated, from an ego-driven 
perspective, by an unconscious intuitive appraisal, 
which through the produced subjective feeling 
will inform the ongoing conscious emotional 
experience. 
S(P6.2b3) 
Any evidence relevant to the act of changing will 
initially be evaluated, from an ego-driven perspective, 
by an unconscious intuitive appraisal, which through the 
produced subjective feeling will inform the ongoing 
conscious emotional experience. 
P6.2b4 
During the initial intuitive appraisal the gnosis-
driven mind operates in a lower level and, 
eventually, appropriates the unconscious 
evaluative results. This creates an illusion of 
conscious will, in the sense that the individual is 
consciously aware of the reflective evaluation, 
while it is the intuitive appraisal that actually 
determines the fate of the process. 
S(P6.2b4)1 
During the initial intuitive appraisal the gnosis-driven 
mind operates in a lower level and, eventually, 
appropriates the unconscious evaluative results. 
S(P6.2b4)2 
This creates an illusion of conscious will, in the sense 
that the individual is consciously aware of the reflective 
evaluation, while it is the intuitive appraisal that actually 
determines the fate of the process. 
P6.2b5 
When, and if, the gnosis-driven mind with its 
reflective evaluations gets actually engaged, the 
S(P6.2b5)1 
When, and if, the gnosis-driven mind with its reflective 
evaluations gets actually engaged, the ego-driven 
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ego-driven processes are attenuated and a 
regulation of the emotional experience occurs. The 
outcome is a counter emotional impulse that re-
determines understanding and action on a more 
ego-detached and objective basis. 
processes are attenuated and a regulation of the 
emotional experience occurs.  
S(P6.2b5)2 
The outcome is a counter emotional impulse that re-
determines understanding and action on a more ego-
detached and objective basis. 
P6.2c1 
The unconscious ego-driven mind is dominating 
the process, since it is its intuitive appraisals that, 
most of the times, will exclusively determine the 
emotional experience and, ultimately, the coping 
response to be adopted. 
S(P6.2c1) 
The unconscious ego-driven mind is dominating the 
process, since it is its intuitive appraisals that, most of 
the times, will exclusively determine the emotional 
experience and, ultimately, the coping response to be 
adopted. 
P6.2c2 
Even when the controlled processes of the gnosis 
driven mind get actively engaged in order to 
reflect on the initial emotional impulses, the 
unconscious intuitive appraisals are still necessary 
in order to generate the regulated-controlled 
emotional experience. 
S(P6.2c2) 
Even when the controlled processes of the gnosis driven 
mind get actively engaged in order to reflect on the 
initial emotional impulses, the unconscious intuitive 
appraisals are still necessary in order to generate the 
regulated-controlled emotional experience. 
P6.2c3 
In reflection, the evidence are unconsciously re-
evaluated in the light of the previously produced 
and ongoing emotional experience, as this is 
conceptualized in and provided by the gnosis-
driven mind. As a result, the individual could 
engage in the potentially perpetual process of 
objectification, during which the generated 
meaning-understanding gradually detaches from 
the ego-self and, thus, becomes a conception of 
expanded consciousness. 
S(P6.2c3)1 
In reflection, the evidence are unconsciously re-
evaluated in the light of the previously produced and 
ongoing emotional experience, as this is conceptualized 
in and provided by the gnosis-driven mind. 
S(P6.2c3)2 
 As a result, the individual could engage in the 
potentially perpetual process of objectification, during 
which the generated meaning-understanding gradually 
detaches from the ego-self and, thus, becomes a 
conception of expanded consciousness. 
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P6.2d1 
The dynamic interaction of the two systems has to 
generate an emotional experience that through its 
action tendencies will motivate the leader to 
decide taking action able to cope with the crisis. 
S(Pc6.2d1) 
The dynamic interaction of the two systems has to 
generate an emotional experience that through its action 
tendencies will motivate the leader to decide taking 
action able to cope with the crisis. 
P6.2d2 
The evaluative dimensions involve micro valences 
that get integrated in a holistic core affect. 
Eventually, this core affect is formalized into an 
unconscious affective impulse (aversive or 
appetitive) and a conscious understanding of the 
case, which in common inform the decision to be 
taken. 
S(P6.2d2)1 
The evaluative dimensions involve micro valences that 
get integrated in a holistic core affect. 
S(P6.2d2)2 
Eventually, this core affect is formalized into an 
unconscious affective impulse (aversive or appetitive) 
and a conscious understanding of the case, which in 
common inform the decision to be taken. 
3 
P6.3a 
Whether reflection will occur or not depends on 
conscious guidance (gnosis-driven mind) which is 
accompanied by an unconscious approval (ego-
driven mind) of putting a veto on the already 
produced emotional response. 
S(P6.3a) 
Whether reflection will occur or not depends on 
conscious guidance (gnosis-driven mind) which is 
accompanied by an unconscious approval (ego-driven 
mind) of putting a veto on the already produced 
emotional response. 
P6.3b 
After the generation of an ego-centric meaning, 
processes of the reflective mind can either engage 
(objectification) or remain apathetic, which makes 
it possible to conceive two distinct, yet similar in 
their fundamentals, ways of a defensive response's 
manifestation. In the former case leaders become 
victims of an illusionary reality that is accepted as 
the only and one logical truth. In the latter case a 
counter emotional impulse of a relatively more 
ego-detached meaning is generated, which leads to 
a conflict between contradictory motivational 
S(P6.3b)1 
After the generation of an ego-centric meaning, 
processes of the reflective mind can either engage 
(objectification) or remain apathetic, which makes it 
possible to conceive two distinct, yet similar in their 
fundamentals, ways of a defensive response's 
manifestation. 
S(P6.3b)2 
In the former case leaders become victims of an 
illusionary reality that is accepted as the only and one 
logical truth.  
S(P6.3b)3 
In the latter case a counter emotional impulse of a 
relatively more ego-detached meaning is generated, 
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valences, with the dominant one determining the 
response to be taken. 
which leads to a conflict between contradictory 
motivational valences, with the dominant one 
determining the response to be taken. 
P6.3c1 
Ego-defensiveness in the reflective state occurs 
when the necessary emotional action tendencies 
(vigilance) towards change are repressed through 
the mechanism of implicit maladaptive emotion 
regulation. Specifically, threatened ego-
commitments will generate negative, yet 
necessary for change, emotionality, which leaders 
avoid by engaging in the process of motivational 
reasoning that aims to protect the honour of the 
attacked ego. 
S(P6.3c1)1 
Ego-defensiveness in the reflective state occurs when 
the necessary emotional action tendencies (vigilance) 
towards change are repressed through the mechanism of 
implicit maladaptive emotion regulation. 
S(P6.3c1)2 
Specifically, threatened ego-commitments will generate 
negative, yet necessary for change, emotionality, which 
leaders avoid by engaging in the process of motivational 
reasoning that aims to protect the honour of the attacked 
ego. 
P6.3c2 
Motivational reasoning is based on the regulatory 
mechanism of cognitive change, according to 
which the appraised meaning of the evidence at 
hand is unconsciously distorted in favour of the 
ego. This leads to the rationalization of the 
discrepancy and, thereby, to no or inadequate 
change. 
S(P6.3c2) 
Motivational reasoning is based on the regulatory 
mechanism of cognitive change, according to which the 
appraised meaning of the evidence at hand is 
unconsciously distorted in favour of the ego. This leads 
to the rationalization of the discrepancy and, thereby, to 
no or inadequate change. 
7 1 
P7.1a1 
“Detecting a crisis-problem” requires the leader to 
classify the discrepancy, which has already been 
sensed in an unconscious level, as significant 
(high magnitude) enough to challenge core 
practices and the survival of the organization.  
S(P7.1a1) 
“Detecting a crisis-problem” requires the leader to 
classify the discrepancy, which has already been sensed 
in an unconscious level, as significant (high magnitude) 
enough to challenge core practices and the survival of 
the organization.  
P7.1a2 
The classification of a discrepancy occurs through 
its conscious verification, which is provided by 
the reflective evaluation of “Business-goal 
congruency”. 
S(P7.1a2) 
The classification of a discrepancy occurs through its 
conscious verification, which is provided by the 
reflective evaluation of “Business-goal congruency”. 
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P7.1b1 
In addition to business goals, the evidence for 
change will challenge a leader’s personal ego-
commitments. This challenge is captured in the 
intuitive level by an preconscious appraisal of 
“Ego-commitments congruency”, which considers 
personal goals along with business ones that are 
held by the leader. 
S(P7.1b1) 
In addition to business goals, the evidence for change 
will challenge a leader’s personal ego-commitments. 
This challenge is captured in the intuitive level by an 
preconscious appraisal of “Ego-commitments 
congruency”, which considers personal goals along with 
business ones that are held by the leader. 
P7.1b2 
Evidence that is intuitively appraised as non-
congruent with ego-commitments can trigger the 
defence mechanism of “Trivialization”, through 
which the magnitude of the faced problem 
(Business Goal Congruency) is reduced. 
S(P7.1b2) 
Evidence that is intuitively appraised as non-congruent 
with ego-commitments can trigger the defence 
mechanism of “Trivialization”, through which the 
magnitude of the faced problem (Business Goal 
Congruency) is reduced. 
P7.1c1 
An appraisal of business goal incongruence 
(problem-crisis) will reveal the magnitude of the 
faced issue and will prepare the leader for large 
scale action. On the contrary, trivialization will 
lead to a perception of no need for change 
(extreme trivialization) or need for minor changes 
(slight trivialization). In the former case leaders 
stick with the current status-quo, while in the latter 
they prepare for minor changes. 
S(P7.1c1)1 
An appraisal of business goal incongruence (problem-
crisis) will reveal the magnitude of the faced issue and 
will prepare the leader for large scale action.  
S(P7.1c1)2 
On the contrary, trivialization will lead to a perception 
of no need for change (extreme trivialization) or need 
for minor changes (slight trivialization). In the former 
case leaders stick with the current status-quo, while in 
the latter they prepare for minor changes. 
P7.1c2 
During the evaluative dimension of problem 
detection there are three main differentiations in 
the feeling component of the emotional 
experience: 
1. A distinction between the experienced general 
feelings of happiness (goal congruence) vs 
sadness & fear (goal incongruence) is drawn 
2. The path for negative (Guilt, Shame) vs positive 
S(P7.1c2) 
During the evaluative dimension of problem detection 
there are three main differentiations in the feeling 
component of the emotional experience: 
1. A distinction between the experienced general 
feelings of happiness (goal congruence) vs sadness & 
fear (goal incongruence) is drawn 
2. The path for negative (Guilt, Shame) vs positive 
(Gratitude, Pride) feelings to be generated in subsequent 
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(Gratitude, Pride) feelings to be generated in 
subsequent appraisals is paved 
3. Goal incongruence due to slight trivialization 
will generate negative feeling but of lower 
intensity compared to cases where the full 
magnitude of the crisis is realized. This difference 
will be reflected in the type of hope that will be 
produced at the final stages of the emotional 
change process (coping potential). 
appraisals is paved 
3. Goal incongruence due to slight trivialization will 
generate negative feeling but of lower intensity 
compared to cases where the full magnitude of the crisis 
is realized. This difference will be reflected in the type 
of hope that will be produced at the final stages of the 
emotional change process (coping potential). 
2 
P7.2a1 
A crisis is a situation that places the organization 
under extreme pressure and calls for action to be 
taken “now”, since any further delay will simply 
deteriorate the condition of the organization 
(Evaluate urgency rate). 
S(P7.2a1) 
A crisis is a situation that places the organization under 
extreme pressure and calls for action to be taken “now”, 
since any further delay will simply deteriorate the 
condition of the organization (Evaluate urgency rate). 
P7.2a2 
The need to take action “now” has to be realized 
first & foremost by the (top) leader. This is done 
through the reflective evaluation of “Urgency 
check”, during which the leader considers 
numerical-rational factors regarding the costs and 
benefits of proceeding immediately to or delaying 
the initiation of change. 
S(P7.2a2) 
The need to take action “now” has to be realized 
initially by the leader. This is done through the 
reflective evaluation of “Urgency check”, during which 
the leader considers numerical-rational factors regarding 
the costs & benefits of proceeding immediately to or 
delaying change. 
P7.2a3 
The evaluation of urgency is underpinned by the 
intuitive appraisal of “Effort considerations”, a 
part of which reflects the urgency check by 
evaluating how soon the necessary effort for 
change should be exerted (Temporal Proximity). 
S(P7.2a3) 
The evaluation of urgency is underpinned by the 
intuitive appraisal of “Effort considerations”, a part of 
which reflects the urgency check by evaluating how 
soon the necessary effort for change should be exerted 
(Temporal Proximity). 
P7.2b1 
In addition to the aspect of temporal proximity, 
the intuitive appraisal of “Effort considerations” 
evaluates the faced evidence along three 
S(P7.2b1) 
In addition to the aspect of temporal proximity, the 
intuitive appraisal of “Effort considerations” evaluates 
the faced evidence along three dimensions related to the 
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dimensions related to the change effort and able to 
manipulate the levels of urgency. These include, 
the general aversiveness of a transformational 
change (Aversiveness); the obligation of leaders to 
drive change successfully as this is evaluated by 
various stakeholders (Ego-threat); the fact that 
exacting efforts that are expected to pay back in 
the long-term are required (Level of difficulty). 
change effort and able to manipulate the levels of 
urgency. These include,  
1. The general aversiveness of a transformational 
change (Aversiveness)  
2. The obligation of leaders to drive change successfully 
as this is evaluated by various stakeholders (Ego-threat) 
3. The fact that exacting efforts that are expected to pay 
back in the long-term are required (Level of difficulty). 
P7.2b2 
In order to protect the self from undergoing this 
difficult and potentially ego-threatening change 
process, “Defensive procrastination” is triggered 
and prevents the essential implementation 
intentions to act “now” (Realization of Urgency) 
from being consciously formulated. 
S(P7.2b2)1 
In order to protect the self from undergoing this difficult 
and potentially ego-threatening change process, 
“Defensive procrastination” is triggered. 
S(P7.2b2)2 
“Defensive procrastination” prevents the essential 
implementation intentions to act “now” (Realization of 
Urgency) from being consciously formulated. 
P7.2c1 
In case of positive emotional experiences (Goal 
congruence) urgency to take action is, by 
definition, low since there is no need for change 
and, thus, the leader can relax and enjoy the 
illusionary success. 
S(P7.2c1) 
In case of positive emotional experiences (Goal 
congruence) urgency to take action is, by definition, low 
since there is no need for change and, thus, the leader 
can relax and enjoy the illusionary success. 
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P7.2c2 
In case of negative emotions (Goal incongruence) 
a set of initial tendencies to act and ameliorate the 
problematic situation, which establish the basis for 
the realization of urgency, have already been 
formulated. These tendencies will be either 
allowed to set in and develop a desire to move and 
win now (Sense of urgency), or suppressed and 
drive the leader into a state where awareness of 
the crisis exists, but urgency is missing and other 
concerns acquire priority (Defensive 
procrastination). 
S(P7.2c2) 
In case of negative emotions (Goal incongruence) a set 
of initial tendencies to act and ameliorate the 
problematic situation, which establish the basis for the 
realization of urgency, have already been formulated. 
These tendencies will be  
1. either allow to set in and develop a desire to move 
and win now (Sense of urgency),  
2. or suppressed and drive the leader into a state where 
awareness of the crisis exists, but urgency is missing 
and other concerns acquire priority (Defensive 
procrastination). 
P7.2c3 
In the evaluative dimension of urgency rate there 
are three main points regarding the feeling 
component: 
1. Positive emotions are characterized by low 
sense of urgency to act now 
2. Negative emotions, the tendencies of which 
have not been suppressed, will be allowed to set in 
and get further differentiated in subsequent 
appraisals.  
3. An evaluation of urgency will establish the 
emotion of fear. 
4. Negative emotions, the tendencies of which 
have been suppressed, will be accompanied by 
indifference. 
S(P7.2c3) 
In the evaluative dimension of urgency rate there are 
three main points regarding the feeling component: 
1. Positive emotions are characterized by low sense of 
urgency to act now 
2. Negative emotions, the tendencies of which have not 
been suppressed, will be allowed to set in and get 
further differentiated in subsequent appraisals.  
3. An evaluation of urgency will establish the emotion 
of fear. 
4. Negative emotions, the tendencies of which have 
been suppressed, will be accompanied by indifference. 
  
3 
P7.3a 
Transformations as responses to crises require the 
leader to “evaluate” and willingly accept “causal 
responsibility” for the current organizational 
S(P7.3a) 
Transformations as responses to crises require the leader 
to “evaluate” and willingly accept “causal 
responsibility” for the current organizational situation.  
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situation. This sense of responsibility is based on 
the logic that (top) leaders, as the key decision 
makers of an organization, are the main causal 
agents of a crisis that should (Obligation) and 
could (Control) have been “potentially” avoided 
(Preventability). 
S(P7.3a)2 
This sense of responsibility is based on the logic that 
(top) leaders, as the key decision makers of an 
organization, are the main causal agents of a crisis that 
should (Obligation) and could (Control) have been 
“potentially” avoided (Preventability). 
P7.3b1 
The evaluation of causal responsibility is 
underpinned by the intuitive appraisal of “Blame 
& Credit”, which considers the same dimension 
that determine responsibility attribution along with 
the hot-affective social implications that 
undertaking this responsibility might entail. 
S(P7.3b1)1 
The evaluation of causal responsibility is underpinned 
by the intuitive appraisal of “Blame & Credit”. 
S(P7.3b1)2 
Blame & Credit considers the same dimension that 
determine responsibility attribution along with the hot-
affective social implications that undertaking this 
responsibility might entail. 
P7.3b2 
The unconscious sense that causal responsibility 
for the crisis lies with the self-leader can trigger 
the defence of “Self-serving attribution”, which 
takes advantage of the general ambiguity of cause 
that characterizes a crisis and promotes the 
conscious misattribution of responsibility to 
external agents. 
S(P7.3b2) 
The unconscious sense that causal responsibility for the 
crisis lies with the self-leader can trigger the defence of 
“Self-serving attribution”, which takes advantage of the 
general ambiguity of cause that characterizes a crisis 
and promotes the conscious misattribution of 
responsibility to external agents. 
P7.3c1 
An internal attribution of causal responsibility will 
direct any action tendencies towards the self-
leader and his/her inaccurate mental models 
regarding how the system should operate. On the 
contrary, an external (mis)attribution, will direct 
S(P7.3c1)1 
An internal attribution of causal responsibility will 
direct any action tendencies towards the self-leader and 
his/her inaccurate mental models regarding how the 
system should operate. 
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action tendencies towards either external others 
(scapegoats) or general political-economic 
circumstances that seem convenient to be blamed 
for the crisis. 
S(P7.3c1)2 
S(P6.3c1)2: On the contrary, an external attribution, will 
direct action tendencies towards either external others or 
general political-economic circumstances that seem 
convenient to be blamed for the crisis. 
P7.3c2 
If general circumstances are blamed, leaders 
engage solely in the essential, yet insufficient 
process of grieving about the loss of the old status 
quo. 
S(P7.3c2) 
If general circumstances are blamed, leaders engage 
solely in the essential, yet insufficient process of 
grieving about the loss of the old status quo. 
P7.3c3 
Respectively, in the evaluative dimension of 
causal responsibility diagnosis there are three 
main points regarding the feeling component: 
1. In goal congruent cases the general emotion of 
happiness will be accompanied by either pride 
(Internal attribution) or Gratitude (External 
attribution) 
2. In goal incongruent cases the general emotions 
of sadness and fear will be accompanied by either 
anger (External misattribution) or shame-guilt 
(Internal attribution) 
3. Misattribution of responsibility to general 
circumstances will make the leader surrender to 
sadness and to a certain extend fear, and, thus, 
respond to the crisis only by grieving for the loss 
of the old status quo (no basis for active 
intentions). 
S(P7.3c3) 
Respectively, in the evaluative dimension of causal 
responsibility diagnosis there are three main points 
regarding the feeling component: 
1. In goal congruent cases the general emotion of 
happiness will be accompanied by either pride (Internal 
attribution) or Gratitude (External attribution) 
2. In goal incongruent cases the general emotions of 
sadness and fear will be accompanied by either anger 
(External misattribution) or shame-guilt (Internal 
attribution) 
3. Misattribution of responsibility to general 
circumstances will make the leader surrender to sadness 
and to a certain extend fear, and, thus, respond to the 
crisis only by grieving for the loss of the old status quo 
(no basis for active intentions). 
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8 1 
P8.1a 
The availability of adequate resources and 
appropriate-effective mechanisms to deal with the 
crisis provides a perception of controllability that 
is essential for instigating a transformational 
change. This is because, it complements the 
already accepted obligation to exert the necessary 
change effort (Aspect of Urgency), and, thus, it 
consolidates responsibility for action which is 
“materialized” through the adoption of problem 
focused (active) coping strategies. 
S(P8.1a) 
The availability of adequate resources and appropriate-
effective mechanisms to deal with the crisis provides a 
perception of controllability that is essential for 
instigating a transformational change. This is because,  
1. it complements the already accepted obligation to 
exert the necessary change effort (Aspect of Urgency), 
and, thus, it consolidates responsibility for action  
2. which is “materialized” through the adoption of 
problem focused (active) coping strategies. 
P8.1b1 
Controllability is realized through the evaluative 
dimension of coping potential, which can be 
broken down into the sub-dimensions of “Assess 
Situational Control” and “Evaluate change 
efficacy" that respectively consider whether: 
1. The issue at hand is under management’s 
decisional control, given the characteristics of the 
situation 
2. Exercising control and implementing change 
effectively is possible, given the collective 
capability of the company and its members. 
S(P8.1b1)1 
Controllability is realized through the evaluative 
dimension of coping potential, which can be broken 
down into the sub-dimensions of “Assess Situational 
Control” and “Evaluate change efficacy" that 
respectively consider whether: 
S(P8.1b1)2 
1. The issue at hand is under management’s decisional 
control, given the characteristics of the situation 
S(P8.1b1)3 
2. Exercising control and implementing change 
effectively is possible, given the collective capability of 
the company and its members. 
P8.1b2 
Controllability is realized upon the sequential 
reflective evaluations of "Control check”, which 
allows leaders to consider a wider range of 
alternatives for coping, and “Manageability”, 
which increases readiness and, thus, motivation 
for change. The former works as prerequisite so 
that the latter can exploit the potential of 
S(P8.1b2) 
Controllability is realized upon the sequential reflective 
evaluations of  
1. "Control check”, which allows leaders to consider a 
wider range of alternatives for coping (prerequisite for 
maximum efficacy   
2. and “Manageability”, which increases readiness and, 
thus, motivation for change 
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maximum efficacy regarding the respond to the 
crisis. 
P8.1c1 
The formulation of the essential perception of 
controllability presupposes, rather contradictorily, 
the acceptance of an initial sense of 
uncontrollability (sadness) & uncertainty (fear), 
which is caused by the chaotic nature of a crisis, 
and refers to the inability of the current 
organizational paradigm to cope and deal 
effectively with it (Innate uncontrollability). 
S(P8.1c1) 
The formulation of the essential perception of 
controllability presupposes, rather contradictorily, the 
acceptance of an initial sense of uncontrollability 
(sadness) & uncertainty (fear), which is caused by the 
chaotic nature of a crisis, and refers to the inability of 
the current organizational paradigm to cope and deal 
effectively with it (Innate uncontrollability). 
P8.1c2 
By accepting the crisis and the urgency to respond 
now, leaders realize the imminent chaos and, 
therefore, formulate a motivational impulse that 
calls for the restoration of order and structure in 
the system-organization. The way this restoration 
will occur depends on how the two evaluative sub-
dimensions of coping potential will shape the 
already formulated (Urgency check) intentions for 
action, the final form of which will be reflected in 
agency thinking, and, thus, in a specific kind of 
hope (emotional response). 
S(P8.1c2)1 
By accepting the crisis and the urgency to respond now, 
leaders realize the imminent chaos and, therefore, 
formulate a motivational impulse that calls for the 
restoration of order and structure in the system-
organization.  
S(P8.1c2)2 
The way this restoration will occur depends on how the 
two evaluative sub-dimensions of coping potential will 
shape the already formulated (Urgency check) intentions 
for action, the final form of which will be reflected in 
agency thinking, and, thus, in a specific kind of hope 
(emotional response). 
P8.1c3 
The innate uncontrollability is threatening for the 
leader’s ego. How this threat and its concomitant 
aversive emotionality are regulated, determines 
the adaptive or maladaptive nature of the 
generated emotional response of hope. 
S(P8.1c3) 
The innate uncontrollability is threatening for the 
leader’s ego. How this threat and its concomitant 
aversive emotionality are regulated, determines the 
adaptive or maladaptive nature of the generated 
emotional response of hope. 
P8.1c4 
Adaptive hope takes the form of yearning for a 
better future and exclusively escorts the 
uncertainty of the decision to change, while 
S(P8.1c4) 
In general, adaptive hope takes the form of yearning for 
a better future and exclusively escorts the uncertainty of 
the decision to change, while maladaptive hope 
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maladaptive hope enhances irrational beliefs in 
status quo’s viability and justify the leaders’ 
reluctance to let go of any old commitments 
(defensive). 
enhances irrational beliefs in status quo’s viability and 
justify the leaders’ reluctance to let go of any old 
commitments (defensive). 
P8.1c5 
Coping potential as a response to the innate 
uncontrollability of a crisis applies only when 
causal responsibility has been attributed internally, 
as an external attribution reduces provides a sense 
of order by locating the source of the problem. 
S(P8.1c5) 
Coping potential as a response to the innate 
uncontrollability of a crisis applies only when causal 
responsibility has been attributed internally, as an 
external attribution reduces provides a sense of order by 
locating the source of the problem. 
2 
P8.2a1 
The intuitive mind appraises (Anchored 
controllability) not only the controllability of the 
case (Dimension of Modifiability) but also the 
need to actively exercise control (Dimension of 
Changeability), which generates the necessary, yet 
susceptible to defensiveness, motivation for 
action. 
S(P8.2a1) 
The intuitive mind appraises (Anchored controllability) 
not only the controllability of the case (Dimension of 
Modifiability) but also the need to actively exercise 
control (Dimension of Changeability), which generates 
the necessary, yet susceptible to defensiveness, 
motivation for action. 
P8.2a2 
P7.2a2: Defensiveness could potentially occur due 
to an ego-threat that is produced by the dimension 
of modifiability, which, by entailing the past, 
enables the realization that the current status quo 
is incapable of exerting control over the crisis 
(Innate uncontrollability that needs regulation). 
S(P8.2a2) 
P7.2a2: Defensiveness could potentially occur due to an 
ego-threat that is produced by the dimension of 
modifiability, which, by entailing the past, enables the 
realization that the current status quo is incapable of 
exerting control over the crisis (Innate uncontrollability 
that needs regulation). 
P8.2b1 
An unregulated threat that comes from the 
inability of the current organizational processes 
and structures to exert control over the faced crisis 
can trigger the defence mechanism of 
“Heteronomous compensation of control”, which 
allow the individual to construct an imaginary 
S(P8.2b1) 
An unregulated threat that comes from the inability of 
the current organizational processes and structures to 
exert control over the faced crisis can trigger the 
defence mechanism of “Heteronomous compensation of 
control”, which allow the individual to construct an 
imaginary system-reality that will compensate the low 
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system-reality that will compensate the low levels 
of control by ascribing a pre-established and 
irrefutable-absolute meaning to the chaotic crisis. 
levels of control by ascribing a pre-established and 
irrefutable-absolute meaning to the chaotic crisis. 
P8.2b2 
The invoked system will justify the status-quo, 
and, thus, eliminate the need for taking action, by: 
1. Making it seem as what it should actually be, 
given that what challenges its ability to exert 
control is, or at least is shaped by a reality that 
lies, beyond the things that humans can actively 
influence 2. Providing an excuse for causal 
responsibility in the sense that leader’s choices, 
which are accepted to have brought the crisis, are 
the only possible ones, given the existence of the 
unchanged imaginary reality 3. Offering a 
construct on which blame for any future failure 
can be placed (self-handicapping), despite the fact 
that active action has not been taken. 
S(P8.2b2) 
The invoked system will justify the status-quo, and, 
thus, eliminate the need for taking action, by:  
1. Making it seem as what it should actually be, given 
that what challenges its ability to exert control is, or at 
least is shaped by a reality that lies, beyond the things 
that humans can actively influence  
2. Providing an excuse for causal responsibility in the 
sense that leader’s choices, which are accepted to have 
brought the crisis, are the only possible ones, given the 
existence of the unchanged imaginary reality  
3. Offering a construct on which blame for any future 
failure can be placed (self-handicapping), despite the 
fact that active action has not been taken. 
P8.2c1 
An appraisal of human control makes the leader to 
emancipate him/herself from the existing order, 
which is viewed as obsolete, and with desire 
undertake the challenge for active action as this is 
imposed from the need to change. 
S(P8.2c1) 
An appraisal of human control makes the leader to 
emancipate him/herself from the existing order, which is 
viewed as obsolete, and with desire undertake the 
challenge for active action as this is imposed from the 
need to change. 
P8.2c2 
Human control of an internally attributed case will 
promote the completion of the emotional 
experience of shame/guilt, which will make the 
leader to accept full causal responsibility for the 
crisis and, thereby, proceed to remedial action. 
S(P8.2c2) 
Human control of an internally attributed case will 
promote the completion of the emotional experience of 
shame/guilt, which will make the leader to accept full 
causal responsibility for the crisis and, thereby, proceed 
to remedial action. 
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P8.2c3 
Human control over an externally attributed case 
will promote the emotion of anger, which prepares 
the leader for taking action in order to protect the 
personal and organizational goals that have been 
offended by the external attack. 
S(P8.2c3) 
Human control over an externally attributed case will 
promote the emotion of anger, which prepares the leader 
for taking action in order to protect the personal and 
organizational goals that have been offended by the 
external attack. 
P8.2c4 
An appraisal of situation control creates the 
perception that despite the inability of the current 
paradigm to deal with the problem, there is no 
alternative way of organizing, as the faced crisis is 
an outcome of an extra-social reality that cannot 
be influenced by human activity, and, thus, needs 
to be passively accepted. 
S(P8.2c4) 
An appraisal of situation control creates the perception 
that despite the inability of the current paradigm to deal 
with the problem, there is no alternative way of 
organizing, as the faced crisis is an outcome of an extra-
social reality that cannot be influenced by human 
activity, and, thus, needs to be passively accepted. 
P8.2c5 
The accepted inability to actively deal with the 
faced crisis could lead to despair, yet leaders will 
utilize the external system to generate the emotion 
of transcendental hope, which allows them to 
become critical of the extra-social reality that 
seems to prevent the otherwise accurate schematic 
beliefs from being deployed, and to believe in and 
passively anticipate the "somehow" self-resolution 
of the crisis. 
S(P8.2c5) 
The accepted inability to actively deal with the faced 
crisis could lead to despair, yet leaders will utilize the 
external system to generate the emotion of 
transcendental hope, which allows them to: 
1. Become critical of the extra-social reality that seems 
to prevent the otherwise accurate schematic beliefs from 
being deployed 
2. Believe in and passively anticipate the "somehow" 
self-resolution of the crisis. 
3 P8.3a1 
In the intuitive mind the collective capability of 
the company and its members to manage the crisis 
is realized through an appraisal of “Power 
concerns”, the basic dimension of which reflects 
the respective conscious evaluation of 
manageability by evaluating the “potential” power 
(relational) to cope with the crisis at hand. 
S(P8.3a1) 
In the intuitive mind the collective capability of the 
company and its members to manage the crisis is 
realized through an appraisal of “Power concerns”, the 
basic dimension of which reflects the respective 
conscious evaluation of manageability by evaluating the 
“potential” power (relational) to cope with the crisis at 
hand. 
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P8.3a2 
The capability of the company to manage the 
crisis will only be perceived as long as its 
collective premise, which is manifested to the 
leader as an inability to cope with the chaotic 
nature of a crisis solely based on his/her own 
heroic actions, is accepted. That is, a resolution to 
a crisis requires from autonomous working teams, 
the free operation of which is facilitated by top 
leaders, to cooperate and construct a new meaning 
that will shape the new organizational reality. 
S(P8.3a2)1 
The capability of the company to manage the crisis will 
only be perceived as long as its collective premise, 
which is manifested to the leader as an inability to cope 
with the chaotic nature of a crisis solely based on his/her 
own heroic actions, is accepted. 
S(P8.3a2)2 
A resolution to a crisis requires from autonomous 
working teams, the free operation of which is facilitated 
by top leaders, to cooperate and construct a new 
meaning that will shape the new organizational reality. 
P8.3b1 
Along with the “potential” power (relational) to 
manage the faced issue, the intuitive appraisal of 
power concerns evaluates the “actual” 
interpersonal power (own) as this is shaped by the 
social aspects of the crisis. 
S(P8.3b1) 
Along with the “potential” power (relational) to manage 
the faced issue, the intuitive appraisal of power concerns 
evaluates the “actual” interpersonal power (own) as this 
is shaped by the social aspects of the crisis. 
P8.3b2 
Leaders who follow the prevailing social norm 
and embrace the “heroic” view of their role will 
experience an ego-threat that needs to be regulated 
for transformational change to occur. This is based 
on the fact that the collective premise of a 
response to a crisis reduces the ability of the 
leader to produce the desired effects via direct 
personal control and calls for the equal 
redistribution of power to lower levels. 
S(P8.3b2) 
Leaders who follow the prevailing social norm and 
embrace the “heroic” view of their role will experience 
an ego-threat that needs to be regulated for 
transformational change to occur. This is based on the 
fact that the collective premise of a response to a crisis 
reduces the ability of the leader to produce the desired 
effects via direct personal control and calls for the equal 
redistribution of power to lower levels. 
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P8.3b3 
P7.3b3: Leaders who do not abolish commandism 
will realize the crisis as a threat to their positional 
power (maladaptive). In such cases, they can 
engage in “Heroic Reactance”, which substitutes 
the low levels of “control to” heroically 
accomplish the change process with the exercise 
of “authority over” the general environment and, 
thereby, regulates the experienced aversive 
emotionality and its concomitant ego-threat. 
S(P8.3b3)1 
Leaders who do not abolish commandism will realize 
the crisis as a threat to their positional power and, thus, 
will engage in “Heroic” reactance,  
S(P8.3b3)2 
Heroic reactance substitutes the low levels of “control 
to” heroically accomplish the change process with the 
exercise of “authority over” the general environment 
and, thereby, regulates the experienced aversive 
emotionality and its concomitant ego-threat. 
P8.3c1 
The evaluative dimension of change efficacy 
determines how the already formulated intentions 
for active action (experience of challenge) will be 
effectuated, so that recovery from shame/guilt can 
be achieved. 
S(P8.3c1) 
The evaluative dimension of change efficacy determines 
how the already formulated intentions for active action 
(experience of challenge) will be effectuated, so that 
recovery from shame/guilt can be achieved. 
P8.3c2 
Leaders who engage in reactance will generate an 
emotional response of heroic hope, which 
formulates the illusion that overall control will be 
restored only when personal control is achieved. 
As a result, leaders escalate their belief in 
authoritarian practices, and, therefore, centralize 
control as well as over-concentrate power 
(rigidity). 
S(P8.3c2)1 
Leaders who engage in reactance will generate the 
emotion of heroic hope, which formulates the illusion 
that overall control will be restored only when personal 
control is achieved. 
S(P8.3c2)2 
In heroic hope leaders escalate their belief in 
authoritarian practices, and, therefore, centralize control 
as well as over-concentrate power (rigidity). 
P8.3c3 
Change initiatives under the paradigm of heroism 
will entail elements of aggression towards 
whatever prevents the realization of a self-
originated resolution to the crisis. Thus, a false 
sense of urgency (Kotter’s approach) is very likely 
to emerge and drive the organization towards 
intangible fights. 
S(P8.3c3) 
Change initiatives under the paradigm of heroism will 
entail elements of aggression towards whatever prevents 
the realization of a self-originated resolution to the 
crisis. Thus, a false sense of urgency (Kotter’s 
approach) is very likely to emerge and drive the 
organization towards intangible fights. 
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P8.3c4 
High power over a trivialized crisis will generate 
the emotion of “Pragmatic hope”, which allows 
the leader to expect the successful resolution to 
the trivialized-minor problem within the realm of 
a rationality that is shaped by current practices and 
knowledge. 
S(P8.3c4) 
High power over a trivialized crisis will generate the 
emotion of “Pragmatic hope”, which allows the leader 
to expect the successful resolution to the trivialized-
minor problem within the realm of a rationality that is 
shaped by current practices and knowledge. 
P8.3c5 
High power over an externally attributed issue will 
generate the emotion of “Martyrial hope”, which 
refers to a wishful desire that the current status 
quo will manage to withstand and cope with the 
externally originated attack. 
S(P8.3c5) 
High power over an externally attributed issue will 
generate the emotion of “Martyrial hope”, which refers 
to a wishful desire that the current status quo will 
manage to withstand and cope with the externally 
originated attack. 
P8.3c6 
High power over an accepted crisis that has been 
internally attributed, generates the emotion of 
“Democratic hope”, which indicates the catholic 
embracement of a crisis’s chaotic nature. 
According to this kind of hope the leader, not only 
rejects every absolute, but also feels a profound 
confidence in the democratic praxis to conceive 
and actualize a radically different future. 
S(P8.3c6)1 
High power over an accepted crisis that has been 
internally attributed, generates the emotion of 
“Democratic hope”, which indicates the catholic 
embracement of a crisis’s chaotic nature. 
S(P8.3c6)2 
According to the democratic hope, the leader, not only 
rejects every absolute, but also feels a profound 
confidence in the collective praxis to conceive and 
actualize a radically different future. 
 
Table. A list of evaluative propositions 
Instigating Transformational Changes  Page 331 
  
6.2 Identify and contact the experts  
The following presents a set of documents that have been used in order to approach, 
invite and inform the experts about the study. The documents below support the 
analysis made in section 2.3.2 (step: Identify and contact the experts). 
Invitation letter to the experts 
Dear (Title & Name) 
My name is Evangelos Kitsos. I am a doctoral researcher at the department of Warwick 
Manufacturing Group at the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom. I am 
writing to invite you to participate in an expert opinion study to support the verification 
of a model that has been developed for the needs of the following research project:  
“Instigating transformational changes: An interdisciplinary approach based on 
the appraisal theories of emotion” 
The project sets out to identify why business-leaders avoid taking action when evidence 
issue an urgent appeal for change. Various theories from the fields of management, 
leadership and change (management part), as well as cognitive theories and appraisal 
theories of emotion (psychology part) were utilized in order to explicate the (basic) 
steps through which leaders evaluate and interpret the evidence that indicate the need 
for change when a crisis is faced. Based on these steps various psychodynamic and 
cognitive barriers have been analysed and the individual change process has been 
mapped. Please, refer to the attached document “Introduction to the work” for further 
information about the research question and the objectives of the study. Also, additional 
information can be sent on request.  
The complexity of the research problem made clear that any potential solution was 
going to lie beyond the borders of the change management field. As a result, an 
interdisciplinary methodological approach has been adopted in order to bring closer 
ideas that lie in distinct and isolated disciplines, which led to the development of an 
interdisciplinary theoretical understanding of the problem under investigation. You 
have been identified as an established expert in at least one of the used disciplines or 
fields of study. Therefore, my supervisor and I would be honoured if you would like to 
offer your expertise as well as your general knowledge in order to review the theoretical 
framework of the current research. In particular, we would like to ask your opinion 
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regarding a set of propositions and evaluative criteria that were produced as an outcome 
of the interdisciplinary literature review. Please, refer to the attached document 
“Participant Information Leaflet” for further information about the study, what will 
be asked from you, and how various ethical considerations have been addressed.  
We feel that your expertise and general knowledge would be extremely beneficial and 
we should be grateful if you would consider participating in the current study.  In case 
you would like to contribute please inform us by email and we will forward to you all 
the necessary documents and instructions for the expert opinion study. 
Lastly, if you know any other researcher who would like to be part of the current 
research project, please forward to us his/her contact details so that we may contact 
him/her.  
Please do not hesitate to contact us if you require further information. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Evangelos Kitsos 
PhD student 
WMG 
International Manufacturing Centre 
University of Warwick 
CV4 7AL 
UK 
Tel.: +44 (0) 7594974456 
Email: V.Kitsos@warwick.ac.uk 
Mr. Paul Roberts 
Principal Fellow, Quality and Reliability 
WMG Senior Tutor 
WMG 
Room 330 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 7AL 
Tel.:   +44 (0) 2476524240 
Email:   Paul.Roberts@warwick.ac.uk 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION LEAFLET 
Study Title: 
Instigating transformational changes: An interdisciplinary 
approach based on the appraisal theories of emotion 
Investigator(s): 
Evangelos Kitsos (Researcher);  
Mr. Paul Roberts (Supervisor) 
Introduction 
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You are invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide, please take the 
time to read the following information.  
(Part 1 tells you the purpose of the study and what will happen to you if you take 
part.  Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study). 
PART 1 
What is the study about? 
The current project sets out to identify why business-leaders avoid taking action 
when evidence indicates an urgent need for change. Various theories from the fields 
of management, leadership and change (management part), as well as cognitive 
theories and appraisal theories of emotion (psychology part) were utilized in order to 
explicate the (basic) steps through which leaders evaluate and interpret the evidence 
that indicate the need for change when a crisis is faced. Based on these steps various 
psychodynamic and cognitive barriers are analysed and the individual change 
process is mapped. You are asked to provide your expertise and review a developed 
literature-based theoretical construct.  
Your participation is optional 
It is entirely up to you to decide. If, after reading the provided information, you 
inform the researcher that your choice is to participate, a set of documents that you 
need to review will be sent to you (refer below). By returning them completed you 
are giving your consent for the information that you have supplied to be used in this 
study. You will be free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason and this will 
not affect you or your circumstances in any way. 
What will happen next if you decide to participate?  
In case you agree to participate in this study the following will occur: 
1. You will receive a PowerPoint which will present to you a set of figures-maps 
(designed in Office Visio) that illustrate the theoretical framework of this work.  
2. Each part of these figures-maps will be accompanied by a brief explanation and 
a proposition (85 in total) that will be expressed as a set of simple and 
straightforward statements (1 to 3 statements for each proposition). These 
propositions reflect the step-based logic behind the conceptualization of the 
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interdisciplinary understanding, for which you will be asked to express your 
opinion on a five-point Likert type response format (Agree Strongly, Agree, 
Neither agree or disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree). Optionally, you can 
also comment and provide feedback on each proposition,  
3. Once the evaluation of the propositions is completed, you will be asked to 
evaluate 10 criteria that aim to provide feedback on whether the proposed 
theorization was able to meet the requirements of a well-constructed theory  
4. Note that the full thesis will be sent to you, so that you can refer to it in case you 
need further clarification on a specific part of the theoretical framework. 
5. After the completion of the evaluation process, you will need to email back the 
PowerPoint to the researcher. You will be given 3 months to complete the 
evaluation process.  
What are the possible disadvantages, side effects, risks, and/or discomforts of 
taking part in this study? 
No possible disadvantages, side effects, risks and/or discomforts are expected to be 
experienced. It should be stated though that the completion of the evaluation process 
will take a considerable amount of time (maximum 16 hours of work over 3 months’ 
time). 
What are the possible benefits of taking part in this study? 
No specific benefits are expected, apart from getting involved in what the 
researcher and his supervisor believe to be an interesting piece of work.  
What will happen when the study ends? 
Once the study ends, the data will be collected and securely stored in the 
researcher’s password protected computers. The researcher will use this data in 
order to discuss the already produced theoretical construct, on which you provided 
your feedback, and, thereby, complete the PhD thesis. A copy of the completed 
thesis, and any associated publications, can be sent to you after request.  
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
Yes.  We will follow strict ethical and legal practice and all information about you 
will be handled in confidence. Further details are included in Part 2. 
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What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study will be 
addressed. Detailed information is given in Part 2. 
This concludes Part 1. 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 before making any 
decision. 
PART 2  
Who is organising and funding the study? 
The PhD research has been funded by the Greek State Scholarship Foundation 
(IKY) and the department of Warwick Manufacturing Group. 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on being part of the study? 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. Refusal to participate will not affect 
you in any way. If you decide to take part in the study, you will be asked to respond 
to the email.  
If you agree to participate, you may nevertheless withdraw from the study at any time 
without affecting you in any way. You have the right to withdraw from the study 
completely and decline any further contact by study staff after you withdraw. In such 
a case, you are kindly requested to inform the Chief Investigator (for contact details 
refer below). 
What if there is a problem? 
This study is covered by the University of Warwick’s insurance and indemnity cover.  
If you have an issue, please contact the Chief Investigator of the study: 
Evangelos Kitsos 
Warwick manufacturing Group 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 8UW 
Tel.:   +44 (0) 7594974456 
Paul Roberts 
Principal Fellow 
WMG 
International Manufacturing Centre 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 7AL 
UK 
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Email: V.kitsos@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Tel.:   +44 (0) 2476524240 
Email:   paul.roberts@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Who should I contact if I wish to make a complaint? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might have suffered will be addressed.  Please address your 
complaint to the person below, who is a senior University of Warwick official 
entirely independent of this study: 
Director of Delivery Assurance 
Registrar's Office 
University House 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 8UW 
Complaints@Warwick.ac.uk  
+44 (0) 24 7657 4774 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
Full anonymity and confidentiality will be kept and the data will be handled 
according to the university’s regulations. The researcher will not use any names in 
the Thesis or in any other situation. The emails that will be used for the purpose of 
communication between the participants and the researcher will be stored in the 
principal investigator’s (Evangelos Kitsos) computer (only), which will be password 
protected and, therefore, only the he will have access to the non-anonymized data. 
Lastly, the non-anonymized data will be destroyed after the completion of the study.  
 What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results of the study, will be used in order to complete the thesis and produce 
relevant academic papers. Such papers will be either submitted to academic journals 
for publication or used in conferences. In any case, full anonymity and confidentiality 
will be kept.  
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Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the University of 
Warwick’s Biomedical and Scientific Research Ethics Committee (BSREC): REGO-
2015-1626; approved on 13th of October 2015. 
What if I want more information about the study? 
If you have any questions about any aspect of the study or your participation in it 
not answered by this participant information leaflet, please contact:   
Evangelos Kitsos 
Warwick manufacturing Group 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 8UW 
Tel.:   +44 (0) 7594974456 
Email: V.kitsos@warwick.ac.uk 
Paul Roberts 
Principal Fellow 
WMG 
International Manufacturing Centre 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 7AL 
UK 
Tel.:   +44 (0) 2476524240 
Email:   paul.roberts@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this participant information leaflet. 
 
Introduction to the work 
Instigating transformational changes: An interdisciplinary approach based on 
the appraisal theories of emotion 
1. Background literature & the research question 
It is widely accepted that in order to survive and prosper within the contemporary 
unprecedented pace of environmental change (By, 2005), organizations have to infuse 
a change mentality in their systems (Bruke, 2006:15). As a result, research and teaching 
on change management has been considerably increased during the last decades (Mills, 
2003; Mills, Dey & Mills, 2008). If, however, theorists pay so much emphasis on 
designing methods and tools that can facilitate organization to change and face the 
problems of the new era as well as improve their performance, why is there a mismatch 
between what science knows and what (plenty of) companies do (i.e. Moreno & Gitlow, 
1999)? This question seems to remain unanswered by the already existing literature on 
the potential causes of failure during the change process (i.e. Eaton, 2010; Lucey, 
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2008). As a result, additional research on identifying what prevents transformational 
and major changes from being instigated in first place seems a promising and 
interesting research area.  
A review of twenty-three change models in the literature demonstrated that the 
awareness of a need or a problem is the first and essential step for instigating a change 
program. That is, according to the current view, a change agent or a team of change 
agents, who realize the need for change, deploy the compelling evidence at the 
executive level in order to persuade the organizational leaders to authorize change. This 
is believed to be achieved by the ability of the compelling evidence to establish a sense 
of urgency and, thereby, set leadership in favour of change (Kotter, 1996; 2008). 
Indeed, urgency is a diachronic and essential requirement for a change to occur 
(Appelbaum, Habashy, Malo & Shafiq, 2012; Guzman, et al. 2011; Quinn, et al. 2012). 
However, it seems that the general assumption that initially a need is identified and, 
then, a sense of urgency is created and change occurs suffers from bias which probably 
is attributed to its anecdotal support (Whelan-Berry, Gordon & Hinings, 2003). There 
have been cases, either academically reported (Dunn 2009; Kitsos, 2011) or not, that 
indicate the existence of organizations which react with complacency even if they face 
extinction (Clark, 2010). Even when a compelling need is obvious for company’s 
employees and urgency has been established, dismissive leaders can still see no reason 
to change and will adhere to the current status quo (Hoag & Ritschard, 2002). As a 
result the following research question has been developed: 
“What barriers inhibit senior management to accept the need for change and commit 
to action when urgency has been established?” 
2. Aims/Objectives: 
Compelling needs are realized through information, which leaders analyse and decide 
to authorize action (change as a decision making process in Liu & Perrewé, 2005). In 
order for this action to take place, and, thereby, an OC to be instigated, a mental shift 
or else a revised mental model regarding how leaders perceive and act in respect to a 
specific issue is necessary (George & Jones, 2001; Senge, 2006). Apparently, then, the 
preliminary aim of this work is: 
To explain the process according to which leaders’ analyse information that indicate 
the need for change and revise their mental models whenever this is necessary. 
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Cognitive psychologists suggest that the construction of mental models is guided by 
minds’ abstract cognitive structures, called schemas (Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997:293), 
based on which individuals interpret information (Ikiuga, 2007:63) and "store" their 
knowledge about the world (Michon, 1986:55). When a change agent introduces the 
need for a new initiative, people in the company, in this case leaders, will have their 
existing schemas, and, consequently, their mental models, challenged (Weber & 
Manning, 2001). The result of such a challenge needs to be a revised mental model and, 
thus, a new understanding of the case at hand which will, ultimately, lead to the 
initiation of different actions and responses on leader’s behalf (Cameron & Green 
2004:21).  
“Objective 1: Research within the general scope of schematic information processing 
how schemas change and construct an altered mental model.” 
This challenge places individuals in an emotionally unstable state, in which they try to 
make sense of the new by modifying and adapting their pre-existing schemas 
(Bartunek, Balogun & Do, 2011).  
“Objective 2: Establish the basic cognitive – emotional principles that underpin the 
schema change process at individual level” 
Schemas do not accept passively the need for change when they face evidence 
discrepant to their existing beliefs (sec. 3.2.1), but, due to their inherent resistance 
qualities (Arzenšek, 2011; Larson, 1994), could halt the change process.  
“Objective 3: Determine the barriers that prevent leaders from perceiving and 
accepting the need for change” 
Someone could argue that when the compelling evidence for change is identified and 
accepted it is obvious that change is the only way. Definitely, awareness and acceptance 
of a need is an essential factor for developing commitment to change (Jaros, 2010), 
yet, schema-change may not occur even if the need is identified (i.e. George and Jones, 
2001). 
“Objective 4: Determine the barriers that prevent leaders from committing to action” 
Given that it is the application of a theory that may cause its revision (Deming, 
1994:103), the theoretical recommendations will have to be verified.  
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“Objective 5: Verify the theoretical recommendations and revise them based on the 
analysis of the feedback” 
3. The reason why you have been contacted 
The complexity of the research problem made clear that any potential solution was going 
to lie beyond the borders of the change management field. In these cases, the 
interdisciplinary research becomes a useful methodology, since it brings closer ideas that 
lie in distinct and isolated disciplines (Rhoten & Parker, 2004). The researcher adopted 
this methodology (for further analysis see Repko, 2006; 2009) and by reviewing the 
literature in the relevant disciplines and fields of study managed to develop an 
interdisciplinary understanding of the problem (objectives 1, 2, 3), which had then to be 
verified (objective 4). On this basis, I feel that your expertise and knowledge would be 
extremely beneficial so that the final objective of this study can be brought into effect. 
Therefore, I would like to welcome you to participate in the study. 
6.3 Ethical Considerations  
The following is a list of ethical issues that have been considered within the scope of 
this work.  
1. Informed Consent 
In the initial email that will be sent to the participants-experts, the researcher will 
provide information about the aim of the research and what their exact role is expected 
be (attached document: Participant Information Leaflet-Evangelos Kitsos-1058919), 
and will ask the experts to reply and state whether they agree or disagree to participate 
in the study. On this basis, they will be informed that a positive response to the email-
invitation suggests their fully informed consent to participate (attached document: 
Consent form-Evangelos Kitsos-1058919).  
2. Participant Confidentiality and Data Security 
Full anonymity & confidentiality will be kept and the data will be handled according 
to the university’s regulations. The researcher will not use any names in the Thesis or 
in any other situation. The emails that will be used for the purpose of communication 
between the participants and the researcher will be stored in the researcher’s computer 
(only), which will be password protected and, therefore, only the principal investigator 
(Evangelos Kitsos) will have access to non-anonymized data. Also, the non-
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anonymized data will be destroyed (erased from the researcher’s personal computer) 
after the completion of the study. 
3. Right of Withdrawal 
Participants can withdraw from the study at any time. In such a case, the participant 
will be asked to inform, via email, the researcher who in his turn will, in case it is 
requested, erase any data that the participant has provided. 
4. Benefits and risks 
The main benefit from participating in the study is the engagement with what the 
researcher and his supervisor consider to be an interesting piece of work. Once they 
agree to participate, experts will receive the actual thesis with the research findings up 
to this point, since this is necessary for the completion of the evaluation process. In 
addition, a summary report once the research is completed and the PhD has been 
awarded will be send as well. Finally, no risks are expected, apart from potential issues 
with participant confidentiality & data security that have already been addressed above.  
5. Dissemination and Implementation  
The results will potentially be presented in conferences or used in order to publish 
academic papers. The participants will be informed about it and will be asked whether 
they want a copy of the produced paper.  
No issues or risks are expected to arise as a result of the dissemination of the research 
findings, as there are no limitations or restrictions from any kind of stakeholder. That 
is, the publication of the results will follow the normal process and will be published 
as part of the overall thesis in a coded form that will ensure anonymity and 
confidentiality. 
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Appendix 7: Leadership expertise and schema change 
This appendix provides further elaboration on the point made in sec. 11.7.2. In 
particular, it will try to explain how future research can investigate about individual 
characteristics and traits in order to identify the vulnerable evaluations that will be more 
prone to appraise maladaptively the compelling evidence in a specific case.  
7.1 Expertise and cognitive rigidity 
Following George and Jones (2001), it can be argued that the defence of selective 
attention is more likely to happen in the case of experts. In a broad sense, an expert is 
someone who possesses extraordinary skill and knowledge, acquired and nourished 
through practice and experience, regarding a specific domain (Sternberg & 
Grigorenko, 2003:157). While it can be assumed by definition that experts could 
achieve superior performance compared to novices, despite its importance, expertise 
doesn’t lack limitations (i.e. Adelson, 1984; Lewandowsky, Little & Kalish, 2007:84; 
Lewandowsky & Thomas, 2009). One limitation, which seems to be of major 
importance for this work, is experts’ inflexibility to adjust their knowledge basis and 
performance in the light of novel information (Adelson, 1984:84). Specifically, experts 
utilize their schemas to conceptualize and represent their knowledge regarding various 
features within their domain of expertise (Hoffman, 1998). Inflexibility occurs because 
once schemas get developed and become well established, like in the case of experts, 
their change is difficult (Huff, Huff & Barr, 2000:48). That is, the continuous validation 
and upgrade of a schemas leads to automatic processing of information and hinder 
flexible thinking and creativity, which both are essential when tasks’ demands change 
and thus contradict established knowledge (Frensch & Sternberg, 1989). This is why, 
when novel problems, or general environmental changes, make already developed 
cognition obsolete and require different and new responses for their solution, experts 
could face problems of adaptation (Canas, Quesada, Antolí & Fajardo, 2003; Chi, 
2006:26). It is apparent, therefore, that the problem of expertise applies when 
individuals are and remain in an automatic state of cognition.  
It should be clarified that expertise is not synonymous with inflexibility. Studies have 
shown that it is easier for experts, compared to novices, to abolish pre-established 
schematic rules when they come up against a new schematic perspective (Bartunek, 
Lacey & Wood, 1992). This is because their well-defined schemas can efficiently trace 
discrepant information that violate their expectations (Palmer & Pickett, 1999), and 
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consequently detect potential problems (Klein, Pliske, Crandall & Woods, 2005). Apart 
from the fact that the appraised negative valence of the evidence could drive the leader 
to respond defensively (sec. 3.2.1), Dane (2010) sheds some additional light to this 
controversy. He argued that expertise is indeed a main cause of inflexibility, yet, an 
expert who operates in a dynamic environment and engages in outside-domain 
activities can avoid “cognitive entrenchment”. Under these conditions, experts-leaders 
develop a pluralistic and multidimensional perspective for perceiving reality, which 
enables them to use their rich expertise resources not as an anchor for clinging to the 
status quo but as a vaulting point for embracing novelty and developing new ways for 
responding to the environmental needs (George & Zhou, 2001; Wang & Chan, 1995). 
Essentially, this kind of leaders do not possess the characteristics of dogmatism and 
reticence to new experience which are highly associated with the phenomenon of 
resistance to change in general (Oreg, 2003) and schema change in particular (Lau & 
Woodman, 1995).  
While it could be argued that by indicating to an expert the need for a different way of 
thinking would have been enough, it seems that this is not the case. Wiley (1998) 
demonstrated that experts insist “on their way” even when they are told about their 
methods and knowledge’s inadequacy to solve a problem. Similar results were 
highlighted by Hinds (1999) who tried, through a presentation, to facilitate 
improvement of experts’ estimations regarding novices’ performance in a specific task. 
His assistance was fruitless since it had no significant alteration on experts’ estimations, 
as they used their “usual practices” to assess novices. Both studies indicate that it is 
difficult for experts to consider a different point of view and change their minds when 
it is necessary (Schraw, 2012:259). Apparently, this experts’ propensity to insist on 
their ways, provides a reasonable explanation regarding why change agents could face 
deaf ears and responses like “Do not confuse me with facts my mind is made up”, even 
in the light of clear compelling evidence.   
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